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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Few exploratory ventures would ever be undertaken if the explorer 
appreciated his own limitations at the outset. Although his ultimate 
destination is unclear, the route uncertain, the terrain unfamiliar and 
the tools inadequate he is spurred initially by a self-assurance born of 
his own limited knowledge. Unfortunately, that same self-assurance 
ill-equips him for the difficulties which he inevitably has to face en- 
route. 
This thesis has been no exception to this pattern. It has involved 
more than its fair share of blind alleys, false trails, disorientation, 
retracing of footsteps and re-establishment of bearings. It has 
occasionally been marked by that feeling of despairing bewilderment which 
confronts the uncertain traveller lost in unfamiliar territory or 
overwhelmed by the novelty and complexity of his surroundings. Like 
most exploratory journeys, it has been difficult to decide when the 
ultimate destination has been reached and almost impossible in 
restrospect to recall the exact route by which that particular point was 
achieved. 
However, the historian of Dahomey is fortunate in comparison with the 
explorer venturing into virgin territory. For he is well served by the 
pioneers who have blazed the trail bef ore him and by the signposts which 
are available to him. The Kingdom of Dahomey has been well covered by 
primary source material and contemporary documentation and publications. 
2. 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE SOURCES 
The Public Record Office in London provides the most lucrative source 
of English language primary material on Dahomey. The core of the 
material concerning Dahomey during the period with which this study deals 
is to be found in the F084 (Slave Trade) Series, which includes reports 
and consular correspondence f rom. Lagos and Fernando Po as well as Whydah 
itself circa 1849-52, and general material relating to the slave trade in 
the period 1816-92. Volumes 3-1750 of this series, covering the period 
down to 1856 proved particularly useful. Series C0147 (Lagos Original 
Correspondence 1861-94) provides material on Dahomey in the subsequent 
decades. Series F02,, containing further material and consular reports 
concerning the Trade, and C096, covering Colonial Office correspondence 
mainly relating to the Gold Coast from 1843 and the Gold Coast and Lagos 
in the 1880's, provide a useful supplement, although references to 
Dahomey are less frequent and more incidental in this series. 
Several other sources of material exist within the Public Records 
Office which provide occasional references or useful background to 
Dahomean developments particularly in the earlier part of the century. 
Volumes 31-36 of the T70 (Treasury) series contains the inward letter 
books from 1762-1818 and Colonial Office file C098 contains the minutes 
of the Cape Coast Council between 1829-44. The Colonial Office series 
C0267 (Sierra Leone), the bulk of which deals with Gold Coast Merchants 
and the Slave Trade itself, provides scattered references to events 
concerning Dahomey in material (vols. 54-147) covering the period 1821-41. 
The British Parliamentary Papers (I. U. P. ) in Stirling University 
Library provided a complementary source of British archival material to 
3. 
that of the Public Record Off ice. While much of the material available 
in this form duplicates that in the Public Records Office, a significant 
proportion of it - particularly the oral and written testimony presented 
to the Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament - is an essential 
supplement to the manuscripts in the Public Records Office. In 
addition, however, the more structured presentation and ease of access 
make the Parliamentary Papers particularly useful. The most important 
series are those of the Colonies: Africa and the Slave Trade. The 
former series affords a rich source of material concerning the West 
Coast. This is especially true of volume 1, dealing with reports of the 
settlements on the coast and volumes 293 and 5 which respectively cover 
the 1842 and 1865 Select Committees. Also worthy of particular mention 
in this series is volume 8 which includes extracts from the Board of 
Trade Journal and volume 50 dealing with correspondence returns and other 
papers concerning West Africa from 1812 through until 1884. 
The Slave Trade Series of 95 volumes also furnishes easily accessible 
published sources, especially IUP volumes 4-7 covering the reports of the 
Select Committees on the Slave Trade in both Houses of Parliament, 
1847-9; volume 8, "Instructions for ... guidance of ... Naval 
Officers employed in the Surpression of the Slave Trade"; volumes 40-60 
concerning correspondence and reports from Naval Officers and the 
Admiralty relative to the Slave Trade between 1854 and 1889; and volume 
91 containing papers relating to the occupation of Lagos. 
A number of papers in Edinburgh University Library proved useful as 
background material although they fell outwith the immediate 
chronological scope of this work. The collection includes papers 
4. 
relative to trade "including the Negro Traffic with Africa" around 1700 
and, of more relevance, a collection of letters written by Archibald 
Dalzel, between 1762-1807. 
The correspondence and reports in the Archives of the Methodist 
Missionary Society, lodged in the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
London, are a useful supplement to the official and commercial 
correspondence in the Public Records Office. The files contain, in 
boxes 262-5, the bulk of the correspondence from Methodist Missionary 
sources on the Coast from Whydah, Porto Novo, Badagry and the surrounding 
area. Boxes 258-261 include earlier material, from 1835-54, emanating 
mainly from the Gold Coast. 
Towards the end of the period with which this work deals several West 
Coast English language newspapers provide information and reports with a 
relevance to Dahomey. Birmingham University houses microfilm copies of 
a number of these including The Anglo-African (Lagos 1863-5), The Lagos 
Observer (1882-8), The Lagos Times (1880-3), The Eagle and Lagos Critic 
(1883-8), The Mirror (Lagos, 1887-8) and the Gold Coast Times (Cape 
Coast, 1874-85). 
FRENCH ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
The French archives also contain much material central to this 
study. In the National Archives, the Section Ancienne contains 
instructions to and from the Dahomean coast, including information on the 
state of internal affairs, and information pertaining to the Slave Trade 
in the 1780s. The Section Moderne, series F12, does ref er to commerce 
and industry, but the file which refers to Consuls' reports (Commercial) 
5. 
from the West Coast of Africa, includes very little of direct interest. 
Nevertheless, there is., scattered throughout the National Archives, a 
fair amount of material on the palm oil trade, particularly through the 
medium of R6gis Freres. 
The archives in Ministýre D'Outre Mer contain general political 
material on the Kingdom of Dahomey during its independent period prior to 
French colonisation, mainly between 1845 and 1888. The later material, 
in the late 1880s and 1890s is primarily concerned with the military 
situation prior to the conquest, but military reports on geography and on 
exploratory missions occasionally furnished information useful to this 
study. 
In Minist6re des Affaires Etrang&res the material is overwhelmingly 
composed of documentation relating to the diplomatic af f airs of France, 
particularly dealings with other European countries on the subject of 
Africa. However, it does, from time to time, include commercial 
reports, often dispatched by visiting naval commanders, on the various 
ports in the Bight of Benin and surrounding area, including those of the 
Kingdom of Dahomey. Similar remarks apply to the documents in the 
Service Historique de la Marine. 
The Bibliotheque Nationale was also consulted for a range of French 
language publications, although only two contemporary documents proved to 
be of any value to the subject of this particular work. 
The French Archives provided in particular a number of reports which 
furnished useful material in connection with the early palm oil 
commerce. These reports helped to compensate f or the relative lack of 
reliable statistical data during the emergence of the trade. A report 
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of 1821, for instance, by a visiting sea Captain, speaks of the trade of 
Whydah as being confined solely to slaves and palm oil. A further 
report in 1838 suggests that da Souza had by then given up the palm oil 
trade due to its relative lack of return. A report dated 1850, but 
dealing with the early 1840s on the subject of a visit by Regis's agent 
to the King, suggests that not only was the King prepared to tolerate the 
trade, but that he formally and publicly initiated encouragement of the 
trade and aspects related to the production of oil, and issued a specific 
instruction to this effect. At the latter end of the period with which 
this work deals Serval's reports, on the commercial and _political 
situation of the Dahomean Kingdom in the 1870s, were fuller and more 
detailed than the normal naval reports. They are of particular interest 
because, in contrast to the constant and varied justifications supplied 
by some, like Regis, to encourage French intervention, Serval displays an 
anxiety and pessimism regarding the waning of the central monarchical 
powerfor which he himself can see no realistic substitute. 
The British and French archival sources f orm the bulk of the primary 
material used in the preparation of this thesis. Archives concerning 
Dahomey do exist in The Hague and in Lisbon, but they refer almost 
excusively to the period prior to 1800.2 
The author did not have the opportunity to consult the archives of 
the Roman Catholic Society of Af rican Missions which are now deposited in 
Rome. Fortunately the most relevant material from this source is 
available in published form in Annales de la Propogation de la Foi, 
especially in volumes XXXlV to XXXX (1862-8) of that publication. 
3 
7. 
It was the intention of the author to supplement the above archival 
and contemporary sources with a period of fieldwork in Dahomey itself, 
but, in a period of increasing financial stringency, the Social Science 
Research Council did not feel that such a project was sufficiently 
important to justify the necessary financial expenditure. Fortunately,, 
Dahomean oral tradition has been comprehensively recorded by 
anthropologists, notably by Le Herisse and Melville Herskovits. 
4 In 
addition, the author has benefitted greatly from regular discussions with 
several observers with f irst hand knowledge of Dahomey, including Dr. ' 
Robin Law, Douglas Harrison and Anselme Gezo, a descendant of King Gezo 
of Dahomey and a historian of his country in his own right. These 
discussions have provided considerable compensation I or the absence of 
the desired fieldwork. 
CONTEMPORARY PUBLICATIONS 
Prior to 1800 the coastal area of Dahomey, both bef ore and af ter its 
incorporation into the Kingdom proper, was the subject of considerable 
attention. 
5 
For the period with which this thesis deals, contemporary 
publications are no less abundant. In the early years of the century 
M'Leod's description, though less reliable than , later writers, does 
provide some useful descriptions of the kingdom at the beginning of the 
19th century. 
6 
Duncan and Freeman in the 1840's and Forbes in 1851, though primarily 
preoccupied with western diplomatic and commercial concerns, provide 
comprehensive accounts of the kingdom and detailed descriptions of 
contemporary even s. 
7 
8. 
Two later writers, influenced and no doubt prejudiced by contemporary 
western interest in anthropological studies, Burton in the 1860's and 
Skertchly in the 1870's, provide more detailed and analytical comment on 
the Kingdom. 
8 
These published works are usefully and fortunately supplemented by 
frequent and extensive reports in the English and French sources, mainly 
of a commercial and diplomatic nature, from visiting or resident 
officials on the coast. 
9 
French publications throughout the period 
tend to be less detailed and comprehensive but perhaps more regular than 
the English language publications. 
10 
MODERN BACKGROUND STUDIES 
Modern historians of the Kingdom of Dahomey, as of all West Africa of 
this period, owe an immense debt of gratitude to those among our 
contemporary colleagues who first undertook the painstaking work of 
marshalling the evidence and providing the regional framework which is 
the essential backcloth against which particular studies take place. 
Colin Newbury produced the pioneering account of the commercial and 
political development of the Slave Coast. 
11 A. G. Hopkins furnisfted 
the first comprehensive account of economic development of West Africa 
for the last millennium and conceptually integrated African economic 
history within the wider context of global economic developments. 
12 
John Hargreaves provided a meticulous study of the political 
interrelationship between and among Europeans and &fricans in the period 
prior to Partition. 
13 And Phillip D. Curtin undertook the immense 
task of collating and interpreting the daunting mass of data concerning 
the Atlantic slave trade. 
14 
9. 
MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
It is against that background that the modern historians of Dahomey 
have undertaken their task. I. A. Akinjogbin, drawing on primary 
material in London, France, Portugal and Brazil, has traced the political 
development of Dahomey in the 18th century, while David Ross, basing his 
work primarily on British and French Archives, completed the pre-conquest 
period in historical terms. 
15 Patrick Manning pioneered the study of 
the economic history of the region, originally f or the period f rom the 
French conquest and, in - more recent publications, covering the period 
1640-1960.16 Pierre Verger and Bernard Schnapper have provided an 
insight into Dahomean commercial developments, particularly in relation 
to the economic linkage with Latin America, based on detailed studies of 
Portuguese and French archives. 
17 
In addition, Dahomey has been the subject of extensive work based 
primarily on secondary anthropological studies. The most notable have 
been those of Polanyi and' Argyle, 
18 but a debt of gratitude is also due 
to Katz and Maroukis who undertook respectively an examination of aspects 
of politica 11 power and of warfare in the Kingdom of Dahomey. 
19 
However, these works are mainly based on contemporary published materials 
and subsequent anthropological descriptions of the Kingdom'; recourse to 
primary archival sources is limited. 
Despite the extent of work already undertaken, a number of unresolved 
questions remain in the 1818-1890 period, particularly concerning the 
inter-relationship of politics and economic change during the critical 
period from the 1840's to 1870's. 
20 
. 
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These questions remain outstanding notwithstanding the considerable 
contribution of David Ross to 19th century Dahomean historical studies. 
Although this present work overlaps chronologically with Ross, there are 
several differences of emphasis, approach and perspective. 
Approximately half of Ross's thesis concern the years 1876-94 which are 
covered more sparsely in this work. Conversely, this thesis is aimed at 
providing a more detailed treatment of the four decades between c. 1835 
and 1875 than is presently available. This difference in emphasis is 
reflected in the consultation of primary sources. Whereas Ross relies 
heavily on French archival sources in the last two decades prior to 
French military intervention, this work employs them more extensively as 
a complement to English language sources in the half century from 1820. 
There is also a difference of aims. Ross's primary concern 
throughout was "to provide ... an accurate outline of developments in 
Dahomean political society during the course of the 19th century" , rather 
than to explore the relationship between economics and politics which is 
the burden of this work. As a corollary, Ross in his pioneering work 
provided a description of the Fon political system, whereas this thesis 
attempts to undertake an investigation of the dynamic underlying Dahomean 
political power, with particular reference to the manner in which 
material control was translated into social and political status. 
21 
Finally, the perspective employed in Ross's thesis is essentially 
concerned with the personal motivations which prompted poltical change, 
in contrast to the approach adopted here which seeks to explain the 
response of individuals and groups in terms of economic and political 
determinants which shaped the choices available to them and largely 
determined the course of their actions. 
ii. 
Thus, although this work does differ from Ross on several specific 
points of detail and interpretation, it is essentially intended as 
complementary to his work. It is aimed primarily at a number of 
questions which have remained unresolved in his own and subsequent 
studies, in the hope that an alternative perspective might contribute 
towards clarification of these issues. 
AREAS/QUESTIONS UNRESOLVED 
Considerable controversy surrounds four major issues in particular; 
firstly, the nature of the political economy of Dahomey; secondly, the 
relationship between the slave trade and the early palm oil trade; 
thirdly, the effect of economic change on the contemporary political 
regime and their response thereto; and, finally, the determinants which 
underlay colonial conquest. 
The most substantial area of controversy which persists despite the 
considerable volume of historical literature is the nature of political 
power in the pre-colonial Kingdom of Dahomey. Several historians, 
notably Akinjogbin and Yoder, have interpreted Dahomean politics along 
lines comparable with the development of European nation states. Thus, 
Akinjogbin depicts 18th century Dahomey as essentially an enlightened 
dictatorship under a centralised monarchy characterised as economically 
progressive, anti-slave trade and socially benevolent. 
22 Yoder, 
dealing with the 19th century Kingdom, characterises the Dahomean state 
as a proto-parliamentary system of competing "parties" under a monarch 
whose power is more constitutional than despotic. 
23 Such 
interpretations not only contrast sharply with the portrayal of 
12. 
contemporary European observers, 
24 but have also been subject to 
penetrating critique in recent years. 
25 
Several other writers have 
attempted analyses of Dahomean political economy from perspectives which 
draw upon economic and anthopological models as well as historical data, 
but with widely differing conclusions. 
26 
The -nature of political power in 19th century Dahomey has important 
ramifications for three other areas of considerable controversy. 
The f irst of these is the relationship between the structure of the 
existing slave trade and the growth of the new palm oil trade, 
particularly from the 1830's onwards. Several historians have suggested 
that the new export trade in palm oil was not only compatible with that 
of slaves, but that its period of early expansion coincided with a 
thriving slave trade. 
27 Others have been more inclined to stress the 
disjunction between the two trades, and the fact that the trade in palm 
oil waxed as that in slaves waned. 
28 The study of contemporary 
evidence from the Dahomean coast provides the opportunity of delineating 
both the course of the -new commerce and the state of the export trade in 
slaves at that chronological juncture. 
Secondly, an understanding of the nature of the political economy of 
the Kingdom would seem crucial to an understanding of Dahomean response 
to the economic changes of the 19th century. This is a further area 
where there has been little agreement among historians. Catherine 
Coquery-Vidrovitch has suggested that, as a consequence of the largely 
of tributary" relationship of the slave trade to the Dahomean regime, the 
transition from slave to palm oil trade was achieved with relative ease 
and speed. 
29 A. G. Hopkins and Robin Law, on the other hand, stress 
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discontinuity and dislocation in contrast to continuity and ease of 
30 
transfer. Hopkins suggests that the structure of legitimate 
commerce "marked an important breach with the past" and, moreover, that 
the strains involved in its creation and the African response thereto are 
central to an understanding of the partition of West Africa. 
31 
In this, Hopkins suggests an alternative, or supplementary dimension 
to those interpretations of imperialism which derive largely from motives 
or determinents emanating f rom the European side of the equation, 
32 
and 
a revisionist justification for the economic determinism of late 19th 
century imperialism in West Africa. 
METHODOLOGY/APPROACH 
This thesis was originally conceived as an attempt to clarify these 
and other related issues by the application of Marx's model of historical 
change to the 19th century history of pre-colonial Dahomey. The choice 
of the expression "Marx's model", rather than "Marxist" or "Marxian" 'is 
intentional. Since the 1970's there has been a torrent, some would say 
deluge, of "Marxist" interpretations of pre-colonial Africa, much of it 
initially undertaken by economic anthropologists. 
33 More recently a 
number of historians, moved among other things by what they term the 
tt theoretical poverty of the existing historiography of the period", have 
felt compelled to demonstrate "the pertinence, indeed the necessity for 
the application, of the concepts of historical materialism to the 
pre-colonial history of Africa", and to retrieve African historical 
studies from "empiricism". 
34 
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It is perhaps ironic, therefore, that this work should start not by 
affirming Marx, but by disclaiming "Marxism". Firstly, because the 
nomenclature has now become so all-embracing as to signify little unless 
accompanied by an inordinately long qualification of exactly what is 
meant by the term. 
35 Partly, this stems from the fact that there has 
been little agreement on the precise nature of the "Marxist Method" or 
the definition of basic Marxist concepts. 
36 
But secondly, it arises because the reaction against perceived 
if empiricism" has often led to a sanctification of abstract theory and a 
denigration of facts (indeed the denial that they can objectively exist) 
which has resulted in an equally distorted conceptual framework as the 
one which is initially condemned. 
37 
If empiricism without theory is 
deemed to be blind, then theory without a basis in empirical fact is 
surely sterile. 
Thus, much of the recent effort to "introduce" marxism into 
pre-colonial studies has been accompanied by sterile, at times almost 
theological debate which has been more concerned with the internal 
coherence of Marx's writings than with application of his model, however 
imperfect, to the test of historical data. 
This appears to particularly the case in the "Modes of Production" 
debate during which perhaps the most penetrating insight has come from 
Kitching: 
if. *- the 'impasse' which we appear to 
have reached 
in these debates is two-fold. Firstly, we do not 
know how they could be 'resolved' (if by resolved we 
mean "how one side or the other could be unambiguously 
vindicated by the evidence") for "the evidence" seems 
irresolubly contradictory or fragmentary or both. 
But secondly, and more significantly I think, we do 
not know what would be attained by "resolving" them 
even if we could., -38 
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This work, therefore, does not seek to argue the coherence or otherwise 
of Marx's model, or to attempt a precise definition thereof. It does not 
seek to catogerise the social structure of 19th century Dahomey into this 
or that "mode of production". It is content and primarily concerned 
f rom a conceptual point of view to apply what is, in the opinion of the 
present writer, the central and much neglected component of Marx's view 
of historical change the dialectical interplay between forces and 
relations of production to the history of 19th century Dahomey. 
39 
Moreover, it treats historical materialism as an empirical theory. 
Firstly, because this is the manner in which Marx himself rendered 
it. 
40 And secondly because Marx's model of histori cal change was 
derived largely from a study of capitalist society while his work on 
pre-capitalist social formations was much less sytematic, much less 
central and based on much more fragmentary data than that which formed 
his primary concern and the primary basis for his theoretical model - 
41 
western European capitalism. 
The approach at the outset, therefore., is tentative rather than 
assured. The model is flexible rather than fixed. And the primary 
concern throughout is whether Marx's model can assist a better 
understanding of Dahomean history, rather than whether Dahomean data can 
offer a retrospective vindication of Marx's model of history. 
Within this framework the study seeks to define the material basis of 
political power in the Dahomean kingdom. It attempts to identify the 
means by which surplus produce was appropriated from the general 
population to the differential benefit of one group within Dahomean 
society. And it tries to better explain the nature of 19th century 
16. 
Dahomean developments in terms of a burgeoning conflict between the new 
forces of production represented by the growing, export-oriented palm oil 
produce and a political formation based on the hitherto existing economic 
structure. 
r 
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24. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DAHOMEY 
THE RISE OF DAHOMEY 
Dahomey's emergence as a major West African power took place against 
the backcloth of increasing contact and economic co-operation between the 
states of the West African coast and European traders. In particular, 
her military and territorial development coincided with the beginnings of 
the Atlantic slave trade along this section of the West African coast. 
The 
1472.1 
Portuguese probaýly first explored the Bight of Benin in 
The first commercial 
perhaps a Portuguese voyage to 
itself appears on Portuguese 
contact with the Ewe/Aja peoples was 
Popo" (Great Popo) in 1553,2 and Allada 
maps from 1570.3 Trade with Allada 
included both slaves and palm Oil, 
4 
and although the total volume of 
trade does not appear to have been substantial, slaves were the normal 
and principal commodity, mainly f or the inter-Af rican coastline trade. 
Otherwise little interest was shown in the area between the Volta and 
Lagos - 
The real take-off in slave exports from Allada probably occurred with 
the Dutch entry into the Trade in the 1630's and 40's, 
5 
and later in 
the 1650's with the spread of s*ugar cultivation in the Caribbean. The 
Dutch were followed by the English from the 1660's and the French from 
the 1670's. From 1671, the main focus of the slave trade shifted from 
Allada to Whydah 
6 
and by the end of the 17th century the area of coast 
between the mouth of the Volta and Lagos was already characterised as the 
Slave Coast on European maps. 
7 
25. 
It was within this context that the Kingdom of Dahomey emerged as a 
major power on the West African coast. According to tradition, the 
founders of the Dahomean state can be traced back to Tado, near the 
present Togo border. Internal dynastic disputes forced their emigration 
from there, and later from Allada, the dominant kingdom in the area prior 
to the rise of Dahomey itself. The Fon were eventually forced to settle 
in the Igede area under the sufferance of the indigeneous people and 
chief s. Strengthened by further immigration from Allada, the Fon rose 
against the original inhabitants, conquered them and established the 
nucleus of the later Kingdom of Dahomey. From the 1620's the Fon, under 
their leader Dako, f ounded the basis of the kingdom whose existence was 
first attested to in the 1680's, 
8 but whose expansion was to continue 
territorially and militarily for over two centuries. 
9 
From the beginning the embryonic state expanded, as it had been 
founded, by military conquest, extending outwards from Abomey, subduing 
other local peoples and consolidating the area under its control. This 
crucible of conquest in which the beginnings of the Kingdom were first 
forged was crucial to its political economy as it later developed under 
Gezo. 
For the Fon, conquest had more than a territorial dimension; it also 
provided for the incorporation of people into the new state. 
10 They 
were incorporated 'en masse' when the conquest of large areas allowed 
their inclusion as citizens of Dahomey. But the domestic labour force 
was also increased through the use of captives as slaves within the 
Kingdom. A proportion of the captives taken in military expeditions 
were sacrificed, others were sold, and some remained within the expanding 
26. 
state as slaves, with their descendants acquiring rights of limited 
citizenship insofar as they could not be sacrificed or sold into external 
slave ry other than for criminal acts. 
" 
The initial dynamic of the Dahomean state - the military conquest of 
people - was supremely important in shaping the political and ideological 
direction of future generations of Dahomeans and in moulding a state 
formation well suited to incorporation into the supply side of the 
expanding Atlantic slave trade. 
12 
Militarism was further incorporated into the Dahomean state structure 
by Wegbaja, whose reign (1650-80) is particularly noted for his martial 
reforms. During this period the Fon military system was overhauled with 
the introduction of new war techniques including night fighting and the 
reorganisation of the warrior bands. 
13 It is around this period also 
that firearms were introduced. 
14 Largely as a result of this 
increased military efficiency, the Fon were able to establish military 
control over the Western Abomey plateau. 
Simultaneously, the position of the warrior leader was strengthened, 
both by the formal militarisation of the state - including the 
establishment of a royal monopoly over the sale of firearms - and also by 
the centralisation of law, order and the administration of justice. 
15 
The incorporation of firearms into Dahomean military techniques 
necessitated a reliable source of such weapons. It required also a 
means of exchange acceptable to the arms suppliers - the European traders 
on the coast. It is significant that Dahomean traditions recall both 
the extensive trade carried out between Wegbaja and the Europeans, and 
the fact that it was Wegbaja who first introduced the tactics of 
27. 
night-f ighting - with their potential f or an enhanced return of captives 
- to the Dahomean army. 
16 The taking of captives had been an integral 
part of Dahomean military conquest from the earliest stage, 
17 
and the 
historical conjuncture of aggressive Dahomean military expansion and 
European demand for the product of such activity afforded extensive 
opportunities for mutual co-operation and benefit. 
Slave raiding and the Atlantic Trade offered unparalleled 
opportunities f or the warrior elite to increase their power; it enabled 
them to enhance their status within Dahomey via an economic mechanism 
which was 
. 
completely compatible with the ethos and practice which had 
given rise to their initial pre-eminence. The slave trade did not give 
birth to a political elite within Dahomey, but it acted as foster parent 
in their transformation from primus-inter-pares to a distinct social 
class by virtue of their monopolisation of scarce and prestigious western 
trade goods. 
Throughout the latter half of the 17th century the coastal states to 
the south of Dahomey furnished a high level of slave exports to the 
Europeans. The small state of Whydah provided many thousands 
annually. Other coastal ports like Jakin, which was controlled by 
Allada, sold similar numbers, 
18 
and this was probably also the case 
with Offra which was Allada'8 main port until its destruction in 1692. 
The bulk of these slave exports were obtained by the coastal states 
through trade rather than direct conquest; Allada, for instance, was an 
important 'middleman' in slaves taken down to the coast. 
19 
Under 
Wegbaja, Dahomey was heavily involved in trade with the Europeans, and 
his successors were certainly involved in the slave trade. 
20 
28. 
Dahomey's position as a hinterland supplier of slaves left it 
vulnerable to disruptions of trade, both f rom the point of view of the 
sale of captives and the procuration of arms. 
21 As long as trade 
continued uninterrupted and flourishing this mattered little. But when 
trade declined from around 1712 because of war and competition among the 
coastal states ' and between themselves and Europeans, 
22 
the need for 
direct Dahomean access to coastal trade came on to the agenda. Between 
1724 and 1727 Dahomey, under Agaja, extended southwards conquering 
Allada, Jakin and finally Whydah itself, securing for the first time 
direct access to the Atlantic Trade. 
23 
The administrative and military reforms continued apace during 
Dahomey's drive south. In Allada the old administrative divisions were 
retained, but the former rulers now acted as officials of the Dahomean 
monarchy. 
24 The political and commercial organisation of Whydah was 
centralised 'under the "White Man's Captain", the Yevogan. Royal control 
over the sl 
. 
ave trade was strengthened, 
25 
the royal monopol .y over 
certain goods such as gold, corals and arms was retained, 
26 
and the 
monarch continued to participate in slave raiding. 
27 
In the immediate aftermath of the Fon takeover slave exports remained 
high. 28 But even at this stage there were signs that all was not well 
with the Whydah slave trade. In particular, continued harassment by the 
Whydahs against the Dahomean conquerers affected the orderly conduct of 
trade. 
29 European traders were frightened by the fighting and by the 
initial reception of the conquerors. 
30 The initial appointment of 
separate chiefs to oversee the trade of the French, English and 
Portuguese forts appears to have created discord rather than 
29. 
co-ordination., although the matter was resolved by the appointment of a 
the Yevogan as the "chief" for all white men in 1733.31 Dahomey's 
territorial expansion brought her into conflict with Oyo, and invasions 
into Dahomey in 1726-30 culminated in Dahomey's acceptance of tributary 
status to Oyo. 
32 
The wars which provided the rich harvest of slaves during the 
immediate post-conquest period were ultimately self-defeating, for 
orderly trade at Whydah had been dependent upon slave raiding being 
carried out further into the hinterland of the actual exporting 
33 
states. 
The decline in the Trade continued into the second half of the 18th 
century. 
34 
Oyo's conquest of Dahomey in 1748 brought the resumption 
of Dahomey's middleman role, but the Trade was driven east again by 
Kpengla's attempts to monopolise it and by Oyo's redirection of commerce 
through Porto Novo instead of Whydah. 
35 
From the 1750's the 
Portuguese shifted their commerce from Whydah as a result of new, 
strictly enforced regulations prohibiting the loading of more than one 
ship at a time, 
36 
a move that was accelerated by the Portuguese policy 
of diversifying outlets and by the extended horizons presented to the 
Portuguese as a result of the crisis in the Dutch West Indies Company. 
37 
Other external factors also intervened. The interruptions to trade 
as a result of the Seven Years War were followed later in the century by 
the removal of English traders to Old Calabar and by the antagonism shown 
towards the Trade by the New French Revolutionary Government. The 
dramatic decline in the lucrative trade prompted political 
instability. 
38 The monarchy responded by increasing internal 
30. 
exploitation and tyranny, 
39 
an increased role for the Gau in 
suppressing internal dissent and the extension of internal mechanisms of 
surveillance. 
40 
Several attempts were made to sustain the economic 
power of the monarchy. As early as 1746, Tegbesu had reorganised the 
sale of slaves at the coast by introducing a small number of "king's 
traders" who sold slaves on the king's acount. 
41 
Later, Kpengla 
unsuccessfully attempted to impose a royal monopoly on the trade. 
42 
However, throughout this period the monarch and his leading ministers 
played an insignificant part in the diminishing Trade. 
43 
This decline in the export trade was linked to a deprioritisatýon of 
44 
militarism. During Kpengla's final years, one report suggests that 
the Dahome'an army had declined to little more than 3000 in number. 
45 
And, with a declining slave trade and diminishing military strength went 
a decline in monarchical power, 
46 
culminating in the assassination of 
King Agonglo in 1797. 
Under Adandozan, his successor, the situation deteriorated rather 
than improved. In 1797 the French gave up their f ort at Whydah 
47 
and 
French export of slaves from the Bight of Benin decreased dramatically 
thereafter - particularly in the first decade of the 19th century. 
48 
Three directors of the Portuguese fort at Whydah were expelled at the 
turn of - the century, and by 1804 Adandozan was desperately dispatching 
emissaries to Portugal in an attempt to foster trade. 
49 
Bereft of a 
thriving export sector, Adandozan directed his antagonism towards Porto 
Novo, carrying out raids on the beach, disrupting trade and taking what 
recompense he could including that from the ransoming of prisoners to the 
French and English. 
50 Despite this, trade continued to develop there 
31. 
rather than at Whydah. 
51 As matters became more desperate - for 
Adandozan's behaviour was hardly calculated to encourage a European 
presence on the coast52 - likewise did the Dahomean response. In 1816 
a Mr Sewett, ex-purser of a Royal Navy ship and now trading In his own 
right, was detained at Whydah against his will and "installed" as 
commander of the British fort there by the Dahomeans. 53 
Not unnaturally, the monarch's personal position came under 
increasing domestic pressure. 
54 According to one tradition, Adandozan 
was regarded as "unworthy to carry the title of warrior", and in others 
he was remembered for his failure to sacrifice for deceased monarchs, 
55 
both damning indictments in view of the martial traditions of the 
monarchy. His personal life style, his internal tyranny and his 
disregard for military affairs came under attack. 
56 Significantly, 
during his reign there is some evidence that the Dahomeans were trading 
in slaves, 
57 but there is no evidence that Adandozan presided over 
successful slave raiding. 
Thus, in the period immediately prior to the accession of Gezo to the 
stool of Dahomey circumstances stood in marked contrast to those which 
had prevailed during the period of Dahomey's emergence as a major power 
and - just as important - to the inherited and idealised perception of 
Dahomey's strength during that period held by Dahomeans themselves. 
Political instability and internal dynastic quarrels had undermined the 
pre-eminent position of the monarchy. The King himself no longer 
epitomised the inherited warrior ethos in his priorities or in his 
practice. The slave trade through Whydah had been undergoing long-term 
decline for around half a century, and economic slump heightened 
political instability. 
58 
32. 
THE ACCESSION OF GEZO 
As is often the case, a serious disjunction between the contemporary 
reality and the inherited ideal gave rise to dramatic political change. 
Around 1818, Gezo, with the support of some sections of the aristocracy 
and the intimate assistance of the slave trader Francisco Felix da Souza, 
came to power through a coup d'etat in Dahomey- 
59 Through a 
combination of circumstance and conscious decision, his reign was to see 
the re-establishment of four features which had been central to the 
success of Dahomey and that of his own predecessors during the Kingdom's 
emergence as a ma or power on the West Af rican. coast. Under Gezo, both 
these features and his Kingdom were to be elevated to a pre-eminence far 
greater than hitherto achieved by any Dahomean monarch. 
DAHOMEAN MILITARISM 
The primary feature re-established by Gezo was the military nature of 
the Dahomean state. Under his rule the Dahomean state was to be 
permeated with militarism in both its structure and its ideology. Few 
states fitted better Smith's assertion that: 
*I 
.- war was itself a 
force, and probably the 
greatest force, in the creation of statehood, so that 
the attainment of statehood - that intangible concept 
- was fostered as well as characterised by the 
development of means by which the interests of the 
state could be forwarded". -60 
Military success had been crucial to the origin and establishment of 
the Dahomean state. It was by military means that the Fon had gained 
their autonomy, taken their capital city, expanded their territory and 
extended their political influence. 
61 War was the means by which 
33. 
tribute was raised and Dahomey was populated. But war was also the 
means by which the economic produce and political esteem of Europe was 
garnered to the prestige of the Dahomean leadership and the glory of the 
Nation. 
Thus, militarism, as might be expected, was embodied within the state 
structure. By the 18th century Dahomey had already developed a standing 
army, 
62 
a female corps of Amazons 
63 
and an impressive armoury of 
military manoeuvres. 
64 In Dahomey, as one French observer put it 
of tout homme est ne soldat., ' et son metier est la guerre 11 . 
65 
Gezo re-established Dahomey as the. military state sans pareil, a process 
reflected even in the coup d'e-tat which brought him to power with the 
assistance of 'Francisco Felix da Souza. Da Souza may well have had 
personal reasons for seeking the overthrow of Adandozan, having suffered 
imprisonment and humiliation by that monarch at an earlier stage. But 
it is also certain that he was stimulated by the prospects of the 
potentially lucrative slave exports which might be expected from a 
sympathetic monarch. 
66 In return for such an opportunity, da Souza 
undertook to supply Gezo with the necessary firearms and finance in order 
to achieve his coup d'etat and to facilitate slave raiding thereafter. 
67 
From Gezo's point of view, da Souza's material assistance provided 
him with the means of attaining power. Slave raiding thereafter 
provided him with the means of procuring, by exchange, the elements 
necessary to ensure the maintenance and consolidation of his domestic 
power - firearms, prestigious western goods, cowries and military 
victory. By the early stages of Gezo's reign, slave raiding had become 
institutionalised in the Dahomean annual calendar. 
68 
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Of necessity, Gezo's military ambition went further than an annual 
campaign. Internally, in order to secure his power, he reformed the 
Amazon guard; they were recruited anew, extended in numbers and raised 
in status. 
69 This formation, utterly loyal to the king personally, 
provided a check against internal treachery 
70 
and, with a command 
structure duplicating the standing army, acted as a counterbalance 
against the latter. 
71 
The Amazons also came to play a prominent part 
in the annual campaign which, as we shall see, became a crucial facet of 
political and economic life in 19th century Dahomey. 
The standing army itself was increased in size and, initially with 
the assistance of da Souza, rendered more efficient in weapons and 
training. 
72 Though estimates of the size of Dahomey's armed forces in 
the 19th century vary, most appear to indicate a substantial increase in 
numbers compared to the second half of the 18th century, at least up 
I 
until the major defeat at Abeokuta in 1851. Dahomey's military strength 
can reasonably be estimated at around 5000 Amazons, 10,000 regulars in 
the standing army, and a possible additional strength of upwards of 
10,000 conscripts from levies during major campaigns or emergencies. 
73 
The majority of the recruits for the standing army appear to have 
been derived from free farmers or artisans. While there is some 
evýdence that young captives were occasionally put into the conscript 
militia, it is unclear whether this happened automatically or whether the 
practice applied to the regular army. 
74 
In his re-establishment of militarism, Gezo was able to build on the 
foundations laid by his predecessor Agaja a century before. Campaigns 
were preceded by an elaborate system of spying, 
75 
the destination of 
35. 
the army was shrouded in secrecy until the last possible moment 
76 
and 
daybreak chosen for attack as the most opportune time to achieve both 
surprise and captives. 
77 Royal control had been exercised over the 
sale and purchase of firearms since the time of Agaja, 
78 
and almost all 
of the powder and firearms for the standing army and Amazons was provided 
by the monarch. 
79 The necessity to supply a considerable number of 
Dahomean soldiers with firearms underlay the obligatory dues - in the 
f orm of f irearms and ammunitions - which were taken on third party 
transactions by the king's agents in European factories. 
80 The 
provision of arms was the greatest single outlay for the monarch since 
the regular army received no formal pay, and although reserve provisions 
might have to be supplied at the beginning of a campaign to supplement 
their "living off the land", 
81 
these could be provided by a general 
agricultural levy. Similar obligations of supplying arms f ell upon the 
leading men of the kingdom who were expected to raise levies of soldiers 
for the campaign. Other arms were provided by Dahomean artisans, 
particularly the smiths who, in later years, were also obliged to provide 
shot for firearms. 
82 
The Dahomean armed forces had an elaborate command structure, and 
were divided on the basis of sex, regular and conscript, as well as into 
territorial, 'status' and assignment corps at lower levels. 
83 
But at 
the higher levels, political and military power were completely 
interwoven in a hierarchical structure with the monarch at the apex as 
the supreme head of both. 
84 
Thus, the nature of Gezo's accession to power - by a military coup 
d'etat - inevitably meant the restoration of militarism as the essence of 
36. 
his holding and consolidating power. And the military reorganisation 
necessarily meant, in turn., a restoration of the monarch's pre-eminent 
position in Dahomean politics. 
What such organisational descriptions cannot convey, however, is the 
potency and all-pervasive nature of the military ethos which permeated 
Dahomean life in the wake of Gezo's accession. The spirit of the 
warrior covered every aspect of society and was fostered and encouraged 
by the ruling elite. War was an ideological as well as a practical 
question in Gezo's Dahomey. 
In a society where courage and martial valour were paramount, 
cowardice was the cardinal sin: 
" If a soldier acts as a coward, or, which is 
considered tantamount, does not take either prisoners 
or head, the king will offer him a present at the 
customs; those who have acted well accuse him, and, 
if their accusation is proved, claim the present,, 
while the charge thus substantiated, is acted upon at 
once. -. 85 
But, while the loss of royal bounty might be the reward for failure to 
take a prisoner or head in battle, actual cowardice was penalized with 
loss of life. 
86 Failure to fulfill military obligations of even the 
87 
meanest kind was treated with public reprimand and abuse. Acts of 
supreme stamina or physical endurance were lauded whether in war or in 
peace-time. 
88 Aggression and argumentation in the form of public 
debate were as important as the content of the topic under discussion; 
aggressive palaver was more a part of the ceremonial manifestation of the 
warrior spirit than a means of reaching a satisfactory conclusion. 
89 
Group challenged group, women challenged men, and each vied with the 
other to display their superior courage and martial worthiness. 
90 
37. 
Thus! o while most 19th century observers remarked upon the great 
military displays which took place at the Abomey Customs, 
91 
the 
military ethos went much further than the formal parades. Every single 
ceremonial feature revolved around the values of the warrior state. 
Dancing became an exhibition of bravery and a tale of conquered 
foes; 92 ostentatious apparel proclaimed heroic deeds of the past: 
93 
and even the ceremonial distribution of cowries by the monarch to the 
assembled throng was the occasion for physical struggle and the winning 
of spoils. 
94 
The potency of. militarism was reinforced early in Gezo's reign by two 
developments. The first of these was of a practical political nature. 
His military reorganisation and the re-awakening of the martial spirit 
provided the basis of a new Dahomean military machine capable of 
restoring Dahomey's prestige, aggression and military expansion. The 
culmination of this occurred early in his reign when in 1823 the 
95 
overlordship of Oyo was overthrown by the might of Dahomean arms. 
This victory was linked with the second development, the extension and 
scale of human sacrifice. 
HUMAN SACRIFICE 
While Agaja is reputed to have established the Annual Customs) 
96 
the tradition of human sacrifice itself can be traced back to the very 
origins of the Dahomean state. Tradition records that the very name 
Dahomey derives from the ritual slaughter of and display of the body of 
Da - the former ruler of the city of Abomey - following a vow to that 
effect taken during the seige of the city by Dako. 
97 This ritual 
38. 
killing in thanksgiving f or victory was the f irst recorded case of human 
sacrifice in the Dahomean traditions, but one which was repeated and 
extended thereafter. 
While the incidence and importance of the human sacrifice throughout 
Dahomean history is not in question, the extent of the practice is more 
problematical. Prior to the emergence of Dahomey as a coastal power 
with the conquest of Whydah in the 1720s, there is little information on 
the scale of sacrifices in the Dahomean kingdom. 
98 
There are a number 
of indications in the 18th century, starting f rom the period immediately 
following, the conquest, but these have to be viewed in the context of the 
99 
debate surrounding the moral implications of the trade in slaves. 
Snelgrave, for instance, claimed to have been, informed by his 
interpreter at the Dahomean camp that 4,000 Whydahs had been sacrif iced 
to the Dahomean gods as a result of their victory, 
100 
and the same 
visitor reported that the sacrifices of the Tuffoe people had resulted in 
101 
the display of 400 bodies. As mentioned, however, Snelgrave's 
accounts must be seen in the context of the utility of human sacrifice as 
a major prop in the arguments of apologists for the slave trade. 
102 
Later in the 18th century, Norris, f rom whom Dalzel drew much of his 
information, anticipated that the annual customs would produce a demand 
for from 200 to 300 of the recently procured prisoners. 
103 However, 
his own account of the Customs of 1772 appears to yield only around 80 
victims, 
104 
although there may have been other victims of which' he had 
no ocular evidence. 
Isert, indicated that 40 to 50 was the number retained for sacrif ice 
annually throughout the 1780s. 
105 And a reliable source is available 
39. 
f or the Customs f or the King's mother in 1789; the event, which lasted 
from the 8th until the 19th of January 1789, involved 18 sacrifices, 
although Gaury, the French Director who attended and reported, also 
referred to an unspecified number of sacrifices carried out 'behind the 
walls ,. 
106 
Dalzel reported 9-10 sacrifices from the 2000 prisoners taken in the 
Ketu campaign in the same year, 
107 but reported that 595 of the king's 
wives were killed in the anarchic slaughter immediately af ter the king's 
death in 1789.10ý The scale of these sacrifices receives some, 
admittedly hearsay, confirmation from a Captain Crow who was informed in 
1790 that on the death of the last Dahomean monarch, 700 of his wives had 
subsequently been sacrificed. 
109 Elsewhere Dalzel reported that not 
less than 500 victims were killed at the Grand Customs in 1791.110 
The pattern established by these 18th century reports., despite their 
bias, may be correct; considerable blood letting on the occasion of the 
Grand Customs following the death of a monarch, particularly through the 
sacrifice of royal wives, but a much more modest scale of sacrifice in 
the normal Annual Customs. This relatively low number of victims in the 
18th century Annual Customs is confirmed by M'Leod who visited Dahomey in 
the early years of the 19th century. M'Leod pointed to the exaggerated 
reports of the numbers involved, and -dismissed the reports of 'hundreds' 
of victims at the Customs of 1803, the year he himself visited the 
coast. Such exagerated reports were encouraged, he believed, by a 
Dahomean desire to increase the grandeur of the Dahomean monarch and 
ill 
state. 
40. 
Mr James, acting governor of the British Fort at Whydah at the time 
of M'Leod's visit was equally sceptical of exaggerated reports, and he 
took the trouble to count the victims in three different years, never 
reckoning more than 65 on any one occasion. 
112 
Human sacrifice had a number of facets. At one level it was 
performed in honour of the ancestors - the "watering of the graves" in 
blood. At another, it was both symbolic of martial Dahomey victorious 
and an assurance of future military success. 
113 But it was also 
highly functional in a military, slave raiding state. Firstly as a 
means of disposing of particularly dangerous political enemies. 
Secondly, in avoiding the burden of those captives - the old, the sick or 
the wounded, f or instance - who had neither the capacity to contribute 
directly as plantation slaves to the domestic economy nor the potential 
for exchange in the Atlantic slave trade. 
114 
As such, human sacrifice fulfilled important ideological, political 
and economic functions. Institutionalised in the Customs, "sanctioned 
by the immemorial practice of past ages", human sacrifice was also a 
central facet of past military glories and the dynamic of the warrior 
ethos of early 18th century Dahomey. 
115 
As one 19th century observer put it: 
"The king of Dahomey has no more power to prevent 
human sacrifice then the Prince of Wales has to forbid 
morning service on a Sunday". 
116 
Far from curtailing the custom, Gezo initially raised it in scale and 
importance to a hitherto unprecedented level, because human sacrifice was 
not merely a religious phenomenon, it was inextricably linked with 
Dahomean martial values. Under Gezo, the extension of human sacrifice 
41. 
was similarly linked with the restoration of military values and with 
success on the field of battle. The earliest manifestation of this was 
the commemoration of the military victory over Oyo by the institution of 
a new victorious Custom to the ancesters - the human sacrifice at the 
Kana Customs. 117 
The power and prerogative to dispense with human life was symbolic 
not only of the greatness of Dahomey in general, but of the monarch in 
particular. Human sacrifice was the supreme symbol of royal 
autocracy. 
118 It was precisely its central ideological role which was 
to have such important political and ideological implications later in 
Gezo's reign when economic developments compelled a radical reappraisal 
and redirection of Dahomean strategy. 
If human sacrifice was the ideological lynchpin around which the 
Dahomean warrior ethos revolved, then the annual campaign became the 
ultimate expression of the military state. Along with human sacrifice 
and the military ref orms already mentioned, the annual campaign became a 
further vehicle which restored the prestige and the centralised power of 
the monarchy. 
ROYAL POWER 
Like the other two features of traditional Dahomey so far outlined, 
the highly centralised powers of the Dahomean monarch have their origins 
in the beginnings of, and the nature of, Dahomey's development as a 
state. This general phenomenon has also been remarked upon by Smith: 
42. 
"In the maintenance of states, as in their formation, 
war and diplomacy retained their importance and 
continued to be agents of change. The need to raise 
an army of the size beyond the capacity of a single 
man to control led to the creation of war chieftains 
*-. the chief s soon extended their role into civil 
government --. War not only created chiefs; it also 
strengthened monarchies as the crises undergone in the 
state called for the greater coercion of citizens and 
an intensification of the -national's military and 
economic efforts .. . "119 
So it was that a group of powerful military leaders developed out of 
the Dahomean military machine. And so it was that the monarch, the most 
prominent and powerful among the military leaders, grew into a position 
of dominance with few equals in. Af rica. As the supreme warrior, the 
King embodied the state itself. Just as in battle a Dahomean's "head 
belongs to the king 
120 
so too this was reflected in domestic 
political life. 
121 It was the monarch who dispensed justice, as he 
dispensed heads and cowries to the crowds in Abomey. At the Customs it 
was the King who "heard complaints, punished delinquents and rewarded 
merit 
122 Before the monarch, even the highest minister, had to 
scrape in the dust. 
123 
Of course, the power of the monarch was not absolute. In practical 
terms he was forced to balance conflicting political and economic forces, 
opinions and factions. But in public he was the supreme sovereign, 
124 
and in practice power was further centralised in the person of the 
monarch by the appointment of closý- relatives as "shadows" to the leading 
men of the kingdom. 
125 And in his personal capacity a militarily 
successful monarch had immense power. The centralisation of 
administration, authority and justice further bolstered the authority of 
43. 
the king, and every social or public occasion provided the opportunity 
for further enhancing the mystique and personal hegemony of the 
monarch. Traditionally the king did not eat, nor did he sleep, for he 
was not as other mortals. 
126 
Every military success, every 
ostentatious display of wealth, and every captive dispatched to the 
ancestors testified to the greatness and glory of the monarch as well as 
of the Dahomean state. But, above all, the militarisation of the state 
placed great power in the hands of a successful warrior king. In the 
17th and 18th centuries Dahomey had achieved her power and her reputation 
on the battlefield. But never was war so institutionalised) so 
systematic as it became under Gezo. Prior to his accession sporadic 
reports of Dahomean wars appear in the records and in the traditions. 
From Gezo's reign the military activity of the Fon came to be regarded as 
an "annual campaign". 
127 
This was Dahomey's period of greatest military achievement and 
expansion. Following the defeat of Oyo in 1823 
128 Gezo expanded his 
Kingdom's influence to the North and East throughout the 1820's and 
1830's. Mahi was invaded, 
129 Save to the north of Ketu was 
destroyed, 130 and by the 1840's Ketu had joined Porto Novo as tributary 
to Dahomey. 
131 To the west, the Dahomean armies reached as far as 
Atakpame, 130 kms. north west of Abomey. 
132 
The campaign became a time of maximum mobilisation affecting every 
part of the kingdom, with town and village contingents supplementing the 
Amazons and the regular army. 
133 
The constant recourse to military 
mobilisation against an external enemy and the aura of successful raiding 
immeasurably strengthened the domestic position of the new monarch. The 
44. 
annual campaign waged by Dahomey throughout the 19th century was also the 
vehicle which allowed the political and military ascendancy of the 
warrior aristocracy inside Dahomey to be converted into the material 
means of enhanced political power. Since it was functional in an 
economic as well as a political and military sense, the role of the 
annual campaign within 19th century Dahomey has to be seen in the context 
of the Atlantic slave trade and of Dahomey's social structure. 
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 
The King stood at the apex of both the military and social 
structure. The basic social and political formation over which he 
presided has been comprehensively described both by contemporary 
observers and by later writers. 
134 
Dahomean society was rigidly 
structured, and the relative absence of institutions such as the secret 
societies which existed in other parts of Africa has earned it the 
reputation of a highly organised or "regimented" society. 
135 
Generally speaking, conventional historiography and anthropology has 
identified four basic social groupings within Dahomey. 
136 
Firstly, the royal family or clan, which was composed of the 
descendants of founding leaders of the kingdom and succeeding monarchs. 
It was f rom within this grouping that the monarch was chosen, but the 
remainder of the family were traditionally debarred from high office. 
137 
Secondly, ranking beneath the royal family in the social hierarchy, 
was a group consisting of appointed aristocrats, whose titles and 
positions were conferred by the monarch, and whose offices, though not 
formally hereditary, commonly remained within their family subject to 
royal ratification. 
138 
45. 
Thirdly, Dahomey contained a group of common agricultural workers, 
artisans and their families, working on the land whose ownership was 
theoretically vested in the monarch, but whose usufruct was traditionally 
retained within the Xenu or clan. 
139 
Finally, there was a slave class, composed of both domestic and 
plantation. slaves. The stock of slaves was regularly refurbished by 
both external purchase and by raiding. Second generation slave status 
included enhanced rights, the most important of which was a prohibition 
on their sale for export. 
140 
These classifications do not, of course, 
include captives procured in Dahomean campaigns and directed towards the 
Atlantic export trade in slaves; in terms of Dahomey and the coastal 
merchants, such captives were regarded as mere commodities. 
This then was the basic Dahomean social hierarchy according to social 
status as perceived by 19th century observers and later writers. Care 
has to be taken, however, that sociological analysis does not obscure 
rather than clarify the real dynamics of power within 19th century 
Dahomey. Much previous writing on Dahomey has concentrated on the 
elite. Apart from the monarch and the Royal Family, considerable 
attention has been given to the documentation of Dahomey's leading 
ministers. 
141 First among these was the Migan, generally regarded as 
the prime minister under the monarch. The Migan acted as the chief 
adviser to the monarch, the supervisor of non-royal chief s, head of the 
army in peace time, overall head of internal security and chief 
executioner. Directly under him on the purely military organisation 
came the Gau, who acted as the effective head of the military during 
campaigns. 
46. 
The Meu acted essentially as the commercial minister of Dahomey. As 
such he supervised the activities of the Yevogan, who was responsible for 
the good government and conduct of trade at Whydah. The Meu also 
oversaw the collection of revenues, taxes and tribute, and affectively 
acted as foreign ambassador in relation to the western nations with whom 
Dahomey had commercial dealings. The Meu in his military capacity was 
overall head of the lef t wing of the army in peacetime, and his military 
adjutant, the Possu, was in effective charge of the left during campaigns. 
Under the Meu and Migan ranged a number of subordinate but important 
officials including the Yevogan who has already been mentioned; the 
Tokpo, minister of agriculture, markets and internal taxation; and the 
Ajaho, who controlled the 'secret police' as well as the palace 
servants. Finally visitors to Abomey recorded details of palace 
officials who, though less senior in status to these ministers, 
nevertheless were perceived as politically important because their duties 
involved them in close and constant contact with the monarch. Such 
officials included the Tonunon who as head eunuch was effectively in 
charge of the palace interior, and the Cambodee, the court chamberlain. 
Although there are occasional differences in the precise ranking of 
these officials under the monarch by contemporary observers and later 
writers, 
142 
such differences are less important than those features 
which they held in common. Firstly, all were members of a conferred 
nobility and all, with the exception of the Yevogan, resided at Abomey. 
All were non-royals - although Gezo later adopted the practice of 
appointing royal second-in-commands to them - and all held life 
appointments, subject to early retirement by the king. Such 
47. 
appointments were not automatically inherited within the family, although 
this was normal in practice. Nevertheless, the constitutional necessity 
of a new royal appointment on the death or retirement of an outgoing 
official or minister reinforced both the political and economic control 
of the monarch. Finally, such officials received no salary, although 
from time to time they were the recipients of the monarch's generosity in 
terms of grants of land, slaves or certain status 'rights of 
apparel'. 
143 
Despite the highly structured nature of Dahomean society there was 
some scope for upward social mobility. But the road to the top did not 
lie through industry or agriculture; indeed, quite the opposite. 
"Should a man inherit industrious habits" wrote Forbes, "he must be very 
cautious in developing them ... If he brings more soil under 
cultivation, or in any manner advances his family in riches, without the 
licence of the king, he not only endangers his future, but his own life, 
and the life of his family". 
144 
The licence and favour of the king were seldom granted on grounds 
other than as a reward for valour. To his favoured warriors the monarch 
displayed his generosity in gifts of slaves, women and land. 
145 
Within the military structure and in accordance with the military ethos, 
limited social advancement was possible on individual merit, but beyond 
that, upward social mobility largely depended upon the ability to put an 
army in the field. 
146 Just as bravery was the criteria by which 
social respect was earned, so too military rank was the indication of 
social status. 
147 
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At the head of the political elite stood the monarch himself. The 
king of Dahomey was the repository of considerable political power. As 
monarch he was head of both the political hierarchy and the armed 
forces. Justice and punishment were his prerogative and while local 
chiefs or officials wielded delegated authority over minor offences, all 
major crimes were tried in Abomey - the most serious of them, like 
treason, being tried by the monarch in person. The king was also the 
source of all major political offices and those commercial appointments 
relating to long distance trade. He was, par excýllence, the controller 
of people including the royal wives, the Amazon corps, the standing army 
and the royal clan. Above all, perhaps, the monarch was the living 
embodiment of Dahomey's past, a role which was enhanced by the dependence 
of the official historians on his beneficence. He was the direct link 
with the founders of the state, and the personification of Dahomean 
military ideology - the warrior king. 
148 
THE MATERIAL BASIS OF POLITICAL POWER 
Taken together, this grouping formed the military aristocracy of 
Dahomey. The establishment and growth of a class of professional 
warrior leaders with a state apparatus - ministers, officials, 
administrators and a standing army - by its very nature meant the 
existence in Dahomey of a considerable body of people who were not 
directly involved in the production of their own means of subsistence. 
They therefore required to appropriate the production of others. But 
their political position required that they maintain a lifestyle above 
the ordinary, rather than merely maintain the means of subsisting life; 
49. 
f or reasons of status and clientage their pattern of consumption was, of 
necessity well above the average, 
149 
and necessarily required the 
virtual monopoly of scarce or prestigious goods. 
The material basis of the political power of the 19th century 
Dahomean aristocracy, therefore, involved an extensive range of 
mechanisms by which the product of others was appropriated. Of these, 
three means predominated. Firstly by direct appropriation of domestic 
produce, either through the use of slave labour or by levies on Dahomean 
producers. Secondly, by indirect appropriation through taxes on trade, 
both internal and external. And f inally, through the direct 
appropriation of the produce of peoples outside Dahomey's borders - 
including the procuration of human beings who could be converted into 
exchange commodities through the Atlantic Trade. Each of these 
categories provided essential economic sustenance for the Dahomean 
leadership, although some had greater political signif icance than others. 
DIRECT DOMESTIC APPROPRIATION 
The economic product of the vast majority of the population of 
Dahomey in the 19th century was derived from agriculture. In theory, 
all land belonged to the monarch, who granted it to clans or to his 
leading men. 
150 Much agricultural production revolved around the 
plantation system where a wide vari-ety of crops including corn, beans, 
yams, ground nuts, maize, cassava and oil palms were cultivated. 
151 
Many such plantations were maintained by slaves owned by Dahomey's 
leading chiefs or, in some instances, by slave traders residing in the 
coastal areas. 
152 A range of livestock was also raised. 
153 
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But the enshrinement of the warrior ethos meant, in turn, the 
downgrading of the status of agricultural pursuits in aristocratic 
eyes. Industry and agriculture, while necessary for the substance of 
daily life, were not encouraged lest they detracted from the chanelling 
of national effort towards military campaigning. 
154 
More generally, agriculture was despised as being the work of 
slaves, 
155 
as Gezo emphasised to Beecroft by scornfully asking him if 
he had seen any farms between Abomey and the swamp. 
156 
As the leading slave owner in Dahomey, the monarch was a plantation 
157 
producer on a grand scale. The produce of such plantations went to 
subsist not only the slaves who worked the plantations, but also the 
ro I yal wives, palace officials, the Amazons and the standing army. 
158 
It is possible that during the early stages of Dahomey's emergence the 
division of labour meant that agriculture, including plantation 
agriculture, was primarily the work of women. Norris, f or instance, 
noted that the royal plantations were worked by the royal wives. 
159 
But as martial Dahomey increased its internal stock of slaves 
agriculture, particularly on the plantations of the leading aristocrats, 
increasingly became the labour of captive slaves. This partly explains 
Forbes' comment that "in the neighbourhood of Abomey, unlike the rest of 
Af rica, men labour in the f ields, and the women are only employed in 
160 
carrying water 
But there was another reason. Within Dahomey water was a scarce 
commodity. At Allada, for instance, the source of fresh water lay some 
half-hour's walk f rom the town and the best water was monopolized by the 
King. 161 At Abomey there was little or no f resh water f or f ive miles 
51. 
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on either side, and the one fresh pond in the area was reserved to 
the monarch. 
163 The local inhabitants made up for the lack of 
vnatural' water facilities by the entrapment of rainwater in a number of 
reservoirs or pits around the town or by direct collection of rainwater 
in earthenware vessels, a proportion being reserved for the dry 
164 
season. 
The relative scarcity of fresh water had important implications. 
Firstly, in an area like Abomey scarcity lent fresh water a luxury value, 
and water was sold as a commodity. 
165 Secondly, and perhaps more 
important for developments in Dahomey in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the collection of water was a labour intensive and 
time-consuming business for both royals and non-royals, 
166 
and its 
collection, particularly in the Abomey area, historically devolved upon 
women, while men were required to participate in agriculture- 
167 Thus 
the conscription of the male labour force into the army at the time of 
the annual mobilisation for the annual raid had the effect of redirecting 
the basic, male, agricultural labour f orce into the military. This was 
to have important domestic consequences as the century progressed and the 
palm oil trade developed. 
After a successful campaign a proportion of the captives taken would 
be allocated to work in the royal plantations and, if the campaign was 
particularly rewarding in terms- of captives, new plantations 
effectively commemorative villages of slaves taken during the campaign - 
were founded by the monarch. 
168 
Along the coastal area of Dahomey fishing and salt manufacture 
complemented agricultural production both for local consumption and for 
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carriage into the interior of the country. 
169 
Elsewhere cotton was 
collected and shea butter produced: coffee, sugar cane, rice and tobacco 
cultivation was attempted on a small scale. 
170 But production of 
these latter items was curtailed by the monarch lest they diverted labour 
resources from the production of domestic requirements into export 
oriented crops. 
171 On occasions this was reflected in specific 
prohibitions. Gezo prohibited the production of ground nuts and shea 
butter for the export market, while Glele would not allow coffee, sugar 
cane, rice or tobacco production at Whydah. 
172 
Dahomean agriculture was accompanied by a wide range of craft 
production including weaving, ironmongery, silverwroughting, cloth 
making, dying and pottery manufacture. 
173 There appears to have been 
some quarrying and some brick making, though the scale and purpose is 
unclear. 
174 Not unnaturally Abomey afforded greater scope for 
specialisation, and silversmiths and blacksmiths abounded in the 
capital. 
175 
Cloth was manufactured by the royal wives inside the palace, using 
cotton brought from outlying areas, 
176 
and the royal wives were also 
involved in the dying of materials. Several domestically produced 
articles were subject to royal monopoly. Pottery, which was produced by 
the royal women at Abomey and in palaces throughout the Kingdom was one 
such item. 
177 A related product-, clay pipes, appears to have been 
similarly subject to royal monopoly. 
178 The position regarding ivory 
is less clear; one European observer noted that the king prohibited the 
transit of ivory through Dahomey, but another recorded that small 
quantities were available for export at the coast. 
This apparent 
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contradiction may may be explained by the fact that while the transit 
trade in ivory through Dahomey may have been outlawed, the hunting of 
elephants and the production of ivory, including some. for export, was 
retained as a royal monopoly by the Amazon Elephant Hunters. 
179 
Thus, both the monarch and his leading men were directly involved in 
production through the use of slave labour on plantations a-ad, in the 
case of the monarch, through monopolies maintained on the manufacture of 
certain domestic products by his dependants. As will be seen later, 
both the king and his leading men also benefitted from domestic 
production through the use of taxes levied on internal produce. 
MARKETS AND TRADE 
The diverse nature of Dahomean domestic production necessitated a 
regular means of internal exchange, and the country was well served by a 
network of domestic markets through which the distribution of produce was 
effected. Dahomean markets were held according to the four day 
system 
180 
and were used basically for native Dahomean exchange, the 
wholesale trade on imported goods being carried out in the yards or 
181 
factories of the various European merchants on the coast. The 
importance and diversity of agricultural and artisan production 
necessitated periodic markets in the interior of the country and there 
were major markets at towns such -as Whydah, Allada, Tori, and Cana as 
well as at Abomey itself where four main markets were housed. 
182 A 
comprehensive range of produce was normally of f ered f or sale, including 
eggs, fruit, vegetables, poultry, meat and fish; palm oil and tobacco 
were also often on offer. 
183 Whydah's markets offered a range of 
54. 
European goods, while those at Abomey offered a wider range of produce 
than elsewhere in the kingdom. 
184 
In addition to such general 
markets, specialised markets for specific products, such as ground nuts 
at Tori, flourished. 
185 Virtually all transactions in both general 
and specialised markets were carried out through the medium of cowrie 
shells, the main Dahomean currency. 
186 
It has been suggested that in Dahomey local, domestic markets and 
overseas trade were institutionally separated, and that commerce was 
regulated not through price competition but by Adminstrative Acts. 187 
This distinction between extra-Dahomean and domestic trade was maintained 
in the 19th century. Long-distance trade was monopolized by the 
Axisinon, 1-88 while the trans-Atlantic trade was closely supervised by 
the monarch's officials at Whydah or chanelled through his appointed 
agents at outlying ports. 
189 
However, it is doubtful if the distinction was ever absolute in 
practice. In mid-century, for instance, the trade in tobacco was 
restricted to 12 -named merchants, but some of the stocks did f ilter 
through to supplement domestic produce in Dahomean markets. 
190 Whydah 
market in particular was well stocked with luxury goods and f oreig-n 
imports. Nevertheless, in the main local markets were merely used for 
the exchange of domestic produce. 
191 
The question of the administration of prices is more complex. There 
is evidence for price fixing in local markets by the king's agent in 
Whydah in 1704., prior to the Dahomean conquest, 
192 
and for the period 
after the French conquest in the Dahomean Kingdom itself. 
193 This 
continuity on its own would be sufficient to suggest that the mechanism 
55. 
was maintained throughout the reigns of Gezo and Glele, but there is also 
specific, contemporary testimony on the point. 
Forbes recorded that: 
"The cha-cha is the principal agent to the king in all 
matters of trade; and to him must be subjected all 
commerce, whether in slaves or palm oil, that he may 
have the refusal. The price is laid down by law, 
subject to alteration if concurred in by the viceroy 
and six traders or superintendants of trade appointed 
by the king ... One or other of these must be 
present at all sales to take the royal duty, which on 
palm oil is about a gallon in a measure of 
eighteen.,, 194 
This does not imply uniform prices on every commodity throughout the 
kingdom. The price of even staple items varied from day to day and from 
location to location. 
195 Similarly, the main export commodities did 
vary in price from time to time, as noted by European observers. Slave 
prices, for instance, were stated to have increased by some 20'/0 between 
1847 and 1848 to 00 a head. 
196 However, Forbes' testimony is 
supported by the remarkable stability shown in export prices over 
considerable periods of time, indicating that prices in external trade, 
particularly in the trans-Atlantic sector, were administratively f ixed. 
The "present price' of slaves, noted in 1848 by Cruickshank at 00 a 
head, was exactly the same as that given by Freeman 14 years later in 
1862.197 
Similarly, the selling price of palm oil on the coast appears to have 
been fixed by decree or convention, from at least around the 
f palm oil appears mid-century. Throughout the late 1840's the price ol- 
to have increased considerably, 
198 but the evidence relating to the 
selling price of oil thereafter shows a remarkable consistency over the 
next quarter of a century, at F-22.50 
3100) a ton. 
199 The reccurrence 
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of these standard prices over a prolonged period strongly supports 
Forbes' testimony that prices in the import-export sector were 
administratively set. 
The tenacity with which the Dahomeans held on to the conventional 
price was illustrated in the second half of the century when Regis' agent 
managed to negotiate a lower slave price, presumably in view of the 
dearth of other outlets. In the event, however, when the time for 
actual shipment occurred and other purchasers were available, the 
Dahomean hierarchy insisted on the conventional price of 00 per 
200 
slave. The incident suggests that market influences were not 
entirely absent from administered prices, but the general pattern was one 
of a negotiated, political price. 
Markets were of considerable religious and political signif icance as 
well as being important centres of distribution. 
201 More importantly, 
they were also economically vital as centres of taxation, as we shall see 
later. Political authorities looked after the organisation and good 
functioning of the market, and the overseer had the triple function of 
manager, priest and fiscal agent, assisting the Houmekponto in the 
collection of dues and taxes. 
202 The political importance of the 
Dahomean markets was reflected in their allocation as a responsibility to 
a senior Dahomean minister, the Tokpo or minister of agriculture. 
203 
In terms of external trading, Dahomey's operations were channelled in 
two basic directions. Firstly, Dahomey was directly involved in 
inter-A-f rican trade. Under the direction of the commercial chief, the 
Meu, 
204 Dahomean merchants were involved in trade with neighbouring 
African states like Ketu and the Mahi country. 
205 She also had weaker 
57. 
trade linkages with the nearby long-distance axis from Hausa country to 
Asante and lateral trade with Yorubaland. 
206 
From an early stage 
Dahomey had purchased slaves from Oyo and the Mahi 
207 
and traded with 
the Mahi in the 1840's. 
208 
Dahomev also dPvP1nnP(i Aj-r,., -t t-rnAina 
links with Kaiama in Borgu, 
209 
and elsewhere in Borgu Dahomean imported 
western goods were exchanged for commodities which included slaves and 
beads. 210 This commercial linkage with the -north in particular had a 
history long pre-dating the 19th century; Islamic traders were reputed 
to have first arrived at Whydah in 1704, prior to the Dahomean 
conquest 
211 
and two decades later were -being warmly received in Abomey 
itself. 212 By the 19th century Hausa traders were regular visitors to 
Porto Novo and Whydah. 
213 The Islamic presence at Abomey is also 
testified to by consecutive visitors throughout the reigns of Gezo and 
Glele. 214 
Despite the penetration by Islamic - probably Hausa - merchants into 
Abomey itself and at Whydah, generally speaking merchandise was not 
allowed to pass through Dahomey other than through the medium of the 
Dahomean traders appointed by the monarch. 
215 Trade routes were 
regarded with some jealousy and proved an important source of rivalry 
between Dahomey and neighbouring states, as in the disputes between 
Dahomey and the emerging power of Abeokuta in the 1840's. 
216 
Dahomean commercial organisation was conducted at three levels, with 
a range of status, rank and powers according to which particular level 
the trader occupied. 
Firstly, there were a number of small, general and domestic traders, 
known as the Axihouan who were authorised to act as traders. Most often 
58. 
these particular traders were retired soldiers or veterans to whom the 
monarch had shown favour by permitting them to transact trade in their 
own right. 
217 Secondly, and ranking above this group, were the 
Axinon. The Axinon were appointed by the king and each member had a 
number of Axihouan under his control and authority. In this position 
they were vested with considerable authority, and were expected to 
specify to the Axihouan under their control the nature of the commerce in 
which they should engage and the manner in which it was to be carried 
out. 
218 
The final and highest rank of traders were the Axisinon, whose 
commercial power extended to every field of commerce and who - were - 
expected to contribute advice to the monarch on the present commercial 
situation and future prospects. 
219 More importantly, perhaps, the 
Axisinon were expected to pay duties to the monarch in return for the 
trading rights which he had bestowed upon them. 
220 The Axisinon had 
been "Captains of Trade" since at least the first decade of the 18th 
century, 
221 
and their mal-treatment by other states was regarded as a 
matter of grievous offence. 
222 It was this group which was entrusted 
with long-distance trade, and although there is little contemporary 
evidence as to the exact nature of the produce exchanged, it is clear 
that they were entitled to purchase slaves outside of Dahomey for re-sale 
to the traders on the Atlantic coast. 
223 
Relations between Dahomey and the Europeans involved in the Atlantic 
slave trade, the second aspect of Dahomey's external trading relations, 
were more highly regulated during the 19th century than ever before. In 
addition to the Yevogan, there were six "superintendents of trade" 
59. 
4 
appointed by the monarch to oversee commercial relations with Europeans 
on the coast. 
224 
Initiallyý such agents had been the medium through 
which the monarch marketed his slaves, but after Gezo's successful coup 
d'etat da Souza was rewarded with this right - succeeded by Domingo 
Martinez and others - and the king's agents appear to have been involved 
with the Yevogan in regulating the conduct of trade in general and in 
collecting the king's dues in particular. 
225 
For such work they 
received an entitlement to trade in their own right at the preferential 
rates of exchange which applied to the monarch's account. 
226 
In the Atlantic trade the commodities exchanged are much better 
documented than in' the internal long-distance exchange. ' Exports f rom 
Dahomey were composed mainly of slaves, country cloth, peppers . corn, a 
little ivory and shea butter and, increasingly, of palm oil. 
227 
Imports were composed mainly of gin, rum, cloths, muskets, powder, 
flints, cowries, handkerchiefs, hardware and glass, with smaller articles 
like perfume, cheap jewellery and ornaments particularly useful in the 
growing palm oil trade - 
228 A number of items, such as rum and tobacco 
were highly regarded as 'luxuries' and were much sought after; 
229 in 
the case of tobacco the trade was confined to a small -number of 
merchants, including da Souza and later Domingo Martinez, appointed by 
the king. 
230 
Such trade restrictions were paralleled elsewhere, and were 
calculated to give the leading men, and in particular the monarch, 
preferential trading terms. The monarch himself had retained a monopoly 
on firearms since the time of Agaja, 
231 
and, as mentioned, also had the 
entitlement to preferential exchange rates which were extended to a small 
60. 
number of his agents; this preferential discount entitled the monarch to 
an advantage of about ten per cent in the terms of trade. 
232 
Moreover, the monarch exercised pre-emptive rights over any new items 
appearing on the coast and to certain luxury goods. 
233 These rights 
were reflected in a subordinate fashion by his leading men who were 
entitled to certain monopoly rights over European goods in the 
territories which their soldiers had conquered in the course of 
campaigns. 
234 
Thus, in addition to direct involvement in production through the use 
of slave labour, the Dahomean monarch and members of the appointed 
aristocracy were entitled to trading benefits which ensured both 
prefere ntial rates of exchange and rights of pre-emption or monopoly over 
certain imported goods. However, in both production and exchange, the 
aristocracy had one further lucrative source of income - taxation. 
Taxation was an important source of income for -the Dahomean 
leadership and for the monarch in particular. It derived from four 
basic sources. Firstly, from payments in kind rendered out of 
agricultural or other domestic production, and from a domestic 'head 
tax'. Secondly, from taxes on trade, internal and external. Thirdly, 
from tolls and tribute. And finally, from an inheritance tax. 
Responsibility for the payment of domestic taxes on production rested on 
the producers themselves. It was normally paid direct to the monarch 
235 
and regarded as a contribution to the Annual Customs. In addition 
to basic agricultural taxes3, taxes were levied in kind on cattle and 
61. 
other animals such as pigs) goats and sheep'236 and on specific items 
such as peppers, salt and honey. 
237 
Finally, there were specific taxes levied on particular groups of 
producers such as blacksmiths3 who normally produced hoes and other 
agricultural implements, but whose skills allowed them to manufacture 
weapons, including, latterly, shot for the Dahomean forces. 
238 
Supplies of meat were received from hunters, 
239 
while even Dahomean 
women engaged in the "oldest profession" were not exempt from fiscal 
obligations on income. 
240 As the demand for palm oil grew in the 
coastal trade, so the tax on palm oil became increasingly important to 
the central exchequer. 
241 
Unfortunately, the written sources of the 19th 'century are 
particularly scant on information on this particular form of taxation, 
and reliance on later anthropological works is more than ever necessary 
on the point. It is difficult, therefore,, to state with any degree of 
certainty just how organised and systematic the collection of taxes was 
in 19th century Dahomey. Herskovits, for instance, has suggested that a 
sophisticated census machinery was in use by the Dahomean 
leadership- 242 Such a mechanism would obviously have enhanced the 
collection of taxes, and in particular the effectiveness of a head tax, 
collected in cowries, which was levied on the head of every 
household. 
243 However, the passage of time, the absence of 
contemporary references and, above all, the secrecy in which such a 
system is alleged to have been shrouded make it impossible to verify. 
In any case,, if such a system did exist, it is likely that it was 
effective only in the Abomey area. 
244 
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Although there is no evidence that the collection of taxes in kind 
f rom the general population was anything other than considerable, there 
were obvious limitations to the value of this form of income to the 
Dahomean leadership. Foodstuffs, by their very nature, became largely 
irrelevant above a certain level; and, in any case, the Dahomean 
aristocracy were in a position to extract subsistence for themselves and 
followers from the labour of their plantation slaves. 
However, taxes in kind were particularly functional on goods whose 
production was geographically confined since ecological conditions meant 
that certain produce like f ish or salt were localized in dif f erent parts 
of the Kingdom. 
Considerable additional quantities of agricultural produce were 
required at certain times of the year, particularly prior to a campaign 
or during the Annual Customs, and it is likely that the bulk of the taxes 
245 
were directed towards these events. The distributive nature of the 
customs, and the national importance of military campaigning also had the 
benefit of legitimising such levies within 'the general 'framework of , 
national benefit. Given the slave-production already available to the 
monarch and aristocracy, it is thus likely that the economic and 
political importance of agricultural taxation largely revolved around 
these two main military aspects of the Dahomean calendar - the Annual 
Customs and the annual campaign. From the point of view of generally 
enhancing the material position of the aristocracy on a political level, 
it is likely that the head taxes and other payments received in cowries 
were more beneficial. 
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Similarly, taxation on trade, direct and indirect, was politically 
effective insofar as it could be levied in, or easily converted into, 
relatively scarce commodities. Dahomey's system of trade taxation was 
extensive and all-pervasive. 
246 At the coast in particular, it has 
been well documented. Royal agents were stationed in the factories of 
the various European traders who transacted business in the export 
trade, 
247 
and taxes were levied on both the vendor and on the purchaser. 
On the vendor, tax was charged during the actual act of exchange. 
On slaves, for instance, the king's agents received a rifle and powder - 
an obligatory part of the exchange goods for every slave 
exchanged. 
248 Palm oil was taxed at 1/18th of the quantity 
exchanged, 
249 
and converted into trade goods on the King's account 
All vendors were expected to render taxation in this fashion irrespective 
of the produce which they were exchanging for export. 
In addition, fiscal revenues were raised from the purchasers, the 
European traders on the coast, by means both formal and informal. 
Imported goods were taxed, prior to the commencement of trading; each 
visiting ship was subject to a tax of approximately 2 per cent of its 
cargo in return for the right 
. to trade. 
250 Furthermore, there was a 
shipment tax on goods exported. On slaves, for instance, a per capita 
tax of 4 dollars per head was levied on each slave shipped, 
251 
while 
palm oil was eventually subjected to such a tax calculated on the -number 
252 
of barrels taken aboard. Trade goods raised. from such taxation 
were stored in the Yevogan's premises at Whydah for onward transmission 
to the monarch in Abomey. 
253 
64. 
European merchants were also subject to an annual tax254 and 
expected to display generosity towards the monarch in the form of "gifts" 
in return for their rights to trade in Dahomey. One example of the 
liberality expected from such traders is the gift by Domingo Martinez of 
30 puncheons of rum to the King and proportionate hospitality to the 
caboceers and natives of Whydah to an estimated cost of WOO. 
256 
Much of the levies derived by the monarch f rom the coastal traders were 
received at the Annual Customs, where generosity commensurate with the 
status of the trader and the importance of the occasion was expected. 
The form of such presents varied, but firearms and artillery were 
favourite for such martial occasions just prior to the annual 
campaign. 
257 Traders who operated outside the kingdom proper but 
within the territory regarded as being under the monarch's suzerainty 
were not exempt from such formal or informal taxation. 
258 
Dahomean trade was not, of course, all confined to the Atlantic 
coast. Much of it was carried out by the Axisinon, the captains of 
trade already referred to. The royal exchequer benefited from the trade 
carried out by the Axisinon by means of taxes levied on them commensurate 
with the extent of their trade. Similarly, less senior chiefs or 
caboceers whose position merited advantageous internal trading rights 
were taxed in like fashion. 
259 
Internal exchange was taxed as well as export orientated trade. 
Those who brought goods to market or exposed them for sale were liable 
for duties payable to the monarch. Local officials oversaw the 
collection of such taxes, while in Whydah the matter was 
handled by one 
of the Yevogan's assistants. 
260 
Furthermore, the transportation of 
65. 
goods within Dahomey was subject to regular road tolls for rights of 
passage, 
261 
often levied by chiefs to whom the right had been granted 
0 
as a reward f or their military contribution towards the conquest of the 
area in question. Local chiefs were, in turn, liable for remission of a 
proportion of the revenues thus raised to the monarch, though in some 
cases such tolls were paid directly to the King. 
262 
Taxation on trade was supplemented by tribute payable by those 
territories which had been defeated militarily by Dahomey, but which were 
not subject to direct rule. Tribute was furnished annually, and an 
estimate of the sufficiency of such tribute as was rendered was 
calculated on the basis of reports from royal 'messengers' resident in. 
the area in question. 
263 
Finally, the royal exchequer benefitted from the proceeds of taxatioD 
on death. Problems of inheritance among free commoners were normally 
settled by a council of the clan elders. 
264 This was not, however, 
the case with leading ministers or officials. Appointment to office or 
aristocratic status afforded the recipient considerable opportunity for 
wealth accumulation throughout his life. In practice, such office 
normally passed to the deceased's heir within the family. 
Constitutionally, however, such appointments were the prerogative of the 0 
monarch and on death the wealth and property of the deceased aristocrat 
passed to the monarch prior to the appointment of his successor. Any 
part of the property which was subsequently passed to the new appointee, 
therefore, was a result of the monarch's benevolence rather than a 
hereditary right. Such a procedure normally resulted in a significant 
proportion of the deceased's wealth being retained by the monarch, with. 
66. 
the residue - usually including the deceased's wives - being passed to 
the succeeding appointee. 
265 Similar opportunities for taxation on 
accumulated wealth occurred on the retirement of a member of the 
appointed aristocracy prior to death. 
THE ECONOMICS OF WARFARE 
Apart f rom direct agricultural production direct taxation and the 
more indirect appropriation of material benefit from trade, the Dahomean 
aristocracy had one further, vital source of economic sustenance 
throughout the first half of the 19th century. For the Dahomean 
leadership the annual campaign was not merely a matter of territorial 
aggrandisement or valour. War for the aristocracy was more important as 
a means of appropriation than an instrument of destruction. It provided 
both the labour needed for domestic production and the commodities 
required to obtain foreign imports - slaves. 
266 In short, war was an 
economic activity. 
The annual campaign is the key to an understanding of the 
relationship between the economics of the slave trade and the political 
ascendancy of the Dahomean leadership throughout the 19th century. The 
aim of the war, in practical terms, was the taking of captives. Some of 
these captives were detained for allocation to the plantations of the 
king or aristocracy to restock the supply of domestic slave labour. 
Some were required as replacements for manpower lost in the campaign 
itself, and a proportion would be sacrificed. However, the economics of 
annual warfare in the 19th century were such that considerable outlays 
were necessary in order to achieve victory and obtain the rewards of a 
67. 
successful campaign. Such outlays could not have been sustained without 
the regular conversion of captives into commodities which could be 
exchanged f or the means of future campaigns and captives - particularly 
firearms. 
But a successful campaign rendered more than just the means of 
further wars. For it was through the medium of captives as commodities 
that the profit from the successful prosecution of the war was realised, 
to the benef it mainly of the monarch and the warrior aristocracy. it 
remains a matter of speculation whether the procuration of captives was a 
sufficient condition for annual campaigning; it was certainly a 
necessary, one. 
The first requirement- of a successful campaign was a sufficient 
military force. Thus the Kingdom was put on a war f ooting internally 
leaving whole villages virtually deserted throughout the period of the 
campaign. 
267 
This mass military corvee of the Dahomean population 
was, as shall be seen later, a vital mechanism in the means of 
appropriation of surplus product by the warrior aristocracy. The scale 
of the manpower necessary and the organisation needed was such that a 
force could be assembled only through the medium of those who controlled 
a large number of people. The chiefs and principal ministers supplied 
whole regiments for the annual campaign 
268 
and slave traders, including 
af ew non-Dahomean residents such as da Souza, who had both a retinue of 
followers or slaves and a vested -interest in the humans spoils of the 
campaign also provided the personnel for the army. 
269 This placed an 
obligation on the leading men of the kingdom, on grounds of both status 
as warrior leaders and entitlement to a share of the rewards, to maintain 
68. 
a sufficient force to participate in the annual campaign. 
270 In a 
sense., then, these followers or slaves became 'risk capital' in the 
course of the campaign since defeat, inadequate return in terms of 
captives,, death or captivity with the prospect of ransom- involved a 
prospective loss to the warrior leader. 
271 
To some extent this 
applied even to Amazons, one of whom stated publicly to Forbes that "For 
my part I am in debt for my provisions for last war, I must go again to 
get money It . 
272 For those responsible for sending scores of warriors 
to the annual campaign the risk of loss was multiplied many times. Such 
a loss had to be calculated against the original cost of purchase or 
captivity of the slave, the cost of subsistence throughout the year, and 
the cost of redistribution and ostentatious life style necessary in order 
to maintain the clientage of followers. 
No-one bore a greater share of the, cost of war than the monarch 
himself. 273 Firstly, because he provided a disproportionate share of 
men and women for the army. 
274 Secondly, because he also provided a 
disproportionate share of the second requirement of a successful campaign 
- arms. In the month or so prior to the annual campaign the 
distribution of ammunition, powder and other armaments took place 
275 
and, as has been noted, the purchase and provision of arms - particularly 
firearms - was a heavy reponsibility of the monarch who exercised a 
monopoly over both imported arms and weapons manufactured within 
Dahomey. 276 
The third requirement of a successful campaign was organisation and 
leadership, a pre-requisite once again provided by the aristocracy whose 
status, qualifications - since one of the few ways of rising by merit in 
69. 
Dahomean society was by martial performance 
277 
_ and control of 
followers entitled them to monopolise this role. 
If the warrior aristocracy thus provided a disproportionate share of 
the resources necessary for a successful campaign, their share of the 
spoils was equally if not more disproportionate. "The road to riches", 
wrote Forbes, "has lain in the number of retainers the noble of chief 
could send to war. ., 
278 This was true in terms of tribute received - 
either directly by the monarch, or accruing indirectly to him as part of 
the rewards garnered in the first instance by those warrior chief s whose 
soldiers had been prominent in the acquisition of a given area. 
279 
Secondly, and more importantly, the aristocracy benefited from the 
captives taken in the campaign. As in the case of tribute, in principle 
the monarch retained the absolute right to commandeer the human spoils of 
war; such rights were always qualified by the need to distribute a share 
of the rewards to his chief s and caboceers. However, theoretically he 
was the owner of all captives taken, 
280 
and in practice was by far the 
greatest beneficiary in terms of captives. 
281 
He had an absolute right to the captives taken by the Amazons. 
Since these formed a central and substantial part of the 19th century 
armies such rewards were significant. It can be reasonably assumed that 
the monarch was also entitled to much of the human spoils of the standing 
army. Although there is no specific contemporary evidence on this 
point, the ceremonial 'purchase' of captives from his soldiers by the 
king is well documented, and it is likely that this represents the 
transfer of captives from his soldiers to the king for a trifling sum 
which was more symbolic than real. 
282 Finally, he probably also 
70. 
exercised rights in respect of captives taken by the local or district 
contingents 
283 
whose local chief or official benefitted throughout the 
year by virtue of royal appointment* 
284 
In like manner, the captives taken by the soldiers raised by the main 
aristocrats and caboceers had to be sold to them by their soldiers for a 
fixed price. 
285 
There is, therefore, a sense in which every 
participant in a Dahomean victory - from the village conscript to the 
monarch - stood to gain from a successful campaign. As Forbes 
II commented, .. war in Dahomey is a trade, and each soldier is a 
trader". 
286 
Gezo's comment to Duncan that he did not sell the greater 
part of the slaves from the country, but that the caboceers whose 
soldiers had captured them were always considered to be the owners of 
slaves taken in war should be seen in this context. 
287 
But, although everyone benefited from a successful campaign, not 
everyone benefited to the same extent. The fixed price which the 
soldier was paid was only a small percentage of the market value of his 
captive. 
288 Freeman may have oversimplified the issue when he assumed 
that the monarch purchased every captive taken in the annual campaign for 
one dollar and sold each f or 80 dollars, 
289 but the tenor of his remark 
was accurate. 
The great chiefs of Dahomey benefitted in proportion to their rank, 
and rank and riches depended on the number of retainers they could send 
to war. 
290 The monarch stood highest in rank, greatest in riches and 
pre-eminent in his ability to put soldiers in the f ield. His rewards 
were thus commensurate. In addition to the captives taken by the 
amazons, standing army and district contingents, he was also entitled to 
71. 
those captives unfit for the market, a proportion of whom were sent to 
the royal palaces to undertake duties, 
291 
and some at least who were 
dispatched by human sacrifice to undertake duties for the ancestors. 
292 
The captives taken in the annual campaign were thus split into those 
distributed to the royal plantations or palaces, those taken by the 
monarch as concubines or export slaves, those distributed to the Dahomean 
aristocracy, and those sacrificed. 
293 
Thus the King and his ministers 
were all major beneficiaries in terms of captives derived from the annual 
campaign, and were all major 'producers' or procurers of slaves bound for 
the export trade. 
294 
Many of the great officers of state are recorded 
as major slave vendors, 
295 
and it was estimated during the 19th century 
that . around 40 per cent of the slaves exported from Whydah were supplied 
by the monarch himself. 
296 For da Souza, who initially backed and 
financed Gezo's coup and who was subsequently rewarded with the right to 
market the King's slaves, the coup provided rich rewards indeed. For 
the monarch and his leading men, annual slave raiding provided a 
mechanism of enhancing their status as warriors and providing the 
material benefits with which to bolster their domestic political power. 
War, then, was for 19th century Dahomey a way of lif e. 
297 
Forbes 
comments that "strange and contradictory though it may sound, this great 
nation is no nation but a Bandiiti" 
298 
contained more than an element 
of truth despite its crudeness. And Burton's recognition that "The 
army, or, what is nearly sy-nonomd-us, the nation of Dahomey . 
299 
reflected more than just the Dahomeans' obsession with military 
parades. It went to the heart of Dahomey's social and political 
structure. But it was also an important insight into Dahomey's economic 
72. 
formation. For the aristocracy, war was far more than a mere extension 
of diplomacy by other means; it was "an industry in its own right 
an economic activity by' which both the labour needed f or domestic 
purposes and the purchasing power needed to acquire f oreign imports was 
mobilised". 
300 
To some extent, of course, Dahomey had always been a slave raiding 
and a slave trading state. It serves little purpose here to become 
further embroiled in the debate over the motivations which inspired 
Dahomean wars in the 17th and early 18th centuries. 
301 
Motives may be 
quite different from causes, and the former need not be conceived in 
economic terms by those thus motivated. 
302 
It can, therefore, be 
accepted that the wars waged by Dahomean monarchs "were fought for many 
reasons, of which the sale of prisoners to the coast was only one". 
303 
Nevertheless, from the time of their emergence as a major power 
Dahomey, or more specifically the Dahomean leadership, benefited 
enormously from slave sales. Firstly, the Dahomean state acted as a 
middleman, prohibiting the transportation of slaves bound for exports 
through its territory for sale to the Europeans on the coast other than 
through the medium of Dahomean merchant brokers. 
304 Thus Dahomean 
merchants benefittedý through Dahomean territorial and political control 
from the trans-Atlantic trade. 
More importantly, Dahomey was a producer of slaves. Though the 
monarch did also benefit indirectly from the trade through the imposition 
of trade and customs dues on both European and Dahomean traders , 
305 
the 
pure commercial transaction - the purchase and re-sale of slaves - was 
considered ignoble for the status of the warrior monarch. 
306 
He and 
73. 
the aristocracy were, however, heavily involved in the sale of caPtives 
taken in war by Dahomean soldiers to whom they were entitled as the 
supreme warriors, on payment of a token amount. 
307 
The role which slave raiding played in 19th century Dahomey cannot be 
appreciated merely by comparing the estimated income from the slave trade 
with an assumed GNP, 
308 
since the activity of slave raiding embodied 
the economic, political and ideological characteristics on which the 
Dahomean aristocracy's power rested. As such it is central to an 
understanding of the dynamics of political economy in the Kingdom. 
Dahomey has already received a fair share of the considerable 
309 
attention which has been devoted to African political economy. 
Karl Polanyi and the substantivist school have stressed the autonomy of 
the Dahomean social formation from capitalist influences. For them 
Dahomey has provided a model of an "archaic economy it , where economic 
forces were completely subordinated to political decisions; where 
administered trade, governmental price fixing, the isolation of Whydah as 
a 'Port of Trade, and the redistributive role of leadership 
characterised a society which had remained largely immune from contact by 
the west and in which economics was subordinated to politics. 
310 
Others, drawing more extensively from empirical data have exposed the 
deficiencies in the substantivist interpretation. 
311 Much of this 
historiography has revolved around the Marxian terminology of a mode of 
production. 
Jean Suret Canale has suggested that African societies can be 
incorporated within Marx's Asiatic mode of production, 
312 
with 
appropriation occurring by a tax in kind on village production by the 
74. 
privileged strata. 
313 
Coquery-Vidrovitch suggests a distinct African 
mode of production in which the Af rican despot exploited his neighbours 
more than his subjects, and identifies long distance trade as the 
mechanism by which the major part of his economic sustenance was 
obtained. 
314 Attention has been given to a "slave labour" mode of 
production as a feature of Dahomean society. 
315 
Manning, in the most 
recent major work on Dahomey, is more eclectic. Drawing on Marx and 
Walras, he argues that Southern Dahomey as a whole was characterised by 
the "commodity exchange mode of production". 
316 
Despite the problems involved in allocating the social formation in 
Dahomey into pre-ordained categories first formulated on the basis of 
empirical data which largely excluded African societies, this latter 
approach has provided valuable insights into the workings of both the 
economy and political power. However, it has its limitations. 
Firstly because of the imprecise nature of the "mode of production" 
concept itself. Marx's own use of the term is ambiguous and at times 
apparently contradictory. On some occasions it is employed with 
reference to the economic - as distinct from social, political or 
ideological - relations within society, 
317 
and on others to the 
totality of economic,, social, political and intellectual relations in 
society- 
318 
In addition, the concept of a mode of production does present 
peculiar problems because of the vital economic and political role played 
by slave raiding in Dahomey. Marx gave consideration to slaves as 
money 
319 
and as money-capital investment. 
320 He reviewed slaves as 
general producers, 
321 
as commodity producers, 
322 
as producers of 
75. 
commodities directed towards the international capitalist market323 and 
he examined their role as a contributory element in the primitive 
accumulation of capital. 
324 
But while he conceded the commodity 
nature of slaves themselves his references to this aspect are sparse and 
directed at the level of the exchange of slaves rather than the 
procuration of slaves. 
325 
The actual method of slave procuration 
merits little attention in his deliberations and was treated as a 
secondary and peripheral aspect of his central concern, the importing 
nations of the west. 
326 
At one level, of course, even if human beings are regarded merely as 
another natural resource, it is difficult to classify slave raiding as a 
productive process in which the value of the product bears any relation 
to the labour expended in producing it. Rather, it is a parasitical 
process akin to plunder, a redistributive rather than a productive system. 
At another level, however, the Dahomean annual raid was indeed a 
production process. It was organised and systematic. The product of 
that organisation was for the most part, treated as commodity. The 
commodity was exchanged and its value was realised through the exchange 
process. Above all, it was a process through which the value realised 
in exchange was appropriated by the aristocracy through the differential 
distribution of the proceeds. 
In fact, slave raiding for the Atlantic trade was a peculiar, hybrid 
process, forged on the anvil of a capitalist market by the 
hammer of the 
rapacious, militarism of a pre-capitalist society. Thus, the concept of 
a mode of production, based largely on 
data drawn from industrial 
societies will not suffice. Neither will a substantivist approach 
76. 
concerned to illustrate the economic insulation of Dahomey from 
international capitalism. The role of slave raiding in the political 
economy of Dahomey was a product of both but the image of neither. 
327 
As such., it can be described in terms of either, but can be most usefully 
explained in terms of the appropriation and distribution of surplus 
within the Kingdom. Here, the crucial nature of the process of slave 
raiding for the Dahomean aristocracy becomes clear. 
The real question is not whether the political economy of Dahomey can 
be reconciled with one or more . previously 
formulated modes of 
production. It lies in an explanation of whether, and in what manner 
the surplus product of one section of the Dahomean population was 
appropriated by another. "The essential difference between the various 
economic f orms of society ... lies only in the mode in which this 
surplus labour is in each case extracted from the actual producer, the 
labourer. . 
328 
It is within this context that slave raiding and supply was crucial 
to the question of political and economic power within the Kingdom of 
Dahomey. Its importance centred on the appropriation and distribution 
of the products other than those needed for requirements of subsistence. 
Appropriation of agricultural and related products was useless beyond 
a certain point. Moreover, the utility of f ood appropriation f rom the 
general population was lessened by the existence of the slave plantations 
of the aristocracy and by the labour of royal wives. Indeed the general 
levy on agricultural produce appears to have been of major importance 
only as regards the Annual Customs and the annual campaign. Otherwise 
it was limited to products like salt or fish whose production was 
77. 
localised in certain areas. 
329 
The limited benefits to be gained from 
the accumulation of the products of an agriculturally based society 
constrained the differentiation between social classes. The aperture of 
the Atlantic Trade, however, allowed the accumulation of scarce and 
prestigious resources which increased these divisions and reinforced both 
economic and social status, thus immeasurably increasing political 
control. 
In terms of political power a system of slave raiding was the vehicle 
through which the social position of a warrior aristocracy was 
transformed from one of primus-inter-pares into one of a distinct social 
class standing over and against the great mass of the Dahomean population. 
For the Kingdom of Dahomey as a whole, the product of annual raiding 
was largely surplus to the requirements of the domestic economy. That 
was precisely its value to the aristocracy who disproportionately 
benefited from their power to monopolise that product and the exchange 
goods realised through it. 
For the Dahomean aristocracy, militarism was indispensible to the 
appropriation of the material basis of their political power. Their 
economic sustenance was drawn from various sources; direct production of 
foodstuffs by plantation slaves, levies on agricultural and craft 
production, taxation on trade and on people by means of a head tax, 
privileged trading rights and direct involvement in the supply of slaves 
for the Atlantic trade. The same essential feature underlay all these 
various forms of appropriation - the control of people. Militarism - 
internal coercive power, external aggression and an all-pervasive warrior 
ethos - provided both the means of popular control and the mechanism, 
for 
translating such control into the material basis of political power. 
78. 
The militaristic aspect of the Dahomean monarch was by no means 
incompatible with his position as custodian of the nation's fortunes and 
the main vehicle through which the wealth of the nation was seen to be 
redistributed to the benefit of all. Far from detracting from the 
redistributive role of the monarch, it actually heightened it through the 
undertaking of national campaigns, the victorious spoils from which were 
ostentatiously distributed at the Annual Customs. Even the 'captive 
price' paid by the monarch to successful soldiers, though considerably 
less than the market value of a slave, was a further manifestation of the 
monarch's direct participation in, and identification with, the 
distribution of benefits garnered through the nations martial prowess. 
The growth of annual raiding, threfore, did not negate but heightened the 
perception of the protective monarchy, redistributing the spoils of the 
Nation's efforts to the benefit of the whole Nation. 
330 
Thus, militarism was economically functional to the 19th century 
Dahomean state and in particular to the domination of that state by the 
warrior aristocracy. The major vehicle by which militarism was 
translated into their material advantage and social status was the 
Atlantic slave trade. 
The military corvee of Dahomeans during the annual campaign was also 
the mechanism through which surplus was extracted from the Dahomean 
population on a scale and in a form which maximised the benefits to the 
aristocracy. The agricultural levy, as we have seen, played an 
essentially supportive role in this process, providing the sustenance 
necessary for the Customs prior to the campaign, and the foodstuffs 
required during the campaign itself. 
79. 
If slave raiding was the process by which the aristocracy 
appropriated the surplus product in a form most advantageous to 
themselves, the key to domination of this economic process was the 
control of labour. Exact details of the origins of such domination by a 
relatively small group of Dahomeans remains a matter of speculation, but 
it is likely that a crucial element was the emergence of a military caste 
as a necessary corollary of the Fon's early struggle for survival. The 
social formation which arose out of the militarisation of Fon society was 
dominated by a warrior aristocracy who were later uniquely placed to 
dominate the system of slave procuration by virtue of their control of 
people. 
In Dahomey, which had a high ratio of fertile land to labour, 
331 
the conquest and control of people had, as elsewhere in Af rica, long been 
a central feature of political power. 
332 
Such control might be 
exercised in a number of ways. But in a society in which the control of 
labour was of paramount importance, women were doubly valuable - as 
labour and as the producers of further labour. 
This was particularly true in the exercise of influence through 
kinship, rendering the control or acquisition of women - as both people 
and the producer of further kinship linked people - an economic 
imperative. 
333 The levying of children by the monarch and his 
distribution of females as wives to his favoured men at the customs were 
two aspects of this phenomenon. 
334 Long before the 19th century 
Norris reported that "the people of rank engross the major part of the 
women IV , 
335 
and from an early stage the monarchy apparently supplemented 
their control of labour by imposing a levy on the children of Dahomean 
80. 
subjects. 
336 
The origins of this tradition are unclear although it is 
possible that it was originally related to agricultural production, 
337 
or perhaps to the desire to distribute rewards to those who had 
distinguished themselves in war. 
338 
Later, however, it was this tradition that Gezo utilized in order 
initially to rebuild his Amazon corps by commandeering the female 
children of his subjects, 
339 
and throughout his reign the levy remained 
an important method of renewing the fighting strength of the Amazons by 
the allocation of young females to each Amazon company. 
340 
But the political value of women lay essentially in their value as 
the producers of further labour. 
341 
In this context the monarch's 
control of labour was further reinforced by a prerogative of the royal 
family to retain paternal power over the children of both male and female 
members. 
342 And a marked tendency developed for the families of 
leading ministers to adopt similar marriage forms which ensured their 
maximum control of future off-spring. 
343 
As with the achievement of status, so too the major mechanism for 
obtaining control of f emale labour in Dahomey lay in martial prowess. 
Women could be purchased, even from the monarch, 
344 
and certain 
officials, particularly those in charge of prisons, benefited from the 
rights of offspring born to females in their charge. 
345 
But in the 
19th century, acts of bravery or valour appear to have constituted the 
major opportunity for both official and commoner, since the monarch 
'dashed' female slaves, palace women or daughters to those who 
distinguished themselves in combat. 
346 Butý significl-:: Lntly, the 
monarch reserved the rights to female offspring of certain female slaves 
given in marriage to his officials and ministers. 
347 
81. 
The social tensions arising from the monopolisation of women by a 
relatively small number of Dahomeans were eased by the incidence of 
prostitution throughout the kingdom. 
348 
Control of labour was also secured by clientage or the attraction of 
followers, which could best be achieved through a combination of personal 
status, wealth .- itself measured in terms of control of people, 
349 
_ 
ostentatious consumption patterns and the distribution of prestigious or 
scarce resources. 
Outright coercion, varying in the degree of severity from domestic 
slavery to plantation slavery could be employed. Finally control might 
be exercised by patronage and the bestowal of preferential of 
advantageous social, political or economic status on the recipient. 
In this context, slave raiding and the Atlantic slave trade played a 
vital role in the pattern of economic and political control in 19th 
century Dahomey. On the one hand, since the 'production' or procuration 
of slaves could only be undertaken on the scale necessary by those in a 
position to monopolise the input of people, firearms and military 
leadership which were essential. And, on the other hand, because of the 
monopolisation of rewards consequent upon this ability to provide the 
necessary means of procuration. In practice this meant the direct 
appropriation of captives f or use in internal production, which directly 
enhanced the aristocracy's control over people. 
350 
And secondly it meant the virtual monopolisation of imported western 
goods by the aristocracy, through the import-export sector. These 
imported goods played a vital economic role insofar as they provided the 
firearms necessary for any future large scale acquisition of slaves. 
82. 
But they also played a vital political role as means of domestic control, 
(firearms) and as means of obtaining highly prestigious and scarce 
'luxury' goods which were indispensible in acquiring followers and 
clients. The primary reason for exerting administrative control over 
the slave export-import market was precisely its importance in bolstering 
the political power and social status of the aristocracy. 
Thus the dominance of martial values in Dahomean society itself can 
be explained and understood with reference to the economic character of 
the Dahomean state. 
351 
The distinction between motives and underlying 
causes is one which is not merely applicable to Dahomey or, for that 
matter, to a pre-industrial society. The capitalist entrepreneur may 
have a considerable range of motives other than the realisation of 
personal profit - the creation of wealth f or the community, the provision 
of badly needed jobs and charitable intent among them. One thing, 
however, is certain; should he cease to realise profits, then he will 
soon cease to be a capitalist entrepreneur, for solid economic reasons. 
So too, in martial Dahomey, a warrior aristocracy which ceased slave 
raiding and the conversion of captives into politically and economically 
important imported goods, would soon face social and political decline, 
as Gezo's immediate predecessors found to their cost. 
Within Dahomey, then, the appropriation of surplus was not confined 
to one single mechanism. As has been indicated, surplus was extracted 
through levies in kind, direct and- indirect taxation, the use of slave 
labour and domination of trade. But slave raiding and the products of 
raiding cannot be evaluated merely in quantitative terms as a proportion 
of all Dahomean economic activity, because the nature of the exchange 
83. 
commodities thus obtained were of vital importance to the maintenance of 
political power. 
As a corollary, the demise of the slave trade undermined this vital 
element of - the aristocracy's dominance at the same time as their control 
of labour was being further weakened by the opportunities being opened up 
to the general population by a developing palm oil trade. 
During the half century 1830-80 Dahomean politics can be seen largely 
in the context of the response of the Dahomean warrior aristocracy to 
these economic changes which threatened the very foundations of a 
Dahomean social formation which they had come to dominate with few 
parallels in West Africa. Although the pinnacle of monarchical and 
aristocratic' power was reached under Gezo, the circumstances which gave 
rise to it were soon to change. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BEGINNINGS 
Background and development of the early Dahomean palm oil trade, 
c. 1588-1840 
The beginnings of the palm oil trade in Dahomey gave no indication of 
the contribution which it was eventually to make towards the undermining 
of established Dahomean economic relationships and political power. The 
tree and its fruits sprung not from alien imposition, as did so many 
plantation products elsewhere in the world, but from the fertile soil of 
the West Coast itself. The manufacturing skills associated with oil and 
other palm produce were indigenous to the West Coast rather than borrowed 
f rom abroad. And long bef ore - its properties and produce oiled the 
wheels and enriched the traders of the New World they had enriched the 
domestic lives of the Dahomean Kingdom. 
TECHNICAL DATA ON PALM OIL AND PRODUCTION 
There are practically only two types of oil palm in West Africa. 
The first of these, the King Palm, favours the sandy country bordering 
the sea shore; Elaeis Gui-neensis, var. Thompsoni. 
The second, which provided by f ar the greatest proportion of the oil 
involved in the West Coast trade, and with which we are therefore mainly 
concerned here, bears the botannical name Elaeis Guineensis, and belongs 
1 
to the order of plants known as Palmae, type Cocoineae. It is 
hereafter referred to as the Oil Palm. It was the latter which provided 
the basic source of the domestic, and later export oil f rom the Kingdom 
of Dahomey. 
2 
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The Oil Palm grows to a height of about 30-60 feet, commences to bear 
fruit from about 4-6 years of age, achieves full bearing around 12, and 
continues to furnish fruit for between 50-60 years. 
3 
On average, a 
single palm yields 5 bunches of f ruit per annum, although they have been 
known to yield up to 11 in ideal conditions. In a wet year, the yield 
of the Dahomean oil palm appears to have been nearer 6-8 bunches. 
4 
The optimum period for collection of the palm nut and the manufacture 
of palm oil in Dahomey appears to have been f rom around March until July 
or August, 
5a fact which was to prove to be not without consequence as 
the palm oil trade developed in Dahomey. 
It has already been mentioned that the Oil Palm commenced to produce 
the fruit f rom which the oil is extracted at around 4-6 years of age. 
But the trees themselves were not "farmed" in the ordinary sense. The 
normal method of cultivation involved "transplantation" rather than 
selective breeding f rom plantation stock; sprouts gathered in the bush 
from seedlings of wild palms were uprooted and replanted, a process which 
continued into the 20th century. 
6 
The trees themselves required little attention once they began to 
bear fruit. 7 However, their physical environment could enhance or 
curtail their longevity and yield, factors which were to some extent 
dependent upon the quantity and nature of the surrounding vegetation. 
8 
Oil could be produced both f rom the kernel of the f ruit, or f rom the 
sof t pericarp which forms between the kernel and the outside shell of the 
nut. Large scale production of palm kernel oil, however, had to await 
the introduction of more sophisticated machinery and techniques onto the 
West Coast, and it is the pericarp oil which mainly concerns us in the 
following remarks. 
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Oil production methods varied all along the coast. Occasionally the 
technique employed involved the use of imported European thin cloth f or 
pressing out the oil from the fruit. 
9 
The more normal and widespread 
technique, however, involved a fairly straightforward combination of 
boiling and pressing, although the relative emphasis on, and sequence of 
these two aspects might vary considerably. 
10 
Perhaps the best description which we have of the Dahomean method of 
manufacture in the period of the independent kingdom has been left to us 
by Forbes, in an account of his visit to Quenun's plantation. 
11 The 
collected nuts were first stored in pits beaten out of the earth and 
surrounded by switch, until about two thirds full; this, . apart f rom 
accumulating a suitable quantity for boiling and pressing would also 
allow some time for the fermentation of the nuts. The kernels were 
extracted from the nuts and the pericarp trodden out by foot. The 
resulting combination of husk, pulp and oil was then boiled in water, in 
earthen vessels, and the oil, separating from the husks and floating to 
the top, was skimmed off and stored. 
TRADITIONAL USE OF PALM OIL 
Few natural products exceeded in the breadth of their economic and 
social utility that of the palm tree in pre-colonial West Africa. Long 
before its emergence as a major export commodity, or its application to 
the industrial and urban development of western Europe, the palm tree 
furnished the peoples of the forest belt of the West Coast with a central 
element of their everyday life. 
12 The area encompassed by the 19th 
century Kingdom of Dahomey was no exception. 
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Both the branches and the leaves of the tree itself could be used in 
the construction of houses, 
13 
while palm kernels - left after the 
extraction of oil f rom the pericarp - were occasionally employed in the 
construction of floors in the more prestigious or sacred dwellings' 
14 
The use of palm oil in cooking is well enough known to require no 
elucidation, 
15 but it is perhaps worth noting its particularly 
important application in a warrior state like Dahomey in furnishing 
provisions for the army during campaigns. 
16 
The Oil Palm provided not only food, but also drink. Even after the 
prohibition of palm wine by Gezo, for instance, palm wine continued to be 
produced outside the metropolitan areas of the Kingdom, and imports f rom 
the "bush" ensured its availability in markets throughout Dahomey. 
17 
Less often remarked upon, but probably just as important in an area of 
scarce water supplies, was the role of palm oil in the lagging of water 
pits constructed for the collection of rain water. 
18 
Not only the oil extracted from the palm fruit, but also the residue 
from the extraction process was utilised, mainly as a form of fuel, both 
domestic fuel and as material for stoking the furnaces of blacksmiths and 
iron-workers around Abomey. 
19 Husks from the extraction process also 
served as a manure or fertilizer. 
The oil itself, in a less well-refined variety than that required for 
cooking, when contained in an earthen jar and accompanied by a makeshift 
wick - often made of palm husks - provided the standard Dahomean means of 
illumination. 20 
A proportion of the domestic consumption of palm oil was employed, 
like a proportion of the oil exported, in the manufacture of soap; 
21 
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it also served, when applied to the body, as an embrocation or 
beautification treatment, and was of particular importance during 
religious ceremonies. The religious uses of oil went further. Both 
the oil itself - usually mixed with cor-n -and the kernels of the fruit, 
were used as "fetish" in some -areas of the kingdom. 
22 
Indeed, the 
persistence of the religious and ceremonial connotations of palm produce 
into the 20th century of f ers testimony to its historic social importance 
in Dahomey. 23 
The importance of the palm tree and palm oil in Dahomey in the period 
prior to the great expansion of the oil export trade had serious 
implications f or. later developments. The widespread access to the tree 
and its fruit, the fairly straightforward method of. oil production, a 
widespread knowledge of the technique for extraction, rights of family 
ownership to what grew on the land including palm trees, the lack of any 
advanced technology in production and, above all, the centrally 
important role of the palm and its oil in the domestic social lif e, all 
combined to minimise the possibility of controlling its production, or 
limiting it to any great extent should this prove politically or 
economically useful to the central government. 
THE EARLY EXPORT TRADE 
But in the early stages of the palm oil export trade no serious 
incompatibility between domestic requirements and commercial interchange 
with the western powers was evident. Indeed the export trade had 
provided an incidental and welcome adjunct to the production of palm oil 
for domestic consumption for centuries prior to the major "take-off" in 
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exports to western Europe. Although European industrialisation and 
urbanisation undoubtedly provided a major stimulus to the export trade, 
smaller quantities had been exported from West African coastal regions 
for a considerable period preceeding the industrial revolution. 
Palm oil imports to Britain, f or instance, are recorded as early as 
1588-90, when a Captain Welsh returned on two occasions with loads of 
palm oil (among other commodities) brought from Benin, although the 
amounts involved - 32 barrels on the second occasion - were negliglble 
compared to later 19th century imports. 
24 
Oil imports remained at these relatively insignificant figures, as 
far as the British example is concerned, throughout the 17th and 18th 
centuries. By 1790, total UK imports of oil from the West Coast did not 
exceed 130 tons. 
25 Nevertheless, these figures do not tell the whole 
story; for, by the onset of the 19th century palm oil was a sufficiently 
well established secondary commodity in the West Coast trade to Br--'Ltain 
to feature along with slaves and ivory on an inventory of commodities to 
be sought issued to a Captain bound for the Bight of Biafra. 
26 
By 
1832, the area from the Gold Coast to the Bight of Benin inclusive, 
supplied Britain with 10,000 tons. 
27 
At least some of this early export trade in palm oil emanated from 
within the area constituted by the 18th century Kingdom of Dahomey, an 
export trade pre-dating by over two centuries that claimed by later 
French and British agents as the first "legal" trade in exports from the 
Dahomean coast. 
28 
In the first decades of the 17th century palm oil destined for use in 
the island of St. Thome was exported along with yams, native cloth, 
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slaves and ivory from the kingdom of Allada . 
29 
This latter area 
furnished part of the oil flowing from the West Coast to Britain in the 
early 1770s, 
30 
and it may well be that production of oil f or export at 
Allada had continued throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Allada was 
generously endowed with palm trees which furnished the local population 
with sufficient surplus above domestic requirements for purposes of 
trade, and a proportion of the oil was carried to Whydah market for 
shipping aboard European vessels, destined for the use of British 
31 
wool-combers and soap manufacturers. 
The connection with the Portuguese and St. Thome might also indicate 
that part of the outlet for palm oil exports was to Brazil, whose 
increasing slave population included in their diet considerable amounts 
of oil. 
32 Returning slave ships could employ the oil on the homeward 
journey in the knowledge that any surplus over and above the requirements 
of the passage could be disposed of on their arrival at the home port. 
It has been suggested that cultivation of the oil palm and the 
coconut tree was commenced in Dahomey at the beginning of the 19th 
century, in the reign of Adandozan, but there is, unf ortunately, no 
corroborative evidence on this point. 
33 
It seems clear, however that palm oil f or exchange and possible 
export continued to arrive at Whydah throughout the late decades of the 
18th century. This is confirmed not only by Norris, 
34 but also by 
Denyau, who was an employee and later director of the French fort at 
Whydah for a period of 13 years during the 1780s and 1790s, and who 
reported that palm oil could be obtained there in abundance, and of f ered 
encouraging prospects for French traders. 
35 
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This situation appears to have continued for some time after the turn 
of the century. M'Leod, who visited Whydah in 1803, included palm oil 
in the list of commodities which had attracted western traders to the 
country over the previous century. 
36 
Between 1803 and 1816 there is no available evidence to indicate the 
level of palm oil exports. There are some grounds for assuming that the 
export trade continued, small but unabated; although M'Leod's visit took 
place in 1803, the publication of his book did not appear until -1820, and 
some sections of it had obviously been revised in the light of events in 
the interim period. It might thus be assumed that a dramatic decline in 
the palm oil trade - or trade generally - would be mentioned had this 
occurred between his visit and the date of publication. 
However, M'Leod is not the most specific or the most accurate of 
observers. Moreover, in 1816, four years prior to the publication of 
his work, the British Government Commissioners reporting to the Select 
Committee on (papers relative to) African Forts of Great Britain 
commented unequivocally that if the establishment of Whydah ought 
unquestionably to be given up -. it is totally useless, being without any 
trade and the ferocious king of Dahomey in whose territory it is 
situated, so tyrannizes over the governor and the few people about him, 
as to render such subjection utterly disgraceful to the British Flag. " 
37 
It is probable that the export trade in oil through Whydah was in 
decline throughout this' period, not because of factors relating to the 
palm oil trade per se, but rather as part of a more general decline of 
the export trade through that port. Palm oil had been a secondary 
export commodity alongside, and to some extent dependent upon, the export 
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trade in slaves. The establishment of Porto Novo and the re-routing of 
Oyo's trade through that port from the 1770s, the subsequent rise of 
Lagos in terms of export trade, the general interruption of shipping 
caused by the American War, and the abolition of the slave trade 
obviously all affected the trade at Whydah. 
38 
It does appear, however, that the export trade in palm oil under-went 
a temporary resurrection in the early years of Gezo's reign. A number 
of factors may have contributed towards its revitalisation. Firstly, 
and perhaps most obviously a change in the Dahomean leadership itself 
following the successful coup of 1818. Trade in general was given an 
intentional stimulus by the new regime; Gezo, within a short period of 
his successful takeover, rearranged the trading system at 'Whydah, 
encouraging Oyo, Nupe and Akan (or Gonja) traders to utilize Whydah as an 
embarkation port for slaves, and sent messengers as far as the Gold Coast 
to encourage the British to return and re-occupy the Fort at Whydah. 
39 
Secondly, Gezo's recently found political and economic ally, 
Francisco Felix da Souza, appears to have involved himself in the oil 
trade at least until such times as later developments ensured slave 
supplies and profits in such quantities as to render the comparatively 
marginal profits of the oil export trade unworthy of attention. 
40 
During the early 1820s, although the principal trade at Whydah was 
still in human cargoes, 
41 
palm oil exports may have been rendered more 
attractive by the world prices for _palm oil, particularly as reflected 
in 
the British market, where oil prices reached their century's peak around 
1818. British palm oil prices which had been running at around E40 per 
ton between 1812 and 1817,42 peaked at E70 per ton in the last quarter 
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of 1818, having maintained a general price of E60 throughout that 
43 
year. 
Whether such increases in Britain were reflected proportionately on 
the West African Coast remains uncertain; however., it is likely that 
allowing for a time-lag such European increases would have the effect of 
increasing demand and prices on the West Coast, thus encouraging traders 
like da Souza to maintain an interest in the trade. Certainly, the oil 
trade was prominent at Whydah by 1821, according to the evidence of a 
visiting French Captain who stated that "The commerce of Whydah consists 
only of slaves and palm oil; there is found there very little ivory, and 
. 44 not an ounce of gold. 
The European price escalation -was, however, temporary. The price of 
oil in Britain, for instance, fell steadily throughout the next few 
years, stabilizing between E24 and E27 a ton from around 1822 
onwards. 
45 
Assuming again that the effect of this fall was felt with 
some time-lag on the West Coast, this would probably have occurred in 
late 1822 or early 1823. The discarding of the trade by major traders 
like da Souza may well have been stimulated both by the relative 
unprofitability of palm oil trade as a result of the fall in prices, and 
by the increased access to supplies of slaves for export as a result of 
the disintegration of the Oyo Empire in the early 1820s. 
Da Souza continued to participate intermittently in the oil trade in 
the following decade, mainly at times when "the slave trade was so 
bad. " 46 He was also instrumental in the establishment of a British 
interest in the oil trade at Badagry by intercession with Gezo, but the 
venture was short-lived, allegedly because of Gezo's resentment that 
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native energies were being chanelled into the collection of palm oil to 
the detriment of the collection of slaves. 
47 
Up until the late 1830s, 
therefore, the Dahomean export trade in palm oil remained small and 
circumscribed by obstacles to its growth. France imported virtually no 
palm oil at all from the West Coast prior to 1832,48 and 'the total 
exports from Whydah were probably no more than around 100 tons. 
49 
OBSTACLES TO THE EARLY PALM OIL TRADE 
The constraints on the growth of the legitimate commerce were 
numerous. The slave trade offered relatively higher returns for little 
outlay in labour so far as the traders were concerned -a complaint 
frequently voiced by European merchants on other parts of the coast 
besides Whydah. 50 According to the same parties., the thriving slave 
trade also limited the palm oil export trade by encouraging the sale of 
slaves rather than their retention for the collection of palm f ruits and 
the . production of palm oil. 
51 
The slave trade, moreover, provided access not only to the products 
of South America - mainly tobacco - but also the means of procuring the 
manufactured products of Western Europe. The domestic demand for 
European products could be satisfied by means of doubloons, carried to 
Dahomey by Brazilian slave ships and paid in part exchange for slave 
52 
cargoes. 
In addition, physical trading facilities - necessary for any 
significant expansion of the oil trade - were lacking up until the end of 
the 1830s. It is true that some Whydah traders did continue to deal in 
palm oil on a small scale. 
53 But while even da Souza might be counted 
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upon for the occasional cargo, 
54 
since he as the most prominent and 
influential trader at Whydah found it generally unattractive, the 
on-shore bases f or the collection, storage and exchange of oil were 
limited to a small number of Spanish traders. 
55 
Even those of the smaller traders who had achieved some success in 
the oil trade and were prepared to offer an on-shore base, were 
themselves further limited by the lack of suitable means of storing the 
oil. Barrels were of little use since workmen with even rudimentary 
cooperage skills were entirely absent at this stage of the trade's 
development. The use of stronger, longer lasting cast-iron strengthened 
casks involved prohibitive costs. Even the use of domestically produced 
Jars offered no solution to storage problems, because they were not 
manufactured in sufficiently large sizes to permit storage in any great 
quantity. 
56 
Thus, up until 1839, the bulk of the palm oil was collected by 
methods which were piecemeal and haphazard. . 
Ships' captains acting f or 
European firms like Regis, who had himself been sending ships f rom 1832, 
anchored in the Whydah Roads and awaited what oil they might be offered 
in greater or smaller bulk. 
57 
Whydah, of all places on the coast, was doubly unsuitable f or such a 
trading scenario. It offered no outlet from the lagoon to the sea, no 
bay or river mouth, and with its reputation as one of the most physically 
arduous loading sites on a coastline full of them, it lacked the 
necessary facilities to maximise the potential growth of the oil trade. 
The sheer physical difficulties of embarkation at Whydah are sometimes 
overlooked. It was far from being an ideal port for the embarkation of 
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palm oil produce; particularly on account of the surf) which always 
rendered loading difficult and hazardous, and frequently made the beach 
inaccessible for long periods. 
58 
It was impossible to effect landing by boats, even under normal 
circumstances, and required the use of landing crews 
59 
normally 
recruited - on the Gold Coast. 
60 Accra canoes were employed for goods, 
and Kru canoes for messengers. 
61 
Although canoes were -necessary f or the shipment of palm oil along 
most of 
. 
the coast, 
62 
Whydah was particularly_ disadvantaged. 
Campbell's assertion that a military landing might be effective at Whydah 
at any time from November to April - since during that period it was 
always smooth enough to land either in paddle-box boats, native canoes or 
canoe boats - was rather over-optimistic. 
63 Numerous commentators 
remarked upon the ef f ect of the weather upon the surf . Fraser reported 
that the weather stimulated the surf to its height during "several 
months" of the year, while Campbell, in July, remarked. that the weather 
had been particularly bad for the last f ew months. Dow has suggested 
that April to July were the worst months, and it is worth noting that 
Skertchly - who arrived off Whydah in July - had to wait over a week 
before he could even get ashore. 
64 It seems clear that conditions 
were at their worst during the Dahomean rainy season which also marked 
the main Dahomean palm oil season. The difficulties of embarkation at 
Whydah thus coincided critically with the period in which palm oil would 
be expected to be shipped from the coastal ports. 
These difficulties were exacerbated at Whydah by the distance which 
the palm oil had to be rolled to the beach f or shipment. This impeded 
127. 
the physical trade flow and was, as Beechcroft pointed out, an obstacle 
IV not to be easily surmounted". 
65 This point was also remarked upon by 
Baudin. 
66 Finally, the sea offered another hazard - sharks. 
67 
None of these problems were exclusive to Whydah, but they appear to 
have been greater in degree. In other coastal areas their solution was 
physically easier. Canoes were used elsewhere on the coast in the palm 
oil trade, but, particularly on the Oil Rivers, a relatively smooth 
loading bay was normally assured. Rope lines were employed for loading 
cargo at Porto Novo, Agoue and Cotonou, 
68 but the nature of the surf at 
Whydah necessitated ships lying in the roads some considerable distance 
from the shore during the bulk of the palm oil season and thus rendered 
the use of such contrivances more hazardous.. 
These organisational and physical difficulties presented severe 
impediments to the palm oil trade of a nature that required an off icial, 
systematic encouragement of the trade if they were to be overcome. Not 
unnaturally, in the early stages the oil trade remained relatively small 
in volume - 
Regis estimated that the total export f rom Whydah during the 1832-9 
period did not exceed fifty barrels, probably about 20 tons. 
69 
Although Regis' f igures have to be treated with caution in view of his 
incentive to underestimate the pre-existing export figures and thereby 
maximise his own subsequent commercial achievement, his estimate is 
probably accurate in indicating an extremely low level of palm oil 
exports during this period. Hutton, on his first visit to the port in 
1838-9, had considerable difficulty in filling even half a small 
vessel. 
70 
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THE START OF IMPROVED CONDITIONS c. 1840 
Low oil prices, a thriving slave trade, lack of adequate on-shore 
facilities) apathy or antipathy on the part of on-shore traders, a 
readily available and satisfactory means of access to European 
merchandise, all combined throughout the 1830s to prohibit any large 
scale growth of the trade. From the late 1830s and early 1840s, 
however, some of these aspects underwent changes which gave the impetus 
to a significant, if erratic, expansion of the oil trade. 
For instance, the availability of a medium of exchange to which the 
Dahomeans had access, and which was acceptable to the suppliers of 
European manufactured commodities, became much more restricted. Up 
until 1841, slave ships, mainly from Brazil, exchanged doubloons or 
dollars against slaves from the factories. The factories in turn 
purchased slaves from Dahomean suppliers in return for a mixture of 
goods, including those of European manufacture. The slave factories 
acquired much of their stock of exchangeable goods f rom European ships, 
mainly in return for specie - although they did also emplov for this 
purpose small amounts of gold dust, ivory or palm oil. 
71 
After the 
decline of the importation of Brazilian specie, palm oil provided the 
most easily procured of these possible intermediary commodities which 
were acceptable to European shippers, and therefore allowed access to 
their products. Thus it was that European traders like R&gis benefitted 
from the fall in the quantities of Brazilian specie arriving in 
Dahomey. 72 By the end of the 1830s, factory goods like cloth, powder 
and other European merchandise were no longer being acquired exclusively 
by specie. 
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It was at this stage, in the second half of the 1830's, that the 
production of palm oil, which had f or centuries occupied a central role 
in domestic Dahomean economic lif e but an almost incidental part in their 
commercial intercourse with the European powers, first began to shift 
from the periphery of economic and political affairs into a more central 
and determining role. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENCOURAGEMENT: 
The official sponsership of the Dahomean palm oil trade 
in response to the declining slave trade, c. 1837-45 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PALM OIL AND SLAVE TRADES 
The relationship between the rise of the palm oil trade and the slave 
trade has proved to be a point of some contention among historians, some 
suggesting that the initial stimulus for palm oil exports derived from 
the opportunity -to "plug into" a thriving slave trade, while others argue 
that 'the take-off of the palm oil trade was related to the demise of the 
slave trade. David Northrup, for instance, stresses the compatibility 
of the two trades; Bernard Schnapper, who takes a similar view as 
regards Dahomey is referred to more specifically later. 
2 
Clarification of this relationship is hampered by the subterfuge in 
which the slave trade was, of necessity, wrapped af ter the abolition of 
the Trade by the main European nations in the opening decades of the 19th 
century. Secrecy could make the difference between the return of a 
lucrative cargo, or heavy losses following the capture of a slaver by the 
anti-slavery squadron. 
3 
The lack of reliable statistics has led one 
historian to conclude that all that can be said with any certainty is 
4 
that the trade "was not suppressed by naval action - 
Others have been less cautious. One recent work, relating 
specifically to the Dahomean Kingdom asserts that the trade at Whydah did 
go into decline during the late 1830s and early 1840s. 
5 Such an 
argument has led to an interpretation that the palm oil trade "waxed" as 
the slave trade "waned". 
6 
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Yet another, and even more recent historian on the French trade on 
the West Coast, basing his conclusions essentially on evidence from the 
"demand" side of the equation - Latin America - rather than on the 
Dahomean "supply" side has argued that the slave trade was in fact in 
full flight at the time that the first large scale palm oil traders, like 
Regis, established themselves on the Dahomean coast and the palm oil 
exports reached significant proportions. 
7 
Case studies on Latin American shipping movements, with all their 
problems of interpretation and reliability as to the honesty of declared 
destinations, do suggest that there was little decline in the estimated 
departures and arrivals to and from the general area of the Slave 
Coast. 8 But statistics from the demand side - even assuming their 
reliability - do not distinguish between different parts of the Slave 
Coast. They allow the possibility that, while the slave trade was 
maintaining the same level or even developing in the Bight of Benin in 
general, it may have been declining at Whydah itself. To ascertain 
trade movements such as this, information from the area of the coast 
itself is liable to be more reliable. 
THE SLAVE TRADE IN DECLINE: LATE 1830's EARLY 1840's 
Such information does exist, and although impressionistic rather than 
statistical, it clearly indicates that there was a marked disruption and 
decline of slave exports from the major port of the Dahomean kingdom 
through the period from around 1838-44, at precisely the time when the 
palm oil trade first emerged as a significant factor in Dahomean trade. 
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In the mid-1830's . the slave trade at Whydah was still being carried 
on with "great activity". 
9 
By 1842) however, several observers 
testified before the British Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa 
that the export trade in slaves had diminished considerably, 
10 
and by 
1844 da Souza himself, while still continuing to export and receive 
income from the Trade. 
11 
was bemoaning the unprofitability of his 
formerly lucrative profession. 
12 
Other, more specific, evidence from the coast supports these general 
statements. Bouet-Willaumes, who visited the port in 1838, reported 
that the operation of the slave trade was being perceptibly displaced at 
Whydah towards Lagos and areas to the east of Dahomey. 
13 
Two years 
later, according to British trading authorities on the Gold Coast, Whydah 
was suffering along with the Oil Rivers from the general move of the 
slave trade towards more southerly ports. 
14 
It was this trend which was confirmed by a number of observers 
presenting evidence to the British 1842 Select Committee, notably Clegg 
and Swanzey - both familiar with recent events on the Coast. They 
commented on the decline of the Whydah slave trade in recent years, f rom 
around 1837, and remarked upon both the small number of visiting ships 
and the fall in the price of slaves. 
15 It is worth pointing out, 
however, that one of them believed that while the actual export of slaves 
from Whydah had decreased, large numbers were still being brought to the 
port from the interior. 
16 
R6gis, the French Merchant, similarly commented on the decline of the 
slave trade, although placing the start of the decline a little later, 
around 1841.17 But Regis' chronology was probably influenced by his 
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own establishment of a permanent on-shore base for palm oil on the 
Dahomean coast in that year. 
By 1844, another French visitor to Whydah could comment that despite 
the fact that the Trade continued unabated - indeed was developing in 
other parts of the West Coast - the Trade at Whydah itself was much 
reduced. He himself had seen the formerly full slave barracoons lying 
empty in testimony to its demise. 
18 
Finally the following year, yet another observer again attributed the 
extension of the palm oil trade at Whydah to the vigorous blockade of 
that part of the Coa: jt by Britain. 
19 
Thus, the evidence from first hand reports from Dahomey itself and 
the testimony of those best qualified to estimate the general state of 
the slave trade from the kingdom seems sufficiently consistent to 
indicate that the slave trade at Whydah was severely disrupted and in 
decline during the period c. 1837-1844. 
DA SOUZA AND THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE 
David Ross has already gone as far as to indicate what he believes 
were the specific reasons for the fall in the Trade in the late 1830s and 
1840s. According to Ross, bad financial management, incompetence, long 
delays and credit unworthiness of Francisco Felix da Souza had finally 
come home to roost. 
20 He argues-that "Whydah's difficulties were, 
. 
in 
fact, almost solely due to da Souza's incompetence and 
over-optimism. " 
21 As a result, da Souza was eventually demoted to the 
level of a Dahomean functionary, levying a tax at a rate of 1 doubloon 
per slave on those exported by other merchants. 
22 In f act, this 
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appears to be a misinterpretation on Ross's part. What Hutton appears 
to indicate is that da Souza stopped shipping slaves. A doubloon seems 
to be not a tax as such, but da Souza's profit on the slaves which he 
s old. 
23 
Moreover, the evidence relating to the causal relationship between 
the decline of da Souza a-ad the decline of the slave trade at Whydah is 
at least open to a different interpretation. 
For one thing, the recurrent testimony of visitors, even those 
opposed to da Souza's chosen profession - as to his politeness, 
correctness, civility and financial honesty, stands ill at ease with the 
characterisation of financial incompetence and unsavoury business 
reputation implied by the Ross thesis. 
24 
Secondly, his "demotion" is open to question. Such a move could 
just as well have been designed to compensate da Souza for a fall in 
income resulting f rom the decline of the slave trade f or reasons outwith 
his control or as part of a general dec. entralisation of the export trade 
in slaves necessitated by the conditions of the late 1830s, or both. 
Indeed, in those conditions, such a move may have been designed to secure 
economic advantage, rather than to indicate social disgrace. 
Furthermore, the fact - remarked upon by Ross himself - that it was 
the relatives and friends of da Souza to whom Gezo initially turned in an 
attempt - unsuccessful as it turned- out - to revive the slave trade - is 
revealing. Given that these were the very people on whom da Souza 
himself could, and very probably did, call upon for support in his 
financial dealings, they would represent a peculiar choice for a monarch 
supposedly attempting to remedy a situation caused by da Souza himself. 
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In fact it is more likely that their geographical dispersion was the key 
to their entry into the slave trade, as a result of the enforced 
decentralisation. of the trade through factors largely unrelated to da 
Souza. 
It is also noteworthy that da Souza himself continued until the end 
of the period at present under consideration - c. 1844 - to receive 
slaves for export from Gezo. In late 1843 and early 1844, for instance, 
he was in receipt of 800 slaves from the king. 
25 
This is a much lower 
figure than formerly, perhaps, and certainly part of a by now 
increasingly less profitable Trade. 
26 
Nevertheless, he was still 
receiving large numbers of slaves from the king and exporting slaves to a 
far greater extent than other Whydah merchants. In the same year, 1844, 
Dos Santos, for instance, managed to export only a total of 27 
slaves. 
27 Additionally, da Souza's credit-worthiness was still 
sufficiently good around 1844 for him to be receiving dispatches of 
bullion from Latin America. 28 
De Souza's fortunes were in decline. And -no doubt his own f inancial 
and social style contributed towards his further decline. But it is 
unlikely that he was the major, "almost the sole" cause of the trade 
misfortunes which both he and the main Dahomean port suffered from the 
end of the 1830s for the next few years. 
Rather, the reverse is trife. Da Souza's ostentatious and 
free-spending lifestyle made political sense; indeed they were 
politically indispensable for him and were economically compatible with 
his position during the thriving years of the slave trade. It only 
amounted to incompetence thereafter, in so far as the decline of the 
I 
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Trade - arising largely from factors outside da Souza's control - 
squeezed his income and profit margins. It was the decline of the 
export trade which ruined da Souza, rather than the reverse. 
GENERAL CAUSES OF THE DECLINE 
One of the main impediments to the health of the Whydah slave trade 
in the secon. d half of the 1830s was the increased activity and aggression 
of the anti-slavery squadron, a point which was noted by contemporary 
commentators. 
29 Perhaps the most ostentatious manifestation of the 
new anti-slavery drive was the destruction of the slave baraccons in the 
Gallinas. 
30 
AlthouRh direct naval action was, t-;; l<pn q. c,, qin-_t- Vhurinh qt- 
least once, 
31 direct activity of this nature was largely innapropriate 
at Whydah and most other parts of the leeward section of the coast. 
32 
But Whydah did not remain unaffected, and the consequences of the 
squadron's activity have sometimes been under-estimated. 
33 
The main demand f or Whydah slaves came through the * medium of the 
Latin American connection, f rom Cuba and Brazil, the Trade being carried 
out mainly by Portuguese, Spanish and Brazilians. Despite the actions 
of the squadron, such traffic had largely eluded their grasp up until the 
mid-1830s. In part, this stemmed from the unsuitable and cumbersome 
nature of the the squadron's vessels compared to those of the speed 
conscious slave merchants. But from around this period more effective 
ships, sometimes old slavers themselvesý were put into service by the 
Royal Navy for the pursuit of slavers. 
34 
More importantly, however, the squadron had previously been hindered 
by the overpowering burden of proof placed upon them to justify the 
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retention of suspected shipping. In practice, non-British shipping 
could only be detained by the squadron where slaves were actually found 
on board. 
35 
Prior to the introduction of what has been termed an 
it equipment clause", a slaver could remain immune f rom the squadron by 
remaining empty in port until sunset, then loading with slaves and making 
off during the day. Thus, the slaver could circumvent the cruiser and 
make safely off with a cargo. 
36 
In the event of being sighted with slaves on board prior to leaving 
Whydah, the shippers could attempt to disembark them again onto Whydah 
beach, and sometimes did so with success. 
37 
Even in the period after 
1816, when the Portuguese slave trade was outlawed north of the line, the 
opportunity for slave exports from Dahomey had continued largely 
unnabated because of the difficulties in catching the slavers with slaves 
aboard. 
The "equipment clause" was first incorporated in the 1835 British 
Treaty with Spain and from the mid-1830s it featured in all anti-slave 
treaties between Europeans and Americans. The range of items covered 
was comprehensive, and those specifically mentioned included hatches with 
open gratings, spare planks f or the construction of slave decks, slave 
irons, coppers for mass cooking, any extraordinary number of water casks, 
or other receptacles for holding large amounts of liquid. 
38 In short, 
the equipment necessary f or the ca'r-riage and survival of their reluctant 
human cargoes. 
Even more importantly, after repeated and largely unsuccessful 
pressure on the Portuguese authorities the British Parliament, in August 
1839, unilaterally authorised its squadron to detain Portuguese ships 
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suspected of involvement in the Trade on the basis of the above clause, 
and it empowered its Vice-Admiralty Courts to condemn such vessels. 
39 
By the end of that year, the British authorities on the West Coast were 
being given orders to implement the new instructions. 
40 
While the lack of reliable statistics as to the total number of slave 
shipments make it difficult to estimate the precise effect of the new 
anti-slavery drive by the British, the steep escalation in insurance 
premiums for the Trade testified to the increasing hazards of shipping 
slaves. 
41 
Much of the value of the enhanced efficiency of the anti-slavery 
drive lay in its deterrent effect. 
. 
It is not the case, f or instance, 
that large numbers of slave ships f rom Whydah were taken by the squadron 
during these years. 
42 
However, in view of the new power given to the 
squadron against Portuguese vessels, Whydah, a port reputed above all 
others north of the line f or its involvement in the Trade, was among the 
most hazardous from which to export, and one of the most closely watched. 
Nevertheless, the increased effectiveness of the anti-slavery 
squadron does not, on its own, account for the differential shift in 
slave exports from Whydah to other coastal ports. 
To some extent Whydah suffered from its reputation. Just as the 
prohibition of the Trade had helped push European traders to the eastern 
territories of the West Coast!, 
43 
so too t he increased capacity for 
intervention by the squadron pushed a proportion of the trade from Whydah 
and the other most infamous slave ports. 
44 
Prior to 1839 slave ships 
docking in double figures at Whydah had not been an uncommon sight. 
45 
From 1839 this was no longer practical or possible; it would have been 
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little more than an invitation to financial suicide on the part of the 
slave dealers. 
The port's reputation was not its only disadvantage. The shipment 
of slaves f rom Whydah required the use of ca-noes which had to be procured 
from the Gold Coast with the commensurate risk of alerting the British 
authorities there. Within months of the passing of the 1839 
legislation, the Gold Coast authorities were being instructed to detain 
vessels equipped for involvement in the Trade, 46 and despite their 
misgivings about the legality of the instructions and their reluctance to 
I 
detain the ships, 'they were in an excellent position to inform the 
47 
squadron of suspected slavers bound for Whydah. 
To some extent , also, Whydah suf f ered f rom a decline in demand f rom 
one of its traditional customers - Cuba- in the late 1830s and early 
1840s. 48 The Cuban trade was undergoing a restriction for internal 
reasons. The excessive importation of slaves into Havannah in the 
previous few years had fuelled fears of a slave insurrection, and the 
local authorities had placed obstacles in the way of -new 
expeditions. 
49 Slave revolts in Haiti and in Bahia a few years 
previously 
50 
may have stiffened their resolve. In any case during 
this period Cuban imports declined markedly, falling from an estimated 
25000 in 1839 to 1500 in 1847.51 
To a certain extent also, the-shift in emphasis by Brazilian ships 
f rom Whydah to Lagos was part of a longer term pattern which was 
accelerated by the conditions of the late 1830s. Brazilian trade with 
the Costa da Mina had reached a peak c. 1770-75 and from then on had 
tended to drift to the east. 
52 At the end of the 1830s this trend 
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appears to have become more pronounced. In 1838-9, for instance, Bouet 
remarked on the stiff competition being offered to the Whydah Trade by 
Lagos and places to the east, and commented on the decline of the Whydah 
trade. Other sources indicate a shift southwards to the detriment of 
Whydah and other ports on the Bights. 
* 53 
There may have been one further reason for the decline of the Whydah 
trade in thlf-s period. In 1844 a French visitor, De Monleon, remarked 
upon the emptiness of the barracoons and the lack of ready slave stocks 
at Whydah, 
54 
a description which stands in marked contrast to reports 
of the situation prior to the late 30s. 
55 This was partly the result 
of the decentralisation of the trade which occurred during this 
period, 
56 but De Monleon's comments were confirmed the f ollowing year 
by Bouet who also remarked that slaves were in short supply at the port, 
much to the despair of both the Dahomeans and the traders. Bouet 
ascribed the shortage to the hostilities among the peoples of the 
interior. 57 In the absence of further contemporary details any 
conclusions must be tentative, but it seems possible that the hinterland 
supply difficulties may have been related to the war against the Anago 
people, between Mahi and Dahomey, reported by Duncan as having taken 
place around 1839.58 Elsewhere, Duncan indicates that the conquest of 
Mahi itself was provoked by attacks on Dahomean traders. 
59 It is 
possible therefore, that the Dahome-ans were experiencing difficulties in 
obtaining slaves through trade because of interference with their 
hinterland supply routes. 
Additionally, it may be that the Dahomeans experienced a diminished 
capacity to procure through raiding because of the decreased 
147. 
vulnerability of their traditional raiding grounds, in particular the 
Egba who had in the past provided rich pickings for Dahomean slave 
raiding. Indeed the rise of the military and political power of 
Abeokuta might well have had the triple effect of reducing slave supplies 
to Dahomey from the north by offering an alter-native commercial network, 
cutting off Dahomean raiding grounds including the Egba themselves and 
drawing slave ships away f rom a thus disrupted market towards one at 
Lagos through which the Egba slave trade - including part of the supplies 
formerly reaching Dahomey - was directed. 
The Egba constituted a rising state in the proximity to a crumbling 
polity'. Oyo; either of these characteristics has been suggested by Curtin 
as a commercial magnet to slave ships. 
60 
Both of them combined 
provided a double attraction to slavers to the detriment of nearby 
ports. The attraction of a ready and steady supply would have been 
powerful even under normal circumstances; in the hazardous conditions 
prevailing immediately after 1839, with a quick turnaround and an assured 
cargoe essential, they were even more potent and stimulated the drift 
towards Lagos to the detriment of Whydah. 
RESPONSE OF SLAVERS TO NEW CONDITIONS 
Those involved in the Dahomean slave trade did not remain passive 
victims of the new situation in thA- late 1830s. The slave dealers and 
shippers attempted to adapt the Trade, and to overcome the new obstacles 
placed in front of them. West Coast slave traders had, of course, to 
some extent already done so since the outlawing of the Trade by the major 
European nations, 
61 but such adaptations were now more necessary than 
ever before. 
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At the time of the introduction of the Equipment Clause in the treaty 
with Spain, for instance, Spanish vessels engaged in the trade through 
Whydah could immediately render themselves immune to its worst effects by 
the simple expedient of calling at Princes Island and there obtaining 
Portuguese - papers. 
62 If a Spanish vessel claiming to be Portuguese had 
the Bill of Sale on board., or even a Portuguese clearance without any 
Bill, she could not be seized, no matter if her crew and captain were 
Spanish, or even if her original papers were found on board. 
63 
For a period prior to the adoption of unilateral action by the 
British on Portuguese vessels, similar methods were employed by the 
Portuguese shippers, who tended to adopt Peruvian or other colours. 
64 
Along the coast as a whole, shackles, irons, extra water casks and other 
incriminating equipment would be dropped off on first arrival at the port 
whence the slaves were to be lif ted; 
65 
the slaver might then cruise at 
leisure until the cargo had been assembled. Necessity bred ingenuity. 
Even palm oil was employed in subterfuge, since it floated on water and 
thus provided a camouflage for water casks. 
These minor refinements, adopted all along the coast, had little 
effect on the essential nature of Whydah trade. This was not true, 
however, of every method of adaptation employed by the slave dealers. 
Some measures effected to ensure the survival of the Dahomean slave trade 
required changes in the structure-of the trade which were incompatible 
with its previously centralised, monopolistic and geographically confined 
f orm. In this sense, they probably affected Whydah more than anywhere 
else on the Western Slave Coast, and provided a more difficult transition. 
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Perhaps the most important change forced on the structure of the 
Dahomean slave trade was the necessity of using the whole coastline, 
rather than just the main port of Whydah, for the shipment of slaves. 
Freeman has left us the best, brief description of the procedures 
involved in shipment in the early 1840s: 
"When the dealers learn ... that one of their 
vessels is at hand, and that a cruiser is also on any 
part of the coast ... they watch for an opportunity 
... sometimes for several days ... and when any 
point can be pronounced clear, slaves are hastened 
along the Lagoon, or down, or up the plain between the 
Lagoon and the beach, and several large canoes, well 
manned, . glide 
down or up, inshore, just outside the 
breakers, to the point decided upon; signals are 
made; the vessel stands in f or a few hours, takes in 
her cargo, and sets off in triumph. -, 66 
As Freeman also pointed out, it was physically as easy to ship slaves 
from any point along the coast, miles distant from any of ýthe major towns 
like Whydah or Lagos. 
67 This was part I icularly necessary for Dahomey, 
whose main port was an infamous entrepot for the trade, and where there 
was a British presence in the person of Hutton. At Badagry, for 
instance, the mere sighting of a British flag was sufficient to send an 
arriving slave ship on her way again; but it is worth noting that 
although shipments of slaves at the latter port largely ceased, it too 
was still used as a base and a market for the Trade with slaves being 
dispatched from there to other points on the coast for shipment. 
68 
The increased vigilance of th6- squadron, and the consequent delays 
and uncertainties of shipping times had a further detrimental effect in 
rendering prohibitive the cost of retaining a large stock of slaves in 
the Whydah barracoons, particularly if the costs had to be borne by one 
person. 
69 The alternative to such high costs was an increased 
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percentage loss through death in the barracoons. Such considerations 
may well partly account for the empty barracoons referred to earlier. 
70 
Though export shipments f rom Whydah decreased in this period, the 
port continued to play a central role in the Dahomean trade in another 
respect. The arrival of slave ships on the West Coast outside Dahomean 
territory generally entailed the disembarkation of only the slaver's 
equipment - for reasons referred to earlier - or at most the light cargo 
along with the Captain or the Supercargo who arranged the barter and 
shipping times. 
71 At Whydah alone, the whole cargo had to be landed 
along with the ships' representative who made the necessary arrangements 
while the slaver cruised out of the port to avoid detection by the 
squadron. 
72 
Indeed there is evidence that during this period at Whydah the ship 
carrying the cargo might even return home, to be followed, sometimes at 
several months interval depending on the availability and facility of 
shipping slaves, bef ore a second ship - the slaver proper - returned f or 
its human cargo. 
73 This procedure minimised the possibility of 
detention by the squadron; it avoided the necessity to retain large 
numbers of slaves in the Whydah barracoons; and, when combined with the 
carriage of gold specie as a proportion of the cargo, it allowed a rapid 
turn-around by the slaver when she finally returned to the Dahomean coast 
to make the shipment - Without sd-ch adjustments to the Trade, shipment 
from ports like Whydah would have been extremely hazardous; with them 
the embarkation of up to 1000 slaves could be completed at the port ia a 
day. 74 
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Nevertheless, it did have its disadvantages for the shipper, since at 
Whydah a cargo, once landed - and as we have seen the whole cargo had to 
be - it could not be removed. 
75 To avoid the risk of detention by 
the squadron, therefore, the shipper had to forego the possibility of 
flexibility and incur the risk of delays or non-appearance of his 
expected slaves without the surety of the return of his own cargo. This 
can hardly have been the most attractive choice with which to have been 
faced for the privilege of trading at Whydah. 
Nevertheless, occasional shipments - and large ones - were still made 
f rom the port. In April 1840 it was reported, admittedly on hearsay 
evidence, that 3000 slaves had been shipped over a period of eight days 
some time previously. 
76 More reliably, Baudin, who visited the port 
in January 1843, indicated that 1500 slaves had been shipped from Whydah 
during that month, and two other vessels on their way to pick up more had 
been detained by the squadron. 
77 It is significant that these two 
reports refer to large shipments from the port in the first quarter of 
the year, at the normal time of the King's return from the annual raid, 
and when stocks of captives at Abomey would have been at their highest, 
delivery assured and 'storage' subsistence costs minimised. 
Thus it is clear that slave shipments from Whydah did not cease 
altogether. But in general, decentralisation of embarkation points was 
required if the trade was to survr-ive. Such decentralisation not only 
entailed geographical diffusion, but also the involvement of greater 
numbers of personnel to maintain the Trade. Large numbers of canoes and 
canoemen were required to achieve flexibility of shipping locations via 
the lagoons, and the use of a body of 'spies' was needed to ascertain 
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movements of the cruisers along the coast and the arrival and position of 
the slavers themselves. 
78 
More importantly, the difficulties of shipment led to the increased 
use of agents along the coast of Dahomey and the area under its political 
control, 
79 
and to an expansion of the number of slave dealers at Whydah 
itself. The former were required to procure and hold slaves for 
shipment, and the need for the latter arose out of the increased risks 
and complexity of the trade. 
Thus the available statistics may give a misleading impression as 
regards the trends in the Dahomean export economy in the late 1830s and 
early 1840s. Statistics on ship movements and prices on the Latin 
American side of the equation fail to distinguish between differences 
within the area of the Slave Coast as a whole. Statistics from the 
European side, relating to the capture and detention of slave ships, or 
the lack of them, can lead to an underestimation of the effect of the 
more aggressive British policy, and the consequent changes it wrought on 
the Dahomean trade. Throughout the period of the late 18301 s and early 
1840's the Dahomean slave trade was undergoing radical changes; changes 
which were all the more important and significant because of the 
extremely centralised slave export structure which had hitherto 
existed. 
80 
But the individuals involved were largely the victims of the decline 
of the slave trade at Whydah rather than the main causes. Physical 
dispersal, increased risk factors3 greater storage costs of slaves 
awaiting shipping opportunities, increased direct costs - especially 
insurance and double shipping - were all inconsistent with the previous 
153. 
virtual one-man monopoly which had prevailed in the export sector. 
81 
Additionally, the increased activity of the squadron, a fall in demand 
from Cuba, the port's reputation, and possibly occasional interruptions 
to the supply or procuration of slaves from a neighbour rapidly growing 
in political and military might, and the more limited opportunities f or 
large-scale shipments from Whydah, had their effect in a decline in the 
absolute number of slaves exported f rom the Kingdom. Cruickshank's 
estimate of 8000 slave exports per annum f rom the kingdom, made in the 
late 1840s and applied to the previous decade 
82 
may have been near 
the mark in the second half of the 'forties, but is almost certainly 
inaccurate for the late 1830s and early 1840s. 
Such a decline had far reaching implications for the Dahomean 
economy. Quite apart from the fall in income to the main personnel 
involved in the slave trade, the Trade itself had been the main medium 
through which the domestic currency - the 
_cowrie 
- was replenished. By 
1844-5, the kingdom and neighbouring areas appear to have been suffering 
from a serious shortage of cowries. 
83 
This account of the period during which palm oil exports began to 
reach significant proportions at Whydah differs from the conclusions 
reached by Bernard Schnapper who regards the suppression attempts as of 
little consequence for the slave trade, and the take-off of palm oil 
occurring at a period when the slaVý! trade was thriving, by plugging into 
the slave trade circuit. 
84 Although there is some truth in the idea 
of plugging into the slave trade circuit, the evidence from the coast 
itself does not support Schnapper's general thesis. 
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This is mainly because he deals with the period 1838-48 as a whole. 
He points out that slave prices in Brazil and Cuba were high and 
increasing throughout this period, largely on account of the increased 
demand for tropical produce and, therefore, slave labour. 
85 
This may 
have been partly -the reason, but the primary evidence from the West Coast 
suggests that it may also have been the result of demand outstripping 
supply, because of the difficulties of obtaining slave shipments. 
Moreover, slave imports into Cuba were actually falling around 1840 due 
to prohibition of the trade. Schnapper's conclusions are more 
applicable to the second half of the 1840's. 
Schnapper is correct in suggesting that palm oil was' used as a 
substitute for specie, though perhaps not for the reasons which he 
suggests. 
86 
From the Dahomean point of view, gold was undoubtedly 
important, not only in terms of its value, but also as a means of 
exchange for European manufactured produce. 
87 
But slave purchasers, 
on the other hand, preferred other, more profitable commodities. 
88 
In 
the less hazardous conditions of the early 1830s for instance, a South 
American slaver bound f or Whydah carried along with tobacco, rum, musket 
powder and Manchester cottons. 
89 Specie had been introduced primarily 
for the purposes of effecting a quicker turn-around in the increasingly 
difficult conditions of the decade from 1835.90 While the percentage 
of any given cargo composed of specie should not be over-estimated, 
91 
it played a disproportionately important role as a means of exchange 
acceptable to European merchants - From the late 1830's, however, palm 
oil was increasingly employed as a substitute exchange commodity for 
specie., partly, as will be argued later, because of its attraction to 
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hard pressed slave merchants. While this may not afford a complete 
explanation f or the change, there seems little doubt that the imports of 
gold specie did decline. 
92 The resultant dearth of a commodity 
allowing access by the Dahomean rulers to socially prestigious western 
goods necessitated a substitute means of exchange acceptable to western 
merchants. The substitute was found in palm oil, unofficially at first, 
and later officially accorded royal approval and encouragement. 
Equally important in the stimulus to palm oil was the absolute 
decline in the income of the Dahomean government and their main trading 
. 
93 
agent, da Souza, because of the decline in slave exports, low prices) 
and the enforced decentralisation of the slave trade. In the first 
instance that income was to be gained through taxation of the oil produce 
exported rather than by direct involvement in production. 
PALM OIL EXPORTS FROM c. 1838-1850 
It was thuý during this period of decline in slave exports and 
deterioration in the prospects of the Trade that the first significant 
strides were taken in the palm export commerce. 
Hutton established himself at Whydah in 1838.94 Regis, probably 
more important f or the early trade, did so a little later. Regis had 
been dispatching ships to Dahomey from about 1832; these had operated 
from the ship rather than an onshare base. As late as March 1840 . in 
fact3 Regis had rejected the idea of establishing an onshore base at 
Whydah as being too expensive f or the expected returns. 
95 But just 
over a year later, prompted by fears of threatened competition from the 
neighbouring Bordeaux mercantile class, 
96 Regis applied for permission 
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to use the old French fort at Whydah as a factory for the palm oil 
trade. 
97 He received conditional acceptance about three months 
later, 
98 
and dispatched his agent to t. he Dahomean coast. 
While statistics are available for both prices and imports of palm 
oil from the west coast into some European countries, no series of 
reliable data is available as regards exports from Dahomey prior to the 
period of colonisation. It is necessary, therefore, to treat figures on 
prices and exports with some caution. Like the comments on prices later 
in this work, several caveats apply. The comments on exports are often 
of an extremely general nature, the method of computation was unreliable, 
of ten the f igures f or Dahomey are included' along with other ports in the 
Bight of Benin and they were generally derived from enlightened 
'guesstimates' by officials placed at Lagos or other places where a 
European administration was better established. 
Even where estimates are available from European merchants actually 
stationed in Dahomey they have to be seen in the light of the latter's 
eagerness to impress or persuade their governments on the importance - or 
gravity - of the trade situation and thereby foster support for their own 
commercial ends. 
Nevertheless some attempt can be made to estimate the general trends 
in the export of palm oil, especially from Whydah, in order to be able to 
establish the farmework. within which political developments were taking 
place. The same quantative assumptions have been used in interpreting 
the data provided in the sources as is used in the later section on palm 
oil prices. 
99 
157. 
It has been indicated earlier that the Dahomean palm oil export 
trade, which reached signif icant proportions around the 1830's, was 
preceded by almost two centuries of external trade during which palm oil 
had featured, albeit as a secondary commodity. 
100 But the first 
recorded figures of- the specific volume exported from the kingdom derive 
f rom the period immediately prior to the establishment of permanent palm 
oil factories at Whydah by Western European merchants. In the five year 
period from 1832 until 1837 the French merchant Re-gis estimated that not 
more than a total of 20 tons (50 barriques) had been exported from the 
port. 
101 
102 Cruickshank's estimate of 50 tons exported for 1838, one of the 
years encompassed by the above quinquenium, would suggest a five year 
figure higher than that of Regis, but nevertheless an annual total of the 
same fairly insignificant order. Cruickshank's estimate was made some 
years later, when the upsurge in palm oil exports from Whydah may, in 
retrospect, have tended to diminish the volume of the late 1830s exports 
in order to maximise the achievement and benefits of British commercial 
encroachment. 
In the early 1840s palm oil exports from the port began to climb, 
slowly, but perceptibly. In 1841 Mgis Fre-res managed to procure a-ad 
ship 20 tons on their own account, claiming it as the first legal exports 
from Whydah. 103 While this was d-ndoubtedly an exaggeration, Regis did 
play a major role in systematizing the collection and export of the 
product, and by the following year had expanded their shipments to around 
100 tons. 
104 
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It was at this stage that Gezo embarked upon a policy of open 
encouragement of the production of palm oil for export, and the early 
1840s marked the first significant advance in the export trade. 
105 By 
1843 Hutton could dispatch six vessels fully laden with oil, 
106 
and 
R6gis alone increased his exports from about 250 to about 400 tons of the 
product. (1100 futailles). 
107 
The success and sustained growth in the 
trade over the previous few years encouraged the latter merchant to 
confidently predict that his own factory could export over 1000 tons of 
oil within a year 
108 (2000 pipes of 6 Hectolitres each). It is 
uncertain whether he actually attained his forecasts, but his exports 
were certainly sustained at hundreds of tons. 
109 
One of the results of the establishment of onshore facilities was a 
greater physical capacity f or the collection and storage of oil. This 
reduced the turn around time for vessels and increased opportunity for 
obtaining full cargoes. By 1845 it was possible for a single visiting 
ship to embark with 80 tons of oil, equivalent to the annual output f rom 
the port a decade bef ore. 
110 As the load per ship increased, so too 
did the range of visiting nationalities. By 1845 the range of national 
colours in the Whydah Roads included French American, English, Prussian 
and Sardinian. 
ill By 1846, Hutton reported that his Whydah factory 
alone could supply 8 to 10 ships with palm oil. 
112 
Part of the increased supply of oil emanated f rom the re-entry into 
the trade of the slave trader extraordinaire, da Souza; the latter, who 
had earlier dropped participation as economically unworthy of his 
attentions, was again heavily involved for a time in the mid-1840's; in 
1846, for instance, he loaded five ships with palm Oil at Whydah. 
113 
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The growth in the oil export trade was sustained in the second half 
of the 1840s, possibly quadrupling in size, 
114 
and the number of ships 
calling at Whydah for palm oil at any one time might now run into double 
figures, a phenomenon unknown several years before. 
115 
Hutton's 
estimate of 1000 tons by 1848 is probably too low, but indicates the 
general trend. 
116 Cruickshank's informants in 1848 put the quantity 
of oil exported from Whydah at in excess of 2000 tons (4000 
puncheons). 
117 
By 1850 R6gis was shipping over 1200 tons of oil per annum through 
Whydah, and optimistically predicted further rapid expansion barring 
extraordinary circumstances. 
118 The European on-shore trading bases 
were by now well established, ensuring that an adequate f low of oil was 
available for consecutive ships. 
119 
Exact coastal prices prior to the colonial period cannot be 
determined with any great degree of accuracy because of the lack of 
corroboration in all except very rare cases, and also because of the 
loose use of, and varying value attributed to, the quantative terminology 
employed by coastal observers and traders. 
120 Nevertheless, it is 
possible to obtain a general picture of palm oil prices in the Dahomey 
area throughout our period from primary sources on the coast. 
The attempt to reach a common denominator in terms of weight and 
price for purposes of comparison is complicated by cowrie inflation. 
Fortunately, few of the prices quoted were indicated in cowrie values 
alone: they were given in pounds, dollars, marks etc. The general 
pattern as indicated by primary sources is as undernoted: 
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Location. Date Month Price per ton. (121) 
Bonny c1825 El: 17: 6s-E2: 5s (122) 
W. Coast 1837 E8: 0: 0 (123) 
Bonny c1842 E16: 5s-E22: 10s (124) 
Agoue 1843 E22: 10s (125) 
Whydah 1846 April Ell: 5s (126) 
Whydah 1846 April E26: 6s ($117) (127) 
Whydah 1850 May E22: 10s($100) (128) 
Whydah 1851 E22: 10s($108)* (129) 
Whydah 1852 E29: l8s(tl33)* (130) 
Whydah 1852 Jan E29: 18sO133) (131) 
Whydah 1852 Jan E45: 0: 0($200) (132) 
Whydah c1853-5 E22.10s (133) 
Porto Novo 1854 May L50: 0: 0 (134) 
Porto Novo 1854 Dec E22: 10s($100) (135) 
Porto Novo 1857 E42: 0: 0 (136) 
Whydah 1857 E22: 10s (137) 
Whydah 1858 E22: 10s (138) 
Porto Novo 1865 L30: 0: 0 (139) 
Whydah 1876 E22: 10s (140) 
Whydah 1876/7 c. E24. (600francs) (141) 
Whydah 1878 c. E21. (540francs) (142) 
The striking and most obvious fact which arises from a compilation of the 
price of palm oil as reported by diverse nationalities in terms of 
various currencies is the stability of palm oil prices at Whydah, and in 
particular the re-occurrence of the specific palm oil price of F-22: 10s. 
per ton, sterling equivalent - or multiple of that f igure - which is 
evident from the West Coast evidence. It is dif f iCUlt to avoid the 
conclusion that the export price for palm oil was centrally regulated and 
not market determined in a direct or simple way. It therefore appears 
that, despite whatever deficiences there may be in Polanyi's thesis of 
161. 
Dahomey as an 'archaic economy', there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
the predominance of political regulation as regards prices in the export 
143 
sector. 
The relative benefits to the Dahomean producer of palm oil - 
particularly the large scale producer using slave labour - may, in fact, 
have been decreasing, since the rate of increase in the exchange of 
cowries against palm oil/western currencies appears to have been g04 -Lng 
UP 
at a lower rate than the internal inflation rate as regards, say., 
subsistence. This is discussed more fully elsewhere in considering the 
costs of production and transportation from the interior. 
OFFICIAL SPONSORSHIP OF THE OIL TRADE 
Thus the take-off of the palm oil trade coincided with a particularly 
severe recession in the Dahomean slave trade in the decade 1835-1845. 
While the decline of the slave trade was largely outside the control of 
the Dahomean authorities, the tolerance and latterly the sponsorship of 
the growth of the palm oil trade was very much within their control. 
Indeed, prompted by the effect of the decline of the slave trade on their 
own income, the monarchy appeared to have played a prominent part in 
sustaining and encouraging the growth of the export trade in legitimate 
commerce. 
Such sponsorship was necessary-. Up until the early years of the 
1840's the palm oil trade from Dahomey remained in its infancy. To some 
extent the establishment of shore bases by Regis, and Hutton bef ore him, 
facilitated collection and helped to stimulate the trade. In July 1841, 
Regis asked, and was granted permission by the French Government, to use 
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the old French Fort at Whydah for the purpose of establishing a palm-oil 
factory on shore. 
144 By 1843, when the French officer Baudin visited 
Whydah, palm oil could be f ound there in abundance. 
145 Nevertheless 
in terms of income, even by this date the growing oil trade did not 
approximate towards an adequate substitute for the badly disrupted slave 
trade - From the Dahomean point of view the latter still provided the 
only large scale access to western manufactured goods, via the slave 
dealers, while palm oil was mainly exchanged directly with the European 
traders for cowries. 
146 
These parallel channels of production for slaves and palm oil were, 
in themselves, ' an obstacle to the further growth of the trade, since up 
until the early 1840's palm oil - the means of commercial linkage between 
the export of slaves and the import of western goods - tended to be 
produced by parties outside the main slave producers, and exchanged 
directly with European firms. 
147 The actual shipment of the oil was 
further hindered by the physical difficulties of transportation from the 
factories to the beach and from there aboard the ships. 
148 
So far as the central government was concerned, its leading 
constituents were constrained from direct involvement in the production 
of palm oil or other agricultural produce f or export: farming for export 
was at odds with the enshrined warrior ideology. 
149 And, the absence 
of any hitherto significant level -of palm oil export up until the late 
1830s had lef t the export produce f ree from any specific export dues to 
the central exchequer (as opposed to the more general import dues which 
were levied by negotiation on cargoes disembarked). 
163. 
Up until 1843 then, the scale of oil exports, the constraints on 
aristocratic involvement in production, obstacles to the extent to which 
either the slave dealers or the European merchants could expand the 
trade, and the absence of f iscal regulation rendered the palm oil trade 
of relatively minor importance to the Dahomean monarchy. 
But not of minor interest. For the potential of the trade must have 
been obvious to both the Dahomean authorities and the slave dealers, and 
certainly was to the palm oil merchants themselves. In the early 1840s, 
all three groups of these were involved in initiatives designed to 
harness that potential for their own economic ends. 
None more so than the Dahomean monarchy. Gezo, faced with a 
declining and disrupted slave trade through the Kingdom's chief port, 
turned to the only available alternative means of income and access to 
prestigious western goods. 
In the early 1840's he launched an initiative to encourage the 
cultivation of agricuture inside Dahomey. 
150 . The scale of this 
enterprise is unclear, although it is possible that it was part of the 
same package of measures which included the enticement to freed slaves to 
return to Dahomey and undertake agricultural production. 
151 But it is 
clear that the production of palm oil played a central role in these 
intiatives. In 1843 Gezo promulgated a series of decrees intended to 
increase the production of oil, t6- encourage and further facilitate the 
export trade, and to maximise, by fiscal means, the benefits therefrom to 
the central exchequer. 
Although the public statement no doubt marked the culmination of 
internal discussion the official proclamation of the King's initiatives 
164. 
resulted directly f rom his 1843 meeting with Re-gis' agent Brue, a meeting 
which was facilitated by da Souza. 
The most significant aspect of the visit was that the official 
recognition extended to the trade by Gezo on behalf of the Dahomean 
authorities marked the culmination of the development of the organised 
oil trade in Dahomey from around 1832. Such recognition was no empty or 
abstract gesture. It had powerful implications for the oil trade and 
the position of the oil traders. Regis' agent was thereby entitled to 
use the old French fort. But., more importantly, Regis also obtained the 
rights as well as duties of the fort's former French 
152 inhabitants, thus gaining not only a more suitable on-shore 
establishment, but also rights over the old 'French' village in 
Whydah. 153 It thus overcame some of the previously daunting problems 
of oil transportation and shipment, 
154 by allowing access to and 
control over the labour rights of the village inhabitants. 
155 
Moreover, official recognition by the sovereign provided safeguards for 
the new factory against the thefts and fire-raising from which it had 
hitherto suffered. 
156 
On the production side, the monarchy and central authorities still 
remained aloof f rom actual production of oil f or export. Nevertheless, 
Gezo's proclamation was judiciously designed to maximise the yield of 
those who were so engaged. Apart from the general exhortation implicit 
in his recognition of the oil trade., several specific instructions were 
issued, decreeing that the Oil Palm be carefullY tended. 
157 
In particular, the young trees were to be cleared of shrubs which 
surrounded them. 
158 This apparently innocuous declaration was, in 
165. 
fact, far more significant than it appears, for the procedure has 
considerable implications for the yield of the Oil Palm. 
Firstly, by removing the parasitic plants around the young trees the 
soil nutrition - and therefore the growth of seedlings - was 
enhanced. 
159 In'addition, the clearing of undergrowth between the Oil 
Palms greatly enhanced their yield in terms of palm f ruit, resulting in 
increased weight and numbers of bunches: to obtain the best results from 
Palm groves the prolific growth of creepers, weeds and useless vegetation 
had to be cleared away. 
160 
Secondly, clearing of the undergrowth surrounding the trees protected 
the Oil Palms from damage or destruction which might result from the 
161 
periodical firing of fields which was part of the agricultural cycle. 
Such practices had long been known in Dahomey. - But by underlining 
the agricultural utility of the methods themselves by giving them the 
status of royal proclamation, Gezo indicated his serious intent to extend 
the production of oil, and his willingness to employ legislation, backed 
by the authority of the Dahomean government towards that end. 
Nor were the instructions limited to narrow 'economic' guidelines. 
The Oil Palm itself was declared 'Fetish'. and as such, was to generally 
enjoy protection from destruction. 
162 The phenomenon of some species 
of Oil Palms being reserved to a class of Fetishers is not uncommon in 
163 West Africa. But the Dahomean regulations went much further than 
this: it was a general regulation, applying to all species, and 
protecting all Oil Palms rather than reserving their usufruct to a 
priestly caste. The decrees were backed by the full force of Dahomean 
law: anyone destroying or felling the oil palm did so at the risk of 
166. 
incurring the most severe penalties. 
164 
The object was to preserve 
the Palm and encourage the widespread use of its f ruit,, rather than 
curtail it to a certain group. 
The use of the Oil Palm was, however, to be limited in one sense. 
The most widespread threat to the longevity of the Oil Palm in Dahomey 
derived from its function as provider of alcoholic beverage for the 
population. The Dahomean method of producing palm wine entailed the 
actual felling of the tree, 
165 
and, as such, the practice was a prime 
target for prohibition by anyone wishing to maximise the useful life of 
the plant. 
It is arguably no coincidence that the first reports of the 
prohibition on Palm Wine arise from visitors at precisely this time. 
Observers do not agree on the motives behind the prohibition. According 
to Freeman palm wine making had been prohibited by the monarch because it 
had been used to excess by many of his subjects who had as a result the 
tendency to become riotous and noisy: 
166. Forbes, some six or seven 
years later confirmed Freeman's version: 
"Foreign liquors are scarce and expensive, and as palm 
wine is forbidden by the king, the chief drinks are a 
palatable malt called Pitto, and a sort of Burgoo 
called Ah-kah-sar. Drunkeness is not allowed, nor is 
there, except in Whydah, much opportunity for it. As 
a public example the King kept a drunkard and f ed him 
rum, and exhibited him at the Customs, that his 
emaciated and disgusting appearance miýht stop his 
people from making fools 6-f themselves.,, 117 
Burton preferred the economic interpretation of Gezo's motives, 
explaining that that since the people "felled the trees like Krumen, they 
are forbidden by a paternal government, which encourages the growth for 
making oil, to make it (palm wine) except in the Bush. " 
168 
167. 
Burton' remarks were oversimplified, for inordinate consumption of 
alcohol does appear to have been a source of concern and distaste to the 
central authorities. Several commentators remarked on the reluctance of 
the King and leading nobility to consume alcohol in public. 
169 Forbes 
referred to the public display of the King's drunkard, and later Glele, 
like his father before him was to retain an official drunkard for similar 
purposes. 
170 The same monarch was quick to scathingly criticise the 0 
missionary Bernasko for the example set by his drinking habits, remarking 
- with some substance - that "if the Whiteman's religion makes men drink 
it be no good. " 
171 This personal attitude on the part of both 
monarchs may have been prompted or encouraged by the reputed character of 
Gezo's intended successor, who according to one source, lost his chance 
of the throne to Glele because of his love of alcohol. 
172 
It can be accepted, therefore, that Gezo's prohibition was at least 
partly inspired by social considerations. But it is difficult to accept 
that the move was prompted exclusively by a desire to curtail alcoholic 
consumption. 
173 Alcohol itself continued to be widely available in 
other forms. Home brewed beer or Pitto, had been in widespread use f or 
many years prior to the period dealt with here, 
174 
and continued to be 
so throughout Gezo's reign along with other domestic manufactures. 
175 
Foreign liquors, although relatively expensive and scarce at 
176 
mid-century, were becoming more widely consumed throughout Gezo's 
reign. 
177 
Palm wine itself continued to be widely available for consumption. 
In the late 1840's it was sold at Whydah, at around ld a gallon, 
178 
and 
in the 1860's Burton remarked on the tolerable palm wine available at 
168. 
Henvi, just south of the Agrime swamp. 
179 A decade later Skertchly 
remarked on its sale and use from the southern frontiers of the DahoMean 
kingdom at Whydah 
180 
to the northenmost extent of the monarch's power 
in Mahi country. 
181 Indeed., so widely available was palm wine, that 
the Dahomeans declined to satisfy their demand for it by accepting any 
inferior substitute. 
182 
It's clear that the distribution of alcohol - particularly of 
imported rum -f ormed one of the main items Of conspicuous generosity at 
the Dahomean Customs each year., 
183 
and it Is perhaps not surprising that 
Gezo himself showed considerable interest in the potential for the 
184 
manufacture of alcohol within Dahomey. His successor displayed 
some discrimination in his choice of palm wine, favouring exclusively 
that produced in the area of Henvi-Dorah on the Allada-Abomey route. 
185 
The continuing availability of alcohol and chronological coincidence 
of the prohibition with the other measures introduced by Gezo to protect 
and foster palm oil production suggest that the economic element was not 
entirely missing from his calculations. Rather, it was merely one among 
a comprehensive package of measures designed to encourage palm oil 
production as a financial supplement to a Dahomean exchequer badly hit by 
disruptions to the Atlantic slave trade. 
CURTAILMENT OF HUMAN SACRIFICE 
Gezo's innovatory adaptations to the economic circumstances of the 
early 1840s extended beyond measures designed to attract increased 
domestic production. He attempted also to influence and increase the 
demand factor as well as the supply, and as such proceeded in attempts to 
169. 
encourage the establishment of not only factories but formal links with 
European powers as a means towards combatting competing ports and 
stabilizing his own export-import sector. Central to this attempt were 
limited concessions on 'non-economic' aspects of Dahomean society which 
stood in the way of increased trade with the European nations, and in 
particular the practice of 'huma-n sacrifice'. 
The economic innovations introduced by Gezo around 1843 were prompted 
primarily not by political considerations or the search for allies, but 
by economic considerations and the search for a replacement for the 
disrupted slave trade. 
Da Souza, far from standing over and against Gezo and the central 
Dahomean authorities was similarly affected by the decline in slave trade 
and was instrumental in persuading the monarch to pursue a course of 
action beneficial to both the Dahomean ruling class and the slave traders 
at the Coast. The Dahomean monarch, desperate to revive trade at 
Whydah, courted England as well as France and Portugal - and no doubt 
would have acted in the same fashion to anyone else who would have 
appeared capable of assisting a trade revival, a supply of trade goods 
and consequent political prestige. 
Certainly, the English, or some English, believed that a special 
relationship existed between themselves and the Dahomean monarch. After 
all, Gezo assured both Duncan aQ Cruickshank, for instance, of the 
special place of England in the heart of the Dahomean state. 
186 But 
Gezo also expressed his special desire that the French come and share the 
industry and commerce - to the French of course, 
187 
and on occasions 
attempted to prompt them into action by pointing out that the English, 
170. 
their rivals for the favours of Dahomey, had already sent ambassadors to 
the Dahomean court. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
Portuguese also saw themselves - and probably with more justification 
than the other two - as the most favoured sons of the King. 
188 The 
fact that the European powers regarded themselves in this fashion is more 
a testimony to Gezols diplomatic skills than to any special status they 
merited. Gezo,, like any monarch faced with a decreasing and politically 
important level of trade., attempted to woo diplomatically those whom he 
regarded of potential benefit economically. 
Probably influenced by da Souza, who is known to have been opposed to 
human sacrifice, 
189 
and who was f rom the start in the centre of the new 
moves designed to stimulate the growth of commerce with the legitimate 
European traders, Gezo offered some concession on the other major issue 
which preoccupied the minds of his European visitors - human sacrifice. 
The last reported large-scale sacrifice at the Annual Customs 
coincided with the Dahomean monarchy embarking on the course designed to 
offset the disruption to the slave trade. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Gezo ever seriously intended to abolish completely the 
practice of human sacrifice: what he did commit himself to, and 
implement, was a reduction in the scale of human sacrifice at Abomey, and 
limitations upon the practice of it throughout his kingdom. 
Moreover, in many ways these limitations were in themselves in the 
interests of the central authority of the King. They were in general 
accord with a series of measures designed to ensure centralisation and 
stability in the Dahomean political structure - for instanceý the 
institution of a standing army, and the creation of a large and 
171. 
externally recruited Amazon brigade - which had been adopted throughout 
his reign. 
The last large scale human sacrifices of Gezo's reign appear to have 
taken place at the 1843 Customs. Brue, who was in Abomey at the time, 
put the total of executions and sacrifices at Imore than one 
thousand'. 
190 It is unfortunate that Brue appears to have based his 
figures on the numbers of heads or skulls exhibited in Abomey, and it is 
of course possible that some of these were not recently separated from 
their unfortunate victims' bodies. Nevertheless, 
. 
some of them 
191 
undoubtedly came from recent executions, and although Brue himself 
appears to have witnessed the dispatch of only two 'messangers' to the 
ancestors., 
192 
we have to make the rather unpleasant assumption that he 
was capable of differentiating between recently severed heads and those 
used in ornamentation in the 1843 festival but derived from more 
chronologically distant sacrifices: as such, we can assume that, 
irrespective of the absolute accuracy of Brue's estimate, sacrifices took 
place on a considerable scale. 
This assumption is verified by the testimony of da Souza, who 
reported in 1843 that apart from the 800 slaves which he had purchased 
from the King's war stock of 7000 captives, the others had been 
sacrificed. 
193 once again, however, extreme caution must be used in 
the acceptance of such massive figures. Certainly the Dahomeans may 
have been suffering from difficulties in ridding themselves of war 
captives through the traditional outlet of the slave trade, but the 
evidence provided by slave traders themselves, or defenders of the slave 
trade, had traditionally and systematically emphasised the scale of the 
172. 
practice, since it afforded a philanthropic justification for the 
transportation of slaves, thus saving them from their 'inevitable' fate 
of death. 
194 
Nevertheless, the figures given by Brue and da Souza on this occasion 
appear to represent the highest total suggested throughout the 19th 
century for an Annual Customs - certainly higher than any other figure 
given even by da Souza throughout this period. The large scale of the 
human sacrifices of the early 1840s also received confirmation from the 
monarch himself when, in 1845, he claimed that until recently it was 
usual to kill many people at the customs. 
195 Gezo, did also proclaim 
his intention ultimately to abolish the same: but notably he qualified 
his avowed intention by remarking specifically that such a process had to 
be gradual, and that such curtailment was limited in its possible extent 
by the need to punish crimes. 
196 
The diminution promised by the monarch is testified to by 
contemporary observers a-ad visitors to the Dahomean capital, starting 
with Duncan in 1845.197 Forbes indicated that in 1848 the number 
sacrificed was 240, (a figure much more in keeping with 18th century 
figures for annual customs, and certainly much lower than that indicated 
for the 1843 custom), and that they had been reduced to 32 a year 
later. 198 
Indeed, such a significant change appears to have taken place that 
Gezo disdained sacrifices at the capital in the Customs for his old 
friend and ally da Souza on the latter's death. 
199 The absence of 
such sacrifices was related to the request of da Souza himself that the 
practice be omitted from his funeral customs, and a small number of 
173. 
deaths - five - were in fact reported as having taken place at 
Whydah. 
200 But the incident suggests that the general trend was 
downwards. Forbes' opinion on the diminution of the scale of sacrifices 
by mid century is independently confirmed by a French source who had made 
several visits to the Capital between 1847 and 1850.201 Indeed, by 
1851 human sacrifice appears to have much diminished as a spectacle at 
the Abomey Customs. 
Thus around 1843 the Dahomean monarchy did undertake a series of 
limited measures to encourage the palm oil trade and to create conditions 
conducive to better Fon-Western relationships. But the measures were 
limited and circumscribed both by prevailing ideology and political 
reality. The monarch introduced measures to stimulate palm oil 
production, without himself becoming overtly involved. He introduced a 
curtailment of the practice of human sacrifice, but declined to envisage 
its abolition. He held out the longer term prospect of an abandonment 
of the slave trade, but more as a diplomatic flourish than an agenda for 
action in the forseeable future. As such, Gezo's response to a 
declining slave trade was skilfully measured to adapt to the prevailing 
economic conditions without incuring the need for a wholesale social 
transformation of Dahomean society. 
ANTICIPATED INCOME FROM PALM OIL TRADE 
Since in the early 1840s the intervention of the monarch was confined 
to the encouragement of the palm oil trade, and did not extend to direct 
involvement in productioný direct compensation to replace that of the 
slave trade was to be gained from fiscal and tributory regulations. 
174. 
Access to western goods thus obtained was to be further indirectly 
assisted through the intermediacy of the slave-dealers on the coast, who 
did become directly involved in producing oil for export. 
The most immediate and direct benefits to the monarchy were derived 
from arrangements made with the French firm Regis and, to a lesser 
extent, Hutton. The assistance, encouragement, protection and labour 
facilities extended to the French firm were granted in return for an 
annual tribute which was represented by dues on any cargoes disembarked 
at Whydah or ships loading with palm oil there, and the customary annual 
presents at the Abomey festival. These, of course, were quite in 
keeping with previous Dahomean practice. 
Though taxes on (export) trade could be more easily avoided than in 
the case of the slave trade, 
202 
the King also perceived the oil trade 
as a potentially lucrative source of taxation. In 1843 Duncan reported 
that: 
"All goods sent out of . 
the country pay a, very heavy 
duty, such as palm oil or ivory ... it is always 
levied on the sellers, who, of course, are subjects of 
the King of Dahomey. Any hesitation in paying would 
cost the individual his head. 203 
Regis's correspondence mentions the tax on oil, which was levied at 
the coast, by the King's agents, again on the sellers. 
204 The same 
tax on sellers of oil is confirmed - at a rate of about 10% - by French 
sources in the 1848-9 period, 
205 ind around 1849-50 by Forbes, who is 
more specific, putting the rate of tax at one gallon in eighteen. 
206 
This tax on oil traded may account for the traditions recorded by Le 
Herisse which place the introduction of a Kouzou tax on palm oil 
production as taking place under Gezo. There is no contemporary 
175. 
confirmation of such a tax being introduced under Gezo and it is likely 
that this was introduced at a much later dateý possibly after the French 
conquest. 
207 Le Herisse's recorded tradition that a Kouzou was 
instituted on palm oil exports by Gezo at the time of the wars with 
Abeokuta possibly ref ers to a tax on trade which was instituted in the 
1840's or 1850s. In the early 1840's Dahomey suffered from an 
interruption of the slave supplies from the hinterland, possibly as a 
result of the Egba - Fon struggle for control of trade routes. 
208 
The 
introduction of measures to increase oil production and the imposition of 
the tax on oil traded is first recorded from 1843 as a tax on palm oil 
vendors in the export sector, not on palm oil production. 
However, the traditions recorded by Le Herisse- may relate to a period 
later than 1845, to the era of growing Fon - Egba confrontation in the 
early 1850's. Once again, there is no contemporary evidence to suggest 
that any f orm of taxation was introduced on oil production at this stage 
by the Dahomeans. But a new tax was introduced in this period - in 1852 
-a Kouzou on the white man, prompted as much by the temporary political 
moves of the British - the blockade - as by economic necessity, although ' 
this would obviously also have been increased by the blockade. In 1852 
contemporary evidence indicates an increase in the price of oil to 12 
dollars the 'measure', and, more importantly, the imposition of a4 
209 dollars a barell surcharge for rolling it off the beach. The 4 
dollars was, in fact a tax on the purchasers, similar to that which had 
previously been levied only on the Dahomean sellers - It was not only 
similar in function: it was also similar in amount. The price of palm 
oil having been raised by the King to 12 dollars the 'measure' (of 18 or 
176. 
19 gallons, probably the former), the price of a normal French puncheon 
of 120 gallons was thus approximately 80 dollars (or 78 dollars if 
measure of 19 taken). A4 dollars tax on the shipment of this would 
represent a tax on 1: 19.7 gallons, (or 1: 18.9 if measure of 19 gallons 
taken). 
THE ROLE OF SLAVE TRADERS IN PALM OIL TRADE 
The role played by da Souza and the Portuguese *slave dealers in 
Gezo's new found enthusiasm for the oil trade has been a moot 
point. 
210 It has already been suggested that they probably encouraged 
the King to give his blessing and encouragement to the trade, 
particularly since da Souza lent his assistance and influence to enable 
first Hutton, 211 and then Regis, 
212 
to establish at Whydah, and that 
da Souza himself was certainly involved in the palm oil export trade by 
1846.213 The contemporary evidence from the West Coastý therefore, 
suggests that da Souza was more sympathetic and helpful towards the palm 
oil trade than has sometimes been allowed. 
214 
Indeed, this view can be taken slightly further, particularly in 
explaining why da. Souza, and possibly some other Portuguese slave dealers 
found it in their own interests to thus encourage the trade, and why they 
should have done so in the late 1830s, early 1840s. 
Portuguese traders had at leasý dabbled in the trade to some extent 
before this time. It has already been noted that da Souza had 
participated in the export in oil in the early years of Gezo's reign, and 
although by 1838 he had foregone any major intervention because of the 
relatively unfavourable returns when compared to a thriving slave trade 
177. 
he was still in the mid-1830s sufficiently interested in the trade to 
provide a likely source of an occasional cargo or load of oil. 
215 
He was not alone in his involvement, f or, f rom the early 1830s the 
arrival of Regis' ships off Whydah on the lookout for palm oil, allowed 
smaller and less well' known traders to participate in the trade. One 
such trader was Joao Baptista Bellarra, who from 1832, precisely the 
period of R(---gis' first shipments from Whydah, began to speculate in the 
palm oil trade largely as a potential buffer against the decline of the 
slave trade. 
216 Up until the mid 1830s the palm oil trade remained 
very much a sideline for the slave dealers, although as mentioned, at 
least some of them f oresaw the potential need f or its expansion in the 
future should their staple export decline. It was exactly those 
circumstances in the closing years of the 1830s which were sufficient to 
stimulate a trade which had already gained a foothold. 
As already mentioned, 
217 
palm oil was used as a substitute for 
gold. 
218 Not because of a disproportionately, low level of gold 
imports vis-a-vis slave exports, 
219 but rather from the positive 
pref &rence of the slave dealers themselves to employ palm oil as an 
exchange commodity for western goods. 
Partly, this resulted from the fact that during this period they 
became involved not only in the palm oil trade, but in the direct 
production of oil for export. Tlý-e uncertainty of slave shipments, and 
the increasing costs of retaining large -numbers of slaves in the Whydah 
barracoons awaiting shipment, prompted their productive use in order to 
offset costs. The initial impetus for large scale manufacture of palm 
oil in Dahomey in the 1840s was initiated not by the monarch and leading 
178. 
Ministers in Abomey, but by the coastal slave dealers 
220 
in an attempt 
to reduce the financial burdens of delayed shipment. 
This practice had a spin-off for the slave dealers, in that it 
provided substantial quantities of a commodity both currently in demand 
and acceptable to European merchants. It thus providing access to 
prestigious western goods. And, unlike gold exchanges., it further held 
out the prospect of double profits - on the slave trade, and on the palm 
oil which was being produced by the slaves at the coast. 
This helps to explain the preference of slave dealers in using palm 
oil rather than gold. It explains why, at the end of the 1830s and 
beginning of the 1840s da Souza, for instance, should have been so keen 
to assist European palm oil merchants to become established. 
The Portuguese on the coast encouraged the establishment of the palm 
oil commerce not out of 'enlightenment', but out of 'enlightened 
self-interest'. The practice of using slaves destined for export as a 
means of producing palm oil while awaiting shipment no doubt encouraged 
the numerous optimistic forecasts by western observers about the palm oil 
trade eradicating the slave trade by displaying the economic advantages 
of a slave retained at home in the production of palm oil. 
221 The 
observers may have been encouraged but they were nevertheless mistaken: 
by and large the slave-dealers were complementing the slave trade, not 
replacing it by palm oil plantations 
CONCLUSION 
Thus the period c. 1837-45 marked a turning point in the Dahomean palm 
oil trade. The period was characterised by a marked decline in the 
179. 
slave trade and the search for means of maintaining a thriving export 
sector. At the beginning of the 1840s, specifically 1843, the Dahomean 
authorities and the Portuguese slave dealers, responded to the disruption 
and decline of the Whydah slave trade which had been occurring f or the 
last few years, by encouragement of the palm oil trade. 
The decline and disruption of the Whydah slave trade in the late 
1830s and early 1840s seriously affected the income of the Dahomean 
authorities and their access to Politically prestigious goods. These 
developments evoked a response from both the Dahomean slave dealers and 
the central government. The slave dealers, encouraged by the 
establishment of European f actors ' on the coast, extended their 
participation in the palm oil trade, and themselves diversified into the 
production of palm oil f or export. The latter process, carried out by 
slaves awaiting shipment, minimised production costs, offset costs of 
subsistence for slaves awaiting shipment, and at the same time allowed 
the slave dealers access to western manufactured goods through the medium 
of the palm oil so produced. 
The slave dealers were also instrumental, da Souza in particular, in 
encouraging the monarch, to undertake a series of measures designed to 
permit the establishment of European factories on the coast, afford them 
protection and grant them control over a cheap, easily accessible labour 
force: to encourage Dahomeans themselves to provide palm oil for 
export: and to protect and stimulate increases in the production yield. 
The monarch was susceptible to these suggestions, since he too was 
suffering from the effects fo the decline in the slave trade. In turn 
the monarch intended to reap the benefit of the new measures through 
180. 
taxes on the externally orientated palm oil trade, additional 'tributary' 
payments from the -newly established factories, and renewed access to 
western goods through the medium of the coastal slave traders. 
The monarch did not himself become directly involved in the 
production of oil for export, but did promulgate a number of decrees 
intended to maximise the growth of oil production for export. 
Regulations governing the clearing of palm gr'oves and the protection of 
young trees, the declaration of the Oil Palm as 'fetish' and the 
prohibition of palm wine production in the metropolitan area were 
measures so designed. 
The economic benefits to the central exchequer . were to be gained 
mainly by the introduction of a tax on palm oil exports, levied at the 
rate of 1/18th on the sellers: ancillary benefits 'were to be expected 
from annual payments from the palm oil traders. But while the role of 
the monarch in the 1840's was confined to encouragement of the palm oil 
trade and the receipt of fiscal income, the numbers of - those involved in 
the production of oil spread rapidly. 
181. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRODUCTION: 
The main sources of Dahomean palm oil in the 1840's 
EARLY EUROPEAN TRADERS. c. 1840 
The establishment of on-shore bases, and the encouragement and 
protection given to the new trade by the monarchy from the early years of 
the 1840s acted as a stimulus to the commerce in palm oil. 
Centrally involved in this development was the French firm of 
Regis . Several factors contributed towards their success, but perhaps 
most important was the nature of their exchange goods. Although Regis 
made much of their skill in selecting a wide variety of trade goods 
suitable to Dahomean taste, 
1 it was primarily their emphasis on cowrie 
shells which gave them the edge over their competitors by allowing them 
access to small scale producers and traders, while at the same time 
af f ording them a. high rate of profit. 
2 
The recently afforded labour rights and protection extended by the 
monarchy as part of their general strategy to encourage the new trade 
encouraged stability and ensured safety: by the mid-1840s commercial 
activity at Regis' factory proceeded with order and regularity, and the 
old French f ort, under Brue's directorship, took on an air of prosperity, 
while the trade itself apparently ý-f f ered scope f or potentially unlimited 
expansion. 
3 
Notwithstanding the low French estimate of their trading 
capabilities, 
4 
even Hutton's appeared satisfied with the progress of 
their whole West Coast trading operations in the early 1840s. 
5 And 
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with some reason: for, having initially established themselves on the 
Coast in the 1830s they had by 1847 increased the number of their trading 
establishments to double figures, inclusive of their factory at Whydah. 
6 
They had, it is true, fared less well than Regis in their 
relationship with the Dahomean government, perhaps partly because - as 
will be seen later - their very success in forming coastal operations 
outside Whydah did not coincide with the general aims of the Dahomean 
monarchy. Nevertheless, their continued presence at the latter port 
testified to the persistence of the new export trade. 
In turn, this increased demand manifested by the varied shipping 
lying off Whydah, 
7 
the success of Re-gis, and the official blessing of 
the monarchy, stimulated the participation of smaller traders in 
'legitimate' commerce. 
8 
The storage of small scale produce and arrangements for forward 
planning of bulk shipments was facilitated by the solution of one 
technical problem which had previously constrained the trade. Between 
the late 1830s and mid-1840s the shipment to the coast of pre-packed 
puncheon kits acted as a catalyst to the growth of the trade by affording 
the means of bulking and long term storing of the product. 
9 
The trade expanded, too, among the Portuguese community. Some of 
them had previously dabbled in the oil trade as a hedge against the 
anticipated decline of the major export commodity - slaves - and had even 
to some extent gone into production of oil as a method of offsetting 
slave storage costs. 
10 But 1846 appears to mark the first large scale 
direct shipments of oil by the Portuguese slave dealers, with da Souza 
himself shipping five shiploads on his own account. 
11 
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LARGE SCALE PRODUCERS: PORTUGUESE, BRAZILIANS AND SLAVERS 
Against this background of the general growth of the oil trade, the 
general level of oil production in Dahomey was steadily increasing, but 
it is more dif f icult to delineate exactly who was producing the oil and 
in what quantities. A comprehensive and detailed description of the 
early production of oil c. 1840-50 is absent from contemporary literature. 
Nevertheless, there is sufficient information scattered throughout 
primary sources and contemporary publications to allow the construction 
of an outline of the main social classes involved in production, and of 
production methods themselves. Moreover, several characteristics of 
production methods, oil prices, and costs relative to geographical 
distribution allow the former information to be placed in the context of 
possible cost benefits to the monarchy. The constraining nature of 
ideological factors on the adoption of palm oil production by the monarch 
will be dealt with later in this work, but some of his political 
obligations may be touched upon here. 
For the purposes of analysis, the production of export oil in the 
1840s may be split into large and small scale enterprise. Large scale 
coastal production involved three main groups: Portuguese/Brazilian 
slave traders, Dahomean Merchants, and liberated slaves subsequently 
settled in the environs of Whydah, although the distinction between the 
groups was necessarily blurred in reality since a number of slave 
traders, like Joaquim d'Almeida at Agoue, were in origin liberated 
slaves. 
12 
Small scale, petty production of oil, relates largely to 
(unidentified) households, possibly employing small numbers of domestic 
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slaves - Though the boundary lines between these large and small scale 
producers is often difficult to draw exactly, the necessarily 
impressionistic distinction is helpful in understanding the consequences 
of the new trade. The role of the monarchy will be dealt with f inally 
and separately. 
It was the Portuguese slave dealers who appear to have been the first 
to involve themselves in the production of export oil on a large scale, 
mainly with the motive of productively employing slave stocks whose 
retention in the Whydah area awaiting shipment constituted an increasing 
f inancial burden. 
13 The practice had initially occurred in the 1830s, 
partly as an attempt to diversify' as a' 'hedge' against the anticipa 
I ted 
decline of the slave trade itself. 
14 But if production * of oil was 
initially intended as a substitute for the ailing slave trade, it was 
also used to complement and facilitate the trade in the increasingly 
difficult conditions pertaining in the late 1830s and 1840s. Access to 
oil fulfilled several advantageous functions for the slave dealers quite , 
apart from the productive use of slave stocks. 
The actual loading of palm oil offered a useful 'blind' to the slave 
trader for the more hazardous and risky business of shipping slaves: 
while awaiting notification of opportunities for slave shipments, slave 
vessels might load with oil, and on notification of available slave 
exports, hasten to the embarkatioii- point indicated, embark the slaves, 
disembark the palm oil, and make off - The slaves were canoed to, and 
the palm oil from, the embarkation point by the system of internal 
lagoons. 15 
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Palm oil was also an attractive asset to slave dealers in so far as 
it attracted legitimate ships and cargoes: and both were so vital to 
them that the slavers were willing to run the oil side of their account 
at a loss to obtain them. 
16 The attraction of cargoes of western 
goods are perhaps obvious. Less often remarked upon is the attraction 
of the actual ships themselves. The hazardous nature of the slave 
trade, given the increasingly aggressive activities of the anti-slave 
squadron from the late 1830s, necessitated the maximum flexibility of 
response by the slave dealers. When the opportunity of making a slave 
shipment occurred, and cruisers were absent from the vicinity, the slave 
traders had learned to provide themselves with the most flexible shipping 
system imaginable. They were prepared, and could afford - such were the 
returns on a successful slave shipment - to purchase outright a visiting 
'legitimate' vessel, load it with slaves and dispatch it, the former 
master and crew having been transferred with their recently acquired 
purchase price to another homeward bound vessel. 
17 This procedure 
enabled the slave dealers to respond quickly to shipping opportunities, 
while avoiding the danger of their ships being detected as slavers on the 
outward journey to the West Coast. Indeed, by the mid-1840s the 
procedure appears to have become widespread, and Sardinian, French and 
German as well as American vessels were purchased at Whydah and so 
used. 
18 
The better known slave traders from the Americas might similarly 
counteract dangers consequent on their reputation by the employment of a 
number of their larger vessels in the embarkation of palm oil, thus 
acting as a decoy while their smaller and speedier vessels made off with 
slave cargoes - 
19 
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To the slave traders, then, palm oil acted as a potential substitute 
for the slave export decline, offered a means of employing slaves 
involved in delays in shipment, and also complemented the mechanisms of 
the slave trade in the increasingly difficult conditions of the late 
1830s and 1840s. All three aspects encouraged the increasing 
involvement of slave traders in the production of the new export 
commodity. By the 1840s growing numbers of them had diversified into 
oil production, though this diversification, and the use of slave stocks 
in production was the consequence rather than the cause of declining 
slave exports, contrary to the assertions of some western 
commentators. 
20 
This is perhaps particularly obvious from the involvement of da 
Souza, the mainstay of Whydah trading operations. He had been 
intermittently involved in the palm oil trade from the time of Gezo's 
ascendancy, 
21 
and was still a potential supplier of the occasional 
cargo in the mid-1830s. 
22 
By this time, however, he had largely 
abandoned the trade as being relatively unprofitable compared to slave 
exports, and by 1838 was reported to have given up trade in the product 
completely. 
23 
But faced with shipment delays, and the attractions of the commodity 
as a complement to his slaving operations, da Souza turned to the palm 
oil trade to an increasing extent. There is no direct evidence of his 
own involvement in palm oil production3 although a later historian has 
written of his ambitious plans to convert considerable areas into 
plantations for palm produce, 
24 
but his ability to ship considerable 
amounts of palm oil by 1846 
25 
suggests that he may have been already 
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involved by that time in using slave stocks to collect the fruits and 
manufacture palm produce from wild trees, and utilizing domestic slaves 
as independent traders /middlemen. 
26 
Other slave dealers were certainly involved on the production side of 
the new commerce. Dos Santos, for instance, was not only trading in 
both slaves and palm oil, but was supplementing his income from commerce 
by that gained f rom the production of oil. Dos Santos himself had at 
least one plantation whereon he maintained the collection and manufacture 
of the product. 
27 
Between 1846 and 1849 the involvement of the slave traders in the 
legitimate commerce accelerated rapidly, 
28 
and even the notorious 
Domingo Martinez was reported to be clearing land in preparation for 
large scale cultivation and production of oil for the export 
market. 
29 
Referred to in 1846/7 merely as a slave trader, 
30 
from at 
least 1849 Domingo was heavily involved in the shipment of oil. 
31 
The chronology of their entry into the palm oil trade suggests that 
the necessary diffusion of the slave trade resulted in the establishment 
of 'monopoly' slave agents in outlying ports who coincidentally 
benefitted from their relationship with the monarch by dominating the 
local palm oil market. D'Almeida at Agou6 and Domingo Martinez at Porto 
Novo were instances of this phenomenon. The decentralisationý necessary 
as a replacement for the hitherto existing da Souza monopoly at Whydah, 
was primarily intended to employ such local agents as a repository of the 
monarch's slave stocks, but the chronological coincidence of their entry 
into the large scale palm oil trade and production palm oil trade 
suggests that this alteration in the structure of the slave trade had 
sPill-over effects in the new legitimate commerce. 
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IARGE SCALE PRODUCERS: DAHOMEAN MERCHANTS 
The second group involved in the large scale production of oil f or 
export by the end of the 1840s was the indigenous Dahomean merchant class 
residing at Whydah. Several secondary works, drawing mainly on the 
writings of Forbes and Burton, have already attempted to outline the 
nature of the Dahomean merchant class, the Axisinon. 
32 
It is clear 
that they were licensed to trade by the monarch on his account and on his 
behalf or that of other Dahomean officials. It also seems clear thatý 
to a greater or lesser extent, they controlled long distance trade 
routes, dealing among others with the Whites at Whydah under the 
supervision of the Yevogan and ultimately the Meu. Their position of 
privilege allowed them opportunities to profit themselves from their 
trading activities but it remains an open question as to the extent to 
which their role as agents of the monarch had been superceded by their 
role as private traders, trading on their own account, with the passing 
of time. 
33 
The granting of monopoly rights to such traders goes back to at least 
the reign of Agaja around the time of the conquest of Whydah, 
34 
and may 
indeed, if some traditional sources are to be relied upon, go back even 
further. 35 From time to time the Dahomean monarchs had tried to 
re-establish closer control over the activities of the Axisinon: in 
particular Kpengla, in the 1770s -and 1780s is said to have tried to 
diminish their role in slave exports. 
36 It is unlikely that the 
attempt was fully successful, since there is evidence that as late as 
1789 Dahomean merchants were in a position to supply slaves to Europeans 
at a time when the monarch found himself bereft of supplies37 . and it 
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seems clear that Kpengla's monopoly was abandoned by his succesor Agonglo 
who proclaimed "full liberty to trade". 
38 
Whatever their original position vis-a-vis the monarch., by the late 
18th century the Dahomean merchant class were developing a relative 
autonomy from the King. Certainly, by the late 1840s,, the Dahomean 
merchants stationed at Whydah were men of considerable wealth and 
influence, paying an annual tax on their commerce to the monarch. 
39 
Many of them owned large numbers of slaves in their own right, and were 
in a position to supply whole regiments to the annual campaign. 
40 
Being in' a position to do so brought commensurate rewards at the 
conclusion of a successful foray for slaves. 
Moreover, their official position under the monarch permitted wide 
scope for personal accumulation: while trading on the King's account 
they were also permitted to trade f or themselves, gaining the benefits of 
the advantageous trade terms reserved to the monarch and his agents and 
the facility of extended credit. 
41 At the same time,, the f act that 
their tribute to the monarch was based on an annual estimate of their 
commercial dealings, rather than on any systematic recording of the 
transactions, enhanced the opportunities for private accumulation. 
42 
Throughout the 1840s individual members of this class situated in the 
area of Whydah embarked in the production of oil for export. 
43 To 
some extent this may have stemmiýd from the difficulties which they 
encountered in their private capacity as slave merchants - similar to 
those of the slave dealers - in offsetting the costs of holding slaves. 
The practice of employing slaves in the large scale production of oil may 
also have been encouraged by the monarch, who, in an attempt to employ 
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captives productively at a time when slave shipments were becoming more 
difficult, but constrained economically and ideologically from employing 
them directly in production of oil in the Abomey area, farmed slave 
stocks out to Dahomean merchants as well as to his appointed 'monopoly' 
agents in ports other than Whydah. This is in accord with the 
traditions recorded by Le Herisse that the monarch embarked on palm oil 
production through the use of plantations, but that the latter were 
managed by 'Axisinon' , the Dahomean private traders established in the 
region of Whydah. 
44 
The monarch was able to reap what income he could from taxing the new 
trade via the Axisinon, without transgressing the inherited martial 
status of the monarchy, or involving himself in the high costs of 
production and oil transportation from the royal plantations proper in 
the vicinity of Abomey. 
In either case, individual Dahomean merchants became involved in the 
production of oil f or the export market, and Forbes, who visited Whydah 
in 1850 described one such venture, a plantation belonging to Ahjovee, 
one of several rich merchants residing in the port. According to 
Forbes, the plantation, lying to the east of Whydah., was an extensive 
undertaking, comprising several villages wherein was collected palm 
fruit, and the oil manufactured. 
45 
LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION: SAROS 
Most of the so-called plantation production of oil appears to have 
taken place on the outskirts of Whydah, some miles distant from the town 
itself 
. 
46 
and it was here also that a third group of large scale 
producers were mainly situated. 
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As we have seen, in 1843 Gezo had embarked on a policy designed to 
encourage the growth of the palm oil trade through various political 
mechanisms and initiatives. As a corollary to these moves designed to 
stimulate internal production from existing producers, he had gone out of 
his way to welcome to the Whydah area liberated slaves f rom the Brazils 
and Sierra Leone, allocating them prime land within easy transportation 
distance from the coast. 
47 
Initially the newcomers to have devoted themselves largely to the 
production of agricultural crops such as cassava, which could be employed 
as subsistence for the slave stocks held on the coast. 
48 
But the 
slave traders appear to have offered them an extremely limited market for 
their produce, perhaps because of the downturn in the Trade during the 
first half of the 1840's. 
It may also have been the result, as one report has it, of jealousy 
on the part of the slave merchants at the allocation of prime land by the 
monarch to the interlopers. 
49 
This, however., appears somewhat 
inconsistent with the attitude of the main slave dealer, da Souza, who 
encouraged the settlement of liberated slaves in the area, and whose 
family appears to have remained on good terms with those liberated slaves 
involved in legitimate production. 
50 The liberated slaves had, in 
fact, for the most part stopped off at Whydah en route for their 
homelands, and had stayed on encoiiraged by the King of Dahomey, 
51 
and 
also by da Souza. 
52 One such group were, according to tradition, 
Muslim Hausas who had been originally shipped f rom Whydah itself by da 
Souza, and who were, on their return, not only welcomed but of f ered land 
by him. They stayed on to establish the Maro quarter in Whydah around 
1848.53 
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It is more likely, therefore, that the use of slaves as palm oil 
producers which had been stimulated among the slave traders as a means of 
cost-cutting also encouraged their use as producers of their own 
subsistence. 
The settled slaves were forced to diversify, and the Brazilians 
applied themselves to farming with considerable zeal. 
54 Part of this 
diversification developed into an involvement in palm oil production for 
the export sector. 
55 
Their transition towards significant production of palm oil coincided 
chronologically with that of the slave traders in production f or the new 
commerce. Duncan in the mid-1840s mentions the Saros mainly as general 
farmers, zealous but lacking in direction., cultivating land in the 
neighbourhood of Whydah. 
56 Between 1846 and 1849, partly as a result 
of the 'push' of a shrinking market from the slave traders for their 
agricultural produce, and perhaps also partly as a result of the 'pull' 
of increasing prices being paid for Dahomean, oil, 
57 
the area around 
Whydah, which had been previously used for the production of slave 
subsistence foodstuffs, was transformed in use towards legitimate 
produce. 
58 
Again it is Forbes who has left us the most specific evidence 
illustrating the involvement of liberated slaves in, the production of 
export oil. During his stay at Whydah he visited the plantation of one 
such returned slave f rom the Brazils, a Mahi in origin, in the company of 
the da Souza f amily - The plantation., three miles to the west of the 
town, was, according to Forbes, of "the highest order", and was partially 
devoted to the collection of palm produce and the manufacture of 
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oil - 
59 Though a number of such Saros were thus involved in relatively 
large scale production of oil, and their aggregate production contributed 
towards the take-of f of oil exports . it is likely that the vast majority 
of them fell into the catagory of small producers which will merit later 
attention. 
THE QUESTION OF PALM OIL PLANTATIONS 
By the late 1840s then, returned liberated slaves had joined Dahomean 
merchants and slave traders as large scale producers of palm oil f or the 
export market. But the categorisation of 'large scale' production, 
while a useful general distinction in outlining the main coastal groups 
heavily involved in export production, does have its limitations in 
describing the form of production. The term 'plantation'. often 
employed in the literature to describe such enterprises, offers a 
convenient, descriptive label but can also be misleading. 
"Plantation" was employed by visitors to Dahomey to describe several 
different phenomena, and the terminological ambiguities have carried on 
into the secondary literature. It has been used, f or instance., to 
denote large scale enterprises manned by captive slaves, 
60 
small scale 
cereal cultivation probably worked by individual households, 
61 
settled 
villages peopled by war captives, 
62 
or as a more general synonym for 
farms 63 or palm groves. 
64 More recently it has been used to 
indicate a system of privately held land furnishing profits to the owner 
through apparently conventional capitalist relations of production65 as 
well as systems whereby the surplus production is extracted through 
pre-capitalist tributary mechanisms. 
66 "Plantation" can probably be 
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justifiably employed to denote any or all of these phenomena, but because 
of the vague connotations of the word it is as well to qualify its use in 
relation to the Dahomean coastal palm oil 'plantations' of the 1840s. 
Firstly, the word can be misleading in so far as it implies the 
systematic planting and resettlement of seedling trees, as happened 
later, for instance, in the Krobo Oil Plantations. There is, in fact, 
no evidence to suggest that anything of this nature took place in in 
Dahomey in the 1840s. 
67 Indeed, what references there are in the 
primary sources suggest that the palm trees which were utilized were 
'wild' or naturally grown, and that the collection of fruit and the 
manufacture of oil was being carried out through the use of existing Oil 
Palm stocks which . had hitherto been neglected. 
68 
Furthermore, 'palm oil plantations' were not devoted exclusively to 
the harvesting of palm trees, but were combined in the traditional 
fashion with other agricultural produce such as corn, cotton, and 
69 
yams. 
Neither does the introduction of 'plantation' production appear to 
have involved any innovation in production techniques - So far as the 
process carried out in plantations is concerned, it did not differ in any 
respect, except scale, from that hitherto employed in the manufacture of 
oil for domestic consumption. 
70 
There therefore seems to have been little alteration in the 
productive forces. The fruit and its growth, horticultural practice and 
the technique of extraction remained essentially the same as for domestic 
oil production. The essential differences between the 'plantation' 
production of oil in the 1840s and the previously existing oil production 
for the export sector were two-fold. 
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Firstly, the scale of the operation: it is this which distinguishes 
the 'plantations' of the literature from other sources of oil. Even 
here the demarcation line is difficult to fix precisely: Forbes, for 
instance, refers to Madiki having only ten slaves on a "plantation" in 
the interior. 
71 Indeed, Forbes referred to this as a "large" 
plantation. 
The second change inherent in some, though not necessarily all, of 
the plantations referred to is the use of slaves destined for the export 
trade. There is no conclusive direct evidence to confirm whether such 
slaves were. permanently retained as producers, or whether their 
employment constituted a temporary expedient until such times as a ship 
was available and free to embark the slaves. 
72 Nor is there any 
evidence to suggest that liberated slaves 'were purchasing or employing 
slaves or captives in either capacity. 
73 Thus, despite the optimistic 
forecasts of Regis and various other French commentators to the effect 
that slaves were. now being kept rather than exported by those who 
previously supplied the export trade it is not clear how transient their 
retention was. Nevetheless, whether permanent or temporary initially, 
the increasing difficulties of making slave shipments gradually entailed 
the further utilization by slave traders and Dahomean merchants of 
previously exported slaves in palm oil producýion and considerable 
74 
numbers were retained in coastal towns and villages. This, of 
course, involved a transition in the economic status of the slave from 
being merely a realizable commodity, to a productively employed creator 
of other commodities. As a corollary, it entailed the partial 
transition of slave merchants and Dahomean coastal merchants from traders 
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deriving prof its largely through market transactions, to praedial slave 
owners extracting realizable surplus f rom their slave f orce in the f orm 
of saleable legitimate produce. 
To complicate the analysis, it appears that they may also have 
developed a quasi-feudal relationship with some of their slaves, exacting 
monthly stipends while encouraging the slaves' participation in palm oil 
produce and commerce, a point which is referred to later. 
But these developments should not be exaggerated, especially as early 
as the 1840s when the scale of export production of oil was much less 
than in later decades. From the beginning of the export trade 
commentators referred to the retention of domestic slaves by Dahomeans, 
rather than their sale to merchants , in order that that they could be 
employed in the collection of palm fruit and the manufacture of palm 
oil. 
75 
Such references continue throughout the 1840s. 
76 
Since 
they could refer to either small scale farmers, with perhaps one or two 
wives or domestic slaves, or to Dahomean merchants mentioned earlier - 
and on occasions appear to refer to both - the references are ambiguous 
on their own. Furthermore, if the supply of slaves for the export trade 
is assumed to have been largely derived from large scale merchants, then 
the retention of the same slaves for oil production would indicate their 
use by large scale operators rather than small scale petty production. 
However, this does not necesarily imply a massive extension of a 
slave based mode of production for the export oil. It is possible that 
even the slaves thus retained by large scale slave owners were relatively 
independent, operating as independent, small-scale producers, while 
paying dues to their owners the rich merchants. Such a development 
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would have allowed the proliferation of small-scale production, with the 
large scale slave owners benefitting through a tributary system of 
payment. Nor was the transition as marked as it may first appear, since 
both the former classes were already 'producers' of slaves through their 
control and input of large amounts of labour. They were never, 
therefore, pure 'merchants', in so far as they 'produced' rather than 
purchased their exports (slaves) to some extent. But what is perhaps 
more significant, is that their officially sanctioned position as 
'merchants' allowed them to enter into large scale agricultural 
production for the export sector much more easily than could the monarch, 
who, as a 'warrior', was constrained by an ideological inheritance 
77 deriving from slave 'production' . In this lay the seeds of the 
'crisis of transition' of the 1850s and 1860s onwards. 
The use of slave labour on coastal plantations does not., of course, 
necessarily imply that their physical conditions deteriorated: indeed, 
compared to the barracoons, settled villages may have been considerably 
more comfortable. 
78 The increased degree of exploitation of the 
slaves while in Dahomey was an economic rather than physical phenomena. 
In a sense the cruiser activity was transferring the economic mechanisms 
of South America to the A-f rican coastline. 
Another limited and short lived change in economic relations should 
be noted even although it was an exceptional case, involving cotton 
rather than palm oil. Cotton, like palm produce, ranked among the 
naturally occurring agricultural produce of Dahomey, and was used locally 
in the manufacture of a Dahomean cloth impressive to even western 
eyes. 
79 
The cotton thus naturally produced was, however, too small in 
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scale to constitute a viable economic prospect. 
80 
Duncan, in an 
attempt to illustrate the viability of large scale Dahomean production of 
cotton as an export commodity, embarked, in 1849, on an experimental 
plantation. 
81 He himself provided the cotton seeds, imported from 
England, 
82 
and drew his labour force mainly from the residents of 
English town at Whydah who had apparently been instructed by the monarch 
to work f or Duncan at whatever remuneration the latter was willing to 
provide. 
83 
Duncan appears to have introduced a wages system, the novelty of 
which, according to the redoubtable North Briton himself, delighted and 
84 
impressed his native labourers. Unfortunately, there are no details 
of the -numbers employed, rates of pay, or the status of those employed: 
indeed, it may well be that the labourers were, in fact, domestic slaves, 
'hired out' to Duncan by their masters as happened on other parts of the 
coast where there was an English presence established. 
85 This may 
explain Duncan's omission to furnish full Anformation. But, even 
assuming that such a 'wage' system was introduced, the experiment was cut 
short by Duncan's death, 
86 
and although it can be speculated that some 
similar relationship existed between R6gis and Whydah natives, there is 
no other specific evidence on the introduction of wage labour. 
Coastal "palm oil plantations" in the 1840s then., were distinguished 
from previous oil production in týeir scale of manufacture, and in the 
new economic relationships between master and slave developed at this 
time, but such change as did occur must not be over-estimated. 
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SMALL SCALE PRODUCERS AND DOMESTIC SLAVES 
By no means all of the oil exported derived f rom such large scale 
enterprises. While there are no quantitative data to indicate what 
share of export produce emanated from small scale production units in the 
early years of the trade there is sufficient impressionistic evidence to 
suggest that the proportion so produced was not insignificant. 
In 1845, for instance, Duncan indicated petty production by the wives 
of Sierra Leone slaves who undertook collection of f ruit f rom the bush 
and manufacture of the oil along with other part-time tasks such as 
laundrying. 
87 
The nature of the exchange goods employed in the palm oil trade also 
indicates extensive small scale transactions. In 1850 Forbes reported 
that apart f rom the normal exchange goods employed in the slave trade - 
which would obviously suffice for large scale transactions in palm oil - 
the conduct of the oil trade also required a range of smaller articles of 
less value: articles such as perfumery, inferior jewellery and 
ornaments. 
88 
Moreover, Forbes provides eye witness testmimony as to 
the regular presence of small scale producers, some with as little as a 
gallon to sell, in the yards of the oil traders. 
89 
Perhaps most important of all in indicating the important role of 
small scale production, is the central role of the cowrie shell in the 
new commerce. Cowries had been in domestic use in Dahomey for a 
considerable period prior to the development of the oil export trade. 
Dapper, one of the earliest visitors to the area, no-Led that cowries were 
in use for internal market transactions on the Slave Coast and the 
Western Delta of the Niger from the beginning of the 17th Century. 
90 
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A century later they constituted a valuable and essential part of any 
assortment in the exchange for slaves, both at Whydah, 
91 
and in the 
interior of the country. 
92 They still formed an important part of a 
slave ship's cargo at the onset of the 19th century, although their 
central role appears to have diminished somewhat. 
93 
The palm oil trade brought the shells back into the fore of exchanges 
in the export sector., and by the 1840s it was, according to one French 
source, the cowrie shell rather than trade goods which formed the 
mainstay and the normal means of exchange f or palm oil produce. 
94 
This report may have been influenced by the trading operations of Regis , 
whose importation of shells direct from the Indies did much to maintain 
95 his pre-eminent position in the Whydah oil trade. But the central 
role of cowries in legitimate commerce is confirmed by Duncan as well as 
French sources. 
96 
To some extent the attraction of the shell - to both large and small 
scale producers - may have been enhanced by its apparent scarcity in 
Dahomean and neighbouring ports in the first half of the 1840s. 
97 
But 
both its central role and the extent of its use in relatively small 
transactions is confirmed by the eye witness account of Forbes at 
mid-century. At that time the wholesale trade in oil was largely 
carried out in yards attached to the establishments of the various 
-98 European and Portuguese merchants. As such their activity can be 
taken to represent the vast majority of oil trading. Forbes, visiting 
one such yard, that of Don Jose Dos Santos at Whydah reported that the 
yard was "filled with traders, some with only a gallon, others having 
slaves loaded with large calabashes of oil: while dozens of his own 
slaves were counting out cowries to pay for the produce. " 
99 
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Outside Whydah, too, there are indications that a significant 
proportion of export oil was being provided by small producers. In the 
late 1840s Domingo Martinez, for instance, still appears to have been 
receiving a substantial proportion of his oil from native Dahomeans: so 
much so that in 1849 a number of European merchants were considering a 
petition to the monarch in an attempt to have the King prevent his people 
selling their oil to Domingo. 
100 
Despite the absence of reliable statistics, the foregoing evidence is 
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that a significant amount of oil 
destined for the export market was being produced and traded in small 
quantities. 
A proportion of this oil appears to have been produced through the 
use of domestic slaves, a fact which was repeatedly mentioned by European 
traders involved in the trade. But it is more difficult to ascertain 
precisely whether or not the new trade actually resulted in the 
significant transformation in the relationship between master and slave 
which was noted on other parts of the coast. 
101 
Nevertheless there are some indications of a change in the status of 
slaves. Under the conditions of traditional large scale slave 
production, in which the slaves had little or no control over their 
produce, which would be appropriated and consumed or marketed by the 
owner, the slaves had no direct access to wealth with which to enhance 
their status. However, the phenomenon noted at Lagos 
102 
whereby 
slaves were permitted -subject to tribute - to operate as independent 
small producers or traders, allowing them to accumulate wealth and, in 
some cases, purchase their freedom appears to have occurred to some 
extent within Dahomey. 
219. 
As mentioned earlier, this may have been because slaves owned by 
large scale slave holders were allowed some relative autonomy in the 
economic sphere, thus giving rise to a pseudo-feudal relationship of 
production and tribute. This was happening to some extent, at least in 
the coastal areas. Cruickshank!, for instance, commented on the 
employment pattern in the towns and villages along the coast; 
"It appears to be the general practice with the 
masters of the slaves, to permit them to prosecute 
their own affairs, and receive in exchange for this 
concession of their time, a stipulated monthly sum 
derived from their labour, and owing to this. 
arrangement an industrious slave is sometimes enabled 
to acquire his freedom by obtaining funds necessary 
for the purchase of two slaves, which will generally 
be accepted as the price of his redemption. ', 103 
It would, of course have taken considerable time to accumulate the 
value of two slaves, especially allowing for expenses, subsistence and 
the monthly stipend to the master. But there is evidence that slaves 
were capable of acquiring a considerable amount of wealth: Duncan, for 
instance, pointed to the fact that some of da Souza's slaves were being 
taxed by the monarch at a rate which would suggest considerable earning 
capacity. 
104 
The general trend is confirmed by Fraser's mention of a category of 
"liberty slaves", who, like those referred to by Cruickshank, had 
permission f rom their "father" - t1je term master was not employed in the 
case of "liberty slaves" - to act independently in return f or a 
stipulated repayment - calculated per diem, according to Fraser. 
105 
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It appears, therefore, that significant changes were taking place in 
the traditional social role of at least some slaves and that the new 
trade was offering a number of slaves the chance of liberty. 
On the other hand, the scale of the changes in the 1840s must be 
treated with caution. For one thing it is impossible to assess 
precisely the extent to which the liberating process encroached upon the 
traditional form of small-scale domestic slavery as opposed to those 
slaves owned by large scale slave holders. Moreover, it seems highly 
improbable that such a seasoned and experienced advocate of the benefits 
of the new commerce - and of his own economic interests - as Regis , for 
instance, would have missed the opportunity of using such a development 
in his own arguments, if it was occurring on an extensive scale: 
particularly since Regis , and other advocates of palm oil commerce, were 
wont to dwell on the subject of domestic slavery - specifically the 
retention of hitherto exported slaves for domestic production - as a 
central illustration of the new commerce's beneficial effects. 
Moreover, it is clear that he was well aware of the potency of any 
argument which held out the possibility of liberation for domestic 
slaves, and he himself employed this very argument in his attempts to 
convince the French Government that he should be allowed to purchase 
labourers - who would eventually be liberated - from the monarch. 
106 
It may well be that the new opportunities were largely confined to 
domestic slaves belonging to large slave holders, men like da Souza, f or 
instance, who wished to diversify into palm oil production and collection 
on a large scale, and who, prior to entry into plantation production, 
found it economically beneficial from their own point of view to 
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encourage the production of palm oil through the extension of economic 
incentives - and eventual liberty - to their own slaves. In the first 
insta . nce it is likely that such procedures resulted from the collection 
of oil produced by others in the hinterland, an activity which involved 
large numbers of small trading agents working on behalf of the larger 
merchants and slave owners, but which, on account of the diffuse nature 
of the operation, would have been impossible to supervise adequately in 
any controlled fashion. The obvious mechanism for ensuring oil supplies 
while retaining control of the agents, was to introduce a vested econoMic 
interest on the. part of the latter. 
107 
It appears, then that two main trends in domestic slavery 
accompanied, and resulted f rom, the declining slave trade and a growing 
palm oil export sector. These trends were alternatives, in the sense 
that a slave could not experience both at once. The first was an 
extension of internal slavery in terms of scale though not in terms of 
relationship between master and slave, as slaves hitherto exported were 
employed in the manufacture of oil and in its collection. In such cases 
the slave became part of a large scale production enterprise and was, 
incidentally, more exploited by the extended expropriation of economic 
surplus from the slave's labour owing to the commercial opportunities 
opened up by the increased demand for palm oil. 
Secondly, however, there is some evidence to suggest that the nature 
of domestic slavery was undergoing change, with the potential liberation 
of domestic slaves from their masters appearing as a concrete reality, 
though one which was probably limited to a relatively small number of 
such slaves throughout the 1840s . In this case the slave was allowed to 
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operate as an independent producer - or in some cases petty trader - 
while surplus was appropriated by the master in the form of regular 
tribute. 
These two catagories of production existed alongside petty commodity 
production by free peasants, from whom surplus was extracted by the state 
by means of taxation, and by traders through their prof its in exchange. 
SUMMARY OF PRODUCERS 
These,, then, were the . main sources of palm oil in the coastal 
region: by the end of the 1840s supplies of oil were being derived f rom 
both large and small scale producers. Petty production had existed 
throughout the 1820s and 1830s but developed considerably from 1839, 
encouraged firstly by the establishment of on-shore trading facilities, 
subsequently by the positive intervention of the monarch to encourage and 
protect the trade, and finally by the higher oil prices in the second 
half of the 1840s. 
The larger production units had their roots in the 1830s, but 
developed largely towards the end of the 1840s. The oil trade, which 
acted as both a substitute for the declining slave trade, and a 
complementary mechanism in an attempt to ensure the slave trade's 
survival, held out attractive advantages to the slave traders and the 
costal Dahomean merchants. Initially the slave traders enhanced 
supplies by the encouragement of petty production - under the auspices of 
the monarch - of Dahomean natives, by offering economic incentives to 
their own domestic slaves, and by encouraging the settlement of liberated 
slaves, particularly from Brazil. The continuing difficulties of slave 
223. 
shipments Ia declining income and costs of slave export stocks on the one 
hand, and ready supplies of labour and increased oil prices on the other, 
led them into the employment of hitherto exported slave stocks in palm 
oil production f rom the last years of the 1840s. Large scale entry into 
palm oil production led on the one hand to an extension of the scale of 
internal domestic slavery, 
108 
and on the other to changes in the 
relationship between master and slave which were limited in scale but 
extremely significant in their nature. 
NON-INVOLVEMENT OF THE MONARCH IN LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION IN THE 1840's 
The production of palm oil in the hinterland during the early stages 
of the palm oil trade has been a more open question than that of coastal 
production. In particular the role of the monarchy in the production of 
oil for the export sector has probably received more attention than any 
other aspect, though without agreed conclusions as to the extent of royal 
involvement, or the chronology of its development. Some authors have 
emphasized the innovatory role of Gezo's diversification into palm oil 
production from a relatively early date, with others disputing both the 
extent of innovation involved and the length of royal involvement in 
actual production. 
109 In fact, some historians suggest that both the 
growth of the oil trade and royal encouragement of the commerce pre-date 
Gezo's accession to the Dahomean stool, placing it as early as the first 
decade of the 19th century, in the reign of Adandozan. 
110 
For the most part, however, attention has concentrated on Gezo's 
reign, and in particular much of the discussion has centred on the 
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establishment of the plantation of Lefu-Lefu, 
ill 
an enterprise 
producing oil through the employment of slave labour. Neither the fact 
of its establishment nor the date of its foundation is necessarily a 
definitive indication of the involvement of the monarch, or the timing of 
his entry into large scale production of oil for export but the date and 
the nature of the plantation do merit some attention. 
The date of the foundation of Lefu-Lefu has remained elusive to a 
range of historians who have considered the question, 
112 
and in the 
absence of any additional information it's perhaps wise to adopt the 
correctly cautious approach of a recent historian who has placed the 
foundation of the plantation somewhere between 1833 and 1849- 
113 
Royal plantations in and around Abomey long preceded the rise of the 
palm oil trade. The use of royal slaves in agriculture was noted by 
Snelgrave, c. 1727.114 In the last decades of the 18th century, Norris 
noted that: 
"Jahou is Master of the Horse: he has the care of 
criminals and is to see their punishment inflicted: 
he also has the superintendance of the plantations 
which supply the King's household with provisions: 
and to see that the women who are to cultivate them 
are not remiss in the discharge of their duty. "113 
Such plantations served to supply the needs of the royal household 
and the standing army,, 
116 
the conscript army supplying its own food 
during campaigns. And, given the important role of palm oil in Dahomean 
cuisine and in army stores, they were inevitably involved to some extent 
in the collection of palm produce and manufacture of oil for domestic 
7 consumpt on. 
11 
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Lefu-Lefu may have differed from previous plantations in the sense 
that both male and female captives were settled in that particular 
plantation. Dunglas specifically refers to captives of both sexes being 
temporarily allocated there to await shipment opportunities, 
118 
while 
Forbes remarked in 1850 that "in the neighbourhood of Abome - y, unlike the 
rest of Africa, men labour in the fields and the women are only employed 
in carrying water. " 
119 If Forbes' remark includes plantations - which 
is not specifically indicated - then it does appear as though Lefu-Lefu 
was innovative in terms of sex employed - or at least that some change 
had taken place since Norris' visit. 
Dunglas's date for the establishment of Lefu-Lefu, 1843,120 is 
appealing since it suggests that the increased export demand for oil may 
have played some role in the plantations establishment. The date would 
suggest that the founding of the plantation coincided with the general 
promulgations by Gezo in encouragement of the oil trade. Moreover, 
Dunglas's assertion that out of the large number of captives the old and 
those with no market value were slain 
121 
could explain the extremely 
high level of human sacrifice at the 1843 customs. 
122 Finally, his 
remark that the original town of Lefu-Lefu itself was taken with 
considerable number of captives, and that the able-bodied of both sexes 
were sent, provisionally, to the royal food plantations, 
123 
would help 
explain the difference between Norris' account of the sex of plantation 
labourers and Forbes' remarks on male agriculturalists. 
But, notwithstanding the apparent diversion from the previous 
practice of employing only females on the royal plantations, Lefu-Lefu 
appears to have fallen into the traditional pattern of using royal 
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plantations for the provision of the monarch's household and others 
dependent upon him. It also appears to have been set in the traditional 
f orm of a mixed agricultural plantation. Like the plantations of the 
coastal merchants and slave dealers, it was not devoted to the exclusive 
production of palm oil. Forbes specifically referred to it as a 
tt plantation of palms, corn, etc. " 
124 
which seems in keeping with 
general f ood plantations outlined by Norris over half a century before, 
and by Forbes himself in his description of other Dahomean 
plantations. 
125 
David Ross accepts that the monarch began the systematic cultivation 
126 
of palm oil soon after Freeman's visit to Gezo in 1843. However, 
so far as Lefu-Lefu is concerned, it appears that the redirection of 
emphasis fell short of a radical or comprehensive attempt to enter into 
large scale production of export oil. Moreover, there is no suggestion 
in Forbes' account of his visit that the royal plantations were being 
used for the production of export oil. 
127 
It is therefore likely that there were other, more pressing reasons 
for the establishment of the plantation, and the involvement of labourers 
of both sexes perhaps provides a clue. The change may have occurred as 
a result of difficulties being experienced by the monarch in divesting 
himself of slave captives via the mechanism of the export trade. It is 
likely that f rom the late 1830ý- the monarch, the main supplier of 
Dahomean war captives f or the export trade, was hit even harder than the 
slave dealers at Whydah by the interruptions to the slave trade . Like 
them, he adapted to the new circumstances by employing slave stocks 
temporarily in a productive capacity - On the royal plantations - while 
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awaiting shipping opportunities. This is particularly likely to have 
happened whenever a Dahomean raid concluded in an overwhelming victory 
with a large number of captives. This would not, of itself, offer a 
rational explanation for the deployment of slave stocks unless the 
produce of the plantations were in demand either for internal consumption 
or f or trade. There is, however., some indication that Dahomey was 
undergoing a food shortage around mid-century. 
128 At the 1851 
Customs, for instance, Forbes noted a discussion on " the agricultural 
condition of the country ... the corn grounds were insuf f icient in 
extent to meet the demand". 
129 Moreover, the same source indicates 
that Dahomey had previously been in the habit of importing corn f rom 
Aja. 130 Thus the combination of internal food demand and decline in 
export slave demand may have encouraged the deployment of slave captives 
into domestic food production. 
But there is no suggestion in the contemporary literature that the 
monarch was developing specialized palm oil plantations in the 1840s - 
Certainly, the monarch himself went out of his way at the beginning of 
1843, to stress, during Freeman"s visit, that he had "no plantations in 
his country for coffee, cotton etc . 
131 Freeman was, in the 
spirit of the times, an enthusiastic advocate of the beneficial effects 
of legitimate agricultural production and its potential effect on the 
132 future of Dahomey. He had certainly raised the prospect of cotton 
cultivation during this first visit to Gezo, and possibly, carried away 
by his own enthusiasm for such a prospect, overestimated the willingness 
and capacity of the monarch to radically restructure his economic 
involvement in the export sector. 
133 
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Gezo, f or his part, was keen to woo the British diplomatically, and, 
holding temporary surplus labour in the form of unsaleable captives, was 
possibly prepared to carry out an experimental scheme of allocating the 
captives to agricultural production which would impress the British while 
at the same time productively employ his slave stocks f or the time being. 
But the move was a temporary economic and political expedient, rather 
than af irm redirection of policy. There are no reference whatsoever 
from the 1840s contemporary literature or primary sources regarding any 
significant direct involvement in palm oil production on the part of the 
monarch. 
134 It seems hardly credible that such a development would 
have gone unremarked upon. Nor is there any references to the carriage 
of oil f rom the Abomey area - where most of the royal plantations were 
situated - until the 1870s. 
There are, however, a number of scattered references which merit 
further attention. In 1851, just after Forbes' visit, Fraser on a visit 
to Abomey recorded some remarks on the vicinity. Among them he included 
reference to the area north of the town, which, was the road to Mahi 
territory, and was also the route which, according to Duncan during a 
visit to the capital some years earlier, was surrounded by "beautifully 
cultivated fields of corn (and) ... ground beans 11 . 
135 Fraser's 
comments on the area are tantilizing: "Took Duncan's route., the North 
Road, there are more young palm trees in this direction than I have ever 
seen: the land is level, covered with coarse grass and numerous patches 
of cultivation. " 
136 While there is no indication that the area 
constituted a royal plantation, it does appear to have been an area 
surrounded by some prohibitions since Fraser apparently reconnoitred the 
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area unknown to , 
the monarch and much to the latter's surprise. 
137 
However, although Duncan makes no reference in his published work to the 
development which so impressed Fraser some years later, he did in fact 
draw the attention of the Select Committee on the Slave Trade to the vast 
number of palm and "shea-butter' trees in the area between Dahomey and 
the "Kong Mountains". There was no suggestion from Duncan that these 
were other than naturally grown, or that they were the result of any 
systematic policy on the part of the monarch. 
138 
Dunglas also records another settlement of captives, established on 
the banks of the River Couffo about 15kms to the west of Abomey. Like 
Lefu-Lefu, he contends A was worked entirely by slave captives who were 
employed productively for the King's benefit, affording him at the same 
time further stocks of readily available slave exports. 
139 
There is, therefore, no evidence to substantiate the view that Gezo 
became directly involved on any scale in systematic production of palm 
oil. for export through the use of royal plantations in the early years of 
the 1840s, although he may have allocated 'spare' war captives 
temporarily to agricultural production. 
Gezo's own testimony bears this out. By 1845, two years af ter the 
Rev. Freeman's visit, the monarch was still apparently willing to 
consider such a course of action, although not to commit himself to it 
without more concrete proposals from his enthusiastic British visitors - 
proposals which had not so far been forthcoming. 
140 As late as 1848 
the monarch went out of his way to stress his non-involvement in 
commercial agricultural production; 
141 
and, on the subject of the palm 
oil trade in particular, while he conceeded that it was now engaging the 
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atention of some of his subjects, he referred to his own financial 
interest only in terms of duties on the trade. 
142 Even later, in 
1851, the monarch was still being subjected to persuasion by Europeans to 
maintain his encouragement and protection to the trade in general. 
143 
The need for such consistent persuasion illustrates the misgivings 
which Gezo was having about even his limited commitment to the palm oil 
trade. By the last years of the decade he had dismissed both cotton and 
coffee cultivation as too long term an investment and too low an income 
yield. 
144 And by that time, also, he was rapidly discarding attention 
to the supposed benefits of legitimate commerce by explicitly rejecting 
the whole notion of royal agricultural involvement in the export trade as 
a basis for his monarchical rule. 
145 
It is likely, in fact, that throughout this period the traditional 
relationship between the monarchy and agriculture had continued to 
prevail, with slaves on the royal plantations being overwhelmingly 
involved in the production of general foodstuffs - including palm oil for 
internal consumption. 
146 The increased demand for palm oil on the 
coast may have been a contributory factor in the establishment of 
Lefu-Lefu, but there is little contemporary evidence to suggest that it 
was anything other than a marginal one - 
As has been seen, when Forbes visited Lefu-Lefu in 1850, for 
instance,, cultivation was not confined to palm trees but also to corn and 
other agricultural produce. 
147 What attracted Forbes' attention was 
not so much the partial allocation to palm produce, but the orderliness 
a-ad quality of its cultivation, and -a point which is sometimes 
forgotten - the very uniqueness of the enterprise: "an operation which" 
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as he put it "if carried out generally, would soon put an end to foreign 
slavery. . 
148 
So far as the monarch's role in the palm oil trade was concerned, 
this was confined to the encouragement and protection of production by 
others - which did not preclude the possibility of supplying them with 
slave manpower for coastal plantations and the protection, 
encouragement and extension of facilities to traders involved in the 
trade. Royal income was derived from the mechanisms of tax on oil 
traded, levies and gifts from European traders, and possibly increased 
tribute from the Axisinon. 
Large scale production of oil throughout the 'forties lay 
substantially in the hands of the three main groups of coastal producers, 
the slave traders, the Axisinon and the liberated slaves settled around 
Whydah. In addition oil was derived in an unknown but probably 
significant proportion from small scale farmers, operating with their 
wives and possibly a small number of domestic slaves, and sometimes 
producing as little as a gallon at a time. 
Though the monarch encouraged all of these producers, and was happy 
to take what he could get by way of taxation f rom the new trade, was 
prepared to use it as a temporary (via the Axisinon) and permanent outlet 
(via Europeans involved, like Regis 149 for captives, and may even 
have been personally prepared to consider direct participation in the 
production of oil through the temporary use of slave stocks, there is no 
evidence that he actually became directly involved in production 
throughout the 1840s. 
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ECONOMIC REASONS FOR THE MONARCHS NON-INVOLVEMENT IN PRODUCTION 
That he failed to become so involved in production springs not so 
much from the personal decision' of the monarch as from existing 
socio-economic factors. His non-intervention in the sphere of 
production was determined on the one hand by the relatively unattractive 
economic prospects of doing so and by several technical characteristics 
of palm oil production itself: and on the other hand by political 
obligations and ideological constraints imposed by the inherited Dahomean 
social structure. Despite the growing strength of palm oil commerce, 
royal diversification into export production as a major means of 
off setting the declining slave trade not only held out little prospect of 
adequately fulfilling the former's vital economic and political role, but 
m. oreover implied nothing less than a complete political and ideological 
revolution. Far from constituting the economic lifeline which Europeans 
suggested, a developing palm oil trade threatened to create a dangerous 
disjunction between contemporary economic reality and inherited political 
ideal. 
Primary among the reasons for the failure of the monarch to diversify 
into palm oil production were the economic. The relatively high return 
from his production of and taxation on slaves over the previous two 
decades encouraged the hope that, despite a temporary dislocation of the 
slave trade, its decline might 'not be inevitable, and it reinforced his 
commitment to this traditional export sector as a steady and lucrative 
way of maintaining important western imports. On the other hand, the 
comparatively low return to the central exchequer f rom palm oil commerce 
throughout the forties held out little prospect of it ever serving as an 
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adequate substitute. Some indication of this can be obtained by 
assessing export levels of the legitimate commodity, and their associated 
income levels. Purely at the level of aggregate exports, even by the 
late 1840s, the total quantity of oil exported from Dahomey's main port 
each year appear to provide a total income figure far below the 
monarchy's traditional income. 
Thus, if Cruickshank's figures are taken as reasonably accurate as 
regards palm oil, 
150 
the total export of oil f rom Whydah at the end of 
the 1840s were running at a level of around 2000 tons per annum. 
151 
The price of oil does appear to have increased considerably in the second 
152 half of the 1840s, roughly doubling between 1846 and 1849, but even 
taking oil prices at their peak, and assuming the higher export totals of 
2000 tons per annum, the total income to all sources in Dahomey could 
have been no higher than E45,000 per annum. (May 1850 prices). At the 
lower 1846 prices the total income to all sources would be in the region 
of E22,500. 
Even allowing calculation on the higher prices and export quantities 
of the late 1840s then, the total income to all sources f rom the palm oil 
trade falls considerably short of Cruickshank's estimated income to the 
monarch f rom the slave trade (production and taxes) in the years prior to 
1848, which was put at E67,500.153 
It is true, of course, that Whydah was not the only port through 
which oil could be exported: but it was the main one - Moreover, the 
figures for palm oil income grossly overestimate the income from the 
trade which was acquired by the monarch, since his role was confined 
largely to that of taxation on the trade. The monarch's actual share of 
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the new commerce was more likely in the region of E2)500, derived from a 
1/18th tax on transactions recorded, and whatever else he might obtain by 
way of increased tribute from the Axisinon. The Whydah figures indicate 
the relatively paltry level of income implied by the new trade: a level 
which was hardly likely to reinforce convincingly the optimistic 
assertions of Gezo's various European visitors. The limited extent of 
the revenue is unlikely to have convinced the monarch of the benefits of 
an economic transition involving his diversification into export 
production. 
Thus, even if the monarch had been able to compete on the same cost 
terms as every other producer, and to produce as much oil as that 
produced from every other source., it is likely that the level of his 
annual income through the export sector would nevertheless have fallen 
considerably. 
But in fact, the monarch could not compete on equal terms with the 
coastal producers if royal plantations like Lefu-Lefu were to be utilized 
as a major production unit. The costs involved in the production, and 
particularly the transportation of oil f rom the interior were extremely 
heavy. 154 The startling difference in transport costs between slave 
and palm oil exports f rom the hinterland can be illustrated by making a 
few, not unreasonable, assumptions: viz: that the average journey from 
Abomey to coast took four days: that one slave export = one ton palm oil 
export = F-20; 
155 that one guard was needed for every ten slaves: that 
one carrier was needed for every five gallons of palm oil. 
The subsistence costs involved by the monarch in transporting ten 
slaves, value F-200, to the coast wou-Id then equal the subsistence costs 
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of 11 men (one guard and 10 slaves) f or f our days on the way to the 
coast, and one man (the guard) for four days on his return trip. A total 
of 48 man-days subsistence. 
The subsistence costs in transporting an equal value of palm oil (10 
tons) the same distance would involve, 600 men for four days on the way 
to the coast, and 600 men on the return trip for four days: a total of 
4,800 man-days subsistence. Palm oil transportation was, then, around 
100 times more costly than the transportation of slaves. 
These figures illustrate why it is unlikely that palm oil production 
f rom plantations in the Abomey area would prove economically worthwhile 
the conditions of the mid 19th century. The also indicate why the 
eventual establishment of plantations was effected near or on the rivers 
Couf o and Weme to facilitate carriage by waterway. 
In some areas of Africa such heavy costs were offset by using 
caravans of export slaves en route to the coast in the carriage of 
legitimate produce. 
156 These procedures were suitable when a market 
for the slaves at the coast was guaranteed, or could be arranged in 
advance. In the erratic and declining situation of the Dahomean slave 
trade, where speed and manoeuverability were essential f or the dispatch 
of slaves, such a cost cutting exercise was unworkable. 
ýoth the level of income, then, and the necessary costs involved in 
transportation indicate how unlikely the palm oil trade must have seemed 
as an adequate substitute for the slave trade. And since Gezo's concern 
was primarily one of revenue, 
157 it is not surprising that he was 
complaining at the end of the 1840s about the minimal amounts of money 
which the new commerce brought into his coffers. 
158 Revenue in the 
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export sector was of primary importance since, although the proportion Of 
income earned there may have been relatively small in comparison with the 
total gross domestic product of the Kingdom, 159 its social and 
political significance was out of all proportion to its share of the GNP 
so f ar as the Dahomean ruling class was concerned. The bulk of western 
imported goods was traditionally channelled in the first instance to only 
a small section of the Dahomean population, 
160 but therein lay its very 
importance rather than its insignificance. 
The import sector was the primary means of access by the ruling 
class, and particularly by the monarchy, to scarce luxury goods and to 
strategic imports - powder and cloth for the standing army, cowries for 
payment and distribution at the annual festivals, fine cloth and 
acoutrements for the monarch's wives in' keeping with their social 
standing, spirits for distribution to 'clients' and commoners, and 
prestigiously scarce western goods for a conspicuous display of wealth at 
the Customs. It is worth quoting the Dahomean monarch himself at some 
length on the relationship between this sector, and domestic political 
and social power. Gezo's words were recorded by Cruickshank. 
"The state which he maintained was great: hi s army 
was expensive, the customs and ceremonies to be 
observed annually, which had been handed down to him 
from his forefathers entailed upon him a vast outlay 
of money. These could not be abolished. who 
would pay his troops and_buy arms and clothing for 
them? Who would give him supplies of cowries, or rum, 
of powder and of cloth to perform his annual 
customs? "141 
The very nature of the traditional political structure upon which the 
power of the monarch rested demanded conspicuous exhibition of wealth, 
ostentatious distribution of relatively scarce commodities and cowries, 
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and provision f or a standing army. All of these in turn depended on a 
high earnings capability in the export sector. The palm oil trade 
offered a low level of income through taxation, and compared to the slave 
trade a low level of prof it through production. 
Furthermore, the monarch required a sustained level of income. Even 
if palm oil production could be achieved on the vast scale necessary to 
produce an adequate income, transitional preparations would involve a 
time-lag incompatible with the maintenance of the monarch's political 
position in the interim. The procuration of slaves, the monarch's 
traditional means of access to the export-import sector, offered, subject 
to a successful campaign, not only a relatively high level of profit, but 
a relatively short-term return. The potential returns from ad-hoc 
production from oil trees in the hinterland were low per unit: the scale 
of production required to achieve tolerable income totals in the export 
sector would have necessitated a massive systematic cultivation and 
planting of trees. But, systematic planting was a very long-term 
investment. 
Gezo was unable to suspend the Dahomean traditional political 
structure at will until such times as he managed to reap the uncertain 
and uninvitingly low potential of legitimate commerce. It was on these 
grounds that he rejected the systematic production of coffee and cotton: 
they constituted too long-term- an investment to merit serious 
consideration as an answer to his present economic problems in the 
1840s. 162 Systematic palm oil planting would, in fact, have taken 
even longer to bear fruit, literally and metaphorically. 
163 The 
utility of palm produce to the monarch was that existing palm stocks, 
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naturally grown, created a reservoir which could be tapped immediately as 
a partial offsetting influence to the declining slave trade, as opposed 
to the longer term cultivation which was required of, say, cotton and 
coffee. 
164 But transportation costs from the central area of the 
kingdom rendered the prof its per u-nit on palm oil so low that economic 
production in an area like Abomey which was not only far from the coast, 
but was also relatively scarce in wild palms, a very distant prospect. 
From an economic point of view, then, palm oil production offered 
little potential solace to the monarch at a time when his major export 
commodity was suffering decline. High transport costs, low profit 
margins and high labour input per unit, and the length of investment 
required to achieve anything like a comparable export income to the slave 
trade all stood in stark contrast to the monarch's requirement of an 
immediate, sustained and high level of income from the export sector. 
THE INHERENT DANGERS IN PALM OIL PRODUCTION 
If palm oil production offered no positive attractions to the 
monarchy as a major source of access to the export-import sector., there 
were aspects of the production process which manifested an increasing 
threat to the traditional economic and political power of the central 
government. These features3 some of which became apparent during the 
1840s, stemmed essentially from four production characteristics of the 
new trade. 
Firstly, the geographical location of the main producing areas was 
situated outside the main metropolitan area, Abomey, and lay mainly to 
the immediate hinterland of the coast between Abomey and the export 
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ports - Secondly, and to a certain extent related to this, the monarch 
was not involved to any extent in production himself. 
Taken together, these two features rendered it extremely difficult 
for the monarch to carry out any bureaucratic or statistical checks on 
the actual amount of oil produced for export, and thus to obtain even the 
limited tax-income to which he was entitled. 
The task was further compounded by a third characteristic of palm oil 
production: its widespread production for internal consumption made it 
extremely difficult to distinguish, at the point of production, between 
oil produced for internal use and that intended for the export market. 
Finally, the sheer scale of a large number of small producers of oil, 
spread over time and space to a far greater extent than in slave 
procuration, made control and assessment of export oil at the point of 
production well nigh impossible. 
Thus, the monarchs lack of real control over the production side of 
the new commerce in all likelihood rendered his income f rom taxation, and 
possibly tribute via Axisinon, even lower than might be suggested from 
calculating his tax entitlement from export figures. 
The monarch could, and did, of course, attempt to effect accurate 
returns and to obtain his full tax entitlement by the stationing of his 
agents in markets , in the yards of merchants or wherever oil exchange 
165 took place, but the vastly increased scale of unit transactions 
increased the opportunities for tax evasion. Even at Whydahý the most 
closely administered of the coastal ports under the sovereignty of the 
central government, oil was changing hands in a clandestine fashion from 
the inception of the trade, avoiding the attention of the King's men and 
240. 
166 
thus the tax impositions. Tax evasion was neither new nor was it 
confined to the palm oil trade alone. 
167 But the diffused nature of 
palm oil production and the scale of transactions rendered the practice 
potentially more widespread and effective. 
In the coastal ports less effectively under direct control from 
Abomey, the task of ensuring effective collection of duties was even more 
difficult. This may have been the reason why some of the 'monopoly' 
agents appointed by the King in outlying ports consequent upon the 
necessary diffusion of the slave trade appear eventually to have 
commanded a near monopoly of the palm oil trade; 
168 
they may have been 
employed by the King in an attempt to ensure adequate income f rom the 
trade. 
The avoidance of duties or tribute., the growing dispersal of the 
means of prosperity as a result of the trade, and acts of political 
defiance became increasingly associated with each other in the official 
Dahomean mind. This attitude is most clearly illustrated in the cases 
of Agoue and Badagry, coastal ports which had been under the suzerainty 
of, and paying tribute to, Dahomey f or some time prior to the development 
of the palm oil trade. Cruickshank was the recipient of Gezo's views on 
the subject when he visited him in 1848. Having illustrated the avowed 
benefits of legitimate commerce to Gezo by reference to the advances in 
riches and 'comfort' attained by the Gold Coast natives, Cruickshanks 
advocacy elicited the following reply from the monarch: 
"No riches f or my people ... Porto Novo, Ajudo, 
Badagry and other towns on the coast once belonged to 
me and paid their tribute as regularly as Whydah. 
Ships now go there and trade with them - factories are 
established there for the purchase of palm oil, and 
the result is, that these people are becoming rich, 
and set my authority at defiance. It is true that 
they still pay a nominal duty to prevent war, but I am 
cheated by them 0-169 
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These sentiments pre-dated by some forty years the political crisis on 
the periphery of the kingdom, particularly around Porto Novo, which was 
t 
to have such grave consequences for the Dahomean monarchy, but their 
expression indicated that even in the 1840, s the potential consequences 
of the new commerce were not untirely hidden from the Dahomean 
authorities. 
POLITICAL ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE PALM OIL TRADE 
The concern to centralise the control of trade was not a new one f or 
Dahomean monarchs. Royal concern to close rival ports or to divert 
their trade through Whydah was a long standing one which long pre-dated 
the oil trade. 
170 But as Gezo's comments quite clearly illustrate, 
the Dahomean monarchy realised the potential threat to their own 
political power inherent in the new commerce: a threat first manifesting 
itself in the peripheral areas of the kingdom, but one which had a 
potential for spreading to the very heart of their polity. 
Lack of control over production for the export sector demanded 
increasingly political action to control it at the level of trade. The 
general movement of trade was, of course, part of a continuing process, 
and one which had its roots in an era pre-dating large scale palm oil 
exports: but the process was accelerated by the nature of the new export 
commodity, and the first signs of the disjunction between inherited 
political power and the reality of the new economic developments was 
manifested in areas least susceptible to direct political control, but 
best placed to reap the advantages of the new commerce - the coastal 
ports on the fringes of the Dahomean Kingdom. 
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From the early 1840s the monarchy attempted to counteract this 
tendency by the use of non-economic mechanisms to try to stifle the trade 
at outlying ports and channel it through their most closely controlled 
port, Whydah. Diplomatic attempts to persuade European powers and 
merchants' towards this end are numerous throughout the 1840s. 171 
But the monarchy did not rely solely on diplomatic persuasion, as is 
evident from the instance of a Captain Marmon who in the late 18301 s had 
managed to establish a palm oil factory at Badagry, largely through the 
mediation of da Souza with the King. Initially the factory prospered, 
attracting considerable quantities of oil from the hinterland. By 1842) 
however, the Captain had been f orced to leave his establishment, largely 
according to one report,, on account of the jealousy of the Dahomean 
authorities. 
172 
Hutton's factory at Badagry, which was established subsequent to that 
of Marmon, was still starved of oil as late as 1844, and was barely in a 
position to cover its running expenses. 
173 This stemmed in large part 
from the fact that the coastal road from Whydah to Badagry had been 
closed by Gezo against the factory since its inception. 
174 
Hutton's Badagry factory was subject to further harrasment. By 1844 
the dispute between the Dahomean authorities and the Badagrian chief s was 
reaching a climax, 
175 
which not only contributed towards the 
interruption to comunications but on a number of occasions threatened the 
port with Dahomean invasions. 
176 Early the following year the 
Dahomean army invaded the surrounding area, and Hutton himself was 
convinced that Gezo was bent on the destruction of the town. 
177 
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In fact., Gezo was probably constrained precisely by the fact that the 
destruction of the town would have involved him in a direct confrontation 
with the British over the possible consequences for Hutton's 
factory. 
178 But the Dahomean monarch did not drop the matter: later 
that year Dahomean soldiers returned to the town, demanding payment of a 
traditional tribute and the restationing there of a Dahomean agent. 
179 
Up until around 1847 the factory was the subject of harassment less 
directly attributable to the Dahomean authorities, but unlikely to have 
been carried out without at least their tacit approval. Domingo 
Martinez, for instance, was involved in attempting to persuade the 
Badagry chief s to drive out the English merchants. 
180 And Domingo was 
again involved in 1847 when remnants of his Dahomean army returning f rom 
an unsuccessful attack on Lagos harassed Hutton's men, and rendered 
puncheon kits useless by making of f with the iron hoops essential f or 
binding the storage vessels. 
181 
Badagry was not the only port competing with Whydah, of course, and 
the monarch actively discouraged trade at any of the other ports. 
182 
Hutton's fared little better there than they did at Badagry. In the 
early 1840s they had established a factory at Agoue to the west of 
Whydah, 183 and remained the sole European factors there f or a number of 
years. 
184 On at least two occasions the factory was badly damaged by 
185 fire, and although there is no conclusive evidence to prove direct 
instigation by the Dahomean. monarch, the suspicions of the factors 
themselves that the Portuguese community at Whydah lay behind the arson 
may have had some substance. Moreover, Agoue suffered in the same 
manner as Badagry., by having the roads from Whydah closed against it by 
the Dahomean authorities. 
186 
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Though Hutton's appear to have believed that the initial Dahomean 
antagonism towards them was the result of an attempt to stifle the palm 
oil trade completely, this is, -in fact, unlikely. Af ter all, both the 
monarch and the Portuguese on the coast were involved in measures 
designed specifically to encourage production and commerce in palm oil. 
And both parties had something to gain from so doing: the Portuguese as 
traders and producers of oil, and the monarch in the more limited field 
of tax income. It is more likely that while the Dahomeans encouraged 
the trade, the very nature of palm oil production made it more important 
than ever to channel commerce through the port most directly under their 
political control. This maximised the commerce of the Portuguese and 
the tax income of the monarch. It may well have been Hutton's success 
in establishing factories at coastal situations other than Whydah, rather 
than their involvement in the palm oil trade per se, which merited them 
the antagonism of both Portuguese and the Dahomean authorities. Regis , 
whose other establishments on the West Coast were sufficiently distant to 
offer no obvious competition to Whydah, basked in the sunshine of the 
monarch's benevolence throughout the forties, in stark contrast to 
Hutton's factory even at Whydah. 
Thus, so far as the new trade was concerned, the actual production 
characteristics limited the capacity for royal diversification into palm 
oil as an effective means of acceý`ss to western imports, and eroded the 
returns in taxation income. Furthermore, the same characteristics 
encouraged a shift in economic power from the monarchy towards coastal 
merchants on the one hand, and from the centre of the Kingdom to the 
periphery on the other. Finally they permitted much wider access to the 
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export sector by small scale producers than had hitherto been the case, 
thus threatening the monarch's dominance of western imports, diffusing 
access to them among sections of the population whose access had 
previously been largely restricted to their distribution via major slave 
producers. 
But if the economic and technical aspects of the new commerce 
constrained the monarchy and central authorities relative to these other 
groups, they were equally constrained by non-economic aspects of Dahomean 
lif e. In particular by an ideology compatible with, and reinforced by, 
an export sector. based on the procuration of slaves. The legitimacy of 
the monarch depended to a large extent on his warrior ethos, and the 
Samurai could not lightly take to the plough. 
In the 1840s the f irst indications of the' threatening tendencies of 
the new commerce had become obvious. They were to be compounded 
throughout the fifties by conflicting pressure on the central 
government., On one side by the continued interruptions to a declining 
slave trade and the growing strength of palm oil in the export sector. 
And, on the other, by two factors rendering production of this means of 
access to important import commodities a high risk venture for the 
central authorities: firstly., continued cowrie inflation, rendering the 
profit margins on oil produced even more precarious for an inland 
producer: and secondly the ideological crisis inherent in transition 
from warrior to farmer. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
PRELUDE TO CRISIS: 
. 
Events leading up to the 1852 Treaty 
THE PALM OIL TRADE c. 1850 
Despite the progress which had been made in the development of palm 
oil exports, there is little doubt that there was a tendency among 
contemporary European observers to exaggerate the extent to which the new 
commerce had made inroads into the traditional Dahomean economic and 
political structures by mid-century. 
1 Perhaps their optimism is 
understandable given that legitimate commerce had taken off at all in the 
most infamous of African slave trading states. 
2 And they could 
underpin their arguments with 'enlightened' European self-interest, for 
by the beginning of the 1850s the -new trade did appear to hold out 
potentially bright prospects f or the major European powers. 
This was particularly so in the case of France, a relatively late 
developer in palm oil imports compared to Britain. One Frenchman who 
made a number of trips to Dahomey in the late 1840s was convinced that 
commercial prospects could not have been better for his country; 
3 
particularly since the Dahomean monarch - with an eye to developing 
industry and commerce - was willing to put any necessary labour force at 
4 
the disposal of incoming merchants, and since the relative 
under-utilization of the product in France up to that time offered 
considerable scope for expansion. 
5 
The British, of course5 were not unaware of the commercial 
possibilities, and the appointment of Duncan as Vice-Consul to Dahomey in 
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1849 reflected their desire to protect and extend British trading 
opportunities with the Dahomean state. 
6 
The trade had similarly attracted widespread commercial interest 
internally. Former slave traders like the da Souzas, Dos Santos at 
Whydah, and Domingo Martinez at Porto Novo Beach, were heavily involved 
in the new trade by the early 1850s. 
7 Indeed the palm oil trade of 
the latter alone was reported by his clerk to be in excess of 200,000 
dollars annually by 1851.8 While da Souza's interest in the trade 
prior to this death appears to have been more limited, he nevertheless 
continued as a lynchpin of Dahomean trading operations up until his 
death, and to the Europeans he remained the best vehicle f or ensuring 
good commercial relations, whether directly with the monarch or with the 
King's principal trading agents. 
9 
The entry of the former slave traders into large scale palm oil 
operations had resulted in part from the depressed state of the slave 
export market in the f inal years of the 1840s. But it was also 
stimulated by the fairly dramatic rise in the coastal value of oil from 
two to six dollers the measure (of 19 gallons) by May 1850,10 and eight 
dollers the measure the following year. 
11 The increased prices paid 
may have been the result of increased competition for oil, 
12 
enhanced 
C-1849 by a shortage of supply because of drought. 
13 
FISCAL MECHANISMS ON THE PALM OIL TRADE 
With the trade in palm oil increasing in both volume and unit value 
the central Dahomean exchequer reaped its share. Dahomea-a trade taxes 
were generally heavy; 
14 
the tax on palm oil, one gallon on . 18 changing 
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hands at the coast, 
15 
was collected by the King's appointed agents 
under the direction of the Meu - the 'Decimeros'3 stationed at all 
transactions taking place in the yards of the coastal merchants. 
16. 
The oil thus collected was then exchanged for trade goods on the 
monarch's account. 
17 
Nevertheless, despite its growth, the trade was still of fairly minor 
importance for the monarchy. As has been pointed out, the revenue 
derived by the Abomey exchequer f rom the new trade throughout the 1840s 
was of relatively insignificant proportions. And the monarch, despite 
the persistent entreaties of European visitors and the erratic nature of 
slave export demand, had hitherto obstinately refused to rely on the new 
commerce. 
Gezo had, in fact, followed a flexible twin approach towards the 
export sector. On the one hand he had been willing to reap what 
benefits he could from the new trade short of direct production - by 
encouraging its growth, - stimulating production, protecting merchants 
involved in the trade, and thereafter deriving his rewards through 
taxation. From his point of view the trade also served as a useful 
point of contact with Europe, whence derived important western 
manufactures. The 'legitimate' contact also had its diplomatic 
rewards. For, on the other hand, Gezo . 
had been firmly committed 
throughout the 1840s to the retention of slave trading opportunities. 
The palm oil trade supplied him with a useful tool in his attempts to 
maintain slaving operations in the face of European moral indignation and 
in spite of European - especially British - diplomatic and naval pressure - 
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So far as the palm oil trade was concerned, Gezo's non participation 
in direct export production necessitated extra-market mechanisms in order 
to derive any benefit. 
At the principal port of Whydah this was achieved through fiscal 
means, by the imposition of trade taxes at the point of exchange. To 
maximise trading the monarch did what he could to facilitate orderly 
collection and shipment of produce. Despite his efforts difficulties, 
not unnaturally perhaps , did remain. One , over which even the monarch 
had no control, was that arising from the difficulty in embarking palm 
oil through the Whydah surf. The operation demanded the services of 
skilled canoeists from outside Dahomey itself - mainly Minas - whose 
hiring costs were a frequent complaint of profit conscious European 
merchants. 
18 
Other difficulties and abuses, however, over which the monarch had 
more control, had again arisen towards the end of the 1840s possibly as a 
result of the depressed state of slave exports; indeed they appear to 
have become so widespread at that particular time that they threatened to 
paralyse the trade. 
19 Principal among these were the frequent 
stoppages to trade caused by the interruptions of the Decimeros, 
20 
fraudulent practices, 
21 
and simple robbery both by canoe men carrying 
palm oil produce and trade goods, and carriers between Whydah and the 
beach. 22 
On these and related issues Gezo displayed an eagerness to 
negotiate, 
23 
and indeed they formed the basic ingredients - from the 
point of view of the French - of the discussions between Gezo and the 
French emissary Bouet when they met in Abomey in 1851. The meeting 
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successfully concluded agreements over trading and Commercial matters and 
re-affirmed the monarch's commitment to protecting France's position in 
the new trade. 
24 
By such mechanisms Gezo encouraged the palm oil trade and maximised 
his economic benefits in the port under his direct Political control. 
outside Whydah, where his control was less directly enforceable, Gezo 
achieved his ends through different mechanisms. 
Whydah was maintained effectively as the only port open to the 
general trader. 
25 In ports outside of it3 the monarch operated 
through the vehicle of favoured merchants whose activities involved both 
slave and palm oil commerce, and whose control over the slave trade at 
outlying ports amounted to a virtual monopoly. In factý their economic 
relationship with the monarch derives initially from the necessary 
diffusion of slave exporting operations throughout the 1840s rather than 
a conscious attempt to ensure returns to the central exchequer from the 
palm oil trade . 
At Little Popo one section of the town (Ajudo) operated under the 
direction of the Portuguese, including Isidoro, da Souza who maintained a 
26 
slave baracoon there. Isidoro's own monopoly operated from Godomey, 
while that of his brother Antonio applied at Cotonou. 
27 At Agou6 
28 
slaving operations were a virtual monopoly of Josý Almeida. All 
were increasingly involved in the new palm oil trade. Separate export 
figures for these ports are not available; 
29 
and even if they were, the 
tributary nature of the relationship between merchant and monarch would 
make it impossible to estimate the extent of his income. This is 
particularly so since not only the f orm of income - dashes, presents, 
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customs tribute to the monarch - but also the content of the tribute, 
which included payments derived from both slave and palm oil trades, 
differed from the position at Whydah. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the monarch did benefit from palm oil 
commerce at ports outside Whydah. In the case of Gezols best known new 
trading partner, Domingo Martinez at Porto Novo Beach, such tribute could 
be substantial. Domingo's career has been the subject of previous 
historical study. 
30 Suf f ice it to say that such a tribute as was paid 
to the Dahomean monarch was in no way a novel departure, other perhaps 
than, in size, so far as Martinez was concerned. During his period at 
Badagry he had previously lavished gifts upon the Egba war chiefs at 
31 Abeokuta in order to foster his own trading interests. But, by 
mid-century he was so heavily involved in the oil trade that European 
merchants contemplated a direct approach to the monarch in a desperate 
attempt to direct commercial traffic away from Martinez's Porto Novo 
establishment. 
32 
It is, therefore,. legitimate to consider the tribute 
and presents given to the monarch by him and others - which in the case 
of Martinez were rewarded by the title of Caboceer of Dahomey 
33 
- as 
income derived partly at least from the new palm oil trade. 
Furthermore, control of the lagoon system on either side of Whydah 
allowed the Dahomean authorities to operatý a taxation system on goods or 
produce moved to the outlying embarkation points by way of the 
Lagoon, 34 thereby supplementing the income derived f rom tax on trade at 
Whydah itself. 
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RELATIVE INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE PALm OIL TRADE TO KING 
Gezo, then, sought to reap what benefits he could from palm oil 
commerce through formal fiscal mechanisms at Whydah, and informal 
tributary mechanisms in the outlying ports less directly under his 
political control. 
Despite this, and despite the optimistic assertions of western 
commentators, by 1850 the benefits to the monarchy from the new trade 
were still of relatively minor importance, particularly when compared to 
that derived from the previously flourishing slave export trade. 
35 
Even the French, who dominated palm oil exports from the main Dahomean 
port, were shipping no more than 800 tons of oil per annum from Whydah in 
the second half of the 1840s, a figure which rose perhaps to a maximum of 
around 1200 tons in the final year of the decade. 
36 At the higher 
figure, and assuming all transactions were recorded, the monarch's share 
in taxation was limited to around the equivalent of 66 tons in trade 
goods, or 66 slaves. 
The comparative insignificance of the palm oil trade in terms of 
revenue to the monarch is important firstly as a counterbalance to the 
over optimistic reports of westerners, and secondly as a context to 
political developments within Dahomey in the early 1850s. 
THE 1852 TREATY: GEZO'S POLICY 
In January 1852 King Gezo appended his signature to a treaty with the 
British, ending forever - at least in terms of the treaty - the export of 
slaves from his Dominions. The most recent detailed study of Dahomean 
19th century politics lays considerable significance not only on the 
treaty itself, but also on the motivations of Gezo in signing. 
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In the view of David Ross, the signing of the 1852 treaty by Gezo 
marks a significant turning point in Dahomean history. It marks an 
attempt by the monarch, finally convinced of the need for a radical 
transformation of Dahomey's economy and in particular the role of the 
monarchy in it, to conspire with the British to effect what Ross himself 
has termed a "revolutionary gamble". Gezo conspired to restore the 
economic power of the monarchy, against, and at the expense of, the 
Dahomean chief s, by monopolizing the new trade in palm oil. To achieve 
this end he was prepared, indeed eager, to employ the active backing of 
England (and the threat of a Egba attack) to overcome chiefly opposition 
to the abolition of the slave trade, making peace with Abeokuta, and 
royal monopolisation of the palm oil trade. 
37 
Accordingly he had set 
out, some time previous to 1852, to cultivate a special relationship with 
the English, primarily in an attempt to replace da Souza whose fortunes 
were ebbing. 
38 
According to this interpretation, Gezo assumed that his agreement on 
the slave trade would be sufficient to ensure the backing of the 
English; their ancillary demands incorporated in the treaty 
specifically the freedom for missionary settlement, freedom of trade and 
the abolition of human sacrifice - were not 'touched upon' by Gezo in 
1852, either because he did not consider them an important part of the 
British demands, or because he assumed that they had been dealt with and 
agreed at previous meetings. 
39 Gezo, assuming that his agreement on 
the slave trade would be sufficient to meet English demands and ensure 
their active support - although it's never quite clear exactly what 
action was expected in the event of chiefly opposition - fully expected 
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them to establish a garrison at Whydah. 
40 
Accordingly he swiftly set 
about monopolizing the palm oil trade while the British officials were 
still in his dominions subsequent to the signing of the Treaty, in 
expectation of their immediate support. 
41 
With the backing of the English, Ross believes, Gezo might have won 
through. But a failure on their part to understand Gezo's motives, and 
thus their dithering over how far he could be seen to have fulfilled 
their demands, badly weakened Gezo's attempted conspiracy and lef t him 
open to serious internal challenge when the Egba threat receded. 
42 
This interpretation is based the view that Gezo personally had f or 
some time wished to transform Dahomean economy in an enlightened western 
fashion, but was prevented from doing so by his reactionary chiefs. In 
terms of future linkage, it assumes'the eventual assassination of Gezo. 
Ross's interpretation obviously has some merit. It is clear that 
the monarch was under considerable economic pressure even before the 
blockade. Gezo did attempt to monopolize the palm oil trade in January 
1852. He did constantly assure the British both of his incapacity to 
act, prior to 1852) because of the reluctance of others, and of his 
desire for a special relationship with them. 
But it appears also to have some obvious flaws. Abomey was well 
protected from military intervention by the West, particularly before the 
arrival of steamboats, by the Lama, the marsh between Whydah. and Abomey 
which - as Gezo knew well - was a major geographical hurdle to any 
military expedition; quite apart from the climate, fever, and general 
lack of geographical knowledge. 
43 
It seems incredible that a warrior 
leader such as Gezo would have relied on English military support, even 
if he was prepared to face an open confrontation with his chiefs. 
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It seems just as unreasonable to suppose that Gezo would have assumed 
the practicality of British intervention on his side within a week of the 
signing of the treaty,, when he 'monopolized' the palm oil trade. if 
Gezo's conspiracy was not founded on active British military support it 
is not clear what support he did expect, particularly of a nature 
sufficient to counteract a possible coup. In fact it's more probable 
that the official presence sought by Gezo stemmed from a traditional 
Dahomean belief that an official presence cements commercial intercourse. 
In fairness to Ross's view it should be mentioned that there are 
scattered pieces of evidence which might be taken suggest a 
conspiratorial attitude on the part of the monarch. Fraser recorded for 
instance, that on his first visit to Abomey in 1851; 
"I made some remark (to Gezo) by way of explanation 
respecting the shipment of slaves at Whydah; the 
difficulty of his finding a sale for his slaves; that 
his revenue must be affected thereby, and why not 
accede to the Queen of England's request, before he 
was compelled, for then it would be too late; the 
strong language of the letter, (from Palmerston) and 
the explanations I gave seemed rather to astonish 
him; for I saw the muscles of his face twitch, and 
soon after he gave me to understand, that all this 
must be kept secret, that another day when he was more 
alone, he would desire me to bring my pen and paper, 
to make book for the Queen. -44 
Furthermore, after the signing of the treaty Gezo did apparently make 
a general statement which can be interpreted as a sign of his good 
faith. On 6 March orders came-to Whydah from Abomey alerting the 
population of an intended attack on Badagry - Hitherto, said the King's 
messenger, the monarch had remained silent on the destination of his 
armies, since he wished to maximise the number of captives. But now 
surprise was no longer at a premium since he was not any longer 
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interested in taking slave captives; this being the case he would allow 
the name of the place to be known. The town would be destroyed and 
anyone who had not fled would be put to the sword. 
45 
These pieces of evidence appear superficially to support Ross's 
interpretations of events surrounding the 1852 Treaty. In factl both of 
them are equally open to an alternative interpretation. In the first 
instance cited Gezo might well have been following his traditional 
diplomatic manoeuvre of presenting himself as honest broker between two 
irreconcilable sides in order to minimise his own concessions. More 
specifically, in this instance, he may have wished to discuss with Fraser 
approaches he had already, and was continuing to make to the British 
seeking special dispensation for a limited number of slave ships, in 
which he had a particular interest, to be given free passage. 
46 
In the second instance, it can be conceded that the monarch's aim was 
the destruction of Badagry rather than captives, without necessarily 
interpreting this as an act of good faith towards the British. A 
threat, within three months of the signature of the treaty, to destroy 
the town in which the main British palm oil factory was established, and 
whose exemption f rom. the coastal blockade had permitted British business 
to continue while the monarch's was still stopped at all other ports, is 
more likely to have been an anti-British act. 
47 
Four years previously 
the British establishment there had been sufficient reason for his not 
attacking the town. 
48 
Gezo's requests for an official British presence at Whydah were 
inspired by the belief that such a presence cemented commercial and 
political ties, but this was a traditional Dahomean practice., not one 
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exclusive to Gezo. Nor does it denote an intention to use such a 
presence for the purposes of internal Political struggle. 
49 
We have 
already seen that in 1816, for instance, during a time of trade 
depression and when the British had abandoned the fort at Whydah, the 
Dahomeans had gone so far as to forcibly detain a British naval officer 
at Whydah and deem him to be the overseer of the fort. 
50 
Ross, partly because of his assumption of Gezo's continuing 
commitment to establish a special relationship with the British and 
transform his economy in an enlightened fashion, and partly because he 
appears to have relied exclusively on English sources regarding the 
events surrounding the 1852 treaty, seriously overestimates the 
importance of the treaty. As a corollary, he underestimates Gezo's own 
appreciation that any transformation of the material basis of Kingship 
would involve a gradual economic and political change, and thereby fails 
to emphasise the crucial period of 1852-7. 
The events surrounding the 1852 treaty suggest that Gezo's reaction 
to the British was one of hostility rather than viewing them as potential 
allies. Seen in the context of economic and political developments of 
the previous f ew years - in particular the trends in the slave export 
sector, Dahomey's relationship with her eastern neighbour Abeokuta, and 
the monarch's own diplomatic history - the treaty is open to an 
alternative and more convincing explanation. 
Gezo, like his predecessors before him, had been keen from the 
beginning of his reign to encourage economic contact with western 
Powers; he had shown himself particularly adept at maintaining this 
contact throughout the 1840s by skillful diplomatic manoeuvring despite 
272. 
their attempts to suppress the slave trade. This is particularly 
manifest in his dealings with the most aggressive anti-slave western 
nation, the British. 
As early as 1843, f or instance, Gezo had expressed his willingness to 
consider abolition of the trade, as long as an adequate substitute income 
- whether through legitimate commerce or otherwise - could be 
provided. 
51 In 1846, to Duncan, the King had expressed his readiness 
to give up the slave trade provided his income was guaranteed and urged 
the British to occupy Whydah and police the abolition themselves. 
52 
Gezo politely conceded the moral rectitude of the British over the issue 
but remarked that such enlightenment came only slowly to his people, as, 
he added - not without sarcasm - it had come to the British. There was 
also the difficult matter of revenue, but he would discuss the whole 
matter with his caboceers, and give his considered opinion the following 
53 
year. 
The following year he was prepared to sign a Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce with the British, but not one committing himself to the 
abolition of the slave trade, the main aim of their visit. The latter 
subject, said the monarch, needed further consideration by himself and 
his ministers. He would consider itý however, he assured the British, 
and give his opinion on the matter the following year. 
54 The 1847 
discussions thus bound the parties in "true friendship, reciprocity and 
good understanding, " guaranteed liberty and protection for British trade, 
and left Gezo totally uncommitted on the matter of the slave trade. 
55 
The following year, in 1848, the monarch outlined the difficulties 
involved in the abolition of the trade to Cruickshank, while lobbying at 
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the same time f or an of f icial British presence at Whydah. Confronted by 
Cruickshank with the stark choice between the slave trade or a British 
presence, Gezo chose the f ormer. Nevertheless, he assured a sceptical 
Cruickshank that he would consider abolition if an adequate substitute 
income could be found. 
56 
Gezo's successful procrastination derives not only from his own 
capacity as a diplomat. Partly it lies in the high turnover of British 
emissaries with whom it must have been comparatively easy to cover the 
same ground. Partly it lies in the fact that despite repeated 
assurances the British never offered him concrete compensation which 
could be considered as adequate in terms of a slave trade substitute. 
The top British of f er which was made was F-3000 f or three years which 
Beecroft was authorized to make in 1850; 
57 
small compensation when 
considered in comparison with British estimates made when the slave trade 
was flourishing. Since the palm oil trade never held out the prospect 
in the 1840s of topping up such offers to a level commensurate with a 
thriving slave trade, Gezo could continually return to the subject of 
adequate compensation, perhaps sincerely, as a prerequisite for 
abolition. Finally, Gezo's diplomatic success derived partly from an 
apparently infinite capacity on the part of British visitors and 
officialdom to convince themselves of both the self-evident rationality 
of their own case, and the delusion that 'progress was being made' . 
In retrospect this delusion appears on occasions to have bordered on 
wilful self-deception by the British. For instance) following a request 
from Gezo that the slave trade should be suppressed in ports outside his 
own dominions prior to his own commitment -a request almost certainly 
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designed to maximise the Trade through Whydah rather than lead to 
abolition - Palmerston draf ted in reply: 
"The British government is glad to find that you wish 
the slave trade put an end to in all places beyond the 
limits of your territories, because that wish on your 
part shows that you are sensible of the bad nature of 
the trade. -58 
By the start of the 1850s, however, the conspicuous lack of success in 
attaining their aims, and the continued procrastination of the Dahomean 
government, was beginning to wear thin the patience of some British 
officials on the coast. Despite the usual Dahomean blandishments and 
assurances on his visit to the Capital, Beecrof tf or one was convinced 
that Gezo "had not the slightest desire to abandon the abom-, *Lnable 
traffic. " 
59 
Certainly, as mentioned above, Gezo had by this time offered 
consideration of an anti-slave trade treaty, provided that the British 
first blockaded the minor ports between Keta and Lagos. 
60 But, such 
apparent willingness eventually to give up the export trade in slaves 
should be viewed with more circumspection than Palmerston evidently gave 
it, particularly in the context of Gezo's increasing 'special pleading' 
as the export trade ran into considerable decline at the end of the 
1840s. 61 He had previously made similar requests regarding the 
legitimate commerce in palm oil, 
62 
and almost certainly such requests 
were dictated by a desire to channel trade through the more closely 
controlled Dahomean port of Whydah rather than any sincere wish for 
abolition of the slave trade. 
63 
Beecroft's more sceptical view of Gezo's real intentions was 
confirmed in 1851, when Fraser's first attempt to enter into a trade 
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palaver with the King was resisted by the King's ministers, who assured 
Fraser that - since both he and the King were busy - he could "leave 
tomorrow, and he (Gezo) will think the trade palaver over by the time the 
next messenger arrives from the Queen. , 
64 
By this time the Dahomeans 
obviously believed, not without cause, that an annual change of 
emissaries was a conscious British policy. Fraser, in fact, remained, 
but with no success, and Beecrof t later commented acidly that Fraser had 
found "that whatever he (Gezo) had to state relative to signing treaties 
was all twaddle. " 
65 
The years of procrastination and frustration were beginning to tell, 
and resulted in a hardening of British attitudes. Following a request 
from Gezo for another ambassador - "a ... soldier with a good head to 
hear some palaver from his mouth at the town of Abomey -. ." Beecroft 
rather discourteously suggested that Gezo should be ". .. peremptorily 
requested ... to deliver his mouth to Her Majesty's representative at 
Whydah. " 66 
REASONS FOR GEZO'S DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE 
Gezols strategy of maximising commercial intercourse with the West, 
gaining what he could from the taxation revenues on the new trade, while 
still maintaining the export trade in slaves as much and f or as long as 
possible, had rested to a large extent on his diplomatic capacity to 
convince the British of his own good faith and intentions. This he had 
managed to do with some success f or eight years. 
But by the beginning of the 1850s the scope for continued 
prOcrastination without effective commitment was running out. The 
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British were bent on effective naval action to stamp out the slave trade 
in the Bights and Lagos. Unfortunately for the Dahomean monarch, this 
coincided with two other important developments, one economic and one 
military, the conjunction of which left him effectively powerless to 
continue the strategy which he and the Dahomean government had pursued 
with such success throughout the 1840s. The first of these was the 
rapid and dramatic decline of the demand f or slaves on the Dahomean coast 
the 1849-51 period. 
Assessment of the level of the slave export trade from Dahomey 
throughout the late 1840s is even more difficult than previously in view 
of the necessary diffusion of the Trade to outlying ports which resulted 
from the more aggressive action of the British -naval squadron from the 
late 1830s onwards. 
Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that by 1849 
the export Trade had reached its lowest ever ebb since possibly 1815-17, 
and that the decline was causing acute dif f iculties f or the monarch in 
particular. 
Early in the 1840s there are indications that, despite the attentions 
of the naval squadron, large shipments could be effected from even Whydah 
itself, and slip through the British net. In January 1843, for 
instance, 1500 slaves appear were successfully embarked from the port, 
despite the attention of two ý-ritish Navy who detained two other 
slavers. 
67 
The successful completion of one such shipload helped to compensate 
for the loss of others and rendered the trade economically worthwhile. 
Despite the avowed losses of da Souza - he claimed to have lost 22 ships 
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to the British by 1845 
68 
_ he still appears to have been willing to 
take a considerable number from Gezo in the mid 1840s. 
69 
Thus, although disrupted and in decline, the slave trade was by no 
means dead in the mid-1840s and opportunities for ocassional but 
profitable shipments offset the deterrent effect of the Navy. It is 
also probable that the Repeal of the British Sugar duties in mid-decade, 
with its stimulus to slave demand., acted as a temporary f illip to the 
west coast Trade. 
But the opportunities f or slave shipments were in decline again in 
the last years of the decade, during which period many of the slave 
dealers diversified into palm oil commerce or into production of palm 
produce. 
70 Cruickshanks' estimate of export totals of 8000 slaves per 
annum is therefore likely to be an overestimate for the period to which 
it refers, 1836-48,71 possibly, as has been suggested, as a result of 
da Souza's influence in providing the figures. The reports of those 
like Duncan who spoke of the virtual extinction of the Dahomean slave 
trade in the final years of the 1840s are probably nearer the mark, 
though they require qualification in two ways. 
Firstly, slave shipments never completely ceased, even from Whydah 
itself. In 1849, for instance, Duncan himself testified to the 
successful embarkation of 300 slaves from the port in August of that 
72 
year. Occasional slave ships continued to arrive in Whydah 
Roads, 73 and the arrival of a slaver was still accompanied by the 
traditional pomp and ceremony bestowed on those lucrative benefactors of 
the Dahomeans, the slave captains. 
74 
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Secondly, Duncan's remarks have to be qualified by a recognition that 
Whydah did not represent the sum total of Dahomean slave exports. The 
diffusion of the slave export trade had led to the employment of the 
whole coastline in an attempt to beat the cruisers. Slaves were 
channeled through Whydah to the outlying embarkation points whenever a 
suitable shipping opportunity occurred. This was particularly the case 
in the aftermath of the annual raid. The hazards of the trade had 
obliged joint shipments from various slave dealers to minimise the 
potential loss to any one trader, and such shipments continued to be made 
75 from ports like Little Popo, as in February 1850, or Agoue as in 
March of the same year. 
76 In shipments such as 
. 
these, slaves were 
retained at Whydah until just prior to embarkation and marched along the 
coast to the embarkation point perhaps af ew days bef ore the anticipated 
arrival of the slave ship at the appointed place. 
77 
Whydah had thus become largely a distribution centre f or the export 
trade. Despite the precautions taken to conceal the gangs of chained 
slaves from the prying eyes of British officials or sympathizers, the 
dealers were not always successful. Forbes, for instance, recorded 
coming across one such "chain gang", belonging, he believed, to Jose 
d'Almeida, during his stay at Whydah. 
78 
Despite these qualifications, there is littýe doubt that those 
involved in the slave trade were experiencing unprecedented financial 
difficulties by the onset of the 1850s. The activities of the squadron 
often necessitated the holding of slaves for considerable periods of 
time, sometimes f or months on end, until a shipping opportunity could be 
obtained. 
79 
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By 1850, many of the slave traders were facing impoverishment 80 and 
the most renowned of them all, da Souza, died in considerable debt, one 
estimate putting his indebtedness to the monarch alone as high as 80,000 
dollars - 
81 
The monarch was suffering to an even greater extent, since he was hit 
not only by the drop in the market for slaves directly produced by 
himself, but also reduced revenue from taxation on slaves produced and 
shipped by others in Dahomey. This problem was compounded by the 
diffusion of the trade to outlying and less directly controlled ports, 
for despite the use of monopoly agents and control of the, lagoon on 
either side of Whydah, it is likely that taxation receipts on even the 
reduced numbers of slaves shipped were further reduced by the 
decentralisation of the export mechanisms. 
82 
By 1849 these developments were causing considerable financial 
difficulties for the monarch in the traditional export sector. To 
compound his problems, the level of exports in the new palm oil export 
sector - and thus his taxation income - was reduced in that year as a 
result of drought conditions the year previously. 
83 
It was perhaps partly for this reason that Gezo launched several 
diplomatic initiatives at this time in an attempt to have the trade 
supressed at ports outside his own kingdom while attempting to gain 
84 
concessions for Whydah. (Gezo claimed suzerainty over Whydah, Porto 
Novo beach, Badagry and the Popoes). 
85 
He was sufficiently disturbed by his economic plight to admit openly 
to Duncan in 1849 that he now faced severe economic difficulties as a 
result of the much reduced market for slaves. 
86 This was not mere 
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posturing by the monarch. The position was confirmed by several of the 
King's leading men who informed Duncan that over the last year the 
monarch had shipped slaves hardly or not at all. 
87 
It is significant also that the estimate placed by a British official 
on the income to the royal purse f rom the slave export trade in 1850 - 
E3,000 per annum - was not only small in absolute terms, but dramatically 
lower than Cruickshank's estimate some years earlier. 
88 
The 
disappointment expressed by Beecroft that year because of the 
anti-climactic experience of the wealth and splendour of Gezo's court and 
Abomey itself may have partly resulted f rom. the monarch's contemporary 
financial difficulties. 
89 
By 1850-51 Gezo had been reduced to 'special pleading' with the 
British in an attempt to procure passage for a limited number of slave 
ships. The request varied - sometimes five ships, on other occasions 
two , or even one - But in each case the burden of his message was the 
same. The monarch was in such severe financial difficulties that he was 
prepared to attempt a negotiated curtailment which would provide himself 
or his appointed agents with at least some income from the slave 
trade. 
90 
Given the personalized benefits of this special pleading, 
this may well have been the substance of the matter which Gezo wished to 
discuss in private with Fraser; this appears more likely than a 
conspiracy to monopolize the palm oil trade. 
All these requests met with a refusal from the British; da Souza had 
been making similar pleas prior to his death, promising to f orego slave 
shipments for ever from that part of the coast if only the British would 
allow him to ship one profitable cargo of 2,000 slaves, 
91 
and had met 
with a similar response. 
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The position of the monarch was thus reflected by the slave dealers 
on the coast. For some time prior to 1850 they had continued to operate 
by jointly organising slave shipments, the batches belonging to different 
merchants being branded like cattle prior to shipment in order to ensure 
their individual 'just rewards' from a successful venture. By 1851, 
however, the situation had become so desperate that all commercial 
caution was being thrown to the wind in an attempt to procure some return 
from the trade. 
Slave merchants were prepared to send batches of slaves aboard 
visiting ships without prior advances or commitments, merely trusting in 
the captains of the ships concerned to provide in good faith what returns 
they saw fit. Uberrima Fides had never been a principle underlying the 
slave trade and the optimistic expectations of the slave traders of 
obtaining any form of return commensurate with their cargoes often proved 
unfounded; one report, perhaps apocryphal, mentions a dealer who 
eventually received the princely sum of one doubloon for his entire 
shipment of slaves. 
92 
The primary reason f or the dramatic downturn in the export trade in 
slaves from Dahomean ports in the period 1849 lay, as R&gis pointed out 
at the time, not so much in cruiser activitY on the west coast, but more 
in developments on the other side of the Atlanticý particularly in 
Brazil. 93 
The Repeal of the Sugar Duties bY the British Parliament in the 
mid-1840s had brought about a revival of the languishing slave trade in 
Brazil. Throughout 1846 and 1847 Bahia had undergone the largest 
importation of slaves since the late 1830s, 
94 
an upturn in demand which 
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had allowed the trade to continue, if not thrive on the Dahomean coast 
despite the attention of the cruisers. 
But the situation in Bahia did not continue for long. Following the 
Aberdeen Act of 1845, the British had extended their naval action against 
the slave trade into Brazilian territorial waters, and although 
comparatively mild at f irst, by the last years of the 1840s their policy 
was being carried out with increasing aggression. 
95 
Cruiser activity 
on the west coast was thus supplemented by activity at the source of 
demand in Bahia - where most of the major Dahomean slave traders like da 
Souza and Martinez had their basic commercial connections; 
96. 
By 1849 
the potential hazards and losses involved in shipping slaves were 
becoming intolerable for the slave dealers. 
The following year their problems deepened yet again due to internal 
political developments in Bahia. In the f inal years of the 1840s those 
politicians inside Bahia who were committed to ending the bribery and 
corruption which had permitted the continuation of slave imports were in 
the ascendancy. Supported by the British and by the cruisers off their 
coast, they were committed to nothing less than the total abolition of 
the Bahia trade. The success of their movement culminated in 1850. In 
September of that year Euzebio de Quiroz Couthi-no Mattoso de Camara, 
minister of Justice in Bahia, oversaw the passage of a law which has come 
to be called af ter him, and which, supplemented by the actions of the 
British navy and stringent jail sentences inside Bahia, practically 
brought the slave trade to an end during the following year. 
97 
On the Dahomean Coast the effect was dramatic. Fraser wrote that 
"The Euzabio de Queiroz Law, passed in Brazil in 1850 put an end to the 
slave trade in this country. " 
98 
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The effect was particularly disastrous for Domingo Martinez. The 
uncertainties of the trade were now such that he contemplated returning 
to Bahia, but was deterred from doing so for fear of the judicial 
situation which might confront him when he arrived. 
99 
Martinez 
nevertheless put his Whydah house, grounds and beach sheds on the market 
for E1,500.100 
For the monarch, whose economic position in the export sector had 
become increasingly perilous during 1849 and 1850, the period following 
the passage of the Law in Bahia was ruinous. According to Madiki, 
occasionally employed as an interpreter by the British on their visits to 
Abomey, not one slave had been shipped from Whydah between Forbes' 
departure on 24 July 1850 and August of the following year. 
101 
The situation outside the main Dahomean port was little better. The 
King himself confirmed the standstill in the slave export trade when he 
informed Fraser that apart from a limited number of Egba prisoners who 
had been sent to Domingo, he had not sold one slave in the year, 1851; 
it -.. the Portuguese come, they no buy. " 
102 According to Fraser, not 
only the slave traders, but the monarch himself was in considerable debt 
to Hutton's and there was every chance of his remaining so. 
103 Thus 
1851 marked not only the turning point in the willingness of the British 
to deal with the question of abolition though normal diplomatic 
channels; it also marked the virtual ending - temporarily - of the slave 
export trade from the Dahomean coast. 
These two factors alone might well have been sufficient to 
iiecessitate a radical attempt at transforming the material basis of the 
Dahomean monarchy's political power. In the event they were reinforced 
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by another development which rendered such a transition even more 
imperative. The destruction of the Dahomean army - and particularly the 
core of Gezo's Amazon's - bef ore the walls of Abeokuta in 1851, marked 
not only a political and military blow of the f irst magnitude to the Fon, 
but effectively underlined the uneconomic nature of the annual campaign 
in the prevailing circumstances. For years Gezo had laboured under an 
erratic demand f or slaves on the coast. In 1851 he was faced with a 
heavy loss in personnel in pursuit of a 'commodity' which he could no 
longer exchange. 
The Fon-Egba clash had been predictable f or some time previously. 
The effective foundation of Abeokuta can be taken to date from 1830 when 
the main body of Egba settled there. For the next few years the 
settlers were obliged to defend themselves against marauding armies of 
different Yoruba groups struggling to establish themselves in the wake of 
the decline and dispersal of the Old Oyo Empire, and particularly against 
the armies of Ijebu and Ibadan. The Egba defeat of the forces of Ibadan 
in 1835 established Abeokuta among the most powerful of the Yoruba 
states, and f rom 1836 onwards they had turned towards a more of f ensive 
posture in establishing their political hegemony in the area. Their 
military success swelled the ranks of the inhabitants by an inf lux of 
Yoruba refugees, and from 1839 onwards the town also acted as a magnet to 
growing numbers of liberated slaves returning to their homelands; by 
1842 there were over 250 Saro's established at Abeokuta. 
104 
Having successfully established themselves vis-a-vis Yoruba 
Competitors to the east, the Egba set about establishing themselves 
secure access to the south-eastern trade route to Lagos, a strategy 
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almost inevitably bound to bring them into competition and rivalry with 
their more powerful western neighbour Dahomey. The Egba had secured a 
port initially through their alliance with Adele, the King of Lagos then 
in exile in Badagry., in the early 1830's. They then helped to secure 
Adele's restoration to Lagos in 1835. The Egba fought off a challenge 
to their authority when the Ajano, of Otta demanded what the Egba 
considered to be excessive tribute to preserve their access to the 
coast. They stormed and took the town, effectively annexing it to 
Abeokutan authority. Sodeke, the Egba leader, carefully avoided 
encroaching any further to the west in terms of outright military 
occupation, but the Egba did 'position a smaller contingent outside Ado, 
sufficient to put the town in a state of siege. The restoration of 
Adele followed the Egba. capture of Ota. Eventually, the Egba were to 
lose their influence at Lagos with the expulsion of Akitoye in 1845, but 
were able to support Akitoye at Badagry thereafter. 
105 
Egba expansionism naturally fuelled the suspicions and fear of the 
Dahomeans who considered Ado under the protection of Porto Novo, and who 
viewed the Egba threat to their access to the coast on their eastern 
flank with increasing concern. Ado was considered the key to the 
eastern territories under Dahomean suzerainty. 
106 Accordingly, the 
Dahomeans attempted to relieve the town, but suffered their first reverse 
at the hands of the Egba. when thJr army was driven back, and the Egba 
continued their siege despite the continued attentions of Dahomey and her 
allies. 
107 
The threat from Abeokuta appeared all the more menacing throughout 
the 1840s in view of the relative decline in the slave trade. While the 
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Dahomeans controlled Whydah and the ports to the Eastý the Trade there 
was becoming increasingly sparse as the decade wore on. The Egba, were 
attempting to open a direct slaving connection with Lagos. In addition 
they were intent on obtaining access to coastal trade through the port of 
Badagry. Indeed the end of the first siege of Ado resulted directly 
from the prospect of established trade with that port. Domingo 
Martinez, at that time established as a trader at Badagry, lavished 
presents on the Abeokutan war chiefs, promising them rum, tobacco and 
rich cloth in return for slaves. In response to Domingo's overtures the 
Egba f or a time opened the Ado route. 
108 
Apart from their military and political threat then, the Egba 
constituted a serious threat to the commercial prospects of Dahomean 
trade in the circumstances of the 1840s. 
But the Egba were not merely slave traders. The Abeokutan divisions 
between civil and military chief s which had remained relatively latent 
under the charismatic leadership of Sodeke expressed themselves more 
openly after his death in 1845. The association of war chiefs - the 
Ologun - increasingly involved themselves in slave raiding, exchanging 
the captives f or arms at the markets of Okeodan and Porto Novo. 
109 
Biobaku explains one such raid, on Oke Ogun to the north of Abeokuta in 
1846, as a consequence of the slaving connection which had been 
established with Domingo Martinez at Badagry- 
110 Other raids 
extensively encroached on the Dahomean frontier. 
ill 
The dramatic fall in the demand for slaves, 1849-51 sharpened 
rivalries. At a time of declining effective demand for slaves on the 
coast, Dahomey was faced with an increasingly powerful rival producing 
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slaves in the interior,, and attempting to establish direct supply routes 
to ports in competition with those under the jurisdiction of the 
Dahomeans, thus diminishing further Dahomean customs revenues and their 
capacity to market whatever slaves they themselves produced. 
112 
In 1848 the Dahomeans destroyed the large market town of 
Okeodan, 
113 in the course of which they once again suffered from the 
military interference of the Egba who., Forbes was informed, made a sortie 
on the Dahomean Amazon army, capturing one of their generals. 
114 
To add to Fon-Egba commercial and military rivalry, their general 
political antagonism was exacerbated by the British use of Abeokuta as an 
indigenous counterpoint to the political strength of the Dahomean Kingdom 
in their diplomatic overtures directed towards obtaining concessions over 
abolition of the slave trade. 
115 
In the conditions of the late 1840s and early 1850s the rise of a 
powerful slave raiding state in proximity of the Dahomean kingdom, with 
direct access to rival ports on the coast, threatened economic disaster 
for what was lef t of the Dahomean export trade in slaves. 
The matter came to a head in late 1850 when the Egba destroyed 
Igbeji, a town under Dahomean protection. 
116 In February of the 
following year the Dahomean army set out on the first expedition against 
Abeokuta, 117 with an estimated 10,000 male soldiers and 6000 
females. 118 on 3 March 1851 the Fon launched their attack against the 
Egba, and in the following days -were defeated with heavy losses - 
The reason for the defeat is unclear, but it was at least partly 
related to the firepower of the enemy. A recent study of Dahomean 
warfare has concluded that; 
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is the most dramatically new factor that the Fon had to 
face was that the enemy was armed with firearms and 
large amounts of amunition. The Fon not only had to 
face an enemy in a strong defensive position, but an 
enemy with massive fire power. "119 
Accounts of the Dahomean casualties vary, but Townsend, who was in 
Abeokuta at the time claimed to have counted over 1200 bodies and 
asserted that at least 1800' died on the first day alone. 
120 Other 
missionary accounts placed the total of Dahomean deaths for the whole 
campaign at around 3000, with a considerable additional number taken 
prisoner. 
121 
Af ter their crushing def eat at Abeokuta the Dahomean army f ell upon 
and destroyed the town of Ishagga,, an Egbado town about 12 miles from 
Abeokuta itself. 122 But the victory offered them small compensation 
f or their earlier def eat. The core of the Dahomean military forces, and 
particularly the central aspect of the monarch's own slave raiding 
capacity, the Amazons, had been destroyed at Abeokuta. 
123 The 
Dahomean monarch, f or so long the purveyor of other Af rican groups to the 
slave merchants at the coast., was now in the ignominious position of 
having to ransom his own army, or what remained of it, from the 
victorious Egba. 
124 It would take the Dahomean monarch's pride, and 
his slave raiding capacity, some considerable time before recovery. 
By 1851 then, the Dahomean monarchy already faced crisis. The 
demand for slaves on the coast gad diminished to almost nil. What 
demand did remain stood to be drawn. to ports outside Dahomey's suzerainty 
by the rise of a powerful slave raiding neighbour, with direct access to 
coastal ports., and the capacity to withstand Dahomean military 
pressure. The King himself had seen the Dahomean army, and particularly 
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that section of it on which he relied for the 'production, of his own 
export slaves, destroyed by an enemy well equipped with firearms, and in 
a position to ensure further supplies through their European - 
particularly British missionary - connections. 
Under the circumstances Gezo had little option to resort once more to 
the diplomatic overtures which had proved relatively successful in the 
past. In 1851, af ter his defeat at Abeokuta, he summoned the British 
Ambassador to Abomey- 
125 He was, as Ross impli-es, eager to point out 
to the British the special nature of their relationship. But he had 
been just as. concerned to ensure the French of the special nature of 
126 Franco-Dahomean relations which had hitherto existed. Gezo was, in 
fact, attempting to employ the known European commercial rivalries f or 
his own benefit. 
Gezo's new initiatives appear to have had a threefold purpose. 
Firstly to re-affirm western alliances and ensure continued income from 
western contact. . 
Secondly, to minimise his. commitment to abolition of 
the slave trade, and to procure limited, and probably personal, advantage 
from particular dispensations over slave exports. Finally, as a direct 
result of his military disaster at Abeokuta, to refurbish his armed 
forces with European weapons. 
TREATY WITH THE FRENCH 1851 
So far as the French were concerned Gezo met with some success on all 
127 three counts. Augustin Bouet arrived in Dahomey on 10 May 1851, 
and by July he could inf orm the French government of . 
the terms of a 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce which he had concluded with Gezo on the lst. 
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of that month. In it Gezo re-affirmed freedom and protection for French 
trade, referring to the palm oil trade among other produce, in return for 
traditional custom rights to be paid to the monarch. Indeed, this time 
the monarch obtained guaranteed anchorage dues incorporated in the terms 
of the treaty. Under its terms, each ship unloading a full cargo paid 
as anchorage rights; 40 Piastres of white Cowries; 28 pieces of 
merchandise; five rifles; five barrels of powder and 60 gallons of 
'eau-de-vie'. Loads of less than a full cargo were to be charged 
128 
pro-ra a. 
Gezo then, assured himself not only of a continued income, ýut of a 
source of arms and powder, even as part of 'legitimate' commerce. 
Moreover, the Bouet mission to Abomey had been accompanied with a gift of 
military hardware at the suggestion of Regis, 
129 
and during his stay at 
Abomey Bouet was involved in advising the Dahomeans on the use of 
artillery and shell. 
130 
The treaty also agreed the freedom of 
missionaries in Dahomey and a most favoured nation clause. But it is 
significant for its omissions as for its inclusions. 
For, despite the claims made by Regis, echoed later by Beecroft, 
regarding Gezo's f inal conversion to the abolition of human sacrif ice as 
a result of Bouet's visit, 
131 
there is no mention of the subject in the 
terms of the treaty. More significantly still, there was no mention, 
far less commitment., to the abolit: Con or supression of the slave trade. 
The French no doubt realised that such demands were unlikely to reap any 
practical reward and merely constituted an obstacle to reaching agreement 
over their other commercial concerns. 
132 
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Gezo, then, had every right to be pleased at the outcome of his 
approaches to the French. He had cemented Political and commercial 
ties, ensured a continuation of legitimate trade, formalised and 
reaffirmed customs dues, obtained an immediate gift of artillery, shells 
and military advice as well as confirmation of a future direct supply (in 
the anchorage rights), while avoiding any concessions over the slave 
trade. 
Gezo's eagerness to refurbish his army suggests that even at this 
stage, he had not abandoned the idea of pursuing the traditional course 
of annual military raids. He was not, of course, exclusively dependent 
upon direct European supply of arms, and had traditionally had access to 
guns and powder through coastal slave traders like Domingo 
Martinez. 133 But in the wake of his def eat at Abeokuta his needs were 
greater than ever. 
134 To some extent this was reflected in the nature 
of the dashes brought by the slave traders to the 1851 Customs. Domingo 
Martinez alone dashed the monarch 800 muskets and 200 quarter barrels of 
powder, 
135 
while lesser merchants gave proportionately. Antonio da 
Souza, for instance, gave 200 muskets and 200 large kegs of powder. 
136 
1) NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH 1851/2 
These must have gone some way towards refurbishing Gezo's army, but 
his defeat had been heavy. Thus, part of the King's efforts throughout 
1851 was directed towards procuring arms from the British. The matter 
was raised in his correspondence with them that year, through direct 
appeals to the new vice-consul Fraser, and through overtures to the 
captains of British men-of-war via the Yevogan at Whydah. 
137 
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With the British., Gezo had much less success than with the French or 
the coastal slave merchants. Indeed, the British were actively trying 
to counteract Dahomean military power by supplying the Egba with 
arms. 
138 Not unreasonably, the Fon suspected the British of being in 
league with the Egba, a suspicion which was strengthened when the 
luckless Fraser was found at Abomey to be in possession of a letter from 
the Bashorun of Abeokuta, the Contents of which quickly became known to 
the Dahomean authorities. 
139 The episode is in many ways symbolic. 
For, by late 1851 relations between the Dahomean monarch and British 
officials on the coast were strained to their utmost, and were hardly 
conducive to the cementing of an alliance between the two parties. 
Dahomey's request f or arms had been rejected by the British, while the 
latter were supplying the enemy and were known to be in league with 
Abeokuta; they had also made it known to the Dahomean monarch that 
diplomatic initiatives to abolish the slave trade had now run their 
course and that stronger measures would now be forthcoming. 
The personality of the newly arrived vice-consul Fraser hardly helped 
to ease diplomatic relationships. Fraser's incipient paranoia was 
apparent even before he left Britain, when he requested that 
accommodation on the coast be assured by the time of his arrival, since 
without it he would be prey to "poison and assassination". 
140 His 
relationship with Dahomey had been dogged by ill-luck, or ill-judgement 
from the start. Having officially accepted his post on 27th December 
1850 and set out for the coast, by mid-March he had progressed no further 
than Sierra Leone, where in an attempt to travel onwards to the Bights he 
had to transfer to a British Cruiser, The Gladiator. Unfortunately for 
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Fraser, his arrival coincided with the aftermath of the Dahomean defeat 
at Abeokuta, and Beecroft, fearing a Dahomean reaction) instructed him 
against landing at Whydah when he had f inally arrived in the area. He 
was thus carried on to the Gladiator's destination at Fernando Po, whence 
he wrote complaining of his confinement to ship for over three months. 
Somewhat ironically, he was again f orced to write to the Foreign Of f ice 
some three months afterwards at the end of June, complaining that the 
lack of shipping for the area of Dahomey had ensured his enforced 
residence on the island. 
141 
Fraser's initial encounter with the Dahomeans displayed little more 
judgement than the arrangements f or his itinerary. He appears to have 
been particularly naive as regards the reality of Dahomean politics and 
its relationship to the slave trade and warfare. On his first visit to 
Abomey he assured the leading men that: 
"I did not come to ask the King or his leading men for 
a single thing; all that was wanted them, in the name 
of the Queen of England, was to discontinue war, 
sacrifice and slave trading, and to substitute the 
making of palm oil, the growing of cotton and coffee, 
and to allow ivory to pass through their country. 
142 
The unfortunate vice consul, as mentionedý further exacerbated 
Anglo-Dahomean tensions, by being found in possession of a letter from 
the Bashorun of Abeokuta, recent victors over the Dahomeans, seeking 
advice on the state of affairs in Dahomey, and not unnaturally placing 
him under the suspicion of the Fon authorities as an Egba spy. The 
incident led to a situation in which the English on the coast were 
subjected to isolation and harassment by the Fon authorities. 
143 
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By December 1851, Fon officials were actively involved in encouraging 
a Franco-Kosoko alliance against the British. 
144 
Matters came to a 
head later in December when the British5 finally bent on imposing the 
abolition of the slave trade in the region of the Bights, imposed a naval 
blockade on the coast, including all. the ports under the jurisdiction of 
the Dahomean monarch. 
The Blockade was declared on 16 December 1851.145 Ten days later 
Fraser was summoned to Abomey to meet with Gezo, a call which raised 
Forbes' hopes of a satisfactory outcome. Gezo subsequently dispatched 
another messenger, arriving on 27 December, requesting that ships be 
allowed to stay in port until 'Fraser's return. Forbes agreed, but 
f orbade communication between shore and ships, and turned down a similar 
request from Domingo at Porto Novo beach. Communications between shore 
and ships was to cease af ter 1 January 1852, and if the King had not come 
to terms thereafter, they would be forced to put to sea. 
146 
The naval blockade was the f inal straw. In the wake of a 
drastically reduced slave trade and military defeat, the reality of 
British naval power and the potential stoppage of all Dahomean trade held 
out the prospect of final economic disaster for Gezo. But his conduct 
of the negotiations portray two characteristics. Firstly, a 
determination to make the minimum possible concessions in so far as they 
affected his own interests. And- secondly, an intent to employ what 
bargaining power he had at his disposal - political or commercial - to 
inflict as much damage as possible on the British while the blockade 
lasted. 
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The negotiations between the monarch and the British were anything 
but amicable. As Ross has pointed out there was some difference between 
British officials over their assessment of the meeting and the degree of 
satisfaction which the conclusion of negotiations merited. 
147 Ross 
appears to have drawn exclusively f rom English accounts of the meeting 
The French sources, however, confirm the more pessimistic view of Fraser, 
and one thing appears certain - the description of Gezo's attitude and 
response to the British officials does nothing to suggest that he was 
attempting to court allies, however subtly. 
148 
Regarding the general atmosphere. in which the negotiations took 
place, Fraser's account and the French report substantially agree on the 
general outline and tenor of the meeting. They could hardly be more 
incongruous with any characterisation. of the meetings as amicable. "Gezo 
denied every proposition of the British. 
"He denies the treaty as being original, the wording of the 
Commodore's (Bruce's) letter as having authenticity; that any. person has 
spoken to him about the slave trade or Abeokuta.,, 
149 The King's 
malice was particularly directed towards Fraser, who he called a spy and 
an intriguer. 
150 
Furthermore, he declared that he had not been involved in the export 
of slaves for the past three years, 
151 
which, as has been seen, was 
near enough the truth, though the-situation arose through a decline in 
effective demand rather than as a conscious decision of the monarch. He 
had, he argued, explained in the past to British visitors the reasons 
which obliged him to allow the slave trade to continue. 
152 
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Nevertheless, Gezo agreed not to take any further part in the slave 
trade. 
153 But it is crucial to clearly understand exactly what Gezo 
was prepared to concede and to commit himself to. For, as Fraser 
pointed out, the King refused to sign anything but a small section of the 
British Treaty. 
154 
French accounts of the procedings also go into some detail over the 
manner in which Gezo conceded. He informed the French officials present 
that he now undertook not to permit the export of captives from his 
state, and that he would sign a treaty with the English having 
exclusively that aim. He further requested that French and Portuguese 
officials be officially sent in order that a similar agreement might be 
concluded. 
155 
However, according to the French account when the English treaty came 
to be signed on 13 January, several claused had been added in pencil 
permitting the arrival of missionaries and the building of churches, 
agreeing to the abolition of human sacrifices and that war should not be 
made against Abeokuta. 
156 
Gezo and his ministers were outraged, and Gezo categorically refused 
to sign anything except a treaty exclusively devoted to the matter of the 
slave trade himself. He did not see why the English wished to be 
masters in his country, a situation to which he would never 
157 
consent. After discussions between the British and French, a 
treaty referring specifically to the slave trade was drawn up by Fraser 
the vice-consul, and signed by Gezo. 
158 
The articles which Gezo did not sign are worthy of some 
consideration, since it has been suggested by Ross that the 
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non-compliance of the monarch was derived from disinterest, and an 
assumption that they were unimportant, or had previously been conceded. 
The question of human sacrifice is dealt with in some detail later, but 
two other issues which caused particular anger among the Dahomeans and 
over which Gezo, himself became annoyed and obstinate - Abeokuta and 
Freedom for missionaries - merit attention here. 
On the protection and freedom of missionaries., Gezo had previously 
made it plain to the British, admittedly under the urging of the Migan, 
that while he was willing to provide aid and protection f or a missionary 
teacher, he was not prepared to have him stationed at Abomey, and that he 
159 
would have to remain at Whydah. Certainly in Fraser's view, the 
King's answer was tantamount to refusal of protection for 
missionaries. 
160 
Regarding Abeokuta, it seems almost incredible in retrospect that the 
British officials expected Gezo to sign away his effective sovereignty 
over 'foreign 
, 
af fairs! and the right to make war. Gezo, did however 
request that Egba ambassadors should be sent to Abomey that they might 
attempt to settle their differences. 
161 But British diplomatic 
blunders on this external aspect of the discussions mounted one upon the 
other. In attempting to persuade Gezo of the advisability of signing 
the whole treaty, they suggested that unless he did so he would find 
himself at odds with all his neighbours. Not surprisingly for the 
warrior monarch, "the talk of leagueing the other African chiefs against 
him nettled him rather", according to Fraser. 
162 
Gezo had further grounds for objecting to British self -righteousness 
over the question of the Egba. Badagry had been exempted from the 
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blockade partly as a source of supplies to the Egba, 
163 
and Gezo was 
aware, as he later revealed!, that the British officer Forbes had been 
assisting the Egba with military advice on tactics. 
164 
So far as the actual treaty was concerned, then, the lack of 
agreement on clauses pertaining 'to issues other than the slave trade 
stemmed neither from disinterest nor an assumption of prior agreement but 
from a refusal on the part of the monarch to make anything other than the 
minimal concession of abandoning his own role as a slave exporter, and 
the banning of slave exports - which I will argue he took as referring 
only to Whydah. In the event, neither of these involved Gezo in any 
great concession in the prevailing circumstances. For some time slave 
exports from Whydah had dropped to almost zero as a result of the closing 
of the trade at the Bahia end; and his own capacity to provide slaves, 
which rested largely on the effectiveness of his army and in particular 
that section of it directly under his own control, had been severely 
reduced as a result of his def eat at Abeokuta. Any return to large 
scale slave raiding would have to await the return of demand and the 
restocking and re-equipping of his military forces. 
But Gezo combined commercial pressure with his concession. He had 
been particularly annoyed by the exclusion of Badagry from the coastal 
blockade, an exemption which he took to indicate British pretentious over 
165 
a coastal port which he considered under his own suzereignty. And 
it was the exclusion of Badagry f rom the blockade which prompted Gezo to 
take prompt action to ensure that 'no Dahomean palm oil reached the 
British until the economic siege was lifted. 
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This exclusion rendered the consequences of the blockade even more 
serious from the point of view of the monarch than they otherwise might 
have been. The blockade in itself meant that any taxation revenues 
which the monarch might have expected from normal trading would be 
delayed until such times as it was lifted. The exclusion of Badagry 
meant a total loss of such revenues, since the palm oil previously 
directed through Whydah where the King's tax collectors were situated, 
was now being taken to Badagry. The British establishments at Badagry 
thus benefitted, while both the Dahomean monarch and French traders at 
Whydah suffered. 
166 
When it became clear from the meeting at Abomey that the limited 
treaty concessions which Gezo had made were insufficient to guarantee 
lifting of the blockade, the Dahomean monarch immediately launched a 
series of measures designed to ensure that the British, and if necessary 
Europeans in general, did not benefit economically while he was suffering 
financially. 
Although the prospect of additional revenues would be welcome, Gezo's 
enforced monopolisation of the palm oil trade for a brief period after 
the signing of the treaty was more of a political move designed to 
counter-blockade the British, rather than a part of a long term economic 
strategy. On 17 January, four days after the signature of the treaty, 
Gezo decreed that all trade at -ports other than Whydah was to be 
closed. Even Domingo was forbidden to return to Porto Novo beach where 
his establishment was situated. The King decreed that no one except 
himself should be permitted to buy or sell palm oil, and that henceforth 
the selling price would be increased by 50 per cent f rom eight to 12 
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dollars the measure, with an additional tax of f our dollars per puncheon 
payable on shipping the oil. In any case, no more trade would be done 
until such times as he had heard from England. 
167 
. (Gezo assumed that 
Commodore Beecroft had gone to England with his letter to 
Victoria. ) 
168 Gezo's decrees were confirmed to the whites at Whydah 
on 20 January. 
169 
Throughout February Dahomean antagonism against the British increased 
and was reflected on the coast. By 1 March the Whydah people had turned 
against the English, and one trader, Stanfield, was summarily fined 800 
dollars for knocking a child over with his horse - without serious 
injury, he maintained. On incapacity to pay the fine he was thrown into 
prison until a considerable fine in trade goods was forthcoming. 
170 
With the exception of Forbes, who was given a dispensation, the British 
had already been prohibited from boarding ship from the time of Gezo's 
decrees on 17 January. 
171 
On 14 February, Fraser received word that Bruce would allow 
legitimate trade to go on,, and instructions to inf orm the Yevogan that 
this would last only until 1 March unless the whole treaty was 
signed. 
172 But, on 16 February, Gezo further reinforced his trade 
embargo by dispatching a considerable number of people f rom the capital 
to collect the palm nuts, from which the oil was made, nearer the 
coast. 
173 Gezo thus effectively -stopped the flow of oil from Dahomey 
to any of the ports outside his immediate control. But Gezo's 
restrictions applied not only to palm products; as a further step, 
following from a second meeting with British representatives at the end 
of February and beginning of March, he imposed currency control. Partly 
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in response to what he saw as an implicit British threat to starve the 
kingdom of currency, Gezo, on 6 March, issued an order that no cowries 
should leave Whydah, by lagoon or otherwise. 
174 
The manner in which the whole escapade had developed. might well 
backfire against the aims of the Britishy complained the French 
traders. For, if the palm oil trade was effectively stifled, the 
Dahomeans would have little choice but to return to slave raiding. 
175 
Notwithstanding this, the British made yet another attempt to 
persuade Gezo to sign the standard treaty, Hutton, Forbes and Fraser 
leaving Whydah on 20 February on a visit which was to last until 
4 March. 176 The meeting was, if anything, more acrimonious than the 
first. Gezo again refused to accept them as representing the true 
wishes of the British government. Moreover, he was insulted at being 
offered a treaty on the same terms and with the same conditions as lesser 
chief s. The signing of the standard treaty by the King of Porto Novo 
and other smaller kingdoms enraged him. 
177 He expressed anger and 
indignation that a British officer should have supplied the Egba with 
arms and training, and threatened to prevent any white men f rom. gaining 
access to that town. He challenged the English to continue their 
attempt to starve him economically, or to try a military intervention. 
In either case he would overcome all they had at their disposal. Even 
if they prevented the inflow of cdwries the Dahomeans would manufacture 
coins. 
178 
Most significantly for the purposes of the British, he once more 
refused to sign the standard treaty. it would, he said, echoing the 
sentiments of the Meu. expressed in an earlier speech, be tantamount to 
selling his country- 
179 
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Gezo's anger may have been exacerbated by bad news f rom Whydah, the 
Meu would have had Fraser believe. 
180 
Conflicting reports were 
arriving concerning the fate of the Dahomean army which had been 
dispatched under the Gau, and had been involved in combat at the town of 
G.... (sic), near Porto Novo. 
181 This may well refer to the town 
of Goary, (Gori) which a few years earlier had been referred to by a 
French observer as the market for the area east of Whydah, and which was 
a considerable interior oil market. 
182 
If so the Dahomean failure 
would have constituted a serious setback to Gezo's plans to effectively 
put an embargo on oil f rom. the interior arriving at any other port except 
Whydah. It is possible also that this was the immediate cause of Gezo's 
threat to destroy Badagry. 
183 Indeed Gezo explicitly ordered Forbes 
to have white men removed f rom Badagry as he intended to "break the 
place". 
184 
But there's little doubt that for the most part Gezo's anger and 
frustration derived from the effectiveness of the British blockade. The 
dramatic decline of the slave trade in the last two to three years, the 
resounding defeat inflicted on his army at Abeokuta, and finally the 
effective power of the British navy when applied to a blockade of his 
coast, had fully exposed the weakness of the monarch's economic 
position. The prevailing circumstances -a stifling of demand and a 
much more vulnerable armed f orce - made slave raiding f or the export 
sector uneconomic. The political tension between the Dahomeans and the 
British dragged on throughout most of 1852. In view of the f ailure of 
negotiations Fraser was instructed on 4 March to leave Whydah, and he did 
so shortly afterwards, remaining in Lagos. 
185 The British blockade 
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was eventually lif ted in June 1852 without having extracted any further 
concession from Gezo., and Fraser returned to his post on 23 September 
1852.186 
But the lessons of 1849-51 had not been lost on the Dahomean King; 
over the next few years the Dahomean monarch was to attempt to diversify 
into palm oil production, effectively cease slave raiding, and in effect 
to attempt a revolutionary transformation of Dahomean society. Despite 
its merits then, Ross's interpretation of events surrounding the 1852 
treaty require some revision. 
Far from being an isolated enlightened advocate of economic 
advancement, Gezo held on to 'the erratic slave trade as long as it was 
humanly possible. In the end it deserted him rather than the other way 
round. And in the initial stages he was representative of a united Fon 
Polity. 187 
The monarch was fully appreciative of the role which the slave trade 
and slave raiding played in not only the economic interests of the 
aristocracy, but in terms of ideological tradition and political 
legitimisation of the monarchy. 
As such, any transformation in the economic sphere would necessitate 
changes in the ideological sphere, and political innovation. Such a 
transformation could only be attempted gradually, if at all, if the 
monarch were to retain his political hegemony and avoid the risk of 
further destabilising his own position. 
Unfortunately for Gezo, economic and political developments largely 
outside his own control forced the pace. Political developments on the 
other side of the Atlantic robbed him of a market for captives. The 
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damage inflicted on his army in 1851 at Abeokuta destroyed a large 
section of his main slave producing vehicle, the Amazons. Economically, 
slave procuration was becoming increasingly costly in terms of outlay and 
less remunerative in terms of returns. On top of this, renewed 
aggression on the part of the anti-slave trade British who had become 
impatient with diplomacy as a means of achieving their ends in the 
Bights, finally exposed the extreme vulnerability of Gezo's control of 
the politically important export sector. And what the British could do 
in 1851, they could repeat again almost at will. 
Gezo did what he could to extricate himself from the dilemma without 
I 
injuring his internal political position. He conceded as little as 
possible over the treaty negotiations, but sufficient to allow the 
possibility of the blockade being lifted. He brought what economic 
pressure he could to bear on the British through a counterblockade - 
monopoly of the palm oil trade, cessation of trading and attempts to 
disrupt produce flows to Badagry. He attempted to safeguard the 
Dahomean currency through controls on the movement of cowries, controls 
which also impeded trade as long as the British blockade lasted. 
In the short term Gezo conceded little more than had already been 
forced on him through the course of events prior to 1852. But the major 
problem was longer term. Given the uneconomic and-erratic nature of the 
slave trade, and the political risks of incurring a further blockade 
which it involved, Gezo's domination of the traditional export sector in 
slaves had effectively been undermined. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CRISIS OF TRANSITION: DAHOMEY 1852-58 
By 1852 the Dahomean ruling class had been forced to accommodate the 
new trade in palm oil. In the initial phase the trade had been 
accepted, and subsequently encouraged, as a potential means of providing 
additional income as a substitute f or an ailing slave trade. But there 
is no indication that there was any genuine intention on the part of the 
monarch or the aristocracy to undertake any radical transformation of the 
Dahomean economy. For one thing the income from the new trade, 
especially compared to the costs involved in the production proc'ess, were 
insufficiently attractive to stimulate such an undertaking. This was 
particularly true when compared to the lucrative returns to be gained 
from the slave trade itself. Prior to 1852, therefore, the Dahomean 
response to the new commercial developments had been accommodating and 
tentative. Their diplomatic efforts had been largely directed towards 
minimising the effects of western political action, specifically as 
regards the demands f or internal change concerning the slave trade and 
human sacrifice. This was equally true of their response to the British 
blockade. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SLAVE TR., 0E TO THE MONARCH IN ECONOMIC AND 
IDEOLOGICAL TERMS 
In a very real sense the economic and ideological problems faced by 
Cezo were most clearly outlined in his own submissions to the various 
British ambassadors who prevailed upon him. The neatest encapsulation 
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of his quandary was set out in a letter f rom the monarch to Queen 
Victoria at the beginning of the decade: 
"At present my people are a warlike people and 
unaccustomed to agricultural pursuits. I should not 
be enabled to keep up my revenue were I at once to 
stop the slave trade. "l 
The transition was in fact forced upon the King by the fact that both the 
slave trade itself, and his capacity to produce slaves, had declined 
seriously in the period from 1849-52. The prevailing circumstances had 
forced not only Gezo but the whole Dahomean leadership to accept the 
economic and political necessity of abandoning - at least any overt 
connection with - the Trade, and of finding an alternative economic 
strategy. Even the minimum concessions which Gezo had agreed to in 1852 
marked a dramatic concession for a ruling class whose political power up 
until that time had been bolstered and underpinned by domination of an 
export-oriented slave procuration system. 
2 
Far from being an eager exponent of the transformation of Dahomean 
society, Gezo realized only too well the difficulties involved in such a 
transition, and accepted its necessity only reluctantly after decades of 
skilful 'holding operations'. The most comprehensive summary of the 
problems and potential difficulties it involved was set out by Gezo 
himself in conversations with Cruickshank, which the latter, fortunately, 
recorded in some detail. It is worth quoting from this record in some 
length, since it provides a considerable amount of useful, first handý 
and contemporary analysis of the relationship between the economic, 
Political and sociological aspects of power in 19th century Dahomey; and 
in particular, the central role of the slave trade in all 
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of these. It is, therefore, a useful antidote to suspicions of the 
imposition of alien, economic determinist notions on African data by 
later, European historians. 
explaining why he could not give up the slave trade, Gezo f irst 
pointed to the state structure which he was obliged to maintain, the 
ceremonies which he was obliged to finance, and the inherited traditions 
which he, as monarch, could not discard. This was not merely a matter 
of administration, but a crucial matter of maintaining the traditional 
legitimacy of the monarchy itself. 
"He held his power by 'the observance of the time 
honoured customs of his forefathers and he would 
forfeit it and entail upon himself a life full of 
shame and death full of misery if he neglected 
them.,, 3 
For the maintenance of the state, then, and for the continuing 
legitimisation of the monarchy in the eyes of the Dahomean people, the 
slave trade played a central role in securing the revenue necessary to 
the royal exchequer; particularly in counterbalancing the vast 
expenditure and ostentatious liberality expected of the monarch. No 
other source of income promised adequate compensation f or the trade in 
captives. Nor were the Dahomeans as keen to effect such a transition as 
was sometimes suggested by the Europeans: 
"No other trade was known to his people. Palm oil, 
it was true., was now engaging the attention of some of 
them, but it was a slow-method of making money and 
brought only a small amount of duties into his 
coffers. The planting of Coffee and Cotton had been 
suggested to him, but this was slower still. -4 
The role of the slave trade went far beyond the f ormal generation of the 
monarch's income. Even had a suitable and economic substitute been 
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available in the agricultural sphere its adoption would have 
ramifications far beyond mere fiscal mechanisms. For, the production 
process for slaves permeated all aspects of Dahomean life. The ideology 
of the warrior was the traditional mode of life for the Dahomeans, and 
that ideology was enshrined in the monarchy. The King's hegemony 
depended not only on raising and dispensing sufficient revenue and 
prestigious goods, but on the f orm of so doing - on the very nature of 
the production process itself . To consider abandoning this was not to 
be undertaken lightly, because it was to envisage nothing less than a 
social revolution. 
"The form of his government could not be changed 
without causing such a revolution as would deprive him 
of his throne, and precipitate his kingdom into a 
state of anarchy. -5 
In short, the mode of production involved in procuring captives f or use 
and exchange, was the very basis of the mode of Dahomean lif e. It was 
the all-pervading thread which held together the fabric of the 19th 
century Dahomean social formation. Gezo puts it succinctly: 
"It was the slave trade which made him terrible to his 
enemies and loved, honoured and respected by his 
people. it had been the ruling principle of action 
with himself and his subjects from their earliest 
childhood. Their thoughts, their habits, their 
discipline, their mode of life, had been formed with 
reference to this all engrossing occupation - even the 
very songs with which the mother stilled her crying 
infant told of triumpYi over foes reduced to 
slavery. -6 
The record of Gezo's conversations with Cruickshank has been quoted at 
some length since it illustrates unambiguouslY that the Dahomean monarch 
was under no illusions about the central role of slave production, and 
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the economic social and Political consequences, both for monarch and 
people, of its abandonment. Gezo's acceptance of changing to an 
agricultural based export sector was both reluctant and consequential 
upon economic and political events largely outside his control. He 
entered the transition period as the embattled victim of social f orces, 
rather than as the enthusiastic advocate of social progress. 
Faced with this unenviable set of circumstances, the King was 
sufficiently foresighted to develop a strategy aimed at avoiding, as far 
as possible, a wholesale social revolution, but a strategy which was 
flexible enough to allow both himself and his people to adapt to the new 
situation with minimum repercussions to his power or to the Dahomean 
state. 
His strategy for adaptation essentially involved continuation of the 
internal slave trade, and covertly, outside of Whydah, the export 
trade. But it did mean the abandonment of the annual war, or at least a 
curtailment of its scale in order to minimise costs incurred with little 
or no return. 
He planned to extend his revenue by the substitution of annual grants 
from the Government of Great Britain, and, if possible, other European 
countries. In addition revenue would be increased by the imposition of 
a tax on oil at the point of embarkation (for rolling off the beach), and 
the positioning of functionaries at7some of the outlying ports. 
Further increases in revenue to the central exchequer could be 
obtained by the allocation of captives - and land - to caboceers, f or the 
production of palm oil. This increased capacity for palm oil production 
could then be taxed through the Kouzou on palm oil. 
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The general strategy was intended to allow the possibility of a 
continued annual war, on a limited scale, with the captives being 
allocated to domestic production rather than export. It allowed the 
Dahomean ruling class the prospect of continued access to imported goods 
through palm oil exports and a share of European annuities, via the 
Monarch. But crucially., it avoided the necessity for the monarch to 
abandon his traditional role as the enshrinment of the Dahomean warrior, 
since he was not involved in direct export production of agricultural 
goods. 
This strategy of adaptation was, therefore, a compromise, aimed at 
minimising the extent of social change in the new circumstances. If the 
'historic compromise' envisaged by Gezo and the Dahomean ruling class 
failed, if revenue proved insufficient to allow the monarch and caboceers 
to maintain their traditional obligations, then the 'middle route' would 
prove increasingly difficult to maintain. Another strategy would have 
to be developed. The half decade from 1852 covered the years of 
experiment. 
THE ABANDONMENT OF SLAVE RAIDING 1852-7 
Since the import-export sector played such an important part in 
internal political power, the monarchy required to replace its lost 
influence in that sphere. It was over the next few years that Gezo 
embarked on this task; if it is important not to overestimate the events 
of 1852ý it is also important not to mistake 1852-7 as merely a reversion 
to what went before. This was the period of Gezols "revolutionary 
gamble". 
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Newbury has remarked that almost as soon as he had signed the treaty, 
Gezo allowed it to lapse and resumed the slave trade. 
7 There is an 
element of truth in this insofar as slave exports continued from the 
coastline which Gezo considered under his jurisdiction; from the opening 
at Grand Popo to Lagos. 
8 
Nevertheless, the statement is an 
oversimplification which underestimates the underlying change in Dahomean 
export sector over the next f ew years, and possibly also underestimates 
the extent to which Gezo maintained his treaty commitments. 
Gezo had signed only a one-articled treaty, 
9 
and it is important to 
realise how limited were the written concessions which he had made. 
10 
Firstly, the terms of the treaty applied only to the export trade in 
slaves. He gave no commitment either to stop the internal trade, or to 
expel slave traders from his dominions. This, in fact, permitted the 
continued internal workings of the slave trade, and slaves could be 
purchased quite openly by coastal traders who could do so under the 
pretext of purchasing domestic slaves. 
Gezo, though it is not specified in the terms of the treaty in 
explicit terms, did commit himself to the abandonment of his personal 
role in the export slave trade. 
11 But he was already claiming that 
this had been the position for a few years prior to signiture. 
12 it 
will be suggested later that the monarch did in fact make an attempt to 
curtail his traditional personal role in the export slave trade - that of 
the largest slave procurer through the medium of the annual raid. 
The second effective commitment in the treaty appears to be one to 
which Gezo gave less real attention to implementing; that is the 
prohibition of the export of slaves f rom the territories of the King and 
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chiefs of Dahomey. Gezo's dominions extended, according to the 
monarch's own view, from the opening at Grand Popo to Lagos. 
13 
Effectively, however his direct political control was limited to the 
Dahomean port of Whydah, and it was to this port alone to which Gezo 
conveniently appears to have considered the terms of the treaty as 
applying. This allowed ample scope for slave shipments from the 
outlying ports. 
Moreover., both Gezo, and the chief s of the outlying ports - who had 
also signed treaties - conveniently interpreted the treaty as prohibiting 
only those shipments which were made precisely from the ports 
14 
themselves. Since the operations of the slave dealers had for some 
time past required the employment of the whole coastal beach in order to 
facilitate-avoidance of detention by the naval squadrons, the commitment, 
if interpreted in this manner, did little to prohibit the trade. 
15 
So far as the actual treaty was concerned then, the acceptance of a 
continuing internal slave trade allowed sufficient leeway to the slave 
dealers and Dahomean chiefs to circumvent the treaty obligations 
regarding the prohibition of the export trade. Interpreting the treaty 
as being applicable only to the main port under his control, and only in 
its immediate vicinity, allowed the monarch the opportunity to claim 
compliance with its terms, provided that he was seen to have outlawed the 
export of slaves from Whydah, and -to have given up his own role in the 
export trade. In this way, Gezo could hope to avoid the threat of a 
further blockade, could anticipate the often promised British revenue in 
trade goods as a compensation for his having abandoned the export trade, 
could avoid any attempt at interference with the internal market in 
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slaves, and could retain both his tribute and duties from those who 
continued to be involved in the Trade. 
Even these limited concessions marked a radical break with the past 
as regards the role of the monarch. But it was one which at the time 
was masked by the revival and continuation of the export trade f rom the 
Dahomean coast. By late 1852 the export of slaves from the ports around 
Whydah - which had declined so dramatically in the previous three years - 
was again on the increase. 
Ironically, much of the impetus for the revival in Dahomean slave 
exports after 1852 stemmed from the expulsion of slave traders from Lagos 
to the east by the British, a move which had derived in part f rom the 
belief - fostered by Gezo himself - that the Dahomean monarch could not 
be expected to abandon the trade until such times as it had been stopped 
at 
. 
minor ports outside his own dominions. 
16 
McCoskry, resident at Lagos in 1852, later testified that in that 
year a considerable number of slaves shipped from the area. of Porto Novo 
and Whydah had in f act derived f rom the Lagos area, being sent down the 
17 lagoons to the west. 
The trend continued throughout the following year. Many of the 
shipments must have gone unseen and unrecorded by British officials. 
But in March, Campbell could report the embarkation of approximately 300 
18- 
slaves from the area of Agoue, and in the next few months recorded 
three more shipments from the area of the same port totalling 
approximately 1300 slaves. 
19 
Agoue was not the only port concerned. The Trade was in the 
increase in the area of the Bight of Benin generally, and according to 
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Campbell, slaves had been shipped in 1853 from the ports of Blookoos, 
Porto Seguro, and Great Popo, as well as the more frequently employed 
20 
ports of Little Popo and Agoue itself. 
But Gezo was astute enough to avoid the threat of a further 
blockade; for some considerable time after the signing of the -1852 
treaty, it appears that there were no shipments of slaves from Whydah 
itself. Certainly by late 1853 Campbell had not heard of any having 
been made f rom that port. 
21 Such activity would, of course, have lef t 
Gezo open to retaliation in the form of the recent blockade, since this 
port was directly under his control, and it is probably f or this reason 
that he had attempted to comply with the terms of the treaty by 
explicitly and strictly forbidding exports of slaves from Whydah. 
22 
Although slave exports may have continued from neighbouring ports, Gezo's 
own position was protected since these were assumed to be only nominally 
under his power. 
23 
This strategy probably involved some economic loss to the monarch 
since his taxation revenues would be less fully collected outside 
Whydah. Nevertheless, this was a -necessary sacrifice in order to avoid 
the threat of blockade. And in any case, the extent of taxation loss is 
open to question, since slaves were of ten marched through Whydah on the 
way to more western embarkation points, and since Whydah itself continued 
to operate as one of several 
'ýtocking centres for intended slave 
exports. Domingo Martinez, for instance, retained a slave barracoon at 
Whydah, 
24 
and both he and the Yevogan retained a considerable number of 
slaves in the port. 
25 
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It is probable then, in the period immediately following the signing 
of the treaty., that the monarch prohibited slave exports f rom Whydah 
itself in order to maintain the terms of the treaty and thus protect 
himself from retaliatory action. In similar style Domingo avoided 
shipping slaves from Porto Novo beach, since his legitimate trade at that 
port meant a close connection with the British mercantile houses and 
visiting British ships only too ready to report any 'illegitimate' 
exports. 
26 
Almost inevitably, though, with the influx of slave traders and the 
revival of the Trade occasional shipments came to be made f rom the area 
of Whydah itself. In May 1854, for instance, it was reported on 'good 
information' that two shiploads of approximately 1000 slaves had been 
taken off Whydah beach, 
27 
and in the first half of the year an 
unseaworthy vessel, the Caesar, was known to have embarked some 400 
slaves after its purchase by Whydah slave dealers. 
28 Campbell, the 
new, British, consul at Lagos wrote to Gezo disapprovingly and asked him to 
ensure implementation of the treaty. 
29 
These particular shipments proved to be something of a disaster f or 
the slave merchants, two of the ships being taken by the authorities in 
Cuba and the Caesar appearing to have been lost at sea. 
30 
Moreover 
the Whydah slave merchants were increasingly coming under financial 
pressure from another direction. - Quite apart from losses of slave 
cargoes - at least one other vessel, the Spanish barque Fernando Po was 
taken a little later - they were being subjected to the demands of the 
monarch who was attempting to maintain af low of income to the central 
Dahomean exchequer. Despite a redirection into the palm oil trade once 
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more, their income was deficient in the face of the King's exorbitant 
demands, and those who could do so were beginning once more by 1854 to 
move to outlying ports like Agoue, outside Whydah itself. 
31 
If 1854 had proved a relatively unprosperous year for the Dahomean 
slave traders, the 'following year was the quietest in terms of slave 
exports since the dramatic decline of the period 1849-51. By the middle 
of the year not one single shipment of slaves had been notified f rom any 
source to British officials at Lagos. 
32 
The moribund state of the 
Trade was amply illustrated later in the year by the incapacity of the 
Ibadans to divest themselves of captives which they had procured in a 
recent raid in the Efong country. They did manage to dispose of the 
children taken,,, as manageable domestic slaves who could be incorporated 
into the domestic economy; but despite both overtures -to Kososko and an 
attempt to market the slaves at Whydah, the Ibadan were eventually forced 
to drop the selling price of the captives as low as 15/- per slave in an 
attempt to secure buyers. 
33 
For a brief spell at the beginning of 1856 the Trade revived at the 
ports neighbouring Whydah, inspired by Domingo Mustich at Whydah and 
Byetta at Agoue, and prompted by arrangements made on the other side of 
the Atlantic by Senor Machado of New York. But once again it was Little 
Popo and Agoue rather than Whydah which were the main embarkation 
points. 
34 
It was precisely at this time that Gezo claimed in a conversation 
with Freeman, that apart from his personal abandonment of the slave 
trade, he had recently also further extended his prohibitions to include 
a ban on Dahomeans taking any part in the f oreign slave trade, and upon 
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any shipments being made from any part of his dominions. 
35 
This, of 
course, did not apply to the conduct of the internal slave trade. 
Gezo's assertions were later to be dismissed by British officials, 
particularly by Campbell, but the available evidence suggests that - 
whether through a decline in demand or through the direct intervention of 
the monarch - slave shipments from Dahomean ports all but ceased in the 
period immediately after his declaration to Freeman in early 1856. 
Campbell himself could claim in mid-1856, for instance, that at 
Whydah and the small ports to the west and east, the slave trade was very 
nearly extinct. 
36 And a Methodist missionary, who had arrived. in 
Whydah at the beginning of the year, could attest some months later that 
he had never had the "least intimation" of slave shipments, actual or 
intended. 
37 Indeed, as late as February 1857 the British Consul could 
optimistically report that he had heard of only two shipments in the 
months prior to his report., 
38 
and only one of these, fron near Cotonou 
(Appi Vista) could be considered under the jurisdiction of the Dahomean 
monarch. 
Within a few months, however, the slave trade was to be again 
flourishing on the Dahomean coastline. Early 1857 marked the turning 
point in the monarch's capacity to sustain the direction of his 
experimental development of an alternative economic basis for the 
Dahomean monarchy. To understand the nature of the experiment, and the 
reasons for the change of direction in 1857 we have to return to the 
operation of the Dahomean slave trade - its sources of supply in the 
period 1852-7. The important aspect of this period is not so much the 
fluctuating slave trade, as much as the fact that Gezo appears to have 
abandoned his role as Dahomey's main slave producer. 
329. 
The actual coastal operation of slave exports from Dahomey between 
1852 and 1857 altered little. The principal slave merchants remained 
those residing at Whydah and Agoue, apparently employing as their 
supercargo one Domingo Mustich, 
39 
a Spaniard who also operated as a 
considerable shipper of slaves in his own right, having establishments at 
both Little Popo and Agoue. 
40 
Among the Coastal merchants, Domingo had taken on the pre-eminent 
role in the trade which the late da Souza had enjoyed in the previous 
decades, 41 and according to one report, was receiving by 1854 about 80 
per cent of the rum and tobacco imported from Bahia. 
42 
His slaving 
establishments were considerable and included barracoons at Appi 
Vista, 43 on the outskirts of Porto Novo, and a considerable capacity 
for slave storage at Whydah. 
44 
In addition, in 1853, he had come to 
an arrangement with the Mewu, a Badagrian chief who had come to power 
during an interregnum. and civil war, 
45 
over the establishment of a 
further baracoon at Ajudo a little to the leeward of Badagry itself. 
46 
Despite the reluctance of some British officials and missionaries to 
47 
accept Mewu's complicity in the continuing slave trade, it seems 
clear that his arrangement with Domingo Martinez resulted in considerable 
economic advantage to himself. Martinez was reluctant to ship slaves 
from Porto Novo beach; his normal practice was to march slaves purchased 
or assembled at Porto Novo along t-o his barracoons or embarkation points 
to the windward. Mewu's coffers were swollen with a toll, usually paid 
in cowries, on all slaves marched along the coastal strip past 
Badagry. 
48 
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This practice was not a novel one for Martinez. It has already been 
noted that by the mid-1840s he had developed an arrangement with the war 
chiefs at Abeokuta in order to secure supplies of captives. 
Nevertheless, the arrangement is significant since it supports other 
impressionistic evidence suggesting that the proportion of slaves 
exported from Dahomean ports which originated from non-Dahomean slave 
'producers' increased significantly after 1852 until c. 1857-8. 
If Campbell is to be believed many of these in fact originated from 
49 Domingo's continued relationship with the Egba. And there is no 
doubt that many of them were brought in by Domingo Martinez from the 
general . area . of Lagos. 
50 Many more, though, were I brought into the 
Dahomey area for shipment by Lagos traders who had moved to Whydah after 
51 
their expulsion consequent upon the British intervention in 1851, and 
who appear to have retained their original supply sources, merely 
diverting to the area west of Lagos for embarkation purposes. Such 
traders retained agents in 
. 
towns like Porto Novo to purchase slaves, 
often under the pretext of domestic use. 
52 
Slaves were also being brought into Dahomey via Okeodan and Ado, and 
Campbell for one suspected that many of the slaves which ended up in 
Whydah emanated f rom Abeokuta, the Egba being the "greatest slave dealers 
throughout Yoruba. " 
53 Central to this Egba connection was the 
notorious madame Tinubu from Lagos. -54 
A proportion of the slaves issuing from Abeokuta probably entered 
Dahomey via Ketu, a town with both pro-Egba and pro-Fon factions; the 
market there appears to have been in some sense a 'neutral' territory - 
intermittently, at least - for the Dahomeans and the Egba. Fon and Egba 
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traders met there, and it was Ketu which was chosen as the market to 
which the Dahomean prisoners were sent by the Egba f or ransoming af ter 
their defeat of the Dahomeans in 1851.55 
Indeed, the increasing dependence of Fon traders on the Egba for 
slave supplies may have led them towards an expedient rapprochment in the 
years after 1852. Although hostility between the two groups was never 
far beneath the surface, there are a number of occasions - quite apart 
from trading contacts - when ambassadors of one of the protagonists were 
reported to be in the capital town of the other. 
56 
But, if slaves continued to come into Dahomey, there is little or 'no 
evidence to suggest in the five years from 1852 that they were being 
supplied on any scale by the King of Dahomey himself through his 
traditional mechanism of the annual raid. The Dahomean slave trade 
appears to have essentially changed not in terms of its actual export 
operations, but in terms of its supply situation. The bulk of slaves 
from 1852-7/8 appear to have been directed to Dahomean ports from 
interior markets or suppliers rather than as the products of the Dahomean 
army. 
This marks a radical break with previous practice, in the light of 
which it appears that Gezo's original commitment to abandon his personal 
role in the slave trade, and his recurrent protestations that he had done 
so, merit more credulity than wag given by many at the time. 
57 it 
was, in fact, a revolutionary departure from the traditional role of the 
monarchy in the Dahomean slave trade. A role which, through the 
mechanism of the annual slave raid, had been developed and 
institutionalised especially during the three decades after Gezo's 
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accession to power. 
58 This change was one aspect of an attempt to 
achieve a fundamental shift in the economic basis of monarchical power by 
Gezo. 
The nature of this attempted transformation of the economic basis of 
the monarchy had been fashioned as much by the events of the 1849-51 
period as by any pre-conceived scheme on the part of the monarch 
himself. The annual slave raid was dropped, being impractical as a 
result of the destruction of the flower of the Dahomean army in 1851, and 
economically unrewarding in the absence of effective demand at Dahomean 
ports. 
The transformation envisaged by Gezo involved more than the 
abandonment of the mechanics of slave raiding and the diversification 
into agricultural production. For slave raiding and the military 
dimension of the Dahomean monarchy and aristocracy were completely 
enmeshed with the ideological aspects of the kingdom. A transformation 
of the economic sphere could not, therefore, be accomplished without a 
major ideological shift within Dahomey, hitherto avoided, and the 
monarch's strategy for adaptation manifested itself in two major 
ideological questions in particular; the further curtailment of human 
sacrifice and the transformation of the Warrior King into the Farmer King. 
These aspects of Dahomean society articulated more than any other the 
ideological essence of martial Dahomey and the prior pre-eminence of the 
warrior aristocracy. Neither could be transformed easily, and the 
successful transformation of either depended upon the economic success of 
Gezo's strategy. 
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THE CURTAILMENT OF HUMAN SACRIFICE UNDER GEZO 
Thus, as a corollary to his economic strategy Gezo embarked on a 
policy of further curtailing human sacrifice. This he hoped, would be a 
useful political indication to Europeans of his commitment to change. 
In fact, it followed 'naturally from the curtailment of slave raiding. 
The absence of a steady supply of captives - one section of which had 
traditionally gone to replace war casualties and plantation slaves - 
rendered slaves more valuable internally. More importantly, perhaps, 
any sacrifices at the Annual Customs would now have to be purchased at 
the full economic costs by the monarch himself. 
The central role of human sacrifice in the political eco nomy of 
Dahomey has already been outlined. 
59 In the 1840's, however, Gezo had 
manifested his willingness to curtail the extent of the -practice,, partly 
as a gesture towards the western powers in the light of their commercial 
potential, and partly also because centralisation of control over human 
sacrifices enhanced his own political control. However, there is no 
indication at that time that he was prepared to countenance total 
abolition of human sacrifice. 
Beecroft was wrongly informed by a French Merchant Captain, a 
Monsieur Couson of the brig Bey that Bouet, who visited Abomey in May of 
1851 "succeeded in obtaining the King's signature to a treaty with the 
French government for the abolition: -of Human Sacrifice". 
60 
61 
Sacrifices did continue, as Europeans were aware. But although 
claims that it was the Bouet Mission to Abomey which convinced the King 
of the economic viability of curtailing human sacrifice and the slave 
trade have to be treated with scepticism, 
62 
there is evidence t hat 
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Gezo's efforts to reduce the scale of sacrifice continued throughout the 
1850's. 
Fraser, who attended the Customs in Abomey in 1851 refers in his 
report only to the intended sacrifice of three children along with the 
sheep and other animals to be slaughtered; in the event he commented 
that the King 'made excuse' over even these sacrifices and it was later 
reported that the children had escaped. 
63 
The comparatively recent dimunition was sufficiently marked to cause 
speculation by the French that the British blockade of early 1852 might 
undo what progress had been made in this direction, and lead to a 
resurrection of large scale sacrifices. 
64 In f act, tI here 
I 
was some 
merit, though undoubtedly considerable economic self-interest, in the 
French argument. It does appears clear that the King, although prepared 
to sign an anti-slave trade treaty with British and French officials, 
refused completely to agree to a British addendum which included 
commitments to the abolition of human sacrifice. 
65 Once again his 
antagonism may have been increased by the the almost absurdly 
undiplomatic approach of the British delegation in unilaterally inserting 
articles, committing Gezo to not only the abolition of Human Sacrifice 
but also to far reaching curtailments in his own control of foreign and 
domestic affairs. 
66 
Eventually, however, in 1853, Gezo did go so far as to announce that 
he would "give up the practice of human sacrifice altogether, according 
to the recommendation of the English. 
67 British scepticism restrained 
them f rom responding. But again, despite British diplomatic aggression 
and their continued high-handedness throughout the 1850s, 
68 Gezo proved 
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somewhat more consistent in his attitude than his European counterparts 
by the maintenance of the limitations imposed on executions and 
sacrifices. 
In the late 1850s, the level of sacrifices at the Annual Customs 
appears to have been perhaps a little lower than those estimated by James 
at the end of the 18th century. One British official on the coast put 
the numbers of victims at 'tens' rather than 'hundreds' in 1857,69 and 
the f ollowing year they were put a little more specifically at 'some 30 
or 40'. 
70 A missionary report conveyed just after Gezo's death spoke 
of him having reduced the number of victims to 'about one hundred 
more or le'Ss'. 
71- 
Undoubtedly Gezo's aims in the sphere of human sacrifice were more 
limited 'than some European contemporaries would have liked to believe, 
but he did pursue them consistently throughout the last years of his 
life, and in a sense, even beyond the grave. 
It has already been noted that Gezo refrained from having sacrifices 
made on the death of da Souza. Early in his reign he had also abolished 
the custom of sacrificing slaves on the death of caboceers, excepting the 
Migan and Meu, who were allowed one each. 
72 This constituted part of 
the general moves of 1843 and related to the curtailment of difusse human 
sacrifices. 
But, having limited the practice of providing caboceers with domestic 
slaves in the next world, Gezo also f orewent the tradition of requiring 
his own caboceers to accompany him. An observer at the Grand Customs 
for Gezo at Abomey in 1860 testified that Gezo had obtained before his 
death a commitment f rom the heir-apparent that Dahomean caboceers would 
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not be required to follow him to his grave. 
73 
This request was, in 
fact, complied with by his successor who neatly managed to combine his 
father's wish with traditional practice by having a number of captives 
created Dahomean 'caboceers' and then dispatched. 
74 
Indeed it appears that Gezo went further than this, by abolishing the 
practice of mutual slaughter by the Royal wives. 
75 
There is thus considerable evidence that Gezo continued his 
curtailment of human sacrifice, begun in the 1840's, throughout the rest 
of his reign. The effect of the reforms which he introduced was not 
insignificant, particularly in view of the important role of the practice 
in Dahomean society. He imposed a reduction in the number of private 
sacrifices., 
76 
reduced the number of royal sacrifices both f or penal 
offences and at the Annual Customs, 
77 
ordered the abolition of the mass 
slaughter traditionally following the king's death 
78 
and exempted at 
least certain officials from sacrifice or suicide at the Grand Customs 
itself. 79 
Unfortunately for the Dahomean monarch and aristocracy, such 
compromises, however significant they were in terms of internal Dahomean 
politics, fell short of that demanded by the Europeans, and failed to 
result in any significant, sustained improvement in their economic 
position. The constant demand for further concessions without 
substantial and commensurate returns could not indefinitely be imposed 
upon the Dahomean ruling class without provoking a reaction. That 
reaction was not to be long in manifesting itself. 
Up until 1857, however, that problem remained latent. There were 
other more immediate issues to be dealt with. The curtailment of slave 
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raiding, which had hitherto presented the monarch with his main export 
'commodity' but which had now been curtailed as part of Gezo's strategy, 
obviously necessitated revenue sources from other directions if the 
monarch were to maintain his Political obligations of conspicuous 
distribution at the Annual Customs, the equipping of his armed force ., and 
the ostentatious upkeep of the royal household. That economic 
diversification had, in itself, considerable political and ideological 
implications. 
THE 'BUSH KING' AND PALM OIL PRODUCTION 
The increasing constraints on finance to the royal exchequer and the 
absence of a suitable substitute income for the slave trade in the years 
after 1852, placed considerable strains on the unity and stability of the 
Dahomean leadership. No one was more vulnerable than Gezo himself. 
Bereft of his slave trade, there was but one option lef t to him by the 
mid 1850s - to directly enter the palm oil export trade as a producer and 
exporter. But the Warrior could not become Farmer without 
revolutionising the ideology as well as the economics of kingship; a 
revolution that struck at the very core of Dahomean society. 
Such a transformation, if it were to be accomplished without 
potentially disastrous social consequences for himself and the kingdom as 
a whole, would take time for his people to become accustomed to. But 
time was not on the monarch's side; the decisive step had to be taken if 
relative impoverishment were not to overtake the King. What was 
required, in fact, was an institutional mechanism which bridged the 
apparent chasm between economic necessity and ideological constraint. 
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By the mid-1850s such a mechanism had been instituted, and a new aspect 
of kingship made its advent in the chronicles of visitors to the 
kingdom: - The Bush King. 
The most recent comprehensive survey of the literature relating to 
the institution of the Bush King in Dahomey has been undertaken by Edna 
Bay. 80 Bay rejects the economic interpretation of the Bush King 
outlined in Burton and Skertchly, whose rationale f or the mechanism was 
as an institution to allow the monarch to become involved in trade. 
81 
She points out, correctly, that much evidence suggests that earlier 
Dahomean monarchs were regularly involved in the sale of slaves and were 
82 
thus effectively traders. 
To some extent, Bay's rejection of the two nineteenth century authors 
revolves around a question of interpretation. For it seems at least 
arguable that the implicit metamorphosis with which both were concerned 
was the transition f rom war-like monarch to -not only trader but producer 
of agricultural goods. The institution of the Bush King was intended to 
deal with the transition from Warrior/slave trader to Farmer/agricultural 
producer-exporter. 
Nevertheless, this interpretative difference is only partial, for Bay 
also rejects the work of several twentieth century historians making this 
very point. In a refinement of the Burton/Skertchly view, Law, 
Coquery-Vidrovitch, and Ross argue that the Bush King was created in 
order to deal with the monarch's participation in the palm oil trade 
specifically. 
Bay's rejection of the 'refined' economic rationale for the Bush King 
appears to be based on two assertions. Firstly, that "in the nineteenth 
339. 
century (the Kings' representatives)., carried on an active trade in palm 
oil on their behalf ". 
83 
Unfortunately, the chronological 
classification is here less than clear. If reference is being made to 
the second half of the nineteenth century., then this hardly undermines 
the argument for An economic determination for the Bush King, since the 
institution had by then been established with the intention, it is 
argued, of permitting just such activity. So far as the first half of 
the century is concerned, there is little or no evidence to substantiate 
the claim that, up until around 1852, the monarch was involved in any 
significant way in the palm oil export trade other than as a recipient of 
tax income which was then converted into trade goods. 
Secondly, however, Bay notes that in mid-century, the King maintained 
various palaces throughout the kingdom, the f emale inhabitants of which 
were involved in the preparation and manufacture of certain goods 
including palm oil. 
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This, of course, is quite correct. A monarch 
obliged to maintain a large standing army, a mass entourage and a host of 
dependents and family, as was the King of Dahomey, was inevitably 
involved not only in the maintenance of a number of households, but in 
the production of susbsistence, accoutrements and clothing. And palm 
oil was, of course, a staple item of cuisine not only for the royal 
households but for the army as well; its production does not of itself, 
85 
therefore, indicate production for participation in the export market. 
To miss this distinction between production of palm oil f or domestic 
use, and the larger scale production by the monarch f or participation in 
the export market., is to fail to perceive the crucial distinction between 
a Warrior King deriving economic sustenance and political legitimacy from 
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the procuration and exchange of slaves as a way of gaining both the 
respect and means of largesse necessary to his position, and a Farmer 
King, directly involved in the production of agricultural commodities for 
the export market as the material basis of his economic and political 
strength. 
This 'economic' rationale for the institution of the Bush King in no 
way deprives the institution a due place within the ideological tradition 
of Dahomean society. Indeed quite the opposite is true. The 
'economic' argument is essentially concerned with the ideological 
sphere; with the necessity to maintain, so far as possible, an inherited 
ideology, to legitimise radical economic change in terms of Dahomean 
perceptions. Paradoxically, much of the oral evidence collected by Bay 
herself, far from contradicting the interpretation outlined in this 
thesis, actually complements and reinforces it. 
86 
Why then, was the Bush King instituted in the 1850's? The answer 
lies in the strategy undertaken at that time by the Dahomean monarchy. 
In 1852, Gezo and the Dahomean leadership, forced by economic and 
political necessity, embarked on a strategy of adaptation. it is 
precisely from this period that the monarch himself became directly 
involved in the production and trading of palm oil f or export. it is 
also around this period that the first references start to appear to the 
King's 'brother' Guerpay. 
87 
The English missionary, Thomas Birch Freeman, is commonly credited 
with the f irst recorded observations of 
Guerpay, later to be termed the 
Bush King by Burton. 
88 At the 1856 Customs., Freeman recorded the 
e istence of Guerpay 
but adds little to the record of Guerpay's name, 
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save that part of the Customs were devoted to him, "an imaginary person 
called the King's brother". 
89 
It seems likely, in fact, that the institution of the Bush King 
occured between 1850 and 1856 when Freeman first recorded his 
existence. Evidence for this can be drawn from the comparison of the 
account of the Annual Customs left by the two most detailed records, that 
of Forbes and of Burton. Burton's descriptions of the ceremonies and 
sacrifices are in two parts; the King's So-Sin Custom, for which 23 
people were sacrificed, and the Bush King's So-Sin Custom, in which 
another 16 died. 
90 Forbes in 1850, on the other hand, makes no 
mention at all of the Bush King. There would therefore appear to be a 
chronological coincidence between the period of Gezols attempts to divert 
the monarchy into direct involvement in agricultural export production 
and the first recorded appearance of the Bush King. But there is 
further contemporary evidence to directly link the two phenomena. 
In the second half of November 1856, a Captain Fursier of the brig 
Columbine of Bristol was anchored at Accra, on the west coast, east of 
Dahomey. During their stay at Accra, he was invited by a Captain Addey 
to visit 'Prya Nova', a small port about seven miles to the west of 
Whydah itself, and was further informed that there was palm oil there in 
abundance. 
91 Both Fursier and his Supercargo, a Mr Williamson, were 
informed at Accra tha this porf- belonged to 'a Prince Guerpay of 
Dahomey'. 92 Indeed, it seems that letters from Prince Guerpay had 
been despatched to Accra soliciting trade with the Columbine and other 
vessels stopping there. 
93 These letters were probably sent by the 
Yevogan under instructions from the King. 
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In the event, the Columbine landed at Prya Nova on 16th January 1857, 
and af ter several days they had set eyes on neither Prince Guerpay nor 
palm oil. They were, however, well supplied with the necessities of 
94 life by the Yevogan. From the natives response to Fursier's 
eventual pleadings 'for assistance to leave, it would appear that Guerpay 
was more than merely a token name for the Yevogan. For, his requests 
elicited the response that "they dared not allow us to leave, for fear of 
Prince Guerpay and the Caboceer of Whyday. "95 
Furthermore, that Prince Guerpay and the monarch were one and the 
same person is effectively made explicit by the Yevogan in a subsequent 
letter to Commander Day concerning the subsequent wreck of the' Columbine 
on Prya Nova beach. Begging to advise Day against the advisability of 
threats., the letter (signed by the Yevogan) does- concede that the 
Columbine was off the beach to "make trade with me", but concludes, "I am 
King of Dahomey". 
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It seems clear, then. that certain facts can be reasonably adduced 
regarding the Bush King from contemporary sources pre-dating Burton's 
economic interpretation by several years. Firstly, that from 1856 at 
least, Prince Guerpay's role was not confined merely to Abomey 
ceremonials but that his name was aleady known among trading ships on the 
coast. Secondly, that he was specif ically and explicitly associated 
with soliciting trade in palm oil. - Thirdly, that his name carried the 
authority and weight of the monarch himself. And, finally, that Guerpay 
was connected with the establishment of a new port, formed around the 
same time as his own first recorded 'appearance' to non-Dahomean 
observers; a port established to the west of Whydah, and entitled Prya 
Nova - 
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Reference to a Fon official named Gampe' also appears in Portuguese 
sources of the 1850's as being connected with commercial transactions, 
although he is assumed to operate under the Yevogan. 
97 
And Commander 
Day of the British squadron was under no illusions as to the identity of 
Guerpay: 
"Prince Guerpay .a* another name f or the King of 
Dahomey, which he used in all the transactions that he 
does not wish his name to appear in ... -98 
Other British Officials accepted a similar view. 
99 
The weight of contemporary evidence is, therefore, sufficient to 
conclude that the institution of the Bush King and the establishment of 
Prya Nova were intended as vehicles to facilitate Gezo's direct 
intervention in the palm oil trade. Prya Nova was a new port, 
apparently under the direct control of the monarch, to the west of the 
better known and longer established ports - More importantly, perhaps, 
it was unencumbered by any existing 'intermediary' traders. As such 
Prya Nova represented an attempt by the monarch to maximise trading 
opportunities for himself by intercepting shipping travelling along the 
coast from a westerly direction, thus pre-empting produce offered at 
ports to his east. 
100 
The port was situated on the beach 7/8 miles west of Whydah, at the 
approximate base of the River Couffo/Lake Aheme waterway. The spot was 
well chosen in order to facilitaCe transportation of produce from the 
interior of the kingdom, avoiding the Lama and expediting 
transportation. It is no less significant that the Bush King's palace 
was later recorded as being situated at Akpweho, "a village on the road 
to Aja, about six miles to the South-West of Agbome" which would places 
it very close to the River Couffo. 
101 
344. 
Finally, it is possible that the Bush King, while intended initially 
as a vehicle to allow the re-orientation of the monarchy in a more 
agriculturally based direction, also eventually offered other 
opportunities. By 1856, Gezo's reluctant acceptance of the terms of the 
1852 treaty was wearing thin, particularly in view of the non-arrival of 
British annuities or adequate alternative sources of income. 
102 
Prince Guerpay, the Bush King, allowed the monarch to diversify into palm 
oil production and trading while minimising internal consequence. it 
also offered him an avenue to minimise external difficulties should 
opportunities arise for the shipment of slaves. The institution of the 
Bush King incidentally provided him with a subterfuge allowing the 
possibility of circumventing the Terms of the 1852 Treaty, particularly 
if operated through a newly established port. In July 1857, British 
cruisers intercepted an attempted embarkation of a large number of slaves 
f rom Prya Nova, an incident which drove the King to fury and led to the 
punitive curtailment of all trade through ports under his sovereignty 
until the demanded recompense for the loss had been obtained from coastal 
traders. 
103 
The operations at Prya Nova, then, disconcerted coastal traders in 
traditional ports in more ways than one, and it is not surprising that it 
was estimated by some European officials that the destruction of the 
Dahomean monarch's embryo port wouid be met with little grief among the 
coastal trading community. 
104 
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SUBSTITUTE INCOME: PALM OIL TAXES AND TRADE: EUROPEAN ANNUITIES 
The mechanism of the Bush King was initially and primarily intended 
to contribute towards this effort by enabling the monarch to participate 
in the direct production of palm oil for export, a decision which 
involved a serious challenge to the traditional ideological trappings of 
the Dahomean monarchy. But in addition, that strategy of adaptation 
contained several serious economic flaws, none of which could reasonably 
have been have been foreseen or anticipated. 
Firstly, the strategy did not take into account the greatly reduced 
return f or outlay of palm oil production compared to the procuration and 
sale of captives, a-ad did not adequately 'allow for the aecreas I ing 
profitability of palm oil production for export the further one went from 
the coast into the exterior. 
Secondly, and particularly from the point of view of the monarch 
himself, it was dependent upon bolstering his income partly by increased 
f iscal income f rom the palm oil trade and by means of annuities f rom the 
European powers; the former was never to be adequate as a substitute for 
the slave trade, and the latter quite simply never arrived. 
Thirdly, it did not envisage the increasing depreciation of the 
domestic Dahomean currency. And finally, it risked internal instability 
consequent upon the increased retention of captives internally. 
Throughout the period 1852-7, these factors increasingly exposed the 
weakness of the new strategy, and initial unity within the Dahomean 
polity gave way to scepticism, consternation and the search for an 
alternative route to preservation. 
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ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION /TRANSPORTATION OF OIL FROM 
THE AREA OF ABOMEY 
Several secondary works refer to the transportation of palm oil 
produce from as far inland as Abomey by the King of Dahomey. 
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According to these works, the King, because of his political power, was 
able to employ legions of slaves transporting huge amounts of palm oil 
produce from the king's plantations for sale on the coast to the king's 
benef it. 
This undoubtedly occurred to some extent, but such accounts tend to 
underestimate the difficulties of such an exercise and little attention 
has been paid to the economic cost/benefits of an undertaking of this 
nature. Implicitly or explicitly, the assumption persists that the 
entry of the monarch into the sphere of export production rendered hiTyi 
considerable benefits to offset the decline of the slave trade. This is 
by no means obvious. 
In Dahomey the normal oil load for a head carrier appears to have 
been five gallons, and to have remained roughly the same throughout our 
period. In the closing decades of the 18th century Norris indicated 
that palm oil was brought to the Whydah marked in calabashes of from five 
to ten or twelve gallons. 
106 Later, in the mid-19th century, Forbes' 
female rum carriers were allocated five gallons each as their load on the 
way to Abomey. 
107 Five gallon earthen jars appear to have been the 
normal size recepticles employed by Dahomeans for storage of newly 
produced oil prior to use, or carriage, in the 1870s 
108 
and 
later. 
109 
The normal carriage weight of a slave/porter, therefore, 
appears to have been around 35 lbs of oil, 
110 
plus the weight of the 
container, probably around 50 pounds in total. 
ill 
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A return journey from Abomey to Whydah fully laden with palm oil on 
the first leg of the journey, and perhaps carrying manufactured goods, 
powder, guns, spirits or cowries on the return, could not have been 
completed in the. 19th century in less than a week, 
112 
particularly 
bearing in mind the nature of the terrain on the route between Abomey and 
Whydah, 113 and the fact that the transportation of the bulk of palm oil 
would have taken place during the rainy season. 
Thus., the carriage of one ton of oil from Abomey for exchange at 
Whydah, would have involved a labour time of around at least 420 
man-days. 
114 
Calculations regarding the actual production of the pericarp oil are 
slightly more problematical in the absence of any precise data f rom the 
Dahomean coast. But one early 20th century estimate for West Africa 
generally suggests a potential oil yield (pericarp) of 18% of the fruit 
gathered, 
115 
with about 30-50% of this potential being realized by 
traditional native methods of extraction. 
116 A contemporary report 
from Gabon in the early 1880s, referring to an extraction process similar 
to that generally employed in Dahomey, suggests that the actual yield of 
oil may have been higher, up to as much as 12.5% of the fruit 
weight. 
117 The estimate which has been made by early 20th century 
commentators on Dahomey, of 1 ton of palm oil (pericarp) f rom about 10 
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tons of fruit, seems, therefore, not unreasonable. 
What is clear, however, is that the process was time consuming and 
labour intensive. 
119 Apart from the labour involved in the actual 
production process, the preliminaries of gathering the 
f ruit, water and 
wood necessary, involved considerable expenditure in terms of 
labour time. 
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Manning, basing his assertions on Rancoule and Adam, suggests 140 
work days to harvest and transport the fruit; 90 work days f or removal 
of the fruit from the bunches; 85 days for cooking the f ruit, preparing 
and purifying the oil - including procuring and transporting the water 
and wood; a total of 315 man-days to produce 1 Ton of oil. 
120 This 
figure confirms the suggestion by nineteenth century sources that a slave 
could produce 1 ton of palm oil a year. 
121 
Thus, assuming relatively easy access to water and wood, the 
production of one ton of oil in the area of Abomey, and its 
transportation to the coast, f or exchange would have involved a minimum 
122 labour input of 735 man-days. 
Since the production season was confined to approximately half the 
year, the labour input required was doubled. Given this., the 
difficulties of producing and transporting oil in the Dahomean rainy 
season, and allowing f or losses en route, it is likely that the process 
of production and transportation of a ton of oil from the Abomey region 
demanded the full time employment of four slaves in terms of direct 
labour. In addition, food production for the slaves thus employed would 
involve the allocation of additional labour. Thus the production of 
even 2000 tons of oil from the Abomey region would have involved directly 
and indirectly somewhere in the region of 10,000 slaves full time during 
the six months season. 
In the light of these figures, some further comments can be made on 
relative profitability on figures supplied by Forbes around mid-century, 
and Burton in the 1860s. The figures are, by their natureý tentative, 
but may be illustrative. 
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According to both Forbes and Bouet, the daily payment f or a carrier 
c. 1850 was 120 cowries, out of which he (the carrier) paid his 
subsistance. 
123 A slave, on the other hand, could be subsisted by his 
master at a cost of 20 cowries per day- 
124 If these rates are 
reasonably accurate the costs of transporting one ton of oil from Abomey 
125 
would lie between El and E5.13, probably nearer the former. Basing 
the labour costs of production on the same scale, the production of one 
ton of oil would lie between 14s and E4.5s again, in the case of slave 
labour, nearer the former; a total production and transportation cost of 
between E1.14s and E9.18s. 
At the former figure, the palm oil trade would have represented a 
profitable venture for Gezo, though probably relatively less so than 
profits obtained through slave raiding.; figures from Whydah on palm oil 
prices in the late 1840s and early 1850s suggest that such labour costs 
allowed large scope f or realisation of surplus by means of exchange. 
Palm oil appears to have risen from Ell. 5s a ton in 1846 to L22.10s in 
May 1850, which level was maintained for a quarter of a century. 
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Throughout this period subsistence costs, on the other hand, appear 
to have risen considerably. By the mid-1860's Burton estimated the 
subsistence costs of a 'poor man' at 500 cowries a day, or a head of 
cowries every four days. 
127 This cannot, of course be taken as a 
straightforward 2500% increase, e: ien allowing that both estimates are 
accurate; for internal inflation has to be taken into account. 
Up until the late 1840s the exchange rate of cowries against specie 
appears to have remained in practice roughly equivalent to 
its nominal 
exchange rate of 1 head, or 2000, to the dol-lar mentioned 
by Dalzel in 
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the 1790s. 
128 By 1849, however, cowrie inflation was beginning to set 
in; while the nominal exchange rate remained at 2000 to the dollar 
(4/6), the actual exchange rate was nearer 2400 to 2600 to the dollar, or 
between 3/9 - 4/2 per head. 
129 By 1863 the dollar exchanged at around 
2 1/2 heads, or 5000 cowries; the head of cowries was now valued in 
terms of exchange between 1/9 and 2/-. 
130 
Thus, Burton's estimate of 500 cowries subsistence per day in 1863, 
was equivalent to around E9.2s. 6d. per annum. 
131 At this rate, the 
labour costs necessary for the production and transport of 1 Ton of oil 
from Abomey would have required subsistence costs of 18.7s. 6d. (735/4 x 
A ton of oil, as' has been remarked above, could command an 
exchange rate at Whydah, of E22.10s. 
It is not suggested that the above figures portray an exact and 
accurate indication of the costs of producing palm oil in absolute 
terms. It is likely, however, that they do illustrate the general 
trend., From the foregoing figures, therefore, it seems that due to 
cowrie inflation and the relatively static price of oil the profitability 
of the palm oil trade fell consistently and considerably between the late 
1840s and the mid 1860s. 
THE PALM OIL TRADE 1852-7 
A central source of income fr6I which Gezo hoped to derive benefit 
was from fiscal returns on the palm oil trade. The trade did enter into 
a half decade of sustained growth from 1852. By the end of that year 
Gezo had received word of the lif ting of the blockade by the British, and 
Fraser had been invited back to take up his official position in 
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Whydah. 132 By the end of the same year, palm oil could be spoken of 
as Whydah's main export commodity. 
133 
The economic position must have appeared at least potentially 
lucrative f or a Nation retaining connections with both the French and the 
British, whose demand for vegetable oils was steadily increasing. 
French imports of vegetable oils from the west coast had increased 
steadily since the 1830s - apart f rom a hiccup in 1853 
134 
_ reaching a 
total of 2,670,000 kg (2622 Tons) in 1854.135 The British, who had 
started earlier than the French, had increased their imports of palm oil 
alone to a total of approximately 31,500 tons the previous year. 
136 
And certainly, during the years 1853-7, Whydah and the neighbouring 
ports under the suzerainty of Dahomey contributed their fair share 
towards European imports. By 1856, Campbell estimated that exports from 
Whydah were at the level of approximately 2500 tons per annum, with the 
same figure in 1857-8; in addition a further 4000 to 4500 tons emanated 
f rom Porto Novo Beach and Appi Vista to the east of Whydah. 
137 A west 
coast captain of some experience, who had been visiting the ports since 
the 1840s, later testified that the trade in palm oil had "wonderfully 
increased" from the mid-1850s. 
138 
No one appears to have taken a larger share in the increased export 
of palm oil than Domingo Martinez. His trade, which had been valued at 
200,000 dollars in 1851,139 (the equivalent of some 700 tons at the 
then prices), was estimated at nearer 5000 tons some three years 
later. 140 This particular report may have overestimated the exact 
extent of his increase, but there seems to be little doubt that his palm 
oil trade was flourishing. Martinez was benefiting in particular 
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because of the interruptions to the trade routes to Badagry, 
141 
and 
had, since 1852, opened another embarkation point at Appi Vista as well 
as his established port at Porto Novo Beach. In May of 1854, he was 
reported to have a total of eight palm oil ships, with a carrying 
capacity of 3000 tons, loading at these two ports. 
142 
Indeed, so abundant do Martinez's sources appear to have been, that 
during the previous year he had been advertising among Bristol and 
Liverpool shippers, offering oil at four and a half gallons to the 
dollar, fifty per cent less than the prevailing price at neighbouring 
ports. 
143 On the arrival of the ships, however, Martinez refused to 
144 trade. except at three gallons to the dollar. Perhaps his 
dominating position in the market encouraged him to hold out for a better 
price, or perhaps, as Campbell suggested, he changed the terms in view of 
the fact that the British ships had brought nothing but specie with which 
to trade, instead of the tobacco which was so much in demand by the 
producers. 
145 In any case, he held to his position. 
Small producers maintained a significant role in the production of 
export oil. Campbell remarked that: 
11 
*. the natives who manufacture palm oil do not 
require specie, and but a very small quantity of 
tobacco in payment for it. " In the absence of 
tobacco he continued, "the supply of oil fell 
off--. 146 
Of course, there is evidence that-a significant proportion of Domingo's 
palm oil emanated from the town of Porto Novo; 
147 but the continued 
involvement of the small producer illustrated in his trade is probably 
equally applicable to Dahomey. Certainly, if the import goods in demand 
at Whydah are anything to go by - cheap clothes, tobacco and brandy - 
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small scale production was an important source of palm oil in the early 
years of the 1850s. 
148 
This seems to reflect the general trend along the coast within the 
proximity of the Dahomean Kingdom. Again it was Campbell who drew 
attention to the increasing capacity of small producers at Lagos to 
relieve themselves of their dependency upon their chief s by means of the 
new trade. 
149 Mistakenly, Campbell viewed this as a bonus for the 
chief s who, he assumed, ought to be pleased at the burden of dependants 
being taken off their hands; he displayed a marked lack of appreciation 
of the role which such a dependency syndrome had to play in ensuring that 
the chiefs continued to hold economic and political sway through their 
domination of labour. 
Thus the period - between the signing of the 1852 treaty and 1857 was 
marked by a steady growth in the palm oil export trade f rom Dahomey. 
But the attempts by the King of Dahomey to capitalise on this growth met 
with mixed results. 
FISCAL IMPOSITIONS ON PALM OIL TRADE 
During the negotiations over the 1852 Treaty, Gezo had taken a number 
of steps in relation to the palm oil trade. Some of these, like the 
increase in price and the monopolisation of trading appear to have been 
short term measures designed as ýiuch to influence the British as to 
enhance his income. 
One of the measures, however - the additional tax imposed on the 
rolling of casks off the beach appears to have been a long term, 
sustained imposition, and one from which the monarch would have 
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maintained an increased tax revenue over the pre-1852 period. This may 
have been part of the 'exorbitant' exactions which, it was claimed, were 
reported to be causing Whydah traders, in the absence of a lucrative 
slave trade, to desert the port within a few years of the 1852 
agreement. 
150 Such traders did not normally leave the west coast, but 
moved to outlying ports. 
But even here it is possible that they were subjected to more closely 
regulated tax impositions than previously had been the case. Gezo could 
not impose tax regulation in ports such as Grand Popo, which were under 
his suzerainty rather than his direct control. But the position was 
different in Porto Novo Beach, long considered to be under the control of 
the Dahomean monarch. Af ter 1852, Gezo appears to have been receiving 
dues as well as tribute from Domingo Martines at that port. 
It was also possible for the monarch to impose taxation on goods 
embarked from any new port which was established on the beach within his 
jurisdiction. This appears to have happened in at least one case,,, at 
Cotonou. Cotonou was re-established, according to its historian, around 
1852.151 More significantly, although the port was under the control 
of Domingo Martinez, it is recorded as having been first established by 
Gezo himself, as an outpost. And the first inhabitants of the town, 
along with Martinezs slaves - who were part of a plantation scheme - 
were Dahomean functionaries. 
152 'It may well be that these were later 
involved in the supervision of the actual production of palm oil, but in 
the f irst instance it is likely that they were placed there in order to 
ensure the orderly collection of the monarch's taxes. 
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Thus the monarch increased his tax revenue on palm oil from 1852 
onwards. But this is unlikely to have been significant in absolute 
terms, since it was counterbalanced by the outward flow of traders, and 
since those who remained saw the price of oil drop from its brief 1852 
peak of E45 the ton. That particular increase did not last long, 
perhaps not surprisingly; in the immediate aftermath of Gezo's decree 
doubling the price, the British trader Stanfield at Whydah was quick to 
complain that he could no longer afford to purchase oil at the statutory 
price, 
153 
and the result of maintaining the commodity at this price 
would undoubtedly have been merely to push ships seeking palm oil to 
ports outside the control of the Dahomean monarch. 
The price dropped shortly af ter its imposition during the blockade, 
possibly in June 1852 when the blockade was lif ted, but in any case, it 
is clear that by 1854 Domingo was once again selling oil at the 
pre-blockade price of fM. 10s the ton. 
154 As has already been noted, 
this price appears to have been maintained with remarkable stability, not 
only throughout the 1850s, but also the 1860s and '70s. 
155 Its 
stability suggests that it was a 'fixed' or conventional price, rather 
than a market price in the true sense, and it appears that the standard 
Dahomean price was f ixed at a rate of 100 dollars the ton (three gallons 
a dollar) from the effective end of the blockade in 1852, throughout the 
'50s, 160s and '70s. 
INADEQUACY OF INCOME FROM THE PALM OIL TRADE 
It has already been indicated that at the start of the 1850s, the 
comparative insignificance of the palm oil trade in terms of revenue to 
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the monarch is important to bear in mind. The growth in the palm oil 
trade throughout the 1850s altered this position to some extent, but 
never to a level where it would have provided adequate compensation for 
the income lost through the slave trade. 
Although exact quantities of palm oil exported are hard to come 
by, 156 the increase in trade seems reasonably sustained throughout the 
first half of the 1850s despite the continuing nuisance of petty thefts 
and the costly necessity of hiring canoists from El Mina. 
157 At the 
beginning of the decade R&gis claimed that he himself was already 
exporting 3000 'barriques' a year, 
158 
and asserted the potential for 
great expansion. By 1856 Campbell could report exports from Whydah, 
Porto Novo and other ports under the sovereignty of the King of Dahomey 
as approximately 8300 tons, and an increase the following year from the 
same ports to around 9500 tons. 
159 These figures appear conservative 
rather than exaggerated extimates. 
160 Assuming a selling price of 
palm oil of E22: 10s the ton, the turnover in palm oil from ports under 
Dahomean sovereignty would have been of the order of E210,000 per 
annum. From Whydah itself in 1857, the estimated exports were 
approximately 2500 tons, 
161 
representing a current (aggregate) selling 
price of E56,350. 
Gezo's share of this (1/18th) would have been of the order of E3000 
from Whydah alone - c. 130 tons in trade goods. This was certainly a 
significant increase since the beginning of the decade, marking perhaps 
more than a doubling of the monarch's income from this source 
alone. 
163 In addition, of course, the monarch was in receipt of 
tribute income from those - mainly ex-slave dealers - to whom he had 
357. 
granted monopolies on the trade at outlying ports. And such tribute 
could be substantial. 
Prime among Gezo's sources of tribute was Domingo Martinez whose 
involvement in the palm oil trade had escalated rapidly throughout the 
1850s. Martinez, who already by 1850 was said to be involved in the 
trade to an excess of $200,000 dollars annually, 
163 
was reported to 
have doubled this once more by 1854. By the mid 1850s, he was certainly 
in a dominating trade position in the area just east of Whydah, 
particularly af ter Mewu took power in Badagri, (traditionally the beach 
for Porto Novo town). 
164 Resultant rivalries between the lat ter and 
Alajogun, the young King of Porto Novo, resulted in stoppages of the flow 
of oil to Badagri thus reducing the oil income of the British mercantile 
establishment there. 
165 
Martinez's prominence in the trade was not achieved without 
liberality towards his overlord and protector Gezo. It was probably to 
Martinez that one west coast traveller referred when he mentioned one 
famous ex-slave dealer who paid the King of Dahomey "something near 
10,000 dollars a year" f or the monopoly of the palm oil trade at Appi 
Vista. 166 If his estimate was correct, and there seems to be no 
reason why it should not be realistic, then Gezo was receiving from 
Martinez almost as much as he was receiving from the total tax income 
from the palm oil trade at Whydah. - 
However, Martinez was far and away the most pre-eminent trader in 
Dahomey by the mid 1850s, dominating both palm oil and slave trades. it 
is unlikely that anyone else approached him in their liberality since the 
scale of his palm oil transactions far outstripped that of any other 
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trader in the Dahomey area. 
167 
It would, therefore, appear that 
Gezo's real income from the palm oil trade by the start of the second 
half of the 1850s, when it had reached a peak, would have been something 
below E10,000 in value. A significant increase since the end of the 
1840s. But, still, and this is the telling point, the equivalent of a 
mere 500 slaves at prevailing coastal prices when the slave trade was to 
revive. 
The growth of the trade throughout the period 1852-58/9 was 
insufficient to raise revenue from palm oil to the central exchequer to 
anything like the level required to compete with a thriving slave 
trade. ' As such it was incapable of providing an adequate income 
substitute on its own. 
FAILURE TO OBTAIN EUROPEAN ANNUITIES 
If the increase to the monarch's income from even a sustained 
increase in the level of palm oil exports was inadequate in relation to 
lost income from the slave trade, the expected income from another 
quarter - European annuities - proved even more disappointing. 
The calculations of the Dahomean leadership in its plans for 
adaptation to the new circumstances of the early 1850s had been partially 
predicated upon the substitute revenue which was to be allowed by the 
British Government. Gezo, of c-ourse, had never presented Dahomean 
participation in wars and the slave trade merely as a matter of income. 
But he had made it unequivocally clear on every possible occasion to 
European ambassadors - particularly to the British - that though an 
alternative income to that derived from the slave trade was not a 
359. 
sufficient condition for his abandonment of the Trade, it was certainly a 
necessary condition for so doing. 
168 
This was recognised by those Europeans on the coast who realised the 
extent to which the monarch's obligations could only be fulfilled if he 
was assured of a continuous, regular and reasonable level of trade goods 
from the import sector. In the absence of the slave trade any deficit 
would have to be made Up., at least in part, by direct support from 
European powers. Thus, as early as 1843, Hutton had suggested that a 
substitute revenue might be paid in the f orm. of guaranteed purchases by 
the British of Dahomean agricultural produce (in this case, cotton was 
suggested). 
169 Hutton's suggestion was designed to fulfil Gezo's 
needs while holding out an attractive commercial proposition based on 
Britain's quest for alternative sources of cotton. But the British had 
never really gone any way towards offering a reasonable and sufficient 
level of compensation. Estimates of the annual worth of the slave trade 
itself to the monarchy varied: from E60,000 per annum (Cruickshank), 
over F-22ý000 (over 50)000 dollars, Winniet), to about E3,000 
(Beecroft). 170 
Compared with these estimates, the British offers of compensation 
were thoroughly inadequate. Foote was authorised to offer F-700 per 
annum in presents for seven years, Cruickshank E400 per annum, and 
Beecroft, the highest offer, E3,000 per annum for three years. 
171 
(Beecroft actually increased the offer to four years in the course of 
negotiations, in an attempt to gain a settlement. ) Even this final and 
largest offer, made in 1850, was the equivalent of only 150 export slaves 
per annum at 1848 prices. 
172 
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Of course, this somewhat underestimates the net effect of such a 
grant since it ignores the cost to Gezo of procuring the slaves in the 
first place. Nevertheless, it is significant that the highest offer to 
Gezo was equivalent to the lowest estimate of his income f rom the slave 
trade, and was insufficient to persuade the Dahomean leadership to 
contemplate abandonment under anything like normal circumstances - By 
the year following this offer, however, as we have seen, the slave trade 
had largely abandoned Dahomey, and economic decline had been accompanied 
by a complete economic blockade. Under the circumstances, the Dahomean 
monarchy and commercial leadership had reluctantly conceded the need f or 
an alternative source of access to the import sector, and the -need to 
sign the treaty with the British. 
It seems almost certain that they did so on the understanding that 
the British would reciprocate by paying an annual income to the Dahomean 
exchequer in trade goods. This is probably also why Gezo was so keen to 
establish similar treaties with the French and the Portuguese, and why he 
invited ambassadors - from these countries with that purpose - of 
multiplying his external sources of income - in mind. 
173 
For their part, the French were keen to avoid involvement in the 
complexities of the abolition issue. 
174 As for the British, no trade 
goods ever arrived from the English Queen. In vain the Dahomean monarch 
remonstrated with British visitors; - in person and by letter in the years 
following 1852. In 1854, and 1855 again he drew attention to the 
promises of Forbes and Beecroft and other British Officers who had 
visited him. The King complained bitterly that no revenue had ever been 
sent and stated specif ically that he had agreed to stop the slave trade 
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in return f or an income of 1880 doubloons per annum. 
175 
The following 
year, 1856, Gezo was again repeating his claims against the British, but 
with no more success than before. 
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Gezo's expectations of an annual 
income from European powers which might supplement any income from the 
palm oil trade thus proved more optimistic than any expectation of an 
adequate income f rom the palm oil trade itself. A further element in 
his strategy for transition had proved illusory. 
COWRIE INFLATION 
With taxation income from the palm oil trade proving a less than 
adequate substitute for the faltering slave trade, and bereft of an 
expected annual income from Europeans, the position of the royal 
exchequer would have been precarious enough; but a triumvirate of 
economic ills was completed by another factor beyond the control of the 
Dahomean authorities - cowrie inflation. 
The use of cowries in Dahomey, for both domestic and export 
transactions, long pre-dated even the Fon conquest of Whydah, 
177 
and 
continued throughout the eighteenth century after the establishment of 
their direct access to coastal markets. 
178 
Cowries were initially exchanged by weight, 
179 but computation of 
the coastal value presents some problems. Bosman (1000 for 2/6) and 
Smith (200 for 6d) indicate a coastal value of 2000 for 5/- in the last 
years ofthe 17th century and the first half of the 18th century 
respectively. Marion Johnson, however, has pointed out that this refers 
to the 'Prime cost' of cowries (in Europe), 
180 
as indicated by 
Atkins, 181 and not the exchange value on the coast, which the latter 
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indicated in, 
--IAI 
1721, as 4000 for 25/-. 182 This is confirmed 
elsewhere. --- However, a few years later, Smith was quoting cowrie 
values at 2000 for 10/-, 
184 (El the Grand Cabess) which remained its 
nominal value for some years. 
So far as Dahomey was concerned from around 1790 onwards, the rate of 
5/- or one dollar which approximated to it - appears to have been the 
actual local exchange rate for 2000 cowries. Dalzel in the 1790s 
asserted that "one thousand are reckoned equal to half a crown", 
185 
M'Leod that "16,000 ... are called an ounce trade, which is considered 
to be about 40 shillings sterling in value". 
186 
and Adams also gave 
187 16,000 to the ounce trade at Whydah. This nominal value appears to 
have been the actual exchange rate. 
The period 1820-45 was a period of relative monetary stability 
throughout the Bights' cowrie-using areas, which may have reflected 
reduced cowrie collection in the Maldive Islands. 
188 Indeed, by the 
mid 1840s the shells appear to have been in short supply in the Dahomey 
area. 
189 However, in response to the expanding potential of the palm 
oil trade in the area, European merchants turned to new sources of cowrie 
supply, particularly Zanzibar and East Africa. 
190 The influx of 
cowries reached its peak between 1851 and 1869, during which period it is 
estimated that over 35,000 tons or 14,000 million shells were imported to 
and unl oaded on the West African coast. 
191 
So far as the Dahomean coast is concerned, the exchange rate for 
cowries appears to have held reasonably steady until the late 1840s and 
early 1850s. At this stage, however, indications of the devaluation of 
the cowrie currency start to set in. For instance, Forbes remarked in 
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1849 that the nominal rate of exchange was 1 dollar to 1 head of cowries 
(2000), but added that the actual exchange rate f or 1 silver dollar was 
in fact 2400/2600.192 
By this time British merchants were operating a differential system, 
selling cow-ries at the nominal value of 5/- per head, but purchasing them 
only at 3/9d - 4/2d per head. 
193 
Fraser's reports confirm this 
trend; in 1851 he was indicating the head of cowries at 4/6 (1 dollar 
the head), 194 but the following year he was estimating their value at 
195 4/-. 
The extent of the debasement of the cowrie currency was fuelled from 
mid-century in Dahomey by competition in direct importation of the shells 
from East Africa, and from Zanzibar in particular. In the first half of 
the 1850s, shells were imported into Dahomey on Ham burg vessels, 
196 
prominent among which were the ships of the Hamburg f irm. of O'Swald, who 
appear to have held a virtual monopoly of direct imports f rom Zanzibar 
until 1856.197 
. 
In 1856, Regis broke the West Coast monopoly of 
O'swald, and, thereafter, both firms imported the shells directly from 
Zanzibar to the west coast. 
198 
This af f ected the Dahomey and Yoruba areas in particular, since the 
inferior Zanzibar shells were quite acceptable there, 
199 
and Whydah and 
Lagos became the main embarkation points for the East African shells. 
At Lagos, for instance, the importartion of shells quadrupled between 1856 
and 1860. Lagos also provides an example of the effects of the 
increased competition and level of cowrie importation. In 1851 a sack 
of cowries was worth about 48/- and purchased 36 gallons of oil. By 
1858, a couple of years af ter Re-gis and O'Swald started competing, they 
364. 
agreed to fix the rate for a sack of cowries at 18-19 gallons. 
200 But 
price f ixing broke down, and by late 1859, the sack of cowries was worth 
only 18/-, and would procure no more than 14-15 gallons of oil. 
201 
This currency depreciation had its corollary in internal inflation. 
In Dahomey, internal prices appear to have risen steadily from the first 
years of the 1850s. By the time of Burton's visit in the early years of 
the 1860s, the cowrie exchange rate was running at 2 1/2 heads to the 
dollar in Dahomey, or around 1/9 a head. 
202 There does not seem to 
have been a differential in the exchange rate in different parts of 
Dahomey - it was the same in Abomey as in Whydah. 
203 
This currency depreciation also appears to have been reflected in 
internal prices. According to Burton, prices at Whydah doubled in the 
ten years from 1853,204 a phenomenon reflected not only in other parts 
of the Bights, 
205 but since found to have affected West Africa 
generally. 
206 But prices throughout the 1850s did not increase at the 
same rate universally. In the interior of the country, and particularly 
in the area of Abomey, the cost of general provisions rose faster than at 
the coast, and according to Burton had quadrupled from the early 
1850s. 207 Burton's explanation for this differential in price 
increases between the coast and Abomey - the recent policy of 
ultra-militarism - seems plausible since the diversion of labour f rom 
agricultural to military pursuits-would have particularly affected the 
area of Abomey. 
208 But, whatever the reason, for the monarch and the 
Dahomean leadership, this general pattern of inflation must have had 
serious consequences. Certainly, since the taxes imposed by the monarch 
on the palm oil trade were levied at dollar rates, he would obtain some 
365. 
compensation for internal price rises. But if Burton is correct, and 
the rate of price-inflation in the Abomey area was higher than both the 
rate of inflation on the coast and the proportionate devaluation of the 
cowrie, the monarch would be relatively disadvantaged since inflation 
normally hits hardest the richer sections of society. Cowrie inflation 
meant a continual depreciation of the stocks in the royal exchequer. 
CONCLUSION 
By the second half of the 1850s then, the alternative strategy of 
adaptation which had been embarked upon by the Dahomean leadership was 
running into serious economic trouble. A relatively low level of fiscal 
returns from palm oil, a complete absence of substitute income from the 
European powers, cowrie, devaluation and internal inflation placed 
increasing strains on the economic basis of Dahomean political lif e. 
Not surprisingly, these economic troubles were reflected in the political 
sphere, for in the absence of an adequate alternative source of income to 
the slave trade, and in the face of the relative devaluation of their 
inherited wealth, the Dahomean. leadership faced the increasing prospect 
of inability to fulfil its political obligations and maintain a standard 
11 
of prestigious/ ostentatious living and distribution central to its 
political position. 
The political crisis became most acute in the final years of Gezo's 
reign and was articulated most openly in the wake of the obvious failure 
of the strategy of adaptation and the revival of slave demand c. 1860. 
But the seeds of the political divisions had been sown some years bef ore 
that. 
366. 
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CHAPTER 
REVERSION: The abandonment of the stategy of adaptation c. 1858-65. 
FROM POLITICAL UNITY TO DIVISION 
The interpretation in this thesis differs somewhat from that 
previously put foward by David Ross. Ross argues that Gezo was intent 
on transforming Dahomean society from the early 1840's. But, having 
failed to obtain an active alliance or backing from England, he could 
neither monopolize the palm oil trade, nor could be carry out his 
revolutionary plan to transform Dahomey by substituting agriculture and 
palm oil in the place of slaves as the material basis of the Dahomean 
state. 
1 
In the political sphere, he failed to make peace with the Egba at 
Abeokuta, 
2 
and lost control of the internal political situation, a War 
Party arising and becoming vocal. 
3 
As late as mid-1855, according to 
Ross, Gezo still entertained hopes that the British would give him 
backing and restore his crumbling political position; after 1855 - 
Campbell's refusal to treat unless prior assurances of the signing of the 
whole of the standard anti-slave treaty were given - that was a well nigh 
untenable hope. 
4 
An uprising of slaves in the wake of this proved to be the turning 
point. The Chiefs attacked Gezo's policy. The Chiefs were 
5 
traditional, reactionary and pro-human sacrifice, and the opposition 
to Gezo was led by Badahou (Glele), the heir apparent, himself heavily 
influenced by the Priests. 
6 After the slave revolt, the policies of 
Badahou prevailed. The King was in a minority, and even the Meu sided 
382. 
with Badahou. England and Portugal having proved useless, Gezo turned 
to France. 
7 
The reasons for chiefly opposition to Gezo, which had flared as a 
direct result of the slave revolt went much deeper than that specific 
incident according to Ross. Although they were generally frightened by 
the slave revolts, a number of them had opposed the monarch throughout 
his reign, resenting his domination. Gezo, according to Ross, had 
"limited their freedom to manoeuvre for their own profit". Above all, 
they resented his seeking and obtaining external support f or his power, 
particularly from da Souza. This section of Badahou's support wanted 
rid of not only Gezo, but any strong central monarchy. But between 
8 1855-8 the Badahou-Gezo conflict reached stalemate. 
Although this work' starts from a different conceptual framework from 
that of David Ross, the evidence suggests that his general outline of 
developments during this period is largely accurate. But it is perhaps 
too closely related to the various personalities involved, it tends to 
underestimate the initial political consensus which prevailed and it 
fails to perceive how the growth of internal opposition was fuelled by 
the course of economic developments. 
Gezo's attempts to transform the ideological and political nature of 
the Dahomean aristocracy in order to accommodate his new economic 
strategy eventually met with opposi-tion, but even many of those who were 
ultimately to reject the experiment initially remained quiescent . 
In the f irst instance, the Dahomean leadership was relatively united 
around the plan to adapt in order to preserve their survival. This is 
perhaps not surprising, given the traditional unity which had cemented 
383. 
the relationships between the foremost men in the kingdom - Gezo had come 
to power in 1818 with the backing of the Meu, Migan and Cambodee. 
9 
And the monarch himself was only too well aware of the dangers of 
internal division. 
10 
Like the King, The Meu had been eager to minimise the commitments 
imposed upon them in 1852, and, like Gezo, he had opposed the signing of 
the additional articles as being tantamount to selling their country to 
Britain. 11 At the level of state finances, the Meu preserved a 
tactful respect for the monarch and recognised the impropriety of anyone 
other than the monarch entering into negotiations with the British. 
Having raised the matter with Forbes and Beecroft in 1850, for instance, 
"he then immediately excused himself and said that he did not wish to 
12 - talk that palaver, he would leave it for the King's mouth". But 
there is little doubt that the Meu, as the state's premier commercial 
minister, had been deeply involved in the discussions as to the possible 
abandonment of the slave trade prior to 1852. He was not merely a state 
functionary; he had a personal commercial interest in the matter, and 
was eager to elicit details of how any potential compromise would af f ect 
his own economic interests. It is significant that in his conversations 
with the British envoys prior to 1852 his interest lay in f inding out 
"how many cargoes the Queen of England would give him, for to give up the 
slave trade". 
13 
The matter of subsidy from the British and other European powers was, 
therefore, of direct interest to the the Meu and other Dahomean 
officials. On another occasion, along with the Yevogan who shared a 
similar economic interest in the matter, the Meu took the opportunity 
to 
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put the matter in a more straightforward fashion. Both men made it 
clear to Forbes that if one slave ship arrived at Whydah the King claimed 
half the trade; if three then he monopolised two. The point of the 
conversation was not lost on Forbes: - "that whatever was offered in 
subsidy, one half became the property of the king, the other of the 
traders. , 
14 The Meu and the Yevogan were not alone in their 
commercial interest in the matter. For, so far as the slave trade was 
concerned, the dichotomy between commercial and war officials was a false 
one. All the major Dahomean merchants were also slave producers. For 
instance, the five native merchants at Whydah mentioned by Forbes - 
Ahjovee, Narwhey, Quening and the others were said to own "thousands of 
slaves, and to have to supply whole regiments to the annual war. " 
15 
The Dahomean leadership as a whole, therefore, had a vested interest 
in the slave trade., both at the level of input and of income received 
from it. As such, they were collectively involved in the decisions 
taken in 1852. When the Meu and Yevogan signed the 1852 Treaty along 
with the monarch, their signatures testified to the acceptance of the 
prevailing economic reality by the whole Dahomean ruling class, political 
and commercial. 
Similarly, Gezo carried with him the heir-apparent Badahou, later 
Glele. 16 This was not merely a matter of tactful, temporary 
acquiescence by the future king. As late as 1855 the heir to the stool 
was still active in encouraging the growth of palm oil commerce and the 
establishment of British firms in Dahomey. 
17 The following year, in 
February 1856, Freeman's discussions in the capital included six hours of 
meetings with Badahou. 
18 Freeman, the arch-apostle of abolition and 
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economic transformation left no indication that his discussions with 
Badahou were any less friendly, or any less directed towards extension of 
the palm oil trade and British annuities than were his' discussions with 
Gezo. 
In the early stages of his economic innovations, therefore, Gezo 
managed to overcome any forces of resistance within the Dahomean polity 
and to carry the majority with him. This applies both to his economic 
strategy and to the political changes which manifested the new approach - 
particularly the run down of the annual raid, the curtailment of human 
sacrifice, and the development of the 'Bush King' as a political 
mechanism to achieve the transition from Warrior to Farmer. 
And yet, even as the 'Bush King' was being introduced into Dahomean 
politics; even as adjustments were being made to the scale of human 
sacrif ice; and even as the strategy of adaptation was being pursued by 
the Dahomean leadership, the very conditions on which it was predicated 
were being undermined by the flux of economic and political 
developments. As the decade progressed the failure of his economic 
strategy provided fertile ground for the voice of political opposition to 
flourish. Perhaps naturally, disenchantment with failed policies 
resulted in the courtship of the heir apparent by those who sought a 
return to more traditional policies on his accession. 
19 
This process was undoubtedly assisted by Gezo's failing health. 
According to a French official who had spent two weeks in Abomey, by 1858 
the King was no more than a shadow of his son and ministers. The reason 
was physical rather than political. Gezo was suffering from an illness 
described .* by the visitor as being akin to consumption. 
20 The French 
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visitor ascribed the dimunition of French and western influence to Gezo's 
incapacity and the intervention of the chiefs hostile to western 
influence. But, in fact, the reasons went deeper; a widespread 
internal debate was taking place in 1856-7. The earlier consensus on 
strategy was beginning to break down under the influence of continued 
economic failure and the voices of internal opposition grew stronger and 
more numerous. Gezo's personal identification with the strategy of 
adaptation and his failing health left the heir-apparent, Badahou, as the 
focal point for those domestic dissidents who wished to see the new 
approach abandoned and the traditional, warrior ethos reasserted. 
By 1856-7 that internal opposition appears to have become 
sufficiently widespread to have convinced Badahou of the necessity of 
shifting his ground towards a more traditional stance, perhaps with a 
view to confirming his prospects of kingship. Repin noted that: 
"Le fils a^ln& du roi, le prince Badahou, heritier 
presumptif. ... m'a paru d'une intelligence bien 
inferieure celle de son pere, et beaucoup moins 
desireux que lui de voir la civilisation et les usages 
des blancs p6n6trer dans ses Etats. - 
21 
Crucially, the opposition cause had gained another defector to their side 
by this time. Repin added: 
"Il appartien- 
au parti de 
ailleurs, en 
national --- 
Although there is 
t, ainsi que le Meu, qui en est la tete, 
la r6sistance, a ce qu'on appellerait 
Turquie par example, le vieux parti 
-22 
no explicit indication of the date of Repin's 
observations in the text of his writings, it was probably 1857, when the 
forces of opposition against the strategy of adaptation were reaching a 
climax. 
23 
It was precisely at this time that a coalescence of 
economic factors was calculated to provide the internal opposition with 
387. 
their most powerful arguments. While his physical capacity made it 
difficult for Gezo to retain his Political influence it is unlikely that 
this was the major factor in dissalusionment with the monarch's programme 
for change. A much more important aspect of the growing influence of 
those who wished to abandon Gezo's strategy was its failure to provide a 
satisfactory economic basis for the kingdom's prosperity. 
ECONOMIC CHANGE 
Those economic problems manifested themselves in the general decline 
of Abomey. Already in 1850 Beecroft had remarked upon the disappointing 
state of the capital, its surroundings and the dilapidated state of the 
royal palaces compared with previous reports. 
24 A better judge was 
Freeman who by the mid-1850s had already made a number of visits to the 
capital over more than 10 years, and who specifically drew attention to 
the considerable deterioration of Ab omey and the royal palaces. 
25 
Such economic deterioration held out the prospect of growing internal 
divisions over the compromise which had been initially accepted by the 
Dahomean polity. The unity which held together the Dahomean leadership 
at the time of the 1852 treaty was af ragile f lower. It was dependent, 
above all on two factors; the conviction that the trade in slaves was in 
terminal decline as a viable export sector, and secondly, the prospect of 
an adequate economic substitute or substitutes. If either of these was 
proven to be illusory by future developmentsý then the apparent unity of 
the Dahomean leadership was liable to disappear. Furthermore, unity 
over the curtailment of the annual raid was easier to preserve in a 
situation where the core of the army had been all but destroyed, as was 
the case in 1852. 
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Gezo had embarked upon the strategy of adaptation in circumstances 
characterised by the 'push' of a dying slave trade and the 'pull' of 
adequate substitute resources of revenue. The latter had never lived up 
to expectations and in the f inal analysis proved illusory. On its own 
this was sufficient to throw the Dahomean leadership into consternation 
and frustration. However, in the absence of a thriving slave trade they 
had little alternative but to pursue their strategy doggedly and to 
persevere with diplomatic and commercial overtures to the western powers 
in pursuit of a significantly enhanced level of income from legitimate 
trade and direct subsidies. This approach had characterised Dahomean 
politics between 1852 and the end of 1856. 
By early 1858, however, the Dahomean armies were once more on the 
march and involved in a major attack on Appo, near Ketu, f rom where they 
carried off some 1400-1500 captives. 
26 This venture signalled the end 
of not only half a decade of curtailed military activity but also marked 
.. the conclusion of a shorter period of intense political debate which took 
place throughout late 1856 and 1857 and which coincided with rumours of 
Gezo's death which were prevalent on the coast throughout this 18 month 
period. 
27 
To contemporary observers it was appealing to view this debate in 
personalized and dynastic t. erms. On the one hand sat Gezo, progressive 
and pro-western, pitted against his would-be successor Glele, a 
reactionary backed by a clique of supporters favouring the slave trade, 
human sacrifice and opposed to the Whites and the Egba in equal terms. 
28 
Such a view has its limitations. Firstly, if some British sources 
on the coast are to be believed, Gezo himself was an eager advocate of an 
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anti-Egba alliance. 
29 
Secondly, the conceptualisation of the conflict 
in personalized terms does not assist in explaining why the 'forces of 
reaction' were increasingly succesful at this particular time, in the 
course of late 1856 and 1857. This can only be adequately explained 
with reference to economic developments, in particular the inadequacy of 
the policy of adaptation and the revival of demand for slave exports. 
It was within this context that the debates and divisions which clearly 
manifested themselves to western observers took place. 
The outcome of that debate is clear; the Dahomean aristocracy in 
1857-8 abandoned the experiment which had represented their economic and 
political strategy for the previous half decade and the general thrust of 
Dahomean politics now reverted to a traditionalist conception and 
practice. 
Speculation on the personal position of the monarch and his succesor 
in this process can over emphasize their capacity to carry political 
consensus in the face of economic adversity. Whether or not Freeman's 
belief in Gezo's enthusiasm for western ideas, commercial and otherwise, 
was correct, or whether Cambell's scepticism regarding the monarch's real 
intentions was more accurate., 
30 
the fact remains that the monarch's 
capacity to influence events was constrained by the social and economic 
system which he had inherited. Borghero, despite his tendency towards. 
personalisation, and a -natural predeliction towards the religious aspect 
of the matter, probably came closest to the truth when he commented that 
although Gezo may have been a "worthy man", he: 
21 ,. could not always rule according to 
his 
desires. He had against him the powerful hierarchy 
of Feteshists ... who founded these atrocious 
laws that 
call for' the sacrifice. . of so many thousands of 
human 
victims ... -31 
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We do not have to agree with the specific terms of Borghero's analysis in 
order to accept the general tenor of his remarks. Burton made the point 
more astutely: 
"From 
--. appearances., a stranger ... is apt to 
conclude that the Dahomean King represents ... a kind of God on earth ... that is f ar f rom being the 
case ... the ministers, war captains and Feteshists 
may be, and often are, individually punished by the 
King, collectively they are too strong for him and 
without their cordial co-operation he would soon cease 
to remain.,, 32 
Though shaped by economic events, the debate itself was expressed in 
ideological terms. Undoubtedly throughout the whole of this period, and 
perhaps particularly at Gezo's death, the debate which Borghero mentions 
- on human sacrifices - took place. The transformation of Dahomean 
society - economic and political - could not but be argued out at an 
ideological level. 33 But the lapse back into 'conservatism, had its 
roots far deeper than political intrigues in Abomey. And, 
significantly, it occurred prior to either the death of Gezo or to the 
attack on Ketu. It took place, in fact, in early 1857, and was prompted 
by the changing economic conditions in which the Dahomean leadership once 
again found themselves. 
By 1857 the search for an alternative, viable, material basis for the 
political power of the Dahomea-n monarchy and aristocracy had gone on, to 
a greater or lesser extent, for almost quarter of a century. The most 
radical steps taken towards transformation had occured over the previous 
five years. Those steps had been taken only under the immense pressure 
of the then prevailing economic conditions at a time when the traditional 
economic order appeared incapable of sustaining their political and 
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social power. Defeat at Abeokuta had compounded the problems created by 
a fall in dema 
. 
nd for slaves and military constraints on the trade; the 
prospects of an alternative material basis - palm oil and annuities - 
offered the only apparent prospect of salvation. 
But, by 1857 the conditions in which the Dahomean leaders were 
operating had again altered dramatically. Gezols hopes for an adequate 
alternative source of income had proved groundless; palm oil revenue, 
although growing, was inadequate; official western annuities were 
practically non-existent. If these two 'pull' factors encouraging 
acceptance of the strategy of adaptation had proved illusory, the two 
'push'factors had diminished in their potency. So f ar as the Dahomean 
army was concerned, time was a healer. Only the dearth of a market f or 
slave 'products' lingered on throughout the 1852-6 period, sustaining the 
persistent if frustrating adherence of the Dahomean leadership to the 
course on which they had embarked. 
REVIVAL OF DEMAND FOR SLAVES 1856-7 
Then, as had happened so often in the past, the unpredictable ebb and 
flow of the slave market was once again to effect a change in the 
direction of the Dahomean polity. It was not the victory of 
conservatism which gave a new lease of life to the Dahomean slave trade: 
rather it was the revival in demand for slaves on the Dahomean coast 
which ensured the temporary restoration of the status-quo-ante. By the 
early months of 1857 the slave trade was once again on the increase in 
the area of the Bights. 
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The actual operation of the Trade had not eased in any way for the 
dealers. Indeed, in some ways it had grown worse3 since in their 
desperation to ship even an occasional cargo they were an easy prey f or 
shippers on the other side of the Atlantic who of ten proved to be less 
than scrupulous in their commercial dealings. 
34 
This fact, added to 
the infrequency of shipments, had encouraged the spread of one further 
change in normal shipping operations. In pursuit of maximising profits 
from any cargoes which managed to run the anti-slave blockade and achieve 
their destination, the dealers at Whydah increasingly preferred to ship 
slaves 'on freight' on their. own account rather than sell them to 
visiting ships. While this entailed a greater risk of losing the 
initial outlay on slaves, a succesful voyage held out the prospect of 
profits some 5-10 times higher than a west coast transaction. 
35 
Although on the increase, this pattern was not universally adopted. 
One significant exception, for instance, was J. A. Machado of New York, who 
had dealt widely throughout the west coast and who operated in Whydah and 
neighbouring ports through the medium of a relative and long-time slave 
dealer, Samuel Da Coasta Soaris. 
36 Involved in both legitimate and 
slave commerce, Machado's annual dispatch of a small fleet of vessels - 
brigs, barques and schooners - to the coast made it difficult for the 
squadron to effectively maintain a watch over all his ships at any given 
time. 
37 
Nevertheless, a general growth of distrust between slave dealers and 
shippers was one further hazard in a trade which had grown increasingly 
hazardous since the late 1840's. 
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Despite this, by the early months of 1857, the slave trade was once 
more taking off in Dahomey. And it appears that the monarch, 
disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of his strategy for adaptation, 
was sanctioning a return to the Trade. One aspect of this, remarked 
upon earlier, was the establishment of Prya Nova, which off ered not only 
the opportunity to pre-empt the trading potential of leeward bound 
trading vessels involved in legitimate commerce, but also a fresh and 
relatively unknown port from which to effect the embarkation of slaves. 
Not surprisingly the new port featured several times in the early 
days of the Trade's revival. In July 1857, for instance, British 
cruisers intercepted the loading of slaves onto the Jupiter at Prya 
Nova. The exact number of slave bound f or export remains unclear, but 
it must have been considerable since despite warning's of the squadron's 
approach and hasty attempts to unload their human cargo the vessel was 
taken with almost 100 slaves still on board. The . 
1! ýýter, which 
features again later, was dispatched to Sierra Leone for adjudication. 
38 
Prior to this the squadron had already captured the Adam Grey, 
39 
another slaver taking slaves of f the Dahomean coast. Nor were these 
isolated incidents. In the same month, July, a succesful embarkation of 
slaves took place f rom a point on the coast near Whydah on the American 
brig W. D. Miller, 
40 
while other slave ships, the Abbot Deverieux, the 
barque Isle of Cuba, the Vesta out of New Orleans and the Virginia Pearce 
out of New York were reported hovering in the vicinity awaiting the 
opportunity to embark slaves. 
41 The exact destination and number of 
slaves taken from Dahomey remains unverifiable but it was certainly 
considerable. The Abbot Deverieux, for instance, was eventually taken 
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by the British along with 270 slaves which had been embarked from 
Whydah. 
42 
The slave trade continued with renewed vitality throughout 1857. In 
September an American schooner, the James Buchanan, embarked 300 slaves 
from Whydah and escaped despite a prolonged chase by the squadron. 
43 
Overnight on the 27th of the same month over 100 more slaves were 
succesfully embark 
. ed on board a Spanish slaver. 
44 
The vitality of the 
trade and the renewed frequency of shipments lent credence to the 
prevailing rumour that a 'fast steamer' was en route destined to uplift 
1400 slaves from the neighbourhood of Whydah. 
45 
Clearly, the Dahomean 
trade was undergoing a revival reminiscent of the heady days of the Trade. 
There is little direct evidence to connect the monarch with any 
specific shipment. But a number of factors indicate not only his 
general support f or the Trade's survival, but his actual involvement in 
it. Firstly, it is unlikely that such frequency and size of shipments 
could have taken place without - at the very least - the tacit approval 
of the monarch. Secondly, the incidence of shipments from the newly 
established Prya Nova port suggests that Gezo's involvement was more than 
mere acquiescence. 
This view is supported by a contemporary incident. The f ailure of 
the much-vaunted (by western powers) legitimate road to prosperity had 
been a frustrating enough experience for the Dahomean leaders. But the 
persistent intervention of the British anti-slave trade squadron in the 
revived trade in the wake of their failure to deliver their promised 
annual subsidy must have been an embittering experience. Gezo 
eventually hit back. Following the capture of the Adam Grey and the 
a 
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Jupiter, mentioned earlier, the monarch stopped all trade at the coastal 
ports until such times as the merchants paid him recompense for his 
alleged loss of $20,000 - representing the currency equivalent of 
approximately 250 slaves at the then prevailing price. This marked the 
first occasion since 1852 on which Gezo had admitted - explicitly or 
implicitly -a current financial interest in the Trade. 
46 
This re-involvement of the monarch in the slave trade is 
significant. The absence of the Trade from the Dahomean ports had 
never, of course, been complete. Succesfull shipments, sometimes of a 
significant size, were occasionally made. In May 1854, for instance, it 
had been reported that a brig had embarked around 700 slaves from the 
Whydah Beach - Great Popo area; a-ad a few days later further reports of 
a shipment half that size were also recorded. 
47 
And there is no doubt that throughout the period up to 1857 the slave 
dealers at Whydah and other ports under Dahomean sovereignty continued to 
purchase slaves and to ship them whenever possible. Domingo Martinez 
and other dealers were obtaining the slaves, of ten in small parcels, and 
assembling them in barracoons - some at Whydah - to await shipping 
opportunities. To minimise publicity regarding the export trade such 
slaves were often ostensibly purchased for 'domestic' purposes. 
The purchase of domestic slaves with the intention of exporting them 
appears to have given rise to a number of problems. As early as January 
1854, for instance, there were reports of Dahomean slaves escaping from 
Domingo at Whydah on learning of the true nature of their 
destination. 
48 At a later period, from 1860 onwards a combination of 
Dahomean slave raiding and widespread warfare in the 
Yoruba interior was 
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to ensure adequate slave supplies. But in the immediate aftermath of 
the revival of slave demand in 1857-9 even a genuine domestic slave of 
several years standing was not immune from exportation; sometimes such 
slaves were embarked under the guise of passengers or seamen on ships 
49 
under Portuguese colours Ironically, many of these slaves appear 
to have originated as the domestic retinue of liberated Saro's. 
50 Not 
unnaturally under these circumstances, desertions of domestic slaves were 
common whenever the opportunity arose. 
51 
Domingo Martinez himself, however, probably derived more 
straightforward supplies from Egba raiding on the Porto Novians and from 
Mewu, installed as chief at Badagry after a virtual civil war. In turn, 
the latter not only be-nefitted from the supply and distribution 
facilities he accorded to Martinez, but derived financial reward from 
tolls on the caravans of slaves ( normally in groups of 20-60) passing 
along the section of the beach under his immediate control. 
52 
In the plethora of charge and counter-charge it is almost impossible 
to state with any degree of certainty the sources of supply for the 
Dahomean slave dealers during this period. The King of Porto Novo laid 
the blame on Mewu of Badagry, 
53 
on Akitoye and on the Egba. In turn, 
the Egba chief s counter-charged Alajogun, King of Porto Novo, and pointed 
to Okeodan rather than Abeokuta as the source of slaves. Campbell 
supported Alajogun's claims and the British Foreign Office strove in vain 
to ascertain the true state of affairs. 
54 
However, there is one consistent absence from any of the 
correspondence - the name of Gezo. Between 1852 and the 1857 incident 
referred to previously there are no accusations of slave supplying laid 
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against the Dahomean monarch. It seems, therefore, that despite 
occasional shipments from Dahomey, and despite evidence that slaves were 
being both purchased into and stored in Dahomey in considerable 
'numbers, 
55 
that throughout this period the Dahomean monarch was not 
involved in slave exporting in any significant fashion. 
And the slave dealers, out of deference to the decrees of Gezo, 
minimised the overt nature of their own trade as we have seen above. 
Domingo Martinez, for instance, refused to trade in slaves at Porto Novo 
Beach because of the proximity of British commercial houses. 
56 The 
trade was never extinct. But it had been reduced to such an extent 
during the 1852-6 period that Campbell could remark in early 1857 that it 
had abandoned Dahomey. 
57 
Within a few months, however, he was forced once more to revise his 
views and to report the "active resumption of the trade at Whydah". 
58 
This revival was prompted as much by events beyond the frontiers of 
Dahomey as it was by internal developments. And it developed in two 
stages. The first occured from the beginning of 1857 and was marked by 
the resumption of consistent and widespread exporting of slaves f rom the 
Dahomean coast. That development was was prompted by three main events: 
firstly, on the negative side, it was encouraged by Dahomean 
disillusionment at the economic inadequacy of the strategy of adaption 
mentioned earlier. On the positive side, it was stimulated by the 
revival of large scale demand for slaves on the coast, particularly 
related to the French Free Emigration Scheme. Finally, it was 
facilitated by a reservoir of slave supplies in consequence of military 
events in the interior adjacent to Dahomey. 
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On 27th March 1857 the French Government contracted with R6gis and 
the House of Maes of Nantes f or the supply of emigrant labour f rom the 
59 
west coast of Africa to the French colonies in the Indian Ocean. 
The scheme itself was in effect a legalised form of slave exports, and 
following diplomatic pressure the French Government agreed to abandon the 
scheme in the period after July 1861.60 Nevertheless, in the 
intervening period it exercised a powerful influence on events on the 
west coast, and in Dahomey in particular. Even before the scheme had 
been finally sanctioned by the French Government the effects were 
beginning to be felt in Dahomey. Plans were already being laid by 
R6gis' agent in Whydah, Vidal. 
61 
By purchasing slaves prior to the 
increase in demand which might reasonably be anticipated as a consequence 
of the sanctioning of the scheme, and with the bargaining power of a 
considerable large-scale purchase, Vidal was able to negotiate a supply 
of slaves at the relatively moderate price of t. 50 a head, some t30 
beneath the conventional price f or slaves when actual shipments began in 
mid-1857.62 
Certainly, Regis must have felt himself to have been in a strong 
bargaining position, not only because of the doldrums in which the slave 
trade had languished f or some years, but also because of the sheer size 
of his potential orders. Between 7th and 10th August 1857, for 
instance, one of Regis' ships, a screw vessel which was boarded by HMS 
Firef ly, had no less than 1200 f ree emigrants" aboard destined 
eventually for Martinique. 
63 
But R&gis' advantage did not remain for long. For one thing, the 
French scheme became widely advertised in Bahia, attracting increased 
399. 
numbers of Brasilian vessels to the coast. 
64 
Within months of the 
last mentioned shipment the demand for slaves at Whydah had ensured that 
the French were pre-empted in acquiring both numbers and quality of 
slaves by Spanish slave dealers who were prepared to pay the conventional 
65 price of 00 a head, well above Re'gis' economic maximum . The French 
factory had to make do with those rejected by the Spaniards, and at one 
point in October 1857 the Stella, a R6-gis vessel, was obliged to leave 
Whydah with only some 60 slaves aboard heading for the Congo in search of 
cheaper and larger human cargoes. 
66 
THE RESUMPTION OF SLAVE RAIDING 1858 
The second stage of the return to the traditional Dahomean political 
economy was marked by the active resumption of slave Eaiding by the 
Dahomeans themselves from around the beginning of 1858. Undoubtedly 
this was influenced by the developments mentioned above and the general 
revival of export prospects. In addition, it may have been fuelled at a 
later stage by the death of Gezo, and the requirement of large scale 
procuration of captives for the Grand Customs. Gezo's death enhanced 
both the political opportunity for the full restoration of the 
traditional pattern and the necessary catalyst for doing so. But, just 
as the revival of slave-trading took place prior to the death of Gezo, so 
too did the practice of slave raiding. Gezo, the greatest of 19th 
century Dahomean warrior kings, died in the second half of 1858.67 
While the active resumption of slave-trading from Dahomean ports had 
taken place some the previous year, the resumption of slave-raiding 
predated his death by af ew months, ocurring in February 1858. In that 
400. 
month the Dahomean army fell on the town of Appo, near Ketu, taking a 
reported 1400-1600 prisoners, 
68 
This raid marked the turning point and the effective abandonment of 
the strategy of adaptation in favour of a return to the traditional form 
of revenue raising for the Dahomean leadership - slave raiding. What 
was in the economic interests of the Dahomean monarchy was not, of 
course, automatically in the interests of purchasers of slaves. The 
effect of the French Emigration Scheme had been to bolster demand, 
69 
and the unfortunate French, who had hoped to gain price concessions as a 
result of their initiation of the revived Trade and their large scale 
purchases, were left to bemoan the evaporation of their prior agreement. 
Thus the resumption of raiding brought little comfort for the French, 
and in May 1858 Regis had two screw vessels sitting idly at Whydah 
awaiting a cargoe for over a month. The testimony of the French 
official sent to Abomey to try to break the deadlock is illustrative. 
According to Protet, the official entrusted with the task, the French 
factor at Whydah - Vidal - had been in close contact with Gezo since 
1856. Agreements - unspecified in actual detail by Protet - had been 
reached between the monarch and the French, regarding the supply of a 
certain number of "emigrants" at a specified price. But Gezo was either 
no longer able or no longer prepared to make good the promises which he 
had previously made to the French. 
70 
"No consideration of politics, or of self-respect", complained the 
French "can make a Black, whether chief or king, even greater yet than 
Gezo, forget his material interests. " 
71 The French, like everyone 
else, would have to pay the conventional price or go empty-handed. In 
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vain they attempted, f or a period Of six months, to make Gezo and the 
chiefs reduce prices, but without success. 
72 For his part, Protet 
attributed Gezo's turn around partly to his failing health and partly to 
the jealousy of the chiefs at what they regarded as the undue influence 
73 
of the French factor over the monarch. In fact, the Dahomean 
hierarchy were doing no more than insisting on the conventional price for 
slave exports which had prevailed for at least a decade before. 
In any event, Protet's comments do indicate that from the beginning 
the Dahomean monarch and leadership not only acquiesced in the 
exportation of slaves under the Free Emigrants Scheme, but were 
intimately involved in the operations and supply of the scheme. The 
attention of the squadron was more unwelcome than ever now that the slave 
trade was undergoing a revival, and the new king, Glele, took steps to 
ensure that vessels belonging to it received no supplies from Dahomean 
ports. 
74 
As mentioned, the reluctance of the Dahomeans to adhere to the 
renegotiated price derived from the availability of potential 
purchasers. The French, of course, faced competition from the 
Spanish-Americans who played as prominent a part in the revived trade as 
they had ever done. For instance, on 16 January 1859 the capture by the 
squadron of a slave vessel consigned, to Signor Carvalho at Whydah and 
equipped to take 250 slaves, came too late to prevent a full cargo being 
embarked some days previously by Signor Baeta. 
75 The North American 
connection also continued to play its part. In mid-1858, the Wanderer, 
a 260 ton yacht originally built for a member of the 
New York Yacht Club, 
and subsequently bought by a Mr Lamar, successfully embarked 
600 slaves 
from Dahomey which were subsequently sold in Georgia. 
76 
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But the French also faced competition from elsewhere. To some 
extent the demand for export slaves had been supplemented by domestic 
demand as a result of Gezo's death., and the consequent human sacrifices 
at the Grand Customs. 
The funeral, quite apart from the demand for slaves which it 
provoked, also marked the f irst appropriate occasion f or the new King to 
display not only his own ascendancy, but also the renewed ascendancy of 
traditional Dahomean values. Glele, it was stated publicly, would 
follow in the footsteps of his father - continuing slave raids and the 
slave trade. 
77 The fact that active slave raiding had been resumed on 
a large scale prior to Gezo's death legitimised this position. But his 
late father's memory would be honoured, and Dahomean tradition fulfilled 
also by the grandiose scale of human sacrifice - that central ideological 
manifestation of the powers of the Dahomean leader. As befitted Gezo's 
Grand Customs, this was to be carried out on a lavish scale, and the 
slave traders were expected to furnish a quota of slaves for sacrifice as 
well as other appropriately ostentatious gifts for the funeral rites. 
78 
THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION: HUMAN SACRIFICE UNDER GLELE 
It was, above all this extensive nature of the human sacrifices at 
the funeral of Gezo which marked the third and most significant public 
proclamation of the Dahomean aristocracy's adherence to the traditional 
form of the Dahomean state. Human sacrifice was the ideological 
battlefield on which the prevailing undercurrents of economic orthodoxy 
and innovation were reflected, and its restoration to prominence at the 
Grand Customs for Gezo was the most obvious manifestation that the years 
of experiment with the strategy of adaptation had drawn to a close. 
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Glele ascended the stool of Dahomey pledged to restore the martial 
tradition of his nation, and to pursue the policies of his father. 
79 
This process of restoration had commenced, . as we have seen, prior to his 
father's death; firstly with the renewed public commitment to slave 
exporting, and subsequently with the recommencement of slave raiding. 
Under Glele, the reassertion of martial values was to be carried from the 
economic into the ideological sphere over the question of human 
sacrifice. Glele's accession and Gezo's Customs were the first and most 
appropriate occasions since the abandonment of the strategy of adaptation 
on which the Dahomean martial tradition was to be re-asserted publicly; 
"War, Bloodshed and slave selling had been left to him by his father, he 
could not avoid them", proclaimed Glele. 
80 
The new sovereign's proclamation was the culmination of a process of 
considerable debate within the Dahomean polity, particularly around human 
sacrifice, which represented the central ideological facet of martial 
81 Dahomey. The outcome of the debate, as of that concerning slave 
raiding and the slave trade, was a reversion to traditional values, and 
the pre-eminence of those who supported a return to martial Dahomey. 
82 
The discontinuity on this issue can be overemphasized, since Gezo 
himself had not attempted or intended to abolish human sacrifice 
altogether, but. rather to. limit its extent and application. 
83 
Similarly Glele would never so commit himself to immediate or absolute 
abolition. 
84 In this sense he was entirely consistent with his 
predecessor, and the policy outlined during the latter's reign as 
specifically outlined by Gezo himself. 
85 Gezo had been prepared to 
reduce the number of sacrifices, 
86 
not abolish them, and much to the 
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chagrin of Europeans, the sacrifices, though diminished, continued 
throughout his reign. 
87 
Thus, on this issue Glele and his supporters were able to wrap 
themselves in the legitimacy of the dead monarch. Glele himself 
publicly proclaimed not the abandonment of his father's policies, but 
their continuation. 
88 
"Had my father put aside all the Customs before he 
died I could never resume them ... if I do not carry 
on the customs as usual I am af raid that I shall be 
dethroned or hurt by the subjects *-., 189 
Glele was bound to the practice of human sacrifice by the traditions of 
his father, and in a more central sense by the political role which they 
played in the Dahomean social formation. Gezo had left this untouched 
in all its essentials, despite the partial compromise entered into to 
curry the favour, and thus the economic advantages, of Europe. 
Abolition of human sacrifice would have rendered Glele, rather than Gezo, 
the innovator, and as such open to the potential repercussions. 
90 
The suggestion that Gezo himself played the role of innovator in 
ordering that no sacrifices be performed at his Grand Customs 
91 
is a 
misinterpretation based on an inaccuracy, as is the assertion that Glele, 
by permitting sacrifice, failed to comply with his father's request. 
What was in fact requested by Gezo was that Dahomean Caboceers would not 
be required to follow him to his grave as per tradition. 
92 
Glele 
technically complied with this - by having captives created 'caboceers' 
and then sacrificed - thus preserving tradition and avoiding a 
substantial innovation the nature of which Gezo himself had never 
undertaken. 
93 
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Thus at Gezo's death the main argument was not whether his ref orms 
should be abandoned or not, but whether the process of ref orm should be 
carried further or not, a division between those who wanted to end human 
sacrifice altogether at the Annual Customs and those who wished to 
maintain it in accordance with the practice inherited from Gezo's 
reign. 
94 
Strictly speaking, then, the course of events did not represent a 
victory for reaction, but the rejection of further reform and the 
maintainance of the status quo. Despite this caveat, the evidence does 
suggest that Gezo's anticipated reforms for the Grand Customs were not, 
wholly implemented and that the level of sacrifice at the subsequent 
Annual Customs increased slightly above that of the latter half of Gezo's 
reign. 
The view that the accession of Glele represented a considerable 
'reaction' from the reign of Gezo was given credence in the eyes of 
contemporary observers by the fact that the period immediately following 
Gezo's death was marked by Grand, rather than Annual Customs, and the 
level of human sacrifice was, in keeping with tradition, considerably 
more extensive. 
The Grand Customs for Gezo were extended over two festivals, 1859 and 
1860. One report put the intended number of sacrifices to mark Gezo's 
95 death at 2000. But, partly due to the unavailability of such large 
numbers, 
96 
and partly because Grand Customs demanded more expense and 
was customarily deferred by the successor, 
97 
the actual figures 
sacrificed in 1859 were probably in the region of 
800,98 with a similar 
amount the following year. 
99 An English trader from Badagry who 
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attended the 1859 Customs, just after Gezo's death, reported that the 
number of human sacrifices approximated to that figure. 
100 
It was the following year which 'confirmed the worst fears of European 
commentators. One missionary source declared them "the most ferocious 
ever, " and becoming so bad that they even disgusted the Whydah slave 
dealers. 101 Another, Bernasko, based at Whydah, reported that the 
revitalisation and large scale of the sacrifices had even eased the 
qualms of those captives destined for export from the coast. 
102 This 
general picture of wholesale executions was confirmed by a third 
missionary source, the French Abbe Bouche, according to whom the 
sacrifices included prisoners taken in a campaign against Idigny waged 
with the specific purpose of securing victims for the Customs, wives of 
the deceased King and dignitaries; the latter two categories partaking 
in voluntary or suicidal sacrifice. 
103 
In addition to missionary sources, independent evidence is available 
from the Frenchman Lartigue, who placed the number of sacrifices even 
higher than those of the missionaries, at 800 sacrifices and an 
additional 600 voluntary deaths. 
104 
It thus seems that the Grand Customs for Gezo were marked by 
extensive human sacrifice and voluntary deaths. Moreover, it appears 
that the the categories of victims included those expressly forbidden by 
Gezo prior to his own demise. Gezo had extracted an oath from his 
chiefs that the custom of mass slaughter following the death of a monarch 
should be abandoned, 
105 
and yet, both Lartigue and Bouche claim that 
voluntary deaths were extensive. 
106 
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Burton does indicate that a senior palace official, the Tononun who 
should have died at the death of Gezo was spared at Gezo's request, but 
the special case which was made out for the individual suggests that this 
was a specific request rather than part of a much more general stay of 
execution. 
107 ' 
Thus the evidence surrounding the Grand Customs, though less 
conclusive than that for Gezo's reforms of human sacrifice., does suggest 
that the traditional level of sacrifice was maintained and that some, at 
least, of Gezo's requested reforms had been rejected. The evidence 
concerning human sacrifice at subsequent Annual Customs is more 
problematic, but, again, is sufficient to sustain the argument that the 
Dahomean monarch reverted to a scale of sacrifice rather more extensive 
than that associated with his father in the last decade and a half of his 
reign. 
Reports on the 1862 Annual Customs indicate much lower numbers than 
those of the Grand Customs, but slightly higher than those occurring at 
the Annual Customs during the latter half of Gezo's reign. Bernasko, 
for instance, estimated 86 executions, - many of whom were reputed to 
have come from Ishagga. 
108 Other missionary sources confirmed the 
considerable numbers of victims and the general picture portrayed by 
Bernasko, 109 though they are of doubtful reliability since the 
information appears to have been received in the first instance from 
Bernasko himself via Borghero. 
However, there is an eye witness account which is far fuller and 
which is worth recounting at some length. On the 6 August 1862 
Commander Perry reported to the Foreign Of f ice inf ormation gleaned f rom a 
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Dutchman - Euschart - who had been summoned to Abomey by the King on the 
grounds that the latter had never previously made the acquaintence of a 
Dutchman. Perry, stressed the reliability of both his informant - of 
whom he had previous experience - and of the information which he (Perry) 
relayed, having himself taken detailed notes of his conversation with the 
Dutchman. 110 
Euschart arrived in Abomey on 28 June 1862. On the 15 July he was 
taken to the market place where he observed a crucified body, allegedly 
that of Docherty, a Sierra Leone liberated slave turned catechist, who it 
was claimed had been taken at Ishagga by the Dahomeans. 
ill In front. 
of the palace Euschart observed rows of human heads, "fresh and gory" and 
the palace itself saturated in blood: evidently Ishagga prisoners who had 
been killed during the previous f ew nights. On 10 July Abomey was hit 
by an earthquake, a phenomenon taken by the King as a sign that his 
father's spirit was warning that the Customs were not being made in a 
proper fashion. Three 'messengers', Ishagga chiefs, were summarily 
dispatched to console Gezo- Twenty four men were then brought out in 
baskets, thrown from the platform and beheaded by the crowd, each 
successful decapitation being rewarded by a head of cowries. 
The following day Euschart was taken to another part of the town 
where "exactly similar horrors" were being perpetrated. 
112 On 12 July 
all the platforms were taken down and there were no further public 
sacrifices for 10 days, although Euschart supposed that many took place 
during the night. On the 22 July, he was taken to see the "Grand 
Customs" at the King's palace. Two platforms had been erected at the 
gates: on each platform sixteen men and four horses were placed. Inside 
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the royal house was another platform in which was placed sixteen women, 
four horses and one alligator. Both the men and women were Sierra Leone 
captives and all were dressed in European clothes. Each group of 
sixteen was placed, bound in chains around a table on which glasses of 
rum were placed f or each person. The King ascended the platform, and 
the right arm of the captives was loosened to allow them to drink the 
King's health. The goods of the late King Gezo were then paraded and 
the troops reviewed. After the review the prisoners, horses and 
alligators were beheaded., "particular care being taken that their blood 
should mingle. " Euschart was then permitted to leave Abomey. 113 
Euscart, then, claimed to have witnessed three executed 'messengers', 
24 victims from the nor-mal Customs and 48 victims from what he referred 
to as the Grand Customs; a total of 75 deaths. However, if July llth 
account - flexactly similar horrors" - is taken to refer to the Bush 
King's platform Customs and another 24 deaths, then the total number of 
viEtims was 99; 48 for the normal customs, and 48 for the Grand Customs, 
plus the three 'messangers'. At the normal customs the platforms had 
been increased to two, although on different days at different 
locations. Furthermore, at the Grand Customs, the two platforms were 
supplemented by a third, inside the palace walls. 
If these figures are accurate, they sustain the argument that Glele 
increased the level of human sacrifice. At the normal Annual Customs 
Glele had doubled the number of victims (from 24 to 48) compared with 
Forbes' recollection. 
114 Since the institution of the 'Bush King' was 
established af ter Forbes' visit, but during Gezo's reign, this in itself 
did not represent an increase by Glele over Gezo. However, at the 
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'mini' Grand Customs - apparently a minor "Grand Customs" incorporated 
within the Annual Customs to commemorate Gezo - he introduced three 
platforms and three multiples of 16 - an additional 48. 
Wilmot, who attended Abomey at the time of the 1862 Customs, reported 
an initial 8, and an additional 14 victims, 7 of which he believed to 
have been spared -a total of 15 sacrifices. 
115 Moreover, according 
to Wilmot, Glele, far from boasting of the restoration of the traditional 
practice of sacrifices, or the increased level of the numbers involved, 
actually went out of his way to dismiss the wild reports and speculations 
of Europeans on the su 
. 
bject. 116 In late 1863., Bernasko's report that 
no sacrifices took place is of less value since he later makes clear that 
execution. s did take place, although. he categorised them as being confined 
117 
to the criminal class. Burton, in constrast reported that 
malignant war captives featured as well as criminals, 
118 
although he 
119 
was as sceptical as Glele of some of the exaggerated reports. 
Burton estimated that there had been -little change- over the previous 
60 years in the scale of sacrifices at the Grand Customs. So far as the 
Annual customs were concerned, he himself estimated the total at the 1863 
customs as "at most 80". 
120 This figure represents an estimate of 
39-40 victims in public, and an assumption that an equal number were 
similarly dispatched inside the walls. 
121 
On balance, then, contemporary reports suggest that there was indeed 
an increase in the number of sacrifices under Glele, although less than 
the somewhat exagerated claims of some westerners would suggest. 
Despite the problems of comparability between different forms of Annual 
Customs, between Grand and Annual Customs, and despite the impossibility 
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of ascertaining precise numbers of sacrifices at either, there is 
sufficient evidence to warrent the view that Gezo's death marked the end 
of progressive reform of human sacrifice and probably led to an increase 
in the number of victims. Along with the resumption of slave raiding 
and the slave trade, the restoration of human sacrifice marked a 
reversion to the social, economic and ideological values traditionally 
associated with the Dahomean aristocracy. 
SLAVE TRADING AND RAIDING 1860-65 
Thus by the early 1860's the Dahomean aristocracy had abandoned. any 
attempt to proceed further with the economic and ideological innovations 
which had been the hallmark of Gezo's later years. The slave trade, 
slave raiding and human sacrifice were once again placed firmly at the 
economic and ideological core of Dahomean life. 
Throughout the early 1860s the Dahomean slave export trade went 
through an unparalleled revival. The vigour with which the return to 
Imartial Dahomey' was pursued is reflected in a reassertion of central 
control over the export sector. At Whydah the Yevogan retained his 
position, despite reports of strained relations between him and the new 
monarch. 
122 Henceforth, however, he was to be accompanied by a direct 
appointee of Glele, one of the King's relations who supervised all 
123 
proceedings in which the Yevogan was involved. 
The French 'Free Emigration Scheme' - although short lived - gave a 
fillip to slave raiding up until its demise in July 1862 and, along with 
the demand for sacrifice victims, fuelled the Dahomean war machine. 
Finally, the demand for slaves on the coast was further heightened by the 
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urgency in need for supplies for Cuba and the Southern States of America 
in the early years of the '60s. At this time the demand in this area 
was stimulated by a pressing desire to ship the maximum number of slaves 
possible before the newly-elected President Lincoln could translate his 
anti-slavery views into practical action. 
124 
It is hardly surprising then, that in the early years of Glele's 
reign, the Dahomean armies seemed constantly on the march., to provide 
both slaves for the export sector and sacrifices for his father's 
customs. 
125 As will be seen later, such constant warring activity 
could not but affect the palm oil trade - one French source estimated 
that during this period it was decimated by two thirds by slave raiding 
and Customs. 
126 In the early months of 1860, literally thousands of 
slaves' awaited shipment from the Whydah barracoons, 
127 
and in the 
course of that year legitimate ships ceased to use the port, 
128 
while 
legitimate traders on the coast itself were subject to persistent 
harassment. 129 
But what was bad f or the palm oil trade was an indication of the new 
found vitality of the slave trade. Relatively small shipments continued 
to be made, including the two made f rom. Whydah in April-May 1860.130 
But the demand f or slaves emboldened dealers, and reports of much larger 
shipments began to percolate through. In September 1860 almost 500 
131 
slaves were shipped on board the barque Buck e. And it was also 
during the early '60s that 1100 slaves were successfully embarked from 
Dahomey to Panama on the Liverpool built steamer Ciceron. 
132 More 
impressive than anything which had gone bef ore in terms of sheer volume, 
a reported embarkation of no less than 1600 slaves was made 
f rom Whydah 
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on the screw steamer Hoc Aqu_i. on 25 March 1862.133 In October a 
further shipment of more than 1000 slaves was succesfully made at 
Agoue-. 134 
Almost certainly the bulk of these captives derived from the human 
spoils taken at Ishagga, which was taken by the Dahomean army with 
thousands of captives in early 1862.135 This victory may also have 
been responsible for the supply of captives which went to make up a 
further large shipment of 1000 slaves some months later; though the 
actual shipment was made f rom Agoue-, the slaves had been transported 
136 there from Whydah prior to embarkation. 
And it was also during this period that one regular visitor to 
Whydah, the Nordagny,, was reputed to have taken of f 4000 slaves in f ive 
trips over the three years 1859-62.137 
The British anti-slave force was ill-prepared for a renaissance of 
this magnitude. At this point there were no more than two cruisers 
stationed on the Bight of Benin and hard-pressed British officials 
remonstrated at their lack of numbers. 
138 The ineffectiveness of the 
British anti-slave activity was further increased by their lack of 
intervention on the other side of the Atlantic, particularly around 
Havannah. 139 
Such large scale successful shipments must have provided not only 
welcome economic sustenance for the Dahomean exchequer, but a practical 
vindication of the new conservatism. Each successful shipment further 
encouraged widespread slave raiding. 
140 
The actual operation of the production of slaves for export during 
this period is relatively well documented. The bulk of the exported 
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slaves appear to have been derived directly from raids by the Dahomean 
army, in contrast to the position between 1852 and the late 1850s. 
141 
In the case of slaves provided by the army and destined for export, the 
mechanics remained relatively straightforward. A-fter a successful raid, 
the monarch and his leaders retired to Abomey to extol and debate their 
victory; there, the King laid claim to the captives, distributing prize 
money in return. 
142 Of the slaves claimed by the monarch., some were 
distributed to his favourites) 143 some set aside for sacrifice, and 
some sold to the coastal traders at the prevailing price in the early 
1860s of 80 dollars a head. 
144 Thus, the sale of 1000 slaves rendered 
a. return to the monarch of almost 80,000 dollars, the equivalent of 
E20,000 or 1,000 tons of palm oil. Alternatively, 4,000 dollars would 
be payable to him as an export tax on 1,000 slaves sold by those other 
than himself. 
145 The captives themselves would be barracooned at 
Whydah and shipped from there or other outlying ports when and if the 
opportunity afforded itself. 
For slaves procured by Dahomean dealers other than through the 
monarch, the diffuse pattern established in the late 1840s persisted. 
Slaves purchased at markets such as Porto Novo Town and Badagry were 
often temporarily employed as domestic slaves in the trading 
establishments of the slave dealers in these towns. 
146 Thereafter, 
they might be brought together in gangs and shipped from one of the 
smaller ports or shipping points on the coast. 
147 Alternatively, they 
were often sent in small groups to Whydah to await shipment. 
148 
As ever, the system of lagoons and outlets provided excellent 
facilities., whether for gathering the dispersed slaves together, or for 
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moving them quickly to an outlying beach port for a sudden 
shipment. 
149 This lagoon system allowed the use of large stretches of 
coast as potential collection and shipping points. The newly arrived 
Consul Foote, 150 gave a good indication of the decentralised and 
geographically dispersed nature of this side of the Trade soon after his 
arrival on the coast. In Outlining the great benefit to the Trade of 
the lagoon system he echoed the points made by Freeman some two decades 
previously: 
"The inhabitants of the towns of Badagry, Porto Novo, 
Appi, Jackin, Whydah, Great and Little Popoe, Ahguay 
etc are all more or less interested in the traffic for 
slaves. " reported Foote. 151 
This geographical spread also allowed word of visiting Cruisers to be 
passed quicklY along the coast. Foote's comments are worth quoting at 
some length. 
"The slaves to be shipped are scattered in parties of 
five and six at the different agencies of the 
Brazilian factories. They are normally household 
slaves - the Brazilian merchant has houses of business 
at Lagos and other places. He sends for some more 
hands to work at his factories at Whydah etc. The 
Cruizer gets tired of waiting: although the commander 
sees a Brazilian Brigantine or two at anchor he sees 
nothing suspicious on board of her - she is probably 
loading af ew casks of palm oil and he goes of f the 
land -a few hours after the Brigantine can purchase 
from the Bristol trader alongside of him what stores 
he wants -, the empty oil casks on shore in the 
compound of the Brazilian are filled with water, 
during the night the slaves scattered here and there 
(for nearly all slaves cargoes are joint stock 
concerns) are collected and shipped before daylight 
and the slaver is soon off and out of sight. The 
Cruizer is outside, but at this season, the Harmattan 
and hazy state of the atmosphere common to the coast 
and more dense than a London f og allows the slaver to 
get well off from the land., -152 
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It was for this reason that the Dahomean leadership, given the 
experiences of 1849-52, had little to fear from a limited British 
blockade. It was for this reason also., that British officials in the 
area had good reason to doubt if anything other than actual occupation of 
the beach from Cape St. Pauls right through to Lagos could effectively 
stop the export traffic. 
153 
In fact, British action when it did occur had a much more limited 
object. Unable to threaten Whydah from the sea with any reasonable 
prospect of coercing the Dahomeans, and considering an attack on Abomey 
by way of the lagoons unfeasible, 
154 
they launched their political and 
naval attack against a more vulnerable target - the King of Porto Novo. 
Ostensibly, the dispute with Porto Novo arose on account of the 
seizure of palm oil by the King of that town. On 5 February 1861, 
Foote, Consul at Lagos, accused the King of seizing oil from English 
traders, of stifling their trade and favouring Brazilian slave dealers, 
all in contravention of the 1852 Treaty. The King denied the charge 
although he stated that he refused to allow English traders to establish 
factories at Porto Novo. On 24 February, Foote and the Royal Navy 
steamer Brune arrived at Porto Novo and demanded that the King board and 
comply with the British demands. On his refusal the British opened fire 
on the town on 25 February. As a direct result of this the chief s of 
Badagry, acting as middlemen, arrived in Lagos with the King of Porto 
Novo's offer to comply. The British drew up additional articles to the 
1852 Treaty, specifying the right of the English to buy houses and land, 
and the right of an English agent to live in Porto Novo with guards when 
this was deemed necessary. 
155 
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In fact., although supposed infringements against British citizens no 
doubt played a part in these events, it seems clear that the object of 
the exercise was as much aimed at Dahomey as at Porto Novo. Firstly, as 
an attempt to restrict the Dahomean slave trade "on the flanks"; and, 
secondly, to create a diversion to deflect the King of Dahomey from a 
suspected further attack on Abeokuta. 
156 
A second bombardment of Porto Novo, in April 1861, assured the 
continued opening of trade and signalled British commitment towards this 
end to all the interior peoples. In pursuit of their by now openly 
interventionist stance, the British attempted to stop the interior war 
between the Yoruba nations, establish Abeokuta as an anti-Dahomean 
bulwark and check the "aggressive" spirit of the King of Dahomey by the 
annexation of Lagos. 
157 By August of that year, after naval action, 
Dosunmi had ceded Lagos to the British, and within 18 months the French, 
in response, had established a Protectorate over Porto Novo. 
158 
Despite such attempts, and their heightened activity at Lagos, the 
British could have little ef f ect on a Dahomean slave trade which was now 
fuelled to a greater extent than at any time since 1852 by the slave 
raiding of the Dahomeans themselves. Throughout 1861 and 1862 the raids 
and slave exports continued, 
159 
culminating in the attack on Ishagga. 
And, as a corollary, the lavish scale of human sacrifice at the Customs 
also continued. 
160 The new lease- of life which had been given to the 
slave trade was not to last long, but in the early years of the 1860s the 
Dahomean leadership must have felt vindicated in their decisions to 
reassert the martial spirit and the slave raiding practices on which 
their traditional greatness had been built. 
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DISRUPTION TO THE PALM OIL TRADE 1858-62 
The revival of the most martial aspects of the Dahomean state could 
not but have an adverse effect on the palm oil trade. Up until around 
1858 it had shown every sign of a flourishing and sustained growth for 
around half a decade. But the corollary of the upswing of the slave 
trade in the area of Dahomey in 1857-8 was a downturn in the palm oil 
commerce. This was true of the Bights as a whole but it was reported 
that "the greatest decrease in the (palm oil) trade in ... 1858 as 
compared with, ... 1857 is in parts westward of Badagri - say Porto 
Novo, Whydah, Ahquay etc. , by 1858 this had dropped by an estimated 
161 2500 tons to 6000 tons. The confident reports of the 
mid-1850s 
162 had given way to more sombre assessments. 
163 Despite 
the occasional and optimistic accounts by some western observers over the 
next few years., 
164 
the reality was that the export trade in palm oil at 
Whydah remained static at around 2500/3000 tons per annum. 
165 
So. far as the actual production of palm oil was concerned, during the 
period of commercial growth the use of plantation slaves continued to 
expand. Despite the predominance of the warior ethos the monarch's 
entry into oil production, via the Bush King, had some success in 
overcoming the dishonour in the application of slaves to plantation 
production of oil. 
166 This applied even after slave raiding had 
resumed. And since the monarch 
ý-ffectively controlled the distribution 
of war captives, he was thus in a position to control the f low of labour 
by distribution of slaves to his favourites. 
167 
168 
Many such plantations owned by the King and his ministers, were 
situated in the area of Abomey itself, and it is probably from around 
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this period that the palm oil plantations identified on later maps by the 
French originate. Following the tradition of his father, Glele in turn 
established villages of captives; villages such as Itako and Ishagga, 
conquests of Glele's reign, took their place alongside Lefu-Lefu. 
169 
The King's ministers too had farms and palm oil plantations on the 
outskirts of Abomey. The Yevogan, for instance, controlled the 
hereditary family village of Dokon, about two miles to the east of the 
Kana Gate of the capital, a village surrounded by fine palm 
plantations. 
170 The growth of plantation production and the ease of 
access to small export transactions in oil, occasionally stolen oil, led 
to friction between plantation owners and slaves as noted a decade later 
by Laffitte. 171 
On the coast the revival of the slave trade meant that the 
agricultural development which had been hoped for and anticipated by 
European observers since the 1830s did not materialise. Indeed during 
this period it appears that agriculture regressed -rather than progressed 
the immediate hinterland of Whydah. The occasional palm orchard 
remained, but agriculture in general deteriorated and the well kept farms 
remarked upon by Duncan in the mid 1840s were by the early 1860s, 
reported gone. 
172 
This resulted partly f rom the adherence of the slave traders on the 
coast to their old trade. But it is also likely that the level of 
expansion which plantation slavery was capable of attaining was limited 
by factors related to domestic stability. An indefinite number of 
slaves could not be absorbed within Dahomey without the danger of 
creating internal social instability. This was particularly true in 
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relation to slaves allocated to plantation production, who were bereft of 
the hybrid characteristics Of family member and slave enjoyed by 
traditional domestic slaves. On the contrary, under the conditions of 
plantation slavery solidarity is evoked with fellow slaves, rather than 
the master. If plantation slavery or plantation villages were to be 
developed on any scale, it was wiser to do so in areas which were 
situated close to the ultimate sanction of military force. To allow the 
unlimited expansion of internal slave holdings in areas far removed from 
the capital would be to court political and social instability. In 
fact, precisely one such scare had been reported in Dahomey in mid 
1855. McCoskrey reported that: 
"the whole kingdom of Dahomey is in a state of panic, 
having just discovered that the Egbas have an 
extensive conspiracy among the Anagoos, and other 
tribes of analogues origin, slaves to the Portuguese 
at Whydah, and to natives in other parts of the 
country; and that the Egbahs are now ready to go on 
an expedition into Dahomey. Their friends or 
supposed friends have however been seized, sent to 
Abomey and the King is calling his people from all 
quarters to defend their territory; so great is the 
panic in Whydah, Godomey, and other places where white 
men are, that, to prevent all from taking flight, the 
King allows no egress.,, 173 
Whatever the accuracy of reports of the Egba conspiracy, the threat 
of a slave revolt appears to have been taken sufficiently seriously to 
warrant dramatic action on the part of the King. The lessons could not 
have been lost on the monarch and his ministers. Development of 
internal slave numbers to the extent required in order to make plantation 
production of palm oil as financially lucrative as the slave trade 
involved a serious threat to the stability of the Dahomean state. 
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In general, despite the growth of large scale production of palm oil 
it remained relatively underdeveloped by the 1860s, and certainly did not 
represent the dominant feature of the Dahomean economy. By the 1860s 
those, like Re-gis, who had been predicting widespread plantation 
production f or over 20 years could only continue to express their vague 
174 tv hopes. His assertion that: It is a question of the large 
slave owners deciding to apply them to agricultural production: it is a 
question of time which can't have to wait much longer for 
resolution" 
175 displayed a gross underestimation of the complex 
I 
implications of such a move. By 1860 small producers continued to be 
the mainstay of palm oil export production, more often than not in return 
f or a small portion of tobacco. 
176 And the revival of the slave trade 
in Dahomey, in which Regis himself played no small part, was to delay for 
some time the resolution of his simple 'question'. 
By 1859, the effects of a return to slave raiding were apparent and 
the increase and expansion of the palm oil trade had been well and truly 
halted in Dahomey. One story is illustrative. In the second half of 
1859, a British ship, the David Cross (Capt. Johns), owned by Moon Adlan 
and Co. , had twice called 
back at Godomey in pursuit of palm oil from 
Jose dos Santos in return f or cargo landed there earlier in the year. 
Out of a total contracted amount of almost 17,000 gallons, dos Santos had 
been willing, or able, to deliver 
iess than 7000 gallons. He eventually 
pleaded that his non-deliverance was on the orders of the King of 
Dahomey, but this was vehemently denied by the Yevogan who interceded to 
obtain settlement. Significantly, the settlement was subsequently made 
in dollars rather than palm oil. 
177 
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This incident highlights the fall in production of palm oil in the 
area. But it is probably also illustrative of deeper problems related 
to the palm oil trade which were beginning to surface in kingdoms 
adjacent to Dahomey, and possibly to some extent inside the Kingdom 
itself - 
At the beginning of the 1859 palm oil season, around February/March, 
the King of Porto Novo had stopped the palm oil trade for a full two 
months. Campbell, under pressure from British commercial interests in 
the area, particularly in Badagri, hastened to Porto Novo to investigate 
and bring the stoppage to a hasty conclusion. The British official was 
told: 
it that the British and other traders now gave the 
makers of the oil so extravagant a price for it that 
the chief s who bought it from the makers to sell again 
could make no profit on it., -178 
In effect, the chiefs' complaint was not so much related to the high 
prices being paid by the traders, as to the f act that the prices were 
being paid direct to the producers - The King and chief s were demanding 
that: 
II a certain measure of oil f or which the traders 
and super cargoes were willing to pay the price of ten 
heads of cowrie (23/-) should be sold by the makers of 
the oil (the inhabitants of the distant villages) - 
for five heads of cowries to the King's wives and 
chiefs who would then sell it to the traders and 
supercargoes at the higher price". 
179 
Faced with an undermining of their control of the new trade 
by the normal 
operation of the free market, the chiefs had resorted to political 
intervention in order to ensure themselves a significant share in the 
produce and returns. However, in turn the producers, 
faced with the 
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demands of the chiefs, and aware of the significant difference between 
the 'political price' and the 'market price' at the coast., refused to 
sell and had stopped bringing their oil to Porto Novo market. Campbell 
put it rather more bluntly: 
"Against this gross injustice that the drones around 
the King's palace should derive so large a profit out 
of the industry of the laborious bees, the villagers 
naturally revolted; they ref used to bring oil to the 
Porto Novo market and ceased manufacturing any 
more". 180 
Effectively, they instituted an oil strike. Under this pressure, and 
the remonstrations and threats of the British, the King and chiefs 
relented and reluctantly proclaimed the annulment of their previous 
decree. The King of Porto Novo signed a mercantile treaty granting free 
commercial intercourse in return f or an income from tax on palm oil. 
But this was achieved in the face of fierce opposition from a section of 
his chief s. 
181 A treaty of similar intent was signed by the Badagrian 
chiefs and the flow of oil, via Porto Novo to Badagri greatly increased 
thereafter. 
182 
This incident at Porto Novo would be of passing interest were it not 
for the fact there is some evidence that the reaction of the Porto Novian 
chiefs was parallelled by events elsewhere. Already in March of that 
year there were reports reaching the coast of similar stoppages of the 
palm oil trade in the interior. -According to one witness, who claimed 
to have spoken to the King of Ijebu on the subject of stoppages of trade, 
the King had informed him: 
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that he was acting in this matter in concert 
with the chiefs of Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijaye and 
Morin, who were all opposed to the palm oil trade as 
it yielded them no profit, and that their people 
occupied themselves too exclusively with this trade, 
neglecting their plantations and other work, by which 
the price of provisions had increased greatly". 183 
According to this report, the King of Ijebu asserted his determination to 
put down the trade, remarking that he had already executed some persons 
f or attempting to smuggle oil to the market. Campbell, who some years 
previously had remarked on the marvellously liberating aspects of the 
trade for both chief s and natives, 
184 
was now adopting a more realistic 
assessment of the consequence of the trade: 
if the Present hostile movements against th6 palm oil 
trade is evidently a combination of slave trade 
chief s, who are unf ortunately, able to put into f orce 
the frightfully despotic powers they possess to put 
down a commerce which altho' it may bring them but 
little revenue, they evidently perceive is elevating 
the position of the masses of the population over whom 
they have higherto exercised such despotic sway". 185 
There is no direct evidence to suggest that either Gezo in his later 
years, ' or Glele who succeeded him were at this stage sufficiently 
concerned about the effects of the new trade to attempt political 
intervention to prohibit it. Stoppages had, of course, occurred and 
continued to do so, but up until the late 1850s early 1860s, the evidence 
suggests that these were related to specific disputes rather than a 
general opposition to the trade per se. However, Glele 
did prohibit, 
under pain of death, the cultivation of ground nuts, another commodity 
marketable to western dealers in the early years of 
his reign. 
186 
This suggests that the concern expressed by the King and chief s of 
Ijebu 
Ode was not altogether lacking in the Dahomean monarch. 
Cultivation of 
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ground nuts, over and above the internal and domestic needs interfered 
with the warrior ethos of his people, as well as his mobilisation 
procedures. Glele had more fear of his nation losing their warrior 
outlook than their agricultural development. 
187 
Nevertheless, he continued to permit palm oil production for both 
internal use and with a view to export. The reason probably derives 
from four aspects of contemporary palm oil production. 
Firstly, the domestic production of palm oil was enormous and its 
utility all pervasive. Secondly, the trade had not only been permitted, 
but actually encouraged and fostered under Gezo. Such a rapid disavowal 
of his father's ways would have been politically inconvenient for the new 
King whose expressed aim was to pursue Gezo's policies. 
As a corollary of this, it was much simpler to prohibit or curtail 
the internal production of an embryonic commodity, like groundnuts, than 
one which had already established itself as marketable produce f or over a 
quarter of a century by the early 1860s. 
But there was one further factor which was of crucial importance in 
relation to the warrior practice and ethos of Dahomey; an important 
distinction could be made between the production process of palm oil and 
that of ground nuts. The answer is provided by a contemporary French 
source: 
to 
,-- le commerce 
de huile de Palme est ... permis, 
parce qu'il ne faut aucun soin, et, comme il n'est pas 
necessaire que la recolte soit faite a 6poque precise, 
le Roi ne risque pas e'etre gene quand il veut faire 
partir tout son Monde en expedition .. . 
"188 
In short, the production process for palm oil was such that it did not 
obviously interfere with the production process with slaves. 
189 This 
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was not the case with ground nuts. Thus, from the Dahomean 
aristocracy's point of view, the production of palm oil was still 
permissible since it did not interfere with the annual raid. However, 
from the point of view of the potential producer of palm oil, the 
interference of the annual raid greatly limited both the quantity and 
quality of his palm produce, a curtailment which was to lead to growing 
discontent in the future. 190 
Thus, the revival of slave demand on the Dahomean coast, the revival 
of Dahomean involvement in slave trading, and even later the re-start of 
Dahomean production of slaves for the coastal trade, could all be 
sustained, at least in the short' term., without the prohibition of the 
palm oil trade. If the palm oil trade did not yet offer a more 
substantial material basis to the political power of the Dahomean 
leadership, it was not yet seen as a sufficient threat to warrant its 
curtailment. The two activities were not mutually exclusive. 
191 
But, a resumption of slave trading, by its very nature, interrupted 
the operation of legitimate commerce inside Dahomey as well as in its 
hinterland raiding ground. This was particularly so in the early part 
of Glele's reign when tradition demanded that a prolonged and 
comprehensive Grand Customs for the death of his father accompany the 
resumption of slave trading. 
192 Not unnaturally, such a disruption to 
the previously prospering palm ýil trade was bound to cause some 
discontent internally, particularly in the coastal area whence emanated 
reports that the ceremonies and war mobilisation had eroded two thirds of 
the oil trade. 
193 This undercurrent of discontent was to continue 
throughout the early years of Glele's reign. 
194 
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Such discontent as was reported may not have been confined merely to 
the western dealers at the coast. There is some evidence to suggest 
that the growth of the palm oil trade in the f irst three quarters of the 
1850s had given rise to a class of native merchants, separate f rom both 
the coastal palm oil dealers and the Axisinon. These native dealers, 
traders and collectors of palm oil, would have been largely superfluous 
under the operations of even the, by now, more diffuse operations of the 
slave trade. But the palm oil trade demanded af ar more numerous and 
dispersed network of collectors/traders. 
Lartigue drew attention to this class of merchants, Mercaders, at the 
1860 customs: 
"Tous les merchands d'huile, appele-s Mercaders, ont 
offert collectivement leur victimes; un grand nombre 
d'animaux, 23 captifs - fatigue' a tuer, le roi a 
pardonne beaucoup de ces derniers". 195 
Lartigue's comment suggests that by 1860 not only was the existence of 
such native, independent traders well enough. established to be perceived 
as a distinct group, but that they were accorded such status by the 
monarch himself. However, as his quotation above also indicates, if 
they had misgivings about the direction of Dahomean policy they were - in 
public at least - keeping them to themselves. 
Thus throughout the 1850s, the palm oil trade achieved a sustained, 
if limited growth. While the I development of plantation-based production 
did not take place on such a widespread scale as anticipated by some 
European observers, there is evidence that it did develop to some extent, 
particularly around the capital of Abomey. In addition, there is 
evidence to suggest a sustained growth in the palm oil trade, 
both f rom 
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the point of view of the large dealers like Domingo Martinez and also as 
regards the proliferation of smaller traders involved in the collection 
L 
and distribution network f rom the production source to the actual export 
of palm oil at the coast. However, by the turn of the decade, the 
period of growth was interrupted by several factors. While there was no 
outright prohibition placed on the trade or on the production for export, 
the renewed military activity which took place in the early years of 
Gezo's reign was not conducive to the growth of the trade. In addition, 
the commerce in palm oil around that time suffered from factors outside 
the control of the Dahomean polity. In particular, fluctuations in 
quantity and price in the supply side became increasingly common. While 
on the demand side, new competition from petrol and tallows combined with 
the interruptions of the American Civil War, further undermined the 
growth in the 
I legitimate trade. 
196 
The late 1850s and early 1860s marked the institution of fiscal 
mechanisms on the west coast intended to f ormalise taxation income from 
palm oil for African leaders. The King of Porto Novo, for instance, 
received in 1858 a tax income of one head of cowries on every puncheon of 
palm oil shipped f rom Badagry beach, traditionally regarded as the port 
of Porto Novo Town. 
197 On June 17,1861 the King also signed a 
British treaty securing to himself an income from tax on palm oil. 
198 
Within Dahomey itself the monarch still maintained his tax on all palm 
oil commerce. On internal trade the King's agents, the 
Decimeros, were 
stationed in each village and levied a tax on all who passed 
in addition 
to the tax levied in the actual palm oil factories themselves. 
199 
Taxation on palm oil dealers and visiting ships was more complex. 
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Merchants on occasions paid an annual charge or tribute irrespective of 
the number of vessels calling at their factories, 200 or occasionally by 
declaring a nominal volume of imports with samples of the trade goods 
being dispatched to Abomey for final arbitration as to what quality, 
quantity and selection of goods should constitute payment to the 
King. 201 The duty varied between that levied on the cargo of a barque 
(05-00) and that on a brig (around E50-E6O) on the basis of the number 
of masts on the vessel. 
202 
Finally, duty might be paid in kind, about 
2%, as the goods were landed. 
203 And, in keeping with the age-old 
Dahomean tradition, once the goods were landed on shore they could not be 
reshipped; it was a custom which' European traders were obliged to 
accept, however reluctantly. 
204 
But the extent of the monarch's fiscal income from the new commerce 
I 
must have been curtailed by renewed raiding, since there is no doubt that 
from the late 1850s until mid-1865 the revitalised Dahomean slave raiding 
expeditions seriously hampered the palm oil trade. Firstly, 
mobilisation for war interfered with collection of the fruit and the 
actual production of oil as well as general trading. 
205 In addition, 
the prolonged Customs and festivities in which the people of Dahomey were 
called to take part in the early part of Glele's reign provided a further 
obstacle. 
206 Finally, the relatively lucrative returns from a 
regenerated slave trade and the stoppages of the road which that entailed 
did little to encourage export production or internal transportation of 
palm oil. 
207 These factors, supplemented by normal disruptions to 
trade through fires or local domestic disputes, seriously constrained the 
potential growth of the new commerce. It has already been noted that 
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one French observer estimated that the palm oil trade during this period 
fell by around two thirds of its previous level. 
208 
The situation was 
exacerbated by the practice of ships allocating their whole cargo to one 
trader on shore, which undoubtedly resulted in at least a proportion of 
such cargo being 'used in the traf f ic of the revived slave trade and in 
the eventual non-payment of the expected oil. 
209 
DOMESTIC POLITICS: CENTRALISATION AND DISCONTENT 
If the restoration of traditional martial Dahomey adversely affected 
the palm oil interest,, it was also accompanied domestically by the new 
monarch's assertion of his rule upon the kingdom. Glele centralised the 
judicial process, abolished the 'Brehon' Judges established by his 
father, and took by himself cases of alleged ' adultery involving 
Amazons. 210 To strengthen control over matters at Whydah he appointed 
one of his immediate relations, Prince Chuydaton, to work alongside and 
oversee the Yevogan. 
211 In due course this prince came to be regarded 
212 
as particularly sympathetic by the western establishment, and both 
he and the Yevogan tended to be exonerated f rom 'the odium of acts which 
213 
are dictated by the King himself' by British officials. But there 
is no doubt that the prince was initially chosen as a particular ally of 
Glele's. 214 This 'twinning' of appointments was carried out in other 
major posts of state and the system of appointing members of the royal 
family to such positions represented a major innovation 
in Dahomean 
politics. 
215 
Glele's aggressive re-assertion of the military aspect of 
Dahomean 
life was not achieved without creating some 
internal animosity, 
431. 
particularly among legitimate traders at Whydah. 
216 
This was perhaps 
to be expected. Glele did not directly intervene to prohibit trade - 
although he did decree against cultivation of sugar cane, coffee, rice or 
tobacco, particularly around the Whydah area, as his father had 
previously curtailed the production of ground nuts other than for 
domestic use. 
217 
The restrictions upon the growth of legitimate 
commerce stemmed more from the disruptions caused by slave raiding and 
temporary depopulation through mobilisation for the army. 
218 The 
French in particular felt that they had suffered as a result of the 
change in monarch. 
219 
Similarly, the effective re-assertion of traditional Dahomean values 
marred the relationship between the Dahomean hierarchy and Christian 
Missionaries. The Methodists had originally been allowed to establish 
themselves at Whydah in the wake of Freeman's 1843 visit as part of 
Gezo's policy of encouraging commercial contact with the west. However, 
while the first Roman Catholic Missionaries were allowed to establish 
themselves in Dahomey in 1861, the attitude of the Dahomean authorities 
had cooled considerably. To the new King, the "tender hearts" which the 
missionaries sought to develop smacked of cowardice; their education 
implied a diversion f rom military training: and the missionaries did not 
even have the saving grace of being commercial catalysts, in order to 
compensate for their misleading 
doctrines. 220 Thus, from the King's 
point of view, they were to be allowed to stay provided they understood 
their place and attended Abomey when ordered. 
221 The missionaries, of 
course, attributed this turn of events more to the personal wickedness of 
the new monarch than to the changing economic situation. 
222 
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There is some evidence, however, that European interests were not the 
only ones who were feeling increasingly antagonistic towards the Dahomean 
ruling class. Contemporary reports suggest a state of domestic 
dissatisfaction with the new monarch sufficiently widespread as to hold 
out the threat of internal revolution. 
223 
Inevitably, such reports 
were coloured by injured commercial prospects, but a return to economic 
decline would almost certainly involve an aggressive response by a 
hierarchy which had been afforded short term relief by the revival of the 
slave trade between 1857-63. By the end of that period the situation 
was once more in a state of flux. 
THE FINAL DECLINE OF THE SLAVE TRADE 
The upturn in the Dahomean Trade had coincided with that in Cuba, and 
it has been suggested earlier that, partly as a result of the French Free 
Emigration Scheme, the two were linked by more than chronology. The 
demand for slaves in Cuba, however, had received a stimulus from another 
quarter. Cuba had long been a supply medium for slaves for the southern 
states of North America, where the expansion of cotton production and the 
annexation of large areas of underdeveloped land like Texas had increased 
the demand for slaves far beyond the capacity of domestic breeding in 
North America. In the late 1850s demand f or slaves and f or the repeal 
of anti-slaving legislation reached a crescendo. 
224 Two additional 
factors had converted this demand into a boon for the Cuban slave trade. 
Firstly, the virtual demise of any action by the British anti-slave 
Cruizers in the Havannah area occurred after a number of embarrassing and 
widely publicised incidents with North American vessels in 1858.225 
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Secondly, the late 1850s also saw the prospect of Lincoln coming to power 
in the North on an active anti-slavery platform 
226 A coalescence of 
these factors had ensured record imports of slaves into Cuba in 1859 - in 
which year alone it was estimated that over 30,000 slaves were imported - 
and in 1860 and 1861.227 
There is -no doubt, from the incidence of Spanish-American shipments 
that Dahomey had been among the chief beneficiaries of this upswing. A 
demand led boom in the slave trade, dictated by events well outwith the 
control of the Dahomeans themselves, was a twin-edged sword. Though 
lucrative in the short term, it could evaporate as quickly as it had 
arrived. And so it proved. 
By July 1861, the French Government had effectively conceded that the 
Emigration Scheme would end by mid-1862. By a cruel coincidence, from 
the Dahomean point of view, 1862 also marked the virtual demise of the 
Cuban/North American trade. In March 1861, Lincoln assumed office in 
North America and within a month the country was on its way to Civil 
War. The Cuban slave trade, which had been at its height between 1859 
and early 1861, had virtually ceased by the end of the following year, 
falling back to the low level of the mid-1850s. 
228 Though the Cuban 
trade lingered on until the mid-1860s, with occasional shipments 
thereafter, 1862 marked the beginning of the terminal decline of the 
South American slave trade. 
DEFEAT AT ABEOKUTA: 1864 
By the beginning of 1864 the demand side of the trade was already 
in 
serious decline, but the baracoons at 
Whydah were full. 
229 By 
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mid-1864, the Dahomean slave trade had not only lost its "demand factor", 
but had also lost its army - its most lucrative means of supplying 
slaves. 
230 In an uncanny echo of the 1850s, disaster struck on the 
15th March 1864 when the Dahomeans led by Glele were routed in their 
attack on Abeokuta. 
231 
The details of the engagement have been 
sufficiently well covered in other works to need no repetition 
here. 232 Suffice it to say that Dahomean casualties were numbered in 
thousands and they lost heavily not only in terms of men, but also in 
arms. Further, in addition to the loss of his initial outlay and any 
hope of a return on it, Glele also suffered subsequent loss involved in 
the ransom of his captured soldiers The economic situation of King and 
country was deteriorating annually. 
The def eat by the Egba was a severe blow f or the Dahomeans. It was 
possible to ransom at least some Dahomeans who had been captured and to 
some extent this was done, either by individual Dahomeans in pursuit of 
relatives, 
233 
or by the King through the payment of palm oil. 
234 
But inevitably, the Dahomean army was severely reduced in both men and 
arms, and in addition the initial outlay costs for the annual raids 
remained unrecompensed in terms of captives. 
235 Under normal 
circumstances such losses would have been severe enough. In a situation 
where the monarch was already suffering from dramatic economic decline in 
his ailing export slave trade it was little short of a disaster. To 
recoup ammunitions took time; and time was not on the Warrior's side, 
for the slave trade was in its death throes. 
From the mid-1860s onwards, despite references by occasional western 
officials to the wealth of the King of Dahomey being based on the slave 
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trade, 
236 
the export trade from Dahomey had, to all intents and 
purposes, effectively ceased. 1865 marked the effective end of the 
Atlantic Trade with Cuba despite occasional shipments thereafter. 
237 
By the beginning of the 1870s the slave barracoons at Whydah, f or over 
two centuries the most notorious final embarkation point of Dahomean 
slaves destined for the Atlantic crossing, had been transformed into 
powder stores for a French commercial House. 
238 
The demise of the Atlantic trade did not, of course, mark the end of 
the internal slave trade, nor of slave raiding. Abomey remained a 
stopping place on the circuit of Hausa caravans seeking slave 
239 
purchases. In the west, along the Mono River, these Hausa 
240 
merchants also included slaves among their dealings. But both the 
scale of such, transactions, and the price at which slaves changed hands 
were well below the heady days of the thriving Atlantic Trade. 
241 The 
consequent economic deterioration manifested itself most of all in Whydah 
242 
which rapidly fell into physical ruin. Unsubstantiated reports of 
slave shipments occasionally filtered through, 
243 but these were by far 
the exception rather than the rule. Each spring the King led his army 
on the annual raid, mainly for the supply of the internal slave trade. 
But the economic benefits deriving from a combination of this and the 
palm oil trade and other sources of available revenue were insufficient 
to maintain a monarch and state 
s-tructure which had been built up and 
expanded on the basis of a lucrative and thriving Atlantic Trade. 
244 
The results were apparent in both the palm oil trade and in the internal 
political developments within Dahomey itself. 
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BACK TO DIPLOMACY 1863 
Even before the defeat at Abeokuta, the result of these events - the 
ending of the French scheme and the rapid decline of the Cuban trade - 
were, by 1863, having an effect on the attitude of the Dahomean 
leadership. Once again they responded to developments in the Atlantic 
trade with the same sense of Irealpolitik' which had marked the reign of 
Gezo. 
To be sure, Glele, had no more intention than his father had had 
before him of abandoning the slave trade while demand for slaves 
continued. The experiences of 1852-7 had taught him and the rest of the 
Dahomean polity the political and economic difficulties of replacing the 
Trade. And the past three decades had also illustrated the resilience 
of a trade which, despite temporary slumps, obstinately refused to die. 
Thus, despite this latest decline in demand in the export sector, 
occasional shipments could still be expected: and the pattern of lavish 
Customs., restored by Glele on his father's death, could not suddenly be 
abandoned. Captives were still needed; the King of Dahomey was still 
the Warrior. Accordingly, Glele led his troops on the annual raid in 
1863, as before. 
245 
Nevertheless, perceptible and significant changes in approach were 
already appearing by that year. Glele had initially come to power 
vowing adherence to the customs of his father in relation to the slave 
trade and annual sacrifice; but he was not to exhibit his father's 
diplomatic finesse in a re-enactment of the Dahomean-British negotiations 
of the late 1840s. 
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The opportunity for exercising such diplomacy arose out of various 
missions on the west coast by Commodore Wilmot in mid-1863. Wilmot had 
been dispatched as a conciliator by a British colonial office desperately 
trying to steer a path through a maze of conflicting British commercial, 
political and missionary interests which had sprouted as a corollary to 
the internecine wars which had been a feature of the Yoruba interior 
since 1859.246 
However, tangential to this, Wilmot had, in December of the year 
before, gone to Abomey on a private visit to Glele with a view to 
discussing the slave trade and related issues. His record of private 
conversations with Glele could easily be taken f or an account of any one 
of the numerous discussions which had previously taken place between Gezo 
and a long series of British ambassadors. On these visits by Wilmot, 
Glele started by complimenting the English and expressing his country's 
history of love and loyalty to them, while querying recent English 
hostility towards Dahomey. He re-iterated the view that the slave trade 
had been carried on in his country for centuries and it was his major 
means of surviving and paying his own people. If he gave up the slave 
trade, he asked, from where would he derive his revenue? He would sell 
palm oil if people came for it, but with his vast, obligatory outlay 
every year he could not live on it alone. In any case, he asserted, he 
did not ship slaves himself; it was the white men who came for them and 
he merely sold them. 
247 
- 
Despite Wilmot's protestations and warnings of an imminent decline in 
the Trade, Glele reminded him of the potential income - 80 dollars a head 
per slave and four dollars export tax on each slave shipped. And, quite 
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apart from the economic aspects of the case, Glele outlined - not for the 
first time to a British official - the political implications. The 
slave trade had become "an institution of his country ... I cannot stop 
it all at once: what will my people do? and besides this, I should be in 
danger of losing my life. " 
248 
The oft-proclaimed exasperation of British officials at the supposed 
inconsistency in the views of the Dahomean polity appears inexplicable 
when gauged against the record of successive conversations between such 
officials and Dahomean. monarchs. Once again, in Glele's conversations 
with Wilmot, a Dahomean monarch explicitly and categorically outlined to 
a British ambassador the central economic and political relevance of the 
slave trade in Dahomean life, and -specifically, in the survival of the 
monarchy. 
In refusing Wilmot's implicit offer of compensation, Glele once more 
adopted the position that it would be impossible to abandon the Trade 
all at ýonce. " Similarly, while denying what he claimed were 
exaggerated accounts of the extent of his human sacrifices, he explained 
that these too were ancient customs which could -not be abandoned "all at 
once of . 
249 Such institutions could not be stopped in this fashion; 
"bye and bye, little by little, much may be done; softly, softly, not by 
threats. You see how I am, placed. " 
250 Glele was employing exactly 
the tactics which had previously been adopted by Gezo when faced with the 
decline in the slave trade in the late 1840s: implicit promises of the 
potential f or gradual change; concessions amounting to 
little more than 
pleasantries, while seeking British support, or at 
least neutrality., 
regarding his general military adventures, and his specific 
designs on 
Abeokuta- 
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In the light of previous expositions of the Dahomean point of view 
such remarks cannot be regarded as merely the opinions of Glele 
himself. They amounted to part of a calculated, consistent and 
systematic diplomatic response to the threatened disruption of the slave 
trade. Within one month of Wilmot's visit to Abomey exactly the same 
message was being relayed to Britain through missionaries on the Dahomean 
coast. Bernasko was approached by the Yevogan and his "shadow", Glele's 
appointee at Whydah, and informed that the monarch could not give up the 
slave trade "all at once", because of his responsibility to and the 
anticipated reaction from, his subjects.. However, the British were 
assured, the situation would have improved by the time of the Commodore's 
second visit. 
251 
The benef it of hindsight, of course, was available to some British 
officials as well as to the Dahomeans themselves. Not all the British 
representatives on the coast were as sympathetic as Wilmot. In 
particular, Freeman regarded Wilmot's visit as an open admission to Glele. 
of British weakness, particularly if the former was again allowed to 
raise the matter of financial subsidies as compensation for abolition of 
the slave trade. 
252 
However, from 1863 onwards the developments which had conditioned 
Glele's conciliatory tone continued to have effect on the Dahomean 
coast. Despite Glele's outward optimism, a dying slave trade once more 
cast a gloom over his slaving ports. Burton depicted well the decaying 
gloom of the main entrepot, Whydah, towards the end of 1863. 
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There is now no society in Whydah; the quondam 
millionaires retain their hospitality, but not the 
means of gratifying it. The old days of sporting 
picnics and processions, of dancing, * loving, drinking 
and playing are gone, probably never to return. The 
place is temporarily ruined and dull as dull can be, 
except when the occasional breaking of the blockade 
gives it a kind of Talvanic life ... All here is now 
in a transition state ... they allow their houses to 
fall, their plantations to become bush, their streets 
to be half grown with rank grass, and their swamps to 
reek unrestrained ..., -253 
Once more, the occupation of slave exporting had become akin to 
gambling. 
254 The pattern of shipping which had been established 
during previous slumps in the Trade as a result of cruizer activity was 
again in evidence. The prospects of loss inhibited any one trader 
risking a full cargo on his own account. The larger traders still 
dispatched slaves in hundreds, but the complement was made up by a large 
number of small traders who each dispatched a relatively small number of 
slaves. 
255 The dealers were generally paid half the agreed slave 
price on embarkation and the rest, subject to extremely heavy f reight 
charges, upon successful arrival of the cargo at a safe port. Even 
allowing for the multiplicity of small dealers, the minimum number of 
slaves accepted f or shipment was two; thus, if one died, the other 
served to cover the freight charges! 
256 
The indications of the Trade's rapid decline was as apparent to 
purchasers as they were to produ(i-ers - In March 1861 the slave ship 
Nordiýny, a vessel prominent among those visiting the Dahomean coast over 
the previous three years, left without paying her dues -a sure sign that 
a return passage for further cargoes was not to be expected. 
257 Nor 
was this an isolated case. One major Dahomean slave dealer who had 
441. 
still been active in exporting in the course of 1863,258 had, by early 
1864, to seek asylum outside the territory under the King's jurisdiction 
on account of a similar offence. 
259 
By 1864 the export slave trade 
had almost totally ceased in Dahomey. Slaves remained in barracoons at 
Whydah, Godomey and other places, 
260 but their prospective sellers 
waited in vain. In late 1863 the Dahomean army once more ventured out 
on campaign, taking Jabatan in the upper Weme area. 
261 But the 
available evidence suggests that no more than one shipload of slaves was 
embarked from Dahomean ports throughout 1864.262 
By this stage the context in which the Dahomean leaders were 
operating was beginning ominously to resemble the 'conditions of 1851/2 
which had forced Gezo into his unsuccesful strategy of adaptation. On 
the one hand a slave export sector which was practically non-existent., 
and on the other hand a British government which, f rom 1861, had been 
displaying increasing signs of active intervention. Glele had already 
responded by, diplomatic overtures in an attempt to mollify the British. 
This was, no doubt, something of a surprise to those Europeans who, in he 
first years of his reign, had contrasted his "politique tres defavourable 
aux Europeens ... " with the toleration previously 
displayed by his 
father. 263 Nevertheless, Glele pursued his diplomatic initiatives 
with the French, who in 'February 
1863, had established a protectorate 
over Porto Novo. 
264 Daumas, an agent of Regis who had been appointed 
French Consul at Lagos and had been instrumental in obtaining the 
protectorate of Porto Novo, travelled to Abomey in July 1863. What 
transpired during this meeting -is a matter of some contention which was 
to prove to be of considerable importance in the longer term - Daumas 
442. 
maintaining that he obtained, verbally, a cession of Cotonou to the 
French by the Dahomeans. 
265 
What is less in dispute, is that the 
French agreed, in return for Glele's ambiguous favours, an annual subsidy 
of 4,000 dollars to the King. 
266 
In the face of the dying slave trade 
the Dahomean leaders were once more establishing alternative sources of 
revenue in the same fashion in which they had attempted to procure them 
in the early 1850s. 
It was the economic pressure underlying these events which 
conditioned Glele's more conciliatory approach to the western powers from 
1863 onwards and which led to the re-introduction of the policy of 
containment promises, special pleading and, above all, procrastination 
- which had been rehearsed by his father in the late 1840s. Finding a 
satisfactory foil for his views in Wilmot, Glele proceeded cautiously but 
unmistakeably. Wilmot was a 'good man' who fully understood the need to 
bring change about 'softly'. 
267 His presence was requested in the 
expected commission from Britain. 
268 According. to 
. 
the Dahomean 
leader, there were no more hindrances in the way between himself and 
England. He appealed to English merchants to come and settle at Whydah 
269 
with a view to carrying out a proper commercial trade with him. 
At the Customs of late 1863 - early 1864, held in the presence of the 
British Commission, the incidence of human sacrifice had been much 
reduced from the scale of the years immediately preceding their visit to 
that of a par with the last years of Gezo's reign. 
270 
Despite the 
fact that the British Commission, which included Burton, were less 
sympathetic to Glele's procrastination than he might have expected, and 
much less rapport was established than he might have anticipated, 
271 
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the Dahomean monarch maintained his Position. A warm welcome was 
extended to Croft, who had arrived at Abomey to extoll the values of 
legitimate commerce and the evils of human sacrifice. 
272 Outwardly, 
of course, Glele's posture towards his domestic audience changed little, 
and the bellicose speeches, particularly directed towards Abeokuta, were 
maintained. 
273 
It may be, of course, that Glele's diplomatic posture was to some 
extent dictated by a desire to neutralize the British in anticipation of 
an attack on that settlement. But, equally, his approach was fashioned 
by the necessity of expanding his relationship in 'proper commerce' with 
274 them, ' as witnessed by his reception of Croft. Faced by the same 
problems with which Gezo had been faced in the late 1840s - early 1850s, 
the Dahomean. leadership responded in exactly the same fashion 
diplomatic overtures aimed at curtailment of British pressure, 
preservation of the slave trade so far as possible, and expansion of 
legitimate commerce as a secondary supplement. 
GROWING EUROPEAN RIVALRIES 
But Glele faced a much more difficult task than his father., not least 
because the 1860's marked the beginning of open rivalry among the 
Europe,, as for political and commercial hegemony on the coast around 
Dahomey. 
Following the death of the head chief at Badagry, in late 1860, the 
British officials, under pressure from commercial interests there, took 
it upon themselves to adjudicate between the various contenders of the 
throne, and to impose their own choice upon the Badagry chiefs - one 
444. 
named Gokoon. 
275 On 1 March., Thomas Tickel, previously a merchant 
residing at Badagry, was appointed British Resident at Badagry and Porto 
Novo by Foote, subject to Foreign Office approval. 
276 Later that year 
the chiefs at Badagry eventually agreed to a Treaty of Commerce which had 
been initially imposed by the British. Within a year it was quite clear 
that the British regarded Badagry as an extension of their interests at 
Lagos, and two years later, on 7 July 1863, the Badagry chiefs ceded the 
town to the British by treaty, in return for a yearly stipend. 
277 
The treaty with. the Badagry chiefs f ollowed the imposition of a 
similar treaty on the King of Porto Novo mentioned earlier. In February 
1861 f ollowing a dispute over treatment of British traders at Porto Novo 
the British bombarded the town, f orcing the King to agree to additional 
articles to the 1852 treaty - abolishing human sacrifice, expelling slave 
traders and effectively establishing extra-territorial rights for British 
residents there. 
278 The additional articles also included a 
commitment by the King of Porto Novo to foster trade with Dosunmu and 
279 Lagos. 
Alarmed by the political and commercial implications inherent in such 
agreements, Glele subsequently dispatched ambassadors to the King of 
Porto Novo, dissuading him from acquiescing in the British plans. 
280 
Porto Novo, although never directly controlled by Dahomey had always been 
regarded by the Dahomean leadership as under their protection. 
281 
Indeed!, so tense did matters become, that Glele was reported to have 
stationed around six thousand of his troops at Cotonou, just west of 
Porto Novo, presumably on alert to resist any threat to the integrity of 
Dahomean territory proper. 
282 This combination of military and 
445. 
diplomatic pressure was suf f i. cient to cause the King of Porto Novo to 
have second thoughts - which considerations were once more resolved only 
by a further act of British 'gun-boat diplomacy', culminating in the 
destruction of Porto Novo with a death toll of hundreds. The King 
acquiesced to British demands and signed the additional articles on 16 
May 1861.283 
The cession of Lagos to Britain in 1861, and the establishment of the 
French Protectorate at Porto Novo in events which have already been 
covered in detail elsewhere, provided further evidence of western 
ambition. 
284 But encroaching west 
. 
ern influence was not limited to the 
seaboard. Already, by 1861, the British were, through the agency of 
Thomas Tickel, their Resident at Badagry and Porto Novo, in contact with 
the chief of Okeodan, the large market town situated on the dire'ct route 
285 
from Porto Novo to the interior. By 1863, a British Protectorate 
had also been established there, initiating a chain reaction involving 
first the Egba - who took and established themselves at Ketu, to the 
north of Okeodan on the Niger route. 
286 Threatened with hostile 
domination on the eastern trade route to the Niger, Glele launched a 
ferocious attack, re-taking Ketu and maintaining it under Dahomean 
influence. 287 
In general, the Dahomean leadership was extremely suspicious of 
British collusion with the Egba. 
288 The -new King himself regarded the 
289 
British as having turned against his country. For their part., the 
British officials and residents at Abeokuta were obsessed with the 
continually expected Dahomean attack against the Egba. 
290 
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By the f irst half of the 1860s also, inter-national relationships were 
becoming inextricably linked with commercial matters in general and the 
palm oil trade in particular. Regis's concern about the implementation 
of British customs dues on the trade lay behind the pressure to have 
their agent Daumas declared French Vice-Consul at Porto Novo and Whydah 
on 18 February 1862.291 A year later, and not unconnected with the 
same cons iderations, a French Protectorate was established over Porto 
Novo, and Sodji's duties were guaranteed to remain at the same level for 
ten years. This move was viewed with disfavour by Glele, 
292 
and seen 
by him as an erosion of his traditional political influence in the 
area .' It was seen by Domingo Martinez as the prelude to a breach of his 
commercial monopoly at Cotonou. 
293 Daumas' visit to Abomey managed to 
secure the verbal but ambiguous agreement regarding the use of Cotonou 
beach, 294 but on Domingo's death in January 1864 Glele occupied the 
beach with his own soldiers. 
295 
Commercial rivalries between the western powers on the coast 
meanwhile continued unabated in an attempt to commandeer the palm oil 
trade and the duties thereon. It was a process from which the Dahomeans 
could scarcely escape. French relations with Abomey became ever more 
strained as French commercial interests on the coast sought to maintain 
their position in the f ace of aggressive British political 
intervention. Following the confiscation of French goods by Dahomean 
soldiers, and disagreements between the Dahomean leadership over the 
French factory at Whydah, Captain Devaux of the French navy went to 
Abomey along with Regis' agent to see the monarch 
in October 1864.296 
By this stage relations between Dahomey and France were at 
breaking 
447. 
point; the delay in Deraux's reception (the King had gone to - war) 
prompted him to demand that he be allowed to leave and to notif y British 
as well as French shipping to this ef f ect. 
297 
The French had intended 
to establish a definitive boundary between Dahomean and Porto Novian 
territory at Cotonou Creek, and the fixing and rationalisation of Customs 
duties as well as redress for the confiscation of French liquer already 
referred to. 
298 
Glele's reply was peremptory. The French could have rights of trade 
at Porto Novo beach, which he would continue to occupy and control. In 
addition, the French could have what was left of the confiscated 
299 
goods. The beleaguered French, sufficiently* put down by Glele's 
response, received a further blow to their pride and interests when Sodji 
of Porto Novo 'died, and was replaced by Mepon rather than the 
French-backed candidate. 
300 
Even the threat of force could not 
retrieve the situation_, and to the consternation of their commercial 
interests the French withdrew their protectorate of, Porto Novo in 
December 1864.301 
The decisions of English off icials on the coast met with little more 
immediate success. Throughout the following year Glover, Governor of 
Lagos, tried by every means - an internal pretender, gunboat diplomacy, 
fines on Mepon, blockading the channel from Porto Novo to Cotonou and 
Godomey - to further direct British control of the Porto Novo area. 
Ultimately, his request for annexation was rebuffed by a reluctant 
Colonial Office. 302 And, by the following year, the Dahomean 
leadership, apparently undeterred - at least publicly - by their def eat 
at Abeokuta, were congratulating Glover on his anti-Egba stance while 
448. 
showering him with congratulations and gif ts. 
303 
A bemused Glover 
could do little but lamely warn Glele against attacking Abeokuta, and 
hope for the best. 
304 
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CHAPTER 
DENOUEMENT: THE FINAL CONTRADICTIONS, 1865-90 
By the mid-1860's the Dahomean aristocracy were once again in the 
midst of an economic and Political crisis. The revival of the demand 
for slaves between 1857 and 1863 had given a badly needed but short lived 
boost to the Trade, but the end of the French Emigration Scheme and the 
decline in demand from Cuba and the American States meant that the 
respite was short lived. The second defeat at Abeokuta only further 
decimated the Dahomean slave raiding capacity and inflicted heavy 
material losses on the warrior aristocrats. Glele's return to diplomacy 
held out much less chance of success than his father since the European 
powers were not only forearmed with the experiences of Dahomean 
procrastination throughout the 1840's and 1850's but, more importantly, 
were increasingly involved with their internal political and economic 
rivalries - The oil trade continued to grow but that growth in itself 
further exacerbated the inherent tensions within Dahomey, between the 
Dahomeans and the European powers, and among the Europeans themselves. 
The quarter century following 1864 saw the working out of these 
tensions, crucially around the 1876 blockade, but the general pattern of 
developments was set from the second half of the 1860's. 
I 
The years immediately following Dahomey's second defeat at Abeokuta 
were, not surprisingly, bereft of any major military campaigns. Between 
1864 and 1869 there is no evidence in contemporary literature of any 
large scale military undertaking. Under normal circumstances the 
absence of military adventure would have created the conditions for a 
469. 
flowering of the oil trade, but the constant interruptions of legitimate 
commerce over the previous few years had left their legacy, and recovery 
was not immediate. 
THE PALM OIL TRADE: 1863-80 
The loss of the palm oil trade would not have worried Glele in the 
early years of his reign, since an active slave trade more than 
compensated for any decline in legitimate commerce. But the decline had 
longer reaching effects. After the British naval action at Porto Novo 
and the signing of a commercial treaty to protect legitimate trade, the 
latter town became a major market for the oil trade of the interior. 
Its relative attraction was enhanced by its cession to the French as a 
Protectorate and by July 1863 French., English and Portuguese factories 
were established there in addition to numerous petty traders. 
1 The 
contempt with which the practitioners of legitimate commerce in Whydah 
had been treated by King and -natives alike, 
2 
only served to increase 
the attraction of Porto Novo. 
3 
The limits upon the expansion of the 
trade foreseen by some, 
4- 
were not immediately apparent to all, but 
revival of the oil trade proved slow. Even the exemption of duty on 
Whydah oil extended by the French government was effectively neutralised 
so far as the competition with Porto Novo was concerned since it applied 
-- 5 also to produce from the latter town. 
However, the vulnerability of even a French protected Porto Novo was 
exposed when the British, jealous of the trade loss from Lagos to Porto 
Novo, blocked the mouth of the lagoon, effectively impeding traffic. 
6 
With a long established British presence at Badagry, the 
best option 
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available to the French was to secure an alternative outlet on the 
beach. This was one of the matters which prompted the visit by Daumas, 
Re-gis's agent at Porto Novo to Abomey in mid-1863, since both Porto Novo 
beach and Cotonou - the nearest point of the lagoon to the sea - were 
under the suzerainty of the King of Dahomey. This visit resulted in the 
confusing 'cession' of Cotonou. 
7 
What Glele clearly intended was to 
allow the use of the beach at Cotonou by the French in return for an 
annual tribute. The French wrongly, but perhaps understandably in the 
wake of the cession of a protectorate at Porto Novo, interpreted this as 
ceding them the same right over Cotonou beach. This initial 
interpretation was to provide a useful pretext for French claims in later 
years. 
But there were more immediate difficulties facing the French palm oil 
commerce. In February 1864 the French factory at Whydah along with 
several hundred tons of palm oil was destroyed in af ire which consumed 
more than half the town. 
8 In June of the same year two pipes of 
Brazilian rum which had been landed on Porto Novo beach by an American 
ship for the French were seized by Dahomean soldiers. 
9A few months 
later the Dahomean authorities at Whydah seized goods from the French 
factory there. 
10 
The Dahomean leaders, hard pressed financially by the loss of the 
slave trade, and now by the growing- attraction of Porto Novo in the palm 
oil trade, had resorted to increased exaction of tribute by force. 
Moreover, recognition by the Dahomeans of the French Protectorate at ID 
Porto Novo, which had apparently been granted during Daumas' visit the 
year before, was now withdrawn: Glele was reported to be threatening to 
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exact punishment from the King of Porto Novo at the earliest 
opportunity. 
11 
This series of events may not have been unconnected with a dispute 
arising within Porto Novo Town itself between a French officer and one of 
the local chiefs who ranked close behind the King in status. 
Significantly, in view of later developments, the dispute resulted in 
threats by the Chief to return to the bush and cut down all the palm 
trees. 
12 Despite an estimated commerce at Porto Novo of around one 
and a half million Francs in 18643 the increasing problems were 
sufficient to stimulate some French officials to recommend the 
abandonment of the Protectorate. 
13 
For the French 1865 was a relatively quiet year f or visiting palm oil 
ships at both Whydah and Porto Novo, and the French commercial house& on 
the coast were left with almost half a million kilos of oil and 150,000 
kilos of nuts - in total almost 2000 tons of palm oil produce - on their 
hands. 14 
. 
French estimates placed the total annual trade at Porto Novo 
and Whydah at about 3500 tons in 1865, the bulk of this being trade 
carried out by the French themselves. 
15 
Since the French dominated the Whydah trade, the annual report of the 
French Consul allows a reasonable insight into the export trade in palm 
produce at that port in the mid-1860s. During 1865, four French ships 
embarked cargo exclusively from Wliy-dah, while a further seven called at 
Whydah and Porto Novo or Lagos. The tonnage of the vessels varied from 
174-294 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of the eleven French ships 
visiting the port in the course of the year amounted to 2766 tons. 
16 
The vessels remained in Whydah, or in the Whydah-Lagos area, for a period 
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varying from two weeks up to four months discharging cargoes of mainly 
rum and cloth - and taking aboard palm produce. 
17 
The total extent of 
cargo embarked on the four vessels visiting Whydah alone was 1636 barrels 
of oil and almost 700,000 kilos of palm kernels. 18 
These f igures indicate one growing feature of the trade - the dealing 
in palm kernels. While kernels held out little attraction to English 
traders who were wary of a slow British market which might inevitably 
oblige them to ship the kernels to the Continent for sale, the French 
dealers were eager for the product which would find a quick and 
profitable market at Marseilles. 
19 
Up until the mid-1860s, the French trade at Whydah had been domina'ted 
completely by Regis. Despite their problems at Porto Novo, the French 
Consular agent Beraud, looked f orward with optimism and anticipated the 
arrival of other French firms. 
20 
Beraud had not long to wait until 
his prophecy was fulfilled, although his apparent foresight is somewhat 
lessened by the fact that he himself was among the partners of one of the 
new firms - Lasnier., Daumas et Cie - being stationed as their agent at 
Whydah. This move prompted a brief period of fierce price competition 
and commercial struggle between the new f irm and Regis until 1868 when 
the arrival of a third French firm finally ensured the end of R6-gis's 
monopoly. 
21 
Such competition between the French commercial houses gave rise to 
manoeuvering to control the rights of labour over the population of the 
22 
appropriate 'towns' within Whydah, but by the 1870s this situation 
had resolved itself and labour allocation persisted in the traditional 
fashion. 23 By this stage the trade in general was again 
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flourishing. The English firm of Swanzey had been established there for 
several years, 
24 
and up to 60 vessels per annum were calling at Whydah 
and surrounding ports from France alone. 
25 
Glele, through the 
Yevogan, maintained the strict control over the conduct of the trade, 
particularly as regards thefts of trade goods by native Dahomeans. 
26 
The expansion of commerce was interrupted when, during 1874, the high 
prices of alcohol and the low prices being fetched for palm oil in France 
dealt a blow to the French trade and brought about a slackening of 
shipping to their factories. 
However, during the second half of the 1870s the palm oil trade in 
the Dahomey area developed steadily, particularly for the French. Their 
factories proliferated. In the mid-70s Regis established a factory at 
Agoue which controlled the trade of the Popos, making use of the lagoon 
system to Whydah for transportation of merchandise and commercial 
communication. 
27 At Godomey two French Houses - Regis and Fabre - 
shared the trade at a smaller outpost which nevertheless rendered some 
100,000 gallons of oil and 600 tons of kernels per annum. 
28 A similar 
quantity of produce was collected at the Regis factory at Abomey-Calavi, 
a trading position connected with Cotonou via the Denham Lake. 
29 
At Cotonou itself the French had three factories. So far as the 
palm oil trade was concerned, Cotonou's importance lay in its role as a 
landing place for spirits, tobacco and other articles of trade, and as a 
transit port for Porto Novo and Abomey-Calavi, and thence the 
interior. 30 Porto Novo was by now the mainstay of the palm oil trade 
in the area apart from Lagos, with three French, an English and a German 
factory as well as numerous smaller traders - Brazilians, Portuguese, 
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liberated slaves, and, by the mid-1870% native Porto Noveans working on 
their own account or for the major factories. 
31 
Between 1875 and 1879 
Porto Novo's trade rose steadily. By the last years of the '70s 
estimates put the trade in palm produce of the three main French houses 
there at 670,000 gallons of palm oil and 2000 tons of palm kernels per 
annum, -involving transactions valued at some five million Francs. 
32 
Commerce of this extent at Porto Novo put it on a par with Whydah 
itself . At Whydah, apart f rom the three French houses of Regis, Fabre, 
and Daumas, the English had a presence through Swanzey and Co. and the 
more recently arrived Walsh's who had been established in 1876. There 
was one further factory, a Portuguese establishment of secondary 
importance. 33 In an average year in the late 1870's some 500,000 
gallons of palm oil, at around 1.80 - 2.0 Francs per gallon, and . 
2500 
tons of kernels were exported from Whydah by the French. 
34 
Thus, 
French exports from the three Dahomean ports of Whydah, Godomey and 
Abomey-Calavi (Cotonou was largely a disembarkation and transit port) 
amounted to around 740,000 gallons of palm oil and 3700 tons of 
kernels. 35 
By 1878 the rise in oil prices in France which had followed the slump 
of 1874 was encouraging European dealers on the coast to pursue business 
with zeal and the oil trade proceeded briskly. 
36 Regis, despite the 
breach of their monopoly in the last decade, still dominated the 
business, but others increasingly contributed to the growing volume of 
the trade. By 1878 the French were importing almost 4) 400 tons of palm 
oil and around 5700 tons of kernels from the Dahomean ports of Whydah, 
Cotonou, Godomey and Abomey-Calavi. 
37 
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One distinction worth making between Regis and the other traders is 
that the former, with a long established trading connection in Dahomey, 
dealt mainly with large producers, 
38 
including the nobility. These 
large producers were increasingly playing a significant role in Dahomean 
palm oil exports. 
OIL PRODUCTION AND TAXATION. 
The revival of the slave trade had had a deleterious effect on 
legitimate commerce., but with its demise the oil trade gradually regained 
some of its former vitality. It also offered the hard-pressed royal 
exchequer a further means of supplementary income. The mid-1860's 
appear to mark the first contemporary recording of the systematic 
taxation on palm oil production. Burton noted that in certain areas of 
the Kingdom the palm trees wer e "numbered with a view to revenue of . 
39 
It is not absolutely clear what he meant to convey by his comment. It 
is possible that he was referring merely to a systematic approach to 
production. However, it seems likely that he was referring to taxation 
revenue. 
Such a tax would have furnished increasing amounts for the royal 
treasury,, not only as a result of the regularisation of fiscal 
procedures, but also because of the revived growth of oil production. 
Throughout the late 1860's and -1870's, plantation production expanded 
in scale. In 1863 the plantations around Whydah had been untended and 
40 
of the slave trade agricultural overgrown . After the demise 
development at Whydah revived and these plantations were better cared 
for. The house of Antonio da Souza at Whydah, for instance, was 
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surrounded by oil palms, and agents of the King like Quenum possessed oil 
plantations on the outskirts of the town. 
41 
Here domestic slaves were 
lodged in huts surrounded by the palm oil trees. The domestic slaves were 
both gatherers of the fruit and manufacturers of the oil, producing it in 
the traditional fashion. 42 The oil produced served as commodity for 
sale to Europeans and, purified, for domestic cooking purposes. The 
residue from the production process was employed as manure or fuel. 
43 
In the interior too, plantation production of palm oil flourished. 
Apart from the produce of the "commemorative villages" which had been 
added to during the reign of Glele, 
44 
the monarch himself and his main 
chiefs retained palm ' oil -groves and plantations. 
45 
By his 
46 jurisdiction over the allocation of both land and slave labour, the 
monarch effectively controlled the wealth and productive capacity of his 
chief s. 
In addition to his own plantations near Abomey, the monarch had 
scattered throughout the Kingdom royal houses peopled by Amazons. 
47 
Entry to such palaces was forbidden to strangers or subjects, and it is 
therefore difficult to state with any degree of certainty the extent to 
which systematic production of palm oil for export was carried out . 
:1 
therein. It seems likely, however, that the inhabitants were heavily 
involved in the manufacture of palm oil, some of which at least, by the 
1870s was destined for export. - Certainly by that period gangs of 
Amazons were being used to carry oil, presumably manufactured on the 
King's plantations or royal houses, to Whydah where apartments were set 
aside for the visitors in the Yevogan's palace. 
48 
This same palace 
had increasingly become a commercial centre, maintaining in its stores 
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those exchange goods received for oil prior to transmission to Abomey, 
while the largest section of the palace was set aside for the storage of 
palm oil awaiting exchange with the mercantile houses on the coast. 
49 
Apart from the production of his estates, of course, the monarch was also 
able to raise a certain amount of palm oil by- way of tribute f rom 
outlying villages. 
50 
It was from large scale producers that Regis drew the bulk of his 
trade, delivering in return goods in bulk, and of ten credit, to either 
his native clients or to responsible "Mullatoe" intermediaries. 
51 
Other French houses, like Daumas dealt in 'smaller amounts and in the main 
obtained their oil from different sources from Regis. The demise of the 
export trade in slaves, and the increase in competition at the coast, had 
encouraged a further proliferation of small intermediaries, often -native 
Dahomeans who collected oil from the interior in small quantities. 
Daumas limited themselves mainly to this end of the market, allowing a 
few credit clients, but mainly carrying out transactions by direct 
52 
exchanges for factory stock. By the end of the 1870's trade was 
sufficiently brisk to satisfy dealers at both ends of the market. Only 
the perennial hazard of sharks off Whydah and Cotonou blighted an 
otherwise sunny horizon. 
53 
THE 1876 BLOCKADE 
And yet this placid picture was misleading. It was the second half 
of the 1870's which marked the final stage in the developing 
contradiction between the new commerce and the hitherto existing pattern 
of political power in Dahomey. The second 
half of the 1870's also 
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marked the beginning of the final phase of the Dahomean leadership's 
response towards the new economic f orces which had been encroaching upon 
their kingdom for almost half a century. 
Up until that point the ultimate direction of the leadership's 
response was uncertain. In the early stages of the palm oil commerce 
the indigenous aristocracy's response had shifted from acceptance to 
encouragement, culminating in Gezo's cautious attempts to adapt 
traditional political structures and ideology to the novel economic 
circumstances. The failure of that process and its inadequacy in 
providing an economic substitute for the slave trade had led to a 
reaction against the direction of Gezo's changes and a return to an 
uneasy equilibrium between acceptance of the palm oil trade and sporadic 
attempts to revive the flagging slave trade. The British blockade of 
the Dahomean coast from 1876 effectively marked the beginning of the end 
of this equilibrium. 
In this sense the blockade of the Dahomean coast by the British in 
1876 was the cumination of almost five decades of inherent tensions 
between a Dahomean military elite which was predominantly committed to 
the maintainance of both political sovereignty and the political status 
quo and, on the other hand, the vested interests - both European and 
Dahomean - in the new palm oil trade. 
In another way the blockade was a watershed. It encapsulated the 
main strands of conflicting interests which were to dominate Dahomean 
politics for the next decade and a half, until the eventual victory of 
the new commercial interests through direct military intervention in the 
1890's. It exhibited the growing rivalries between the European powers 
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f or political and commercial advantage. It highlighted the growing and 
aggressive influence of the west's commercial interests within their own 
political bureaucracies. It displayed the increasing vulnerability of 
the African Kingdom to western military power and ambitions. And it 
illustrated the growing divergence of opinion and approach within the 
Dahomean polity, between those who sought an accommodation with European 
commercial expansion and those who finally set their face against any 
further compromise and strove to maintain their economic and political 
power in the traditional manner despite the new economic forces. 
The causes and course of the 1876 blockade have been comprehensivelv 
detailed by modern historians. 
54 
The spark which ignited what had 
already been f or some time a potential powder keg was the treatment of 
Turnbull, Swanzey's agent at Whydah. A trade dispute between the Whydah 
authorities and a merchant named da Costa resulted in the confiscation of 
goods which had been farmed out to him by Swanzey's agent. When the 
latter protested against the seizure of the goods he was ill-treated and 
punished by the Dahomean authorities. 
55 
Commodore Hewett, the British Naval representative on the spot, 
immediately demanded reparation of 500 puncheons (80,000 gallons) of palm 
oil, to the value of approximately E6000, and threatened military action 
against Whydah in the event of any re-occurrence of maltreatment. 
Despite misgivings inside the Admiralty in London regarding the scale of 
reparation demanded and the apparent impetuosity in imposing it, they had 
little option but to back Hewett. 
56 
In fact, Hewett's response to the Whydah. incident was considerably 
less 'impetuous' than the Admiralty believed: it was typical of an 
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increasingly aggressive attitude being adopted by British officials on 
the coast, in contrast to the caution being displayed by their 
counterparts in London. On the coast officials were under increasing 
pressure f rom both commercial and missionary interests to bring Dahomey 
to heel, particularly in view of the perceived threat to Abeokuta, and 
Hewett himself had previously been actively encouraging the idea of a 
blockade. 57 
DIVISIONS IN THE DAHOMEAN POLITY 
The differing Dahomean responses to the British demands told as much 
about the divergence of opinio In within the Dahomean polity as it did 
about tensions between the Europeans and the Dahomean leadership. 
Initially, the head men at Whydah wanted to pay the fine and began to 
seize palm oil from the coastal population in order to make good the 
demanded recompense. But these orders were countermanded by the monarch 
who set himself against payment and instructed that the oil be restored 
to its original owners. 
58 
Despite the king's steadfast refusal to countenance payment of the 
fine, equivocation on the part of others in the Dahomean leadership 
continued. By May 1876 Europeans on the coast were still convinced that 
the Yevogan and Dahomean authorities were about to pay. The Yevoga-a 
himself had requested casks for the oil and explained that it was being 
made ready. 
59 
Glele, however, stood firm. He refuted the British demands on 
grounds that would surely have withstood examination in any court of 
justice and which appear to have received sympathy from even the 
481. 
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occasional British observer. The King argued that there was no 
precedent for such a demand. It was peremptory, arbitrary and 
unilaterally imposed. There had not been even the minimum of discussion 
on the matter. It impinged upon the right of Dahomeans to apply their 
own legal jurisdiction in their own territory. Glele could not bring 
himself to believe that the fine had in fact been imposed with the full 
authority of the Queen, on whose behalf the Commodore purported to 
speak. He appealed to the Commodore to make trade rather than war. 
61 
There is some evidence to suggest that the Dahomean monarch did in 
fact take steps of his own to impose punishment on those responsible for 
the mal-treatment of 'Turnbull, partly because he suspected a malign 
intention on the part of the culprits to bring the English into direct 
conflict at Whydah. 
62 But in his defence of Dahomean sovereignty and 
their right to settle the matter internally the King was resolute, even 
when a compromise was available. Regis' agent, whose firm was suffering 
badly as a result of the blockade suggested that the monarch might write 
a conciliatory letter to the British suggesting a reduction of the fine; 
in these circumstances, he suggested, Regis themselves would discreetly 
provide the oil in payment of any reduced fine. To have done so, of 
course, would have been tantamount to conceding those points of principle 
and practice regarding Dahomean sovereignty which Glele was determined 
not to concede. He regarded the -offer with scepticism, and although he 
did eventually agree to the preparation of a letter and its dispatch in 
his name it remains extremely unlikely that he was aware of the extent of 
compromise and concession which was being effected in his name. 
63 
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Glele also remained aloof from the negotiations leading to the final 
settlement., which ended without the monarch making any concessions over 
the sovereignty of the Dahomean state. 
64 
.A few weeks after the 
signing of the Treaty of Amnity and Trade which ended the blockade, Glele 
could write extending the hand of friendship to English traders, but 
making it plain that they, like everyone else were subject to the laws of 
Dahomey. 
65 
Nevertheless, the equivocation and colaboration of some Fon officials 
was sufficient to indicate that the economic crisis was giving way to a 
growing political crisis as divisions within the leadership emerged as to 
the approach to be adopted. 
At -one level these divisions were a reflection of divided opinion 
over the great issues which had faced the Dahomean leadership for half a 
decade - how far to compromise their traditional military, raiding 
structure and the military ethos in order to accommodate the new economic 
and political forces which accompanied the commercialisation of the palm 
oil trade. Glele, who had had to face several internal insurrections 
before he was finally established on the Dahomean stool 
66 
and who was 
later destined to fend off a further attempted coup in 1883 in the wake 
of military defeat, 
67 knew that the slave trade and human sacrifice 
could not be lightly abandoned without the possibility of a political 
threat to his own position, 
68 
a threat not to be taken lightly. 
DUAL APPOINTEES. 
Aware of the threat he had already tried to bolster his position by 
appointing close relatives or allies in important political positions. 
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The Chuydaton at Whydah, the second-in-command to the Yevogan, was one 
such close relative already mentioned. 
69 
In addition, the Matro, 
deputy to the Gau the military commander, was a half-brother to Glele. 
At Abomey a considerable number of officials like the Tometti, the Vodoh, 
the Nuage and the Nonpwento were brothers to the king, while outside the 
capital chiefs like Atakpeh, the caboceer of M'Henvi-Asinweh and the 
commercial chief at Cotonou were the king's relatives. 
70 
All or most of the appointed 'shadows' were of the royal lineage, and 
the move was almost certainly prompted partly in an attempt to strengthen 
royal power vis-a-vis the other chiefs in view of the factional 
infighting surrounding Gezo's death. It seems, however, that it was at 
least partly necessitated by the fact that Glele wished personally to 
appoint his own placemen alongside those he had inherited., perhaps 
reluctantly, as a result - of his fathers decree that there was to be no 
mass slaughter of caboceers or officials on his own death. 
71 
The object of such double te-aure was two-fold, firstly, to neutralise 
the worst effects, from the point of view of the new monarch, of defects 
in capacity or fidelity in the inherited ministers without openly 
72 
subjecting them to mass dismissal or degradation. Such a mass 
dismissal would have been calculated to inspire simmering resentment 
against Glele, an unwelcome risk to any -new monarch. Since the other 
alternative to dismissal - dispatch of the ministers in the company of 
their deceased monarch - was effectively foreclosed to Glele by agreement 
with his father prior to the latter's death, twinning of the ministers 
with others personally loyal to and patronised by the new monarch was the 
path of 'least resistance' in bolstering his personal power and position. 
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Secondly, the practice did have some beneficial practical effects. 
The new office holder appointed by the incoming monarch to directly 
represent his interests, was thus afforded immediate opportunity for 
direct intervention on all matters of state pertaining to his office, 
while maintaining a certain consistency and stability while the new 
appointee gained appropriate experience in office. 
73 
More leisurely 
dimunition of the influence of 'inherited' ministers could be 
anticipated, whether by death or otherwise. 
Finally, the practice was also a method of providing wealth to the 
princes, at no direct cost to the monarch, a practice which made 
particular sense since the royal finances were under considerable 
pressure. Effectively, the move redistributed the financial burden away 
from the royal family onto the shoulders of the tax-paying subjects. 
PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS 
However, Glele's plans in this direction were not entirely succesful, 
particularly among those appointees who were involved in commercial 
intercourse with the western powers. The most prominent of these was 
Prince Chyudaton himself. From an early stage, Chuydaton appears to 
have cultivated and befriended his western contacts, initially perhaps as 
a normal part of commercial diplomacy. However, increasingly he came to 
be regarded as particularly sympathetic to western interests and a likely 
advocate of their cause. Burton wrote of him: 
it Prince Chuydaton, a caboceer of note and influence, 
one of the king's many cousins, supposed to possess 
the ear of royalty, and lately appointed second 
Yevogan of Whydah ... The English subjects speak 
highly of him; the French, whose 'landlord' he is, 
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declare him to be cunning and interested. He 
certainly knows the habits of white men, and it was long ago proposed that he should visit England, the 
principal advantage being that after return he might 
venture upon the truth, which a meaner man would not dare before royalty ... I much regretted not seeing 
more of this young man ... one so conversant with 'European Society". 74 
Clearly then, Chuydaton was regarded with some considerable respect by 
the European 'lobby', and was, moreover, regarded as a likely vehicle for 
the transmission of their version of "the truth" - the advocacy of 
commercial development, western style. 
Although he was appointed as ý 'shadow' to the Yevogan at Whydah 
precisely because he was a close relation and ally of the new King, 
75 
a 
blood relationship proved no guarantee of continuing allegiance. The 
serious divisions which were by now appearing within the Dahomean polity 
were reflected by the autonomy with which he and other members of the 
Dahomean polity were by the 1870's operating in opposition to Glele's 
inflexible protection of Dahomean sovereignty against the encroachments 
of the western powers. Chuydaton's direct interest in the European 
trade and his intercourse with the European powers had eroded the warrior 
ethos and illustrated the opportunities f or commercial advance. Along 
with the Yevogan he was the prime example of those forces working for 
compromise with the western powers. It was Chuydaton and the Yevogan 
who were involved in the deal which ended the 1876 blockade in terms 
which were unknown in detail 'to Glele himsel . 
76 It was again 
Chuydaton and the Yevogan who were signatories to the 1878 cession of 
Cotonou where there are reasonable grounds f or suspecting that Glele was 
unaware of the exact nature of what was being signed away in his name. 
77 
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Not surprisingly, Chuydaton was particularly well regarded by the 
French for his role in the encouragement of export commerce and his 
protection of French interests. 
78 
He remained a confirmed advocate of 
compromise with the western powers up until the years immediately 
preceeding the French invasion of Dahomey. Significantly, he was part 
of a group striving for friendly relations with France and who were 
involved in an attempted coup against Behanzin in 1889.79 
Even within the circle of the royal family there were those who 
sought closer cooperation with the west and the new commerce. Prime 
amongst these was Topa, one of the younger sons of Glele, and Vissegan, 
Glele's senior wife. The later, like others among the 'progressive' 
grouping was later to come into open conflict with the monarch and was 
80 
eventually imprisoned on a charge of treason. 
However, although the political divisions were reflected within the 
royal circle, they were most apparent and widespread amongst those whose 
commercial contact with the west and geographical distance from Abomey 
was greatest. One French observer noted: 
Loin du roi, administrant le territoire le plus 
important du royaume, les cabeceres de Whydah ont pris 
a la longue une tres, grande initiative dans le 
reglement des affaires et, a -ne parler que de 
prele-vement des imp8ts 91 ils savent, dit-ons, s'y 
tailler une bonne part. ' 
These growing divisions within tSe Dahomean polity between those who 
sought closer cooperation with the new western commercial interests and 
those who opposed it were graphically illustrated by the open breach 
which developed between Kpadonou Quenum (Houenou) and Glele. Quenum's 
own family had long been close associates and trusted servants of the 
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kings of Dahomey, and his father had been appointed by Gezo as an 
Ahissigan, or trade captain, at Whydah after a short but illustrious 
military career. 
82 
Kpadonou Quenum. succeeded to his father's position 
in 1866, and for a number of years acted as both Ahissigan and as 
counsellor to the king. 
83 
He grew convinced of the material benefits 
of the new commerce and was actively involved in soliciting the monarch's 
approval for the establishment of Fabre's factory at Abomey-Calavi. 
84 
However, the growing polarisation within the Dahomean hierarchy led 
to strained relations between Quenum and the da Souza familly, and 
growing emnity between himself and Prince Kondo, the heir apparent and 
later King Behanzin. In the late 1870's Quenum's commercial contacts 
with merchants and monarch at Porto Novo were employed against him and - 
fuelled by Prince Kondo - were sufficient to merit his own imprisonment 
by Glele and the breaking of the Quenum familly. 
85 
Despite an 
attempted reconciliation by Glele in 1881 the two remained at loggerheads 
and the Quenum family, like Chuydaton, eventually developed into bitter 
enemies of the monarch. The Quenum family supported the French against 
86 
Behanzin in 1892. 
The Yevogan too was counted upon as an advocate of closer commercial 
links with the west. The French believed that: 
"Le Yevogan est tres devoue. a notre cause et serait 
partisan de Vetablissement du protectorat francais au 
Dahomey-87 
Friction also appears to have developed between the Brasilian traders on 
the coast and the Dahomean Government, particularly over the question of 
inherited wealth which the traders wished to leave to their offspring in 
traditional western practice but which reverted to the monarch under 
88 
Dahomean custom. 
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TRADITIONALISTS 
But not all the leadership were in such constant or close proximity 
to the west. And as political polarisation proceeded the 
traditionalists came to dominate, eschewing compromise with the new 
commercial interests and resorting to the means of their former glory. 
By the mid 1870's the Dahomean leadership had reverted to a system of 
annual raiding. 
89 
In May 1876 the Dahomeans destroyed the town of Idofa on the 
90 
outskirts of Abeokuta. Throughout 1878 and 1879 a war between Porto 
Novo and the people of Weme had already closed the roads f or a year. 
Early in that year the Dahomeans sacked 6 villages and a second 
expedition was launched in April. Later still, in October 1878 they 
launched a surprise attack on Meko, to the North West of Abeokuta 
reportedly slaughtering 4000 people and taking 3000 prisoners. 
91 
In 1881 when Tof fo of Porto Novo was again at war with Okeodan with 
consequent serious disruption of trade the Dahomeans went further into 
92 
Yoruba territory, destroying several villages under Oyo control. 
The following year they attacked several villages under Ketu control 
93 
and in 1883 the target became Ketu itgelf where the aged and infirm were 
slaughtered and the rest taken as prisoners to Abomey. 
94 In July of 
that year the roads from Whydah to Great Popo were blocked by the 
Dahomeans. In that same year Dahomey's eastern neighbours, Yoruba, Oyo, 
Bariba and Save united against, and inflicted a defeat upon the 
Dahomeans. 
95 Later that same year the German factories at Porto Novo 
were closed because of a dispute with Toffo over import and export 
dues. 
96 
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ECONOMIC DECLINE, DOMESTIC DISCONTENT AND AUTHORITARIANISM 
These developments were taking place against the backcloth of an 
increasing fragility in the position of Glele and the Dahomean leadership 
as a whole. On the one hand the export trade in slaves which had 
revived with relative suddenness, died away almost as quickly. The palm 
oil trade, which had been decimated, offered no means of a ready 
substitute. 
On the other hand, the manner of Glele's accession, the return to 
regular raiding, the regularity and extent of Customs af ter Gezo's death 
and the lavish outlay involved, were sustainable in the short term only 
on the basis of a thriving slave trade. The pattern of political 
ostentation could not be altered as easily and abruptly as swings in the 
Atlantic slave trade. 
Moreover, since Glele's accession the Dahomean state apparatus now 
had to bear a considerable additional burden compared to the last years 
of Gezo's reign - double tenure in of lice-holding, the appointment of 
newer ministers alongside those inherited from Gezo's reign. 
The motivation f or this move has been touched upon earlier, but set 
against its political advantages was the economic burden of doubling the 
number of ministers entitled to expect largesse and reimbursement from 
the royal exchequer and - indirectly - from the population as a whole. In 
effect, the increase in ministers and officers of royal lineage marked a 
transfer of the cost burden from the royal family themselves to the state 
apparatus. This was already heavily burdened since Gezo's prohibition on 
his Caboceers' sacrificing themselves on his death had ensured an 
inordinately high inheritance rate of ministers for the new monarch. 
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Of course, additional to the cost of extra personnel with a direct 
claim to Exchequer disbursement were the costs - direct and indirect - of 
consistent raiding and wars. The resumption of large-scale raiding 
involved indirect loss of revenue to the monarch resulting from the 
diversion of labour from the production of palm oil and disruption to the 
trade in oil. But, more directly, the resumption of a pattern of 
regular raiding involved direct costs in the supply of arms and 
powder. 
97 The cost of such initial outlay could be met from the 
profits of a successful slave raid, provided such profit was realised 
f rom the sale of slave products. But if , due to decline in the export 
demand for slaves, this was not the case, the leadership faced increasing 
impoverishment in sustaining raiding. 
To be sure, conquest involved the receipt of tribute. But this was 
small in scale relative to the immediate income which could be 
anticipated from a successful harvest of saleable captives. And the 
public manifestation of a successful policy of martial conquest was 
enshrined not only in lavish customs, but particularly in the display of 
the material benefits of such a policy and the liberality of the 
monarch. The old, heady days of the Atlantic trade, institutionalised 
in its effects by Gezo, had acquainted both the higher ranks and lower 
orders with a magnificence which could no easily be forgotten. 
98 
Glele's accession had promised a -renaissance of such times, a promise 
justified up until 1862. But from then on the decline in the export 
sector for slaves had started to tarnish the early expectations. 
By the mid-1860's it was already apparent that this was occurring. 
The condition of Whydah, 
99 
the Royal Palaces, 
100 Royal 
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hospitality, 101 and particularly of the Customs 102 all indicated to 
visitors a decline in the fortunes of the Dahomean leadership. Burton, 
who visited the Customs in 1863 referred to the display of wealth as a 
display of poverty, and concluded that whereas Gezo attempted to keep up 
state, his son was either unable or unwilling to do so. 
103 Dahomey 
had the aura of a declining power. 
As the economic crisis accelerated, the monarch resorted to the 
solutions adopted by his predecessor Adandozan at the beginning of the 
century. Beset by economic difficulties, direct political coercion was 
employed in order to sustain the royal income and increasingly Glele was 
forced into arbitrary impositions on 'western mercantile interests. 
104 
By 1870 the African Company were complaining bitterly to the British 
authorities about the monarchs activity, accusing him of "demanding on 
credit what he likes" and "stopping trade if it be not given. it 
105 
The King was in considerable debt largely because the major method of 
payment available to him remained the supply of slaves, a commodity no 
longer commercially attractive to the western powers. 
106 
By the mid 1870's the signs of decay proliferated. At Abomey the 
Cowrie House lapsed into decay and was no longer festooned by strings of 
cowries or decorated with dollars as in the prosperous days of the slave 
tra e. 
107 
The increasing economic probfems had their effect too upon the 
internal commercial and social situation. Arbitrary impositions on the 
roads or at the factories increased, forcing the domestic population into 
elaborate measures to avoid payment. 
108 Economic impositions were 
accompanied by an increased severity in the treatment of offenders. 
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Anyone caught at avoidance of the impositions suffered confiscation of 
their goods and conscription into the army. 
109 
More than ever, it 
became incautious for Dahomeans to display signs of advances in wealth. 
At signs of enrichment heavy fines were imposed or confiscation 
undertaken on the least pretext. 
110 
The expanding palm oil trade had, in fact, proved to be a two-edged 
sword as far as the aristocracy was concerned. Between 1865 and 1878 
the growing trade in palm oil had brought immediate and direct material 
benefits to an increasing number of Dahomeans. It offered to families 
hitherto denied access to western imports the opportunity to produce oil. 
over and above their domestic requirements and to reinvest part of the 
proceeds of such trade in slaves for the further production of oil. 
Thus, although the export-oriented commodity production remained. 
numerically restricted within Dahomey it is not unnatural that those so 
involved - as well as others who had benefited from the spin-off effects 
on agriculture and pottery production - resented the disruption of their 
newly acquired economic opportunities which accompanied the revival of 
slave raiding- 
ill 
The attraction of the oil trade had an undermining effect on the 
relationship between master and slave, and led to a breakdown in 
discipline which manifested itself particularly in the incidence of 
thefts which persisted despite warnings and beatings. Laffitte commented: 
"Le roi et les dignitaires du gouvernement possedent 
d'immenses plantations de palmiers, chaque nýgre libre 
en poss6-de quelques pieds; les esclaves grappillent 
un peu partout: le bambou proprietaire leur cingle 
les epaules de temps a Vautre pour leur inculquer la 
distinction du tien et du mien; mais ils n'attendent 
pas que les 6paules soient gueries pour recommencer 
la 
maraude". 
112 
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The internal discontent manifested itself also in an outward flow of 
population from the Kingdom. Since the mid-18601 s there had been some 
emigration to the Porto Novo area by families who wished to escape from 
the constraints on opportunities within Dahomey. 113 Gradually, this 
growing social discontent penetrated even the Dahomean armies. By the 
1880's the army could not be taken on expedition in the Porto Novo area 
without risking the loss of part of the troops through desertion to the 
outskirts of the British territories. By the mid-1880's there was a 
settlement of Dahomean refugees at Lagos and a further settlement of some 
400 Dahomeans just behind Badagry. 114 
Glele continued to receive income from many of the traditional 
sources of royal finance. Tribute provided palm oil, cotton, cowries 
and foodstuffs such as Guinea corn and yams. 
115 Tolls on trade goods 
in transit by road or water or at markets provided western goods such as 
rum and domestic produce for the royal household. 
116 Further western 
produce was obtained from dues levied in kind on visiting ships. 
117 
But the income from taxation and tolls was increasingly insufficient 
to maintain a court and state apparatus on the traditionally lavish 
Dahomean scale. 
118 The demise of the slave trade placed the royal 
exchequer under increasing pressure. The lack of an export market f or 
slaves meant the absence of any means. of recompense f or the outlays 
incurred in raiding, particularly 'if heavy losses were sustained during 
the campaign. 
119 It also meant a dearth of imported western luxury 
goods which were so essential to the prestige of the aristocratic class. 
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ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE THE SLAVE TRADE 
At this stage the traditionalists' hand was immeasurably strengthened 
by first the Portuguese and later the German commercial interests. The 
Portuguese connection at Whydah in the late 1870s and early 1880's was as 
strong as it had ever been. Seven out of the twenty-five major traders 
of Dahomey were Brazilian and over half the smaller 'Commercants' - 
seventy-eight out of one hundred and fifty-four - were of a similar 
background. 120 
But by the mid-1880's the relationship between Dahomey and Portugal 
was being put on a far more formalised footing. Partly, this arose from 
a desire of the Dahomean leadership to "cover their backs" while raiding 
was in progress and partly, as we have seen, from their suspicions of 
British and French ambitions. 
121 
Mainly, however, it stemmed from the 
Dahomean desire to resurrect the export trade in slaves. Early in 1884 
Portuguese officers visited Dahomey from the 19th January until the 6th 
February. 122 In mid-1884 Ambassadors were imminently expected to be 
dispatched from Dahomey to Lisbon. 
123 
The subject under discussion was two-fold. Firstly the 
establishment of Portuguese protection to counter the perceived threat 
from the French and the British. And secondly, the resurrection of the 
external slave trade under the guise of "indentured labourers" for St. 
Thome. 124 By the middle of the following year rumours of the intended 
large scale shipment of "indentured labour" were by now widely 
circulating on the west coast. 
125 
In June 1885 the Portuguese Governor of St. Thom& visited Whydah to 
settle the final arrangements. In July or August 200 slaves were 
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reportedly shipped upon the Portuguese transport Africa as indentured 
labourers for 5 years. 
126 
On the 7th July 1885 a convoy of 300 slaves 
arrived at Whydah and were shipped upon the Portguese gunboat Sado. The 
operation was shrouded in considerable secrecy, the slaves were equipped 
with tickets signifying that they had agreed to serve 5 years as 
indentured labourers, and they were reported to be heading f or Angola. 
In August a further steamer arrived to pick up another 400 slaves 
127 
The following month, September, 1000 more slaves were reportedly exported 
coinciding with the placing of Dahomey under Portuguese protection. 
128 
Led by the Cha-Cha Julio Da Souza, several Portuguese officials from 
St Thome, Portuguese colony coffee plantation owners, merchants and the 
Governor of the Portuguese f ort at Whydah went to Abomey to treat with 
the King for a further convoy of several hundred slaves which were 
reportedly planned f or later in the year, and 300 of whom were already 
stationed at Whydah. 
129 In the course of negotiating these new export 
shipments, the monarch, in view of his precarious economic position, 
attempted to ensure his personal monopoly as slave supplier to the 
Portuguese. Others were, of course, keen to sell, and some did in f act 
supply a limited number of slaves, but the King fined the culprits 
heavily. 130 
As is mentioned later, the Germans were eventually to follow the 
Portuguese in giving succour and support to the traditionalists during 
the brief reign of Glele's successor Behanzin, providing rifles and 
ammunition in return for slaves. 
131 
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EFFECT OF RAIDING ON PALM OIL PRODUCTION 
For the western commercial interests and the Afro-Brazilians engaged 
in legitimate trade the resumption of systematic annual raiding was a 
serious curtailment on their potential trading profit. The period 
immediately after the lifting of the British blockade had been one of 
considerable commercial activity, with the establishment of several new 
trading houses along the Dahomean coast. Indeed, by the mid-1880's 
exports f rom Cotonou by R&gis and Fabre alone were running at a level of 
46,391 hectolitres of oil per annum and 2,158,363, kilos of kernels. 
132 
But the constant raiding of the Dahomean army seriously disrupted the 
potential supply of oil, acted as a brake to expansion and affected the 
orderly conduct of trade.. Even British trade, which was represented 
within Dahomean territory proper by only one f irm, Swanzy's, was 
seriously curtailed in the Lagos area by Dahomean raids on the Egba 
hinterland. 133 
1884 was perhaps the most disastrous year yet for western commercial 
interests. There was a disruption of trade from Abomey-Calavi because 
of the impositions and prohibitions of the local chief s, and disruption 
through pillaging at Cotonou. Trade was once more seriously disrupted 
in the same year when the Dahomeans destroyed Okeodan, the strategically 
important town on the commercial trade routes. 
134 
In 1885 the Dahomean armies marched south east against Porto Novo 
territory destroying the large village of Lake and five other of the 
outlying villages and taking the survivors into captivity. 
135 In 
July of that year the second seige of Ketu took place and after early 
reverses the Fon razed the city and took away the survivors as 
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prisoners. Almost certainly these provided the human cargoes f or the 
shipments of "indentured labourers" aboard Portuguese vessels later that 
136 
year. 
Thus, the very regularity of raiding disrupted the orderly conduct of 
commerce. But the essential underlying problem lay in the restrictions 
which were placed on potential palm oil production by the system of 
military raiding. Both could co-exist while the palm oil trade was in 
its infancy, but if the new commerce was to fulfill its maximum potential 
the two were essentially incompatible. This was particularly so since 
raiding not only interrupted the trade in oil, but also limited the time 
which could be spent on the collection of 'the fruit and the production of 
oil, resulting in either a high proportion of the f ruit rotting on the 
trees or the later collection of over-ripe fruit with the consequent 
production of an inferior quality product. 
137 
Contemporary evidence suggests that the bulk of 19th century Dahomean 
oil was produced during the period May-August. This is consistent with 
the experience of Regis's agent Brue in the 1840's. Passing through 
Allada in May 1843, the latter reported on the harvesting of the fruit 
and the intensive palm oil trade in that area . Returning in August of 
the same year he remarked upon the considerable increase in the amount of 
oil on sale at the Allada market, f rom around 10 'pipes' in early May to 
138 30 in August. In the 1870's-; - Skertchly commented on the carriage 
of oil to the coast during early August, 
139 
and dwelt on the 
140 
difficulties of transporting the product during the rainy season. 
areas adjacent to Dahomey the intensive production of palm oil 
appears to have commenced somewhat earlier 
in the year . At Lagos, the 
498. 
certainty of oil cargoes was guaranteed from as early as February, 
141 
while at Abeokuta the palm oil season ran from February to July. 
142 
It thus appears that the productive potential in Dahomey was curtailed by 
the military mobilisation and campaigning which normally occurred c. 
November to February/March. 143 This point is borne out by the fact 
that in 20th century Dahomey, after the demise of militarism, the main 
palm oil season came to be located in November-March, 
144 
precisely the 
period which was occupied with the military mobilisation throughout the 
19th century. 
This conflict between the timing of military mbbilisation and the 
potential palm oil season was particularly acute in Dahomey. On the 
Abomey plateau, unlike many areas of Africa, men formed the mainstay of 
the agricultural labour force, largely because the severe shortage of 
water required the involvement of large numbers of women as water 
carriers. 
145 Thus the military corvee which drew mainly Dahomean 
males into the army was particularly constraining on the full development 
of palm oil production. 
In addition, the practice of annual raiding not only curtailed the 
commercial exploitation of Dahomean palm oil potential, but also 
discouraged effort in caring for the palm trees or the clearing of 
brushwood around them 
146 And, from the point of view of transport 
the difficulties of moving oil -during the rainy season must have 
curtailed the ability of large producers to move significant amounts of 
oil from the central regions of the kingdom to Whydah, given the 
geographical conditions of Dahomey and in particular the Lama. 
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While the military calendar may have been a severe obstacle to those 
seeking to maximise oil production, from the monarch's point of view 
there was no reason why the palm oil trade should, in the first instance, 
prove incompatible with a Dahomey largely directed towards military 
raiding. Although there was an optimimum period f or preparation and 
production of the oil, it was a sufficiently flexible process to allow 
sub-optimum production to take place for a considerable period of the 
year. Indeed, this may well have been a central feature of its 
attraction to the Dahomean warrior aristocracy prior to its destabilising 
influence becoming apparent. 
Thus the fact that -the monarch and Dahomean leadership, despite their 
participation in the palm oil trade, were still committed to slave 
raiding and a martial life-style for Dahomey was ultimately a 
constraining factor on the oil trade. Moreover, from the point of view 
of the aristocracy the new trade still did not compensate in economic 
terms for the loss of the slave trade, and the final decline of the 
latter led to a serious shortage of revenue which had to be replaced from 
some quarter. Finally, developing commercial and political rivalry 
between the western powers on the coast inexorably drew the Dahomean 
leadership into the arena of territorial conflict. Just as the slave 
trade at its height had become integrally related to Dahomean-Western 
relations, so now the flourishiii-g palm oil trade began to permeate 
Glele's political relationships with the western powers. 
In the earlier part of his reign, Glele had adopted the same 
confident posture in his dealings with Europeans in general. A, 11 
Europeans without exception had to attend the Customs. 
147 Letters 
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from distant ambassadors would no longer suffice; the King required 
personal communication. 
148 
Renewed threats of British suppression of 
the slave trade were, during this period, met with renewed Dahomean 
confidence. There was, according to the Dahomean leadership, plenty of 
opportunity to sell, at good prices. 
149 
In any case, if the British 
suppressed the export trade, they would continue to raid., and to 
sacrifice the captives. 
150 
To a great extent this confident and agressive tone - in contrast to 
the conciliatory posture adopted by Gezo in the decade from 1850 - 
derived. directly f rom the revival of t, he slave trade around the time of 
Glele's accession. .A thriving trade - provided the spur to a 
re-invigorated military drive, and the economic strength to support 
renewed confidence vis-a-vis the western powers. To some extent also, 
it derived from a perceived failure of the western powers, particularly 
Britain, to fulfill their promises from Cruickshank onwards, 
151 
and an 
apparent incapacity on their part to suppress the slave trade. Glele's 
slave raiding was more likely to be constrained by a shortage of demand 
than by British naval might. But in the meantime, the growing 
polarisation of opinion within Dahomey and the increasing tension between 
Europeans and the African kingdom was parallelled by developing divisions 
among the European powers themselves, none of whom had yet established 
territorial dominance. 
GROWING EUROPEAN RIVALRY. FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY 
These divisions between western commercial concerns became sharper 
and more pronounced in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
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partly, as Hopkins has pointed out, because of the adverse movement in 
the terms of trade during this period. 
152 
More immediately, on the 
Dahomean coast the divisions were strengthened by the commercial 
sufferings imposed on other Europeans - particularly the French - as a 
result of the British blockade. The French at Whydah, already suffering 
disproportionately compared with English merchants based at Lagos and 
areas to the East, were now additionally hampered by the restrictions on 
merchants correspondence and movement imposed as a result of the 
blockade. 153 
But the rivalries had deeper roots. Dahomey had become a 
centre-piece of Franco-British rivalries which had been heightening on 
the coast since the 1860's. Under Glover the British had been 
attempting to channel trade through Lagos, while the French, urged on by 
Regis, tried to combat this by building up their commercial interests and 
political influence at Cotonou. 
The French claimed that Glele had ceded Cotonou to Desrauz in 1864, 
and on the 19th May 1868 Regis' agent Bonnaud, acting as French 
Vice-Consul, signed a Treaty with the Yevogan confirming the cession to 
France of an area of some 6 Kilometres at Cotonou. According to this 
alleged agreement this area was to remain under Dahomean occupation until 
such time as France wished to occupy it. 
154 Not surprisingly, some 
French officials remained scepticar that Glele personally had assented to 
the terms of the Cotonou Treaty as understood by the French, but in the 
absence of any likely, immediate commitments the French Government 
eventually decided to confirm the Treaty. 
155 They were encouraged to 
do so by a feeling of increasing vulnerability to British 
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encroachments. That feeling was strengthened early in 1875 when the 
chiefs of Grand Popo requested admission to the British 
Protectorate. 156 But it was the blockade the following year which 
really brought home to the French just how important Cotonou was to their 
own commercial interests, and in particular how important it was as a 
thoroughfare to Porto-Novo trade. 157 
There was some relief among the French that the Anglo-Dahomean Treaty 
which concluded the blockade involved no extension of British territory 
in the area of the Bights which would have strengthened Britain's 
leverage in the anticipated Gambia negotiations and enhanced their local 
commercial position. 
158 
But despite their faith in the good 
intentions of the Yevogan, 
159 
the French remained concerned about some 
aspects of the Treaty. 
Firstly, article (11) gave the British rights to "hire, occupy and 
possess any houses and warehouses for the purpose of commerce. " 
Although the French did not believe that the King would place the same 
construction on this article as the British they were aware that if the 
British followed it in its entirety it would create an entirely new 
precedent. Secondly, article (111) called for the protection of the 
British, not only from native Dahomeans, but also from other foreigners 
in the country. 
160 
Accordingly, the French responded to the perceived threat to their 
interests by appointing Regis' agent in the area as Vice-Consul for 
France in 1876 and by negotiating a new Franco-Dahomean Treaty confirming 0 
yet again the French rights at Cotonou which the British had refused to 
recognise during the blockade. 
161 
The Treaty, dated 19/4/1878 and 
503. 
signed by the Yevogan and Chuydaton was similar to the 1877 
Anglo-Dahomean Treaty. But in Article 7 it once again gave further 
confirmation to the cession of Cotonou. 
162 
In view of Glele's attitude towards the European powers, his obvious 
commitment to maintaining Dahomey's integrity and his steadfastedness 
throughout the period of the blockade, it seems inconceivable that the 
monarch was fully cognisant of the terms of the Treaty signed on his 
behalf by the Yevogan and Chuydaton. It seems far more likely that what 
he was agreeing to was the concession of the rights of trade at 
Cotonot. 163 Nevertheless, to enforce their own legitimacy the French 
appointed Ardin D'Elteil as resident at Cotonou and salaried Vice-Consul 
at Whydah. 
164 
Immediately after the cession of Cotonou by the Treaty of 1878, Great 
Britain responded by planting their flag at Ketonou, sustaining the 
claims of Hungbo, a rival claimant to Toffo at Porto Novo, and declaring 
Ketonou autonomous from the latter. Ketonou was strategically vital, 
for it was by Ketonou that the Lagoon of Porto Novo communicated with 
Cotonou. Thus a British occupation isolated Porto Novo and rendered it 
dependent on the English customs at Lagos. The same European power 
struggle was conducted by proxy among the Aguegne in the hinterland of 
Porto Novo on the lower Oueme where the chief, Aide, passed in turn 
165 
between Britain's man and France's man. 
Throughout the 1880's the Franco-British competition heightened in 
the Dahomey area, fuelled by rumour, speculation and mutual suspicion. 
France responded to Toffo's fears of the British by placing the kingdom 
of Porto Novo under their protection in 1883. But 
internal divisions 
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over succession allowed the British to foster instability. In the same 
year rumours abounded concerning plans to place Great Popo under French 
protection, 
166 
while it was reported that King Toffo of Porto Novo was 
trying to persuade the natives of Ketonou to withdraw from British 
protection. 
167 
Early the next year French missionaries reported the eagerness of the 
people of Okparo, to the east of Porto Novo, to seek French protection, 
and at the same time French officials were turning their minds to the 
strategic value of the length and navigability of the River Addo which 
by-passed Okeodan. 168 
French suspicions of British intentions in Dahomey and the 
possibility of military intervention were strengthened by the 
establishment of a further British firm, Walsh Brothers in Dahomey in the 
late 1870's. 169 
EUROPEAN RIVAlRIES INCREASED BY PORTUGUESE AND GERMANS 
In the late 1870's and 1880's European rivalry on the coast was 
complicated further by the re-emergence of the Portuguese as political 
suitors and commercial benefactors of the Dahomean leadership. French 
and British paranoia swung hither and thither at the re-emergence of a 
third European force. 
In late 1878 and early 1879 Portuguese officers and merchants were 
detained at Abomey for a considerable time in discussion with the 
Dahomean leaders. 170 French speculation in early 1883 that the 
Portuguese intended to cede their rights at Whydah to the British 
171 
were quashed later the same year by Portuguese visits to Abomey and by 
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reports early in April 1884 that 2 envoys f rom the King of Dahomey had 
been dispatched to Lisbon. 
172 
Their purpose became clearer when 
within two months the then Cha-Cha, Julio da Souza, was entertained at 
the Dahomean capital along with Portuguese officials offering protection 
and seeking f rom the Dahomeans the 'hire' of "indentured labour", a 
euphemism for a revived slave trade. 
173 The following month it was 
announced that all debates concerning European trading disputes must take 
place at the house of the Cha-qha. 
174 
This new found Portuguese influence only served to increase their 
rivalry with the French, particularly over Cotonou. As we have already 
seen, Cotonou had been a source of friction between the French and the 
Fon for some time. The French Resident at Porto Novo complained 
bitterly that despite the 1878 Treaty the Chief at Cotonou had continued 
to charge customs. dues on the factories on the beach in the name of the 
King of Dahomey, and to insist on ruling on disputes between the European 
175 
factories and the natives whom they employed. The situation was 
further exacerbated when in September 1885 the Portuguese announced that 
all Dahomean territories including Whydah, Godomey, Abomey-Calavi and the 
beach at Cotonou were being placed under their protection. The 
Portuguese flag was hoisted at Whydah on the 10th September and at 
Cotonou on the 13th. The French immediately protested and their Agent 
proceeded to Cotonou with an armed -escort, refusing Portuguese entreaties 
to discuss the matter at Whydah. When the Portuguese themselves 
proceeded to Whydah the French pulled down the Portuguese flag and 
thereafter effectively occupied Cotonou. 
176 
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When Fabre's agent at Cotonou constructed a channel with a view to 
establishing a direct access to the sea on the 21st August 1885 the Fon 
and French faced open conflict. Quite apart from the breach of Dahomean 
sovereignty which this entailed., the chanelling caused considerable flood 
damage to native dwellings, and consequent appeals to the King of Dahomey 
by the local chiefs. 
177 
The Fon demanded reparation, dispatched troops and closed the roads 
stopping trade at the French factories at Whydah and Cotonou. But they 
effectively left the Portuguese to handle the matter on the spot. The 
French brought up 2 warships and both French and Portuguese dispatched 
troops to Cotonou, but the latter eventually withdrew, once again leaving 
the beach to the French. This second rebuff to the Portuguese by the 
French inevitably undermined Fon confidence in the capacity of the 
Portuguese to act effectively as military allies, but the Dahomean desire 
to maintain a slave export sector was sufficient to stop an open breach 
with the Portuguese. 
178 
Undeterred, the Portuguese continued their overtures to establish 
their protectorate. In February 1886 the French Agent at Whydah 
reported that the Portuguese intended to establish customs dues at 
Whydah. 179 Two months later a Portuguese major, Cortez da Sylva 
Curado, left for another mission to Abomey in an attempt to settle the 
terms of a Portuguese protectorate. -180 
But the Portuguese were increasingly proving of little value to the 
Fon, and their loyalty was in doubt. A-f ter the announcement of a 
Portuguese protectorate at Cotonou in 1885, when the Portuguese f lag was 
raised alongside the French one, French protests to their superiors at 
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home resulted in a French Emissary, Victor Ballot, being sent to 
undertake negotiations with Julio da Souza and the Goveror of St. 
Thome-. At that stage Glele summoned Julio to Abomey, f rom where he 
never returned. 
181 
These inter-European rivalries were further complicated in the late 
1880's when German commercial houses began trading arms to the Fon in 
return for slaves. The demand for 'indentured labourers' to accompany 
the more active colonial policy of the government of Cameroon provided a 
new stimulus to German entrepreneurs, and in July 1890 Barth, a Hamburg 
merchant met the -new King Behanzin - Glele had died on the 28th December 
1889 182 to negotiate the exchange of slaves for arms. 
183 The 
main German firms involved were Wolber and Brohm, Frangoff and 
Goedelt, 184 and training instructors were also supplie d. 
185 The 
exact quantity of arms delivered is uncertain, although it was reported 
that Wolber and Brohm. supplied the new monarch with 800 rifles, while 
Barth had contracted to supply a further 3000.186 Between 1889-91, at 
least 5 shipments of slaves left Whydah on German vessels bound for the 
Congo, Cameroon and San Thome-. 
187 This German activity had for some 
time been perceived by the French as a threat to their commercial 
interest and led to calls for France to put the Popos, Dahomey and Porto 
Novo under one French protectorate. 
188 
THE FINAL SOLUTION. PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OF PALM TREES 
European territorial aggression might well have been enough in itself 
to ensure an inevitable confrontation with the Dahomean authorities. 
But it was matched within the Dahomean hierarchy itself by a growing 
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antipathy towards the consequences of the new commerce. After five 
decades of experiment, adaptation,, conciliation and compromise the 
Dahomean leadership were increasingly pushed towards total resistance to 
the external threat posed by the western powers and the internal 
destabilisation resulting from legitimate trade. 
Increasingly, as the traditionalists within the Dahomean hierarchy 
reacted to the commercial and political threat from the new trade, 
Dahomean raiding took on another aspect, more directly and consciously 
aimed at damaging the palm oil trade. The Dahomean leadership, who had 
attempted for so long at least to live with the new palm oil commerce 
were f inally pushed into a position of downright opposition to those 
areas of the trade which they could not control. Dahomean raiding 
became as much directed towards the destruction of palm trees - the main 
source of attraction to western commercial interests and the new found 
source of wealth for Dahomean subjects and peripheral peoples. This 
development marked the final, desperate reponse of a political 
aristocracy whose economic and social position had been more and more 
undermined by changing commercial f orces. Not surprisingly, the focus 
of attention f or Dahomean wrath was the Porto Novo area, one central to 
the political struggle between the Fon and the French, but just as 
importantly, an area abundant in palm trees and the potential riches of 
the palm oil trade. 
189 
In late 1889 reports from Dahomey suggested that Glele was preparing 
a huge expedition against the Porto Novo outskirts as they 
had done 
earlier that year. But the reports went 
further. On Glele's 
instructions the forges of Dahomey had been directed towards the 
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production of ten thousand axes with which to equip his army for the 
cutting down of the lucrative palm trees. 
190 That the monarch's 
explicit aim was the disruption of western trade and the destruction of 
the palm trees which formed the basis of the lucrative oil trade was made 
abundantly clear in a communication from himself to western officials on 
the coast. 
191 
Between May and August of the following year the Dahomean army 
ravaged and pillaged their way through the outlying villages of Porto 
Novo, burning the villages to the ground and cutting down the palm 
trees. 
192 The constant menaces of the Fon Against Porto Novo in 
general and the palm oil trade in particular now represented aý threat to 
French commerce and customs which could not be ignored. 
193 For the 
French, the f inal act of intervention was by now inevitable. The 
government of Dahomey represented an obstacle to their ambitions to 
develop Cotonou and a menace to their commercial interests at Porto Novo. 
Moreover, they now constituted a threat to the potentially lucrative 
Oueme valley and an unreliable partner in the protection of the palm oil 
commerce in Dahomey itself. 
194 The growing frustration of the French 
was encapsulated in the sentiments of one official who wrote that: 
"La question de Kotonou se regle-ra facilement; il ne 
I- Glele sans s agit que d1imposer notre volonte au Roi 
II entrer en pourparlers ... 
195 
In December 1889 the French-emissary Bayol failed to get Prince 
Condo (later King Behanzin) to budge over the sovereignty of 
Cotonou, 196 and early in the new year French officials on the coast 
were actively urging a military attack on 
Abomey. 
197 In February 1890 
Bayol declared that henceforth Cotonou would be French territory. 
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Despite intermittent negotiations thereafter the die was Cast and French 
intervention was eventually sparked of f by the Dahomean raid into Dekame 
in the Oueme valley in March of the following year. French military 
reinforcements arrived in May of that year, had crossed the Oueme en 
route for Abomey by 2nd October and deposed Behanzin on 3 December. 
198 
For the Fon, the wheel had turned full circle. The central Dahomean 
authorities had tried to accept the new commercial ventures and the palm 
oil trade in the early 1830's. From the late 1830's they had even tried 
to encourage it as a supplement to the slave trade. Throughout the 
1850's Gezo had attempted to introduce a strategy for adaptation aimed at 
achieving the gradual replacement of an inherited socio-economic 
structure by a commercially oriented economic basis for political 
power. Failure and disillusionment led initially to a reaction in the 
late 1850's and early 1860's, a return to raiding and attempts to revive 
the increasingly beleaguered slave trade. 
Between the second defeat at Abeokuta in 1864 and the mid-1870's an 
uneasy equilibrium had been maintained between Dahomean and the west, and 
within Dahomey itself. But the 1876 blockade had illustrated just how 
fragile that equilibrium was. Increasingly from then onwards an 
embattled Dahomean leadership abandoned compromise with the west and 
resorted to military force as the means of maintaining the old ways and 
surpressing the new, corrosive economic trends. From the mid-1870's 
Dahomey returned to her classical annual raiding system developed under 
Gezo with predictable effects on the flow of trade to the west. And 
from the late 1880's all hope of compromise with the new trade had been 
abandoned by the majority of the Dahomean leadership. They had finally 
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recognised the incompatibility of the new commercial trends with the 
hitherto economic existing basis of their political power. 
But the Dahomean polity itself was seriously split. It included 
within it those who wished to bow to what they perceived as the 
inevitable - and potentialy beneficial - outcome of the new economic 
trends. This opposition, and the growth of internal discontent which it 
reflected, was insufficiently strong to achieve any radical change in the 
Dahomean state or economic system. Indeed, its very existence 
accentuated the trend towards reaction. Thus, if economic factors 
prompted a resort to arbitrary government,, political paranoia heightened 
the determination with which it was applied. Both dimensions pointed 
towards the new palm oil commerce as a threat which had to be removed. 
As a corollary, the western powers moved -towards a perception of the 
existing Dahomean government and state structure as the major impediment 
to economic progress. "Dahomey" wrote Foa in the 1890's: 
er a passe sa vie a faire la guerre; .... ruiný surtout 
par son, 
lgouvernment 
despotique qui s'oppose au 
progres. ' 
9 
And elsewhere he commented: 
"Au Dahomey ... il ne fallait compter sur aucune 
amelioration, tantodue le regime gouvernmental n'avait 
pas ete modifie. -2 
Foa's comments are illustrative of the growing consensus among the 
western powers as regards their perception of Dahomey. Undoubtedly they 
were Eurocentric. No doubt such sentiments were also useful as an 
apology for colonial adventure. But, despite the preconceptions and 
prejudice which underlay them, they also displayed a recognition of 
temporary reality. The west correctly perceived the Dahomean state and 
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social formation as a major obstacle to economic expansion, just as the 
Dahomean authorities came to regard the 'economic progress' of the west 
as a dire threat to their political position. It was this twin 
conflict, internal as well as external, which led to the eventual 
colonial occupation of Dahomey. 
The seriousness of the burgeoning contradi-etions within Dahomey 
itself has not always been appreciated by modern historians. Indeed, 
one of the foremost scholars of 19th century Dahomey has explicitly 
rejected the notion of internal dislocation and disruption. On the 
C. ontrary, Dahomey is characterised as a relatively stable country, with 
the government f irmly in control and a well integrated, internal market 
economy flourishing. 
201 
In fact, by the last quarter of the 19th century the evidence 
suggests a very different Dahomey. Attempts at political and economic 
adjustment had been made, but the corrosive influence of economic 
developments on the inherited social formation required the . eventual 
resistance of the Dahomean hierarchy. Dahomey's integration into the 
world economy was, quite simply, incompatible with the material basis on 
which her social hierarchy and state structure rested. 
It is thi s essential contradiction which has previously been 
identified by Hopkins: 
"African rulers attempted -to bolster their fortunes by 
means which were familiar to pre-industrial 
governments throughout the world, namely by employing 
armed strength to plunder and to exact tribute 
from 
their neighbours ... the kings of 
Dahomey made 
annual incursions into Yoruba country ... Military 
operations, and, perhaps more important., the constant 
threat of them, led to the abandonment of fertile 
land, and to the creation of broad areas of neutral 
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territory between hostile states. They perpetuated 
conditions which were inimical to the growth of the 
petty capitalism that had been fostered by legitimate 
commerce. They dramatised what may be called the 
crisis of the aristocracy in nineteenth-century West 
Africa, a social and political crisis stemming from a 
contradiction between past and. present relations of 
production. They were a last resort, and, as such, 
represented the ultimate failure of the ancien r6gime 
to adapt peacefully and efficiently to the demands of 
the industrial world., -202 
I 
From that point it was inevitable that the conflict between the two would 
have to involve one side losing out. That conflict was eventually 
resolved by the f orce of French arms, when military conquest imposed 
commercial free trade on a reluctant Dahomean leadership. 
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APPENDIX A 
DAHOMEY, CANNAH 
JANUARY 12,1852. 
Madam, 
In answer to a letter addressed to King Gezo from Commodore Bruce, dated 
December 17th 1851, he sends the following reply to Her Most Gracious 
Majesty, Queen Victoria. 
lst. This letter was not written by the Queen of England. 
2nd. If two persons at a distance are seen laughing' together they must 
have something to amuse them. 
3rd. It is necessary when two parties dispute a fight, that a third 
should intercede. 
4th. He has had no palaver with the Queen of England. 
5th. The three Forts at Whydah, the f ormer King made arrangements with 
the English, French and Portuguese governments f or building them, and a 
Roman Catholic Chapel was built in the Portuguese Fort. He appointed 
the Yer-vo-gan to take care of these Forts and the Portuguese sent a 
priest to take care of the King. 
6th. The reason he mentions these particulars, is, when there is any 
correspondence between white and blackman, the white man cannot forget 
the transaction, the black man may forget it, for he cannot read or write. 
7th. The reason he says so, he wishes to call the attention of all white 
men present, that not one of them is his equal, because he is the King, 
and the Queen of England's friend; for all that, whenever he sees a 
white man come to his place, he gives him his hand, f or he remembers the 
treaty that was made by his ancestors. For instance, he shakes hands 
with Mr Hutton and his son, without making any distinction. - He gives 
his hand to all white men who come-here to see him because the Kings and 
Queens of Europe cannot come here, therefore he gives his hand out of 
respect to their sovereign. 
8th. It is nine years ago since he had the first message from the Queen 
of England, about the supression of the Slave Trade; since which time he 
has received one or two messangers, said to come 
from the Queen of 
England, he gave his answers and expected that they would return, which 
they have not done. To prevent mistakes between himself and the Queen 
529. 
of England, he sent two boys and two girls to be educated in England and 
he has not heard of them since. 
9th. He has not shipped slaves from Whydah for three years, which is 
previous to Mr Beecroft's and Lieut. Forbes' mission from the Queen of 
England to see his Customs and report the cost, but they went away in the 
middle of them and have not returned. 
10th. He does not know why all of his country should be blockaded, except 
Badagry. That his dominations extend from the opening at Grand Popoe to 
Lagos, therefore he does not think the Queen of England sent this palaver. 
llth. Now about War and Sacrifices 
The reason, he says, this message is not from the Queen of England, 
because if the Queen makes a Law and any breaks (sic) that law or causes 
revolution, they will be punished, on that account the Queen sends out 
Her Ships of War. 
That is the reason he makes laws and when they break them he makes war . 
.*. 0*... 0 
When two princes are fighting and the weakest runs to him for protection, 
then he assists or makes peace. 
When any of his traders are sent, with goods to any place in the 
interior, they are seized and killed or beaten, that is the reason he 
attacks the place. As in the case with the Attahpams, they seized one 
of his subjects, killed and gibbeted him, therefore he made war with 
them, and sent his people to bring those parties, to serve them the same 
as was done to his subjects. 
12th In answer to the letter brought by Comm. T. G. Forbes, he will send a 
messenger to accompany Cap. Forbes to deliver him, to the Commodore, to 
be sent to England, with this letter, and return with the Queen's answer. 
13th The reason he makes war 
For example; Kosoko and Attakoy, both living in the same country, and 
they make war, Accatoy (sic) finding he has not sufficient force applies 
to the Queen of England for assistance; He says the Queen of England did 
not send the messages for him not to make war. 
14th Respecting Abeokuta - 
When two kings are fighting the third will mediate; Abbeokuta sent a 
message to the Queen of England, which has 
been answered by a messenger 
from England. Previous to the Queen sending a messenger to the Chiefs of 
Abbeokuta, it would have been well to enquire the cause of his making war 
with that nation and to have sent a messanger 
by sea, to Whydah, to hear 
the causes of this war. It is necessary that the 
Queen of England and 
the President of France, send each a messenger to speak about this, 
because he does not live on the sea side, and if anything takes place at 
Whydah he is not there. 
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15th. The King says if white man does not come to buy slaves, he cannot 
sell; but since the Queen of England and other nations prohibit the 
Slave trade, he distinctly declares that the Slave trade is ended and he 
will not sell any more. And, as the Queen of England made this law, he 
will not break it and states that his line of coast extends from the 
opening at Grand Popoe to Lagos. 
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APPENDIX B 
Treaty to be Proposed to the King of Dahomey 
HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of Dahomey, being desirous of concluding a Treaty for the abolition of the barbarous practice of transporting natives of Africa across the sea for the purpose of consigning them to Slavery in 
foreign countries, Her Majesty has for this purpose named as her 
Plenipotentiaries, John Beecroft, Esquire, her Consul to the native 
Chiefs of Africa whose territories lie between Cape St Paul and Cape St 
John, and Frederick Edwin Forbes, a Lieutenant in Her Majesty's Naval 
Service, and the Commander of her ship of war the "Bonetta". 
And they, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, for and on behalf of Her 
Majesty, her heirs and successors, and His Majesty Guezo, King of 
Dahomey, for himself, his heirs and successors, have agreed upon and 
concluded the following Articles and Conditions: - 
ARTICLE I 
The exportation of slaves to foreign countries is for eN 
in the territories of the King of Dahomey, and the King 
engages to make and to proclaim a law prohibiting any of his 
any person within his jurisdiction from selling or assisting 
of any slave for transportation to a foreign country; and 
Dahomey promises to inflict a severe punishment on any 
break this law. 
ARTICLE II 
ýr abolished 
of Dahomey 
subjects or 
in the sale 
the King of 
II- person wno sna-L-L 
No European or other person whatever shall be permitted to reside 
within the territory of the King of Dahomey for the purpose of carrying 
on in any way the Traffic in Slaves; and no houses, stores, barracoons, 
or other buildings of any kind whatever shallbe erected for the purposes 
of Slave Trade within the territory of the King of Dahomey; and if any 
such houses, stores, barracoons, or other buildings shall at any future 
time be erected within the territory of Dahomey, and the King of Dahomey 
shall fail or be unable to destroy them, they may be destroyed by any 
British officers employed for the suppression of the Slave Trade. 
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ARTICLE III 
If at any time it shall appear that Slave Trade has been carried on 
through or from the territory of the King of Dahomey, such Slave Trade 
may be put down in that territory by Great Britain by force, and British 
officers may seize any boats of Dahomey found anywhere carrying on the 
Slave Trade. 
ARTICLE IV 
The slaves now held f or exportation in Dahomey shall be delivered up 
at Whydah to the senior off icer of Her Britannic Majesty's Naval Forces 
in the Bight of Benin, for the purpose of being carried to a British 
colony, to be there set free; and all the implements of the Slave Trade 
and the barracoons or buildings exclusively used in the Slave Trade shall 
be forthwith destroyed. 
ARTICLE V 
Europeans or other persons who may be found to be engaged in the 
Slave Trade in the territory of Dahomey, are to be expelled from the 
country; the houses, stores or buildings hitherto employed as slave 
factories, if not converted to lawful purposes within three months from 
the conclusion of this Treaty, are to be destroyed. 
ARTICLE VI 
The subjects of Her Britannic Majesty may always trade freely with 
the people of Dahomey in every article which they may wish to buy or sell 
in all the places and ports and rivers within the territories of the King 
of Dahomey, and throughout the whole of his dominions; and the King of 
Dahomey pledges himself to show no favour and to give no privilege to the 
ships and traders of other countries, which he 
does not or will not show 
to those of England. 
ARTICLE VII 
In consideration of the above-mentioned concessions on the part of 
the King of Dahomey, and in full c-ompensation for the temporary 
loss of 
revenue to which His Majesty may be subject therefrom, 
Her Majesty the 
Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland engages to make 
to the King of Dahomey yearly for three years, a present of either of 
E sterling, or of goods to that value, at the option of 
the King. 
But this annual present is to cease if 
Slave Trade should again be 
carried on within the territory of 
Dahomey. 
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ARTICLE VIII 
This Treaty shall have full force and effect from the day 
of 1850. 
In faith whereof the above-names Plenipotentiaries of Her Britannic 
Majesty and His Majesty the King of Dahomey have signed the same, and 
have affixed thereto their respective seals. 
Done at Abomey, the day of 3 1850. 
Source: Parliamentary Papers, Slave Trade, vol. 90,1845-59, "Papers 
relative to the Reduction of Lagos", item 3, enclosure no. 20. 
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Treaty Signed By the King of Dahomey, January 1852. 
Engagement between Her Majesty the Queen of England and the King and 
Chiefs of Dahomey, for the Abolition of the traffic in Slaves. 
signed at Cannah 
I. Thomas George Forbes, of Her Majesty's ship Philomel on the part of 
Her Majesty the Queen of England and the King and Chiefs of Dahomey and 
the neighbourhood on the part of themselves and their country, have 
agreed to the following article and condition. 
Article I 
The export of Slaves to f oreign. countries is f or ever abolished in the 
territories of the King and Chief s of Dahomey; and the King 'and Chief s 
of Dahomey engage to make and proclaim a Law, prohibiting any of their 
subjects, or any person within their jurisdiction, from selling or 
assisting in the sale of any Slaves for transportation to a foreign 
country; and the King and Chief s of Dahomey promise to inflict a severe 
punishment on any person who shall break this law. 
Dated January 13 1852. 
In faith of which we have here set our hands and seals. 
Witnesses 
Isidore Fellix da Souza 
Ignatio Fellix da Souza 
Antonio Fellix da Souza 
Thomas Hutton. 
syned 
Gezo, King of Dahomey 
x 
his mark. 
Tho. Geo. Forbes, Com. HMS Philomel 
Lious Fraser, ... V. C. King. of 
Dahomey 
Mayhoo X his mark 
Yer-vo-gan X his mark 
Source: F084/886/158. 
535. 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, between Her Majesty and the King of Dahomey. 
Signed at Whydah, May 12,1877. 
Treaty between Captain George Lydiard Sulivan, of the Royal Navy, 
commanding Her Majesty's ship "Sirius"y on behalf of Her Most 
Gracious Majesty Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and 
Empress of India, and the Avogah of Dahomey, Sahcloca, the second 
Avogah of Dahomey, Chodatong, on behalf of Glele, King of Dahomey. 
ARTICLE I 
IT is agreed that there shall be henceforth peace and friendship 
between Her Most Gravious Majesty Queen Victoria and His Majesty Gelele, 
of Dahomey, in Africa, and their heirs and successors. 
ARTICLE II 
There shall be to the subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty Victoria, 
Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and Empress of India, complete liberty 
of commerce, and they shall have entire right and liberty to come with 
their ships and cargoes to all places and ports in the dominions of His 
Majesty Gelele, to reside and trade in any part of the said dominions, to 
hire, occupy, and possess any houses or warehouses for the purpose of 
commerce, and enjoy the most complete protection and security from His 
Majesty the King of Dahomey, the Governors and people of his dominions. 
ARTICLE III 
The subjects of Her Britannic Majesty being or residing or trading in 
the country of Dahomey shall receive special protection from all 
annoyance and inconvenience in their various occupations or trades from 
any and all of the subjects of His Majesty Gelele, and from foreigners 
residing in that country, and they shall be permitted to hoist on their 
houses and factories a flag of the Kingdom of Dahomey alone, or in 
concert with the flag of England; and the King Gelele engages herewith 
to issue a proclamation to His Majesty's subjects, and to all foreigners 
in his dominions, never again to molest, interfere with, or threaten the 
lives of persons of British subjects, on pain of severe punishment. 
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ARTICLE IV 
The export of slaves to foreign countries 
the territories of the King of Dahomey, and th( 
in accordance with a former Treaty between H 
England and King Gezo of Dahomey, dated January 
in force for ever. 
ARTICLE V 
is for ever abolished in 
! law made and proclaimed 
ar Majesty the Queen of 
13) 1852, shall continue 
No British subject shall henceforth be compelled to attend any of the 
customs of the country of Dahomey where any human sacrifices are held. 
ARTICLE VI 
Whereas, in consequence of insult and violence towards one of Her 
Majesty's subjects in the country of Dahomey, a fine has been imposed of 
500 puncheons of oil on that Kingdom, and a blockade established to 
enforce payment of the same, it is herein agreed, on the part of Her Most 
Gracious Majesty, that the fine shall be reduced to 500 puncheons of oil 
and the blockade immediately raised, under the following conditions: 
that 200 puncheons of oil are paid at once, and the remainder within 
twelve months from this date; and His Majesty King Gelele agrees to 
these conditions, and promises herewith to complete the payment of the 
400 puncheons of oil by the time given. 
Signed at the Pacooteh Whydahý at Whydah, this 12th day of May, 1877. 
(Signed) GEORGE LYDIARD SULIVAN, Captain and 
Senior Officer, West Coast of 
Africa. 
SACHLOCA, the Avogah of Dahomey. 
CHODATONG, the Second Avogah of Dahomey. 
KING GELELE, his X mark. 
Witnesses to Treaty: 
(Signed) ARTHUR H. ALINGTON, 
Commander, H. M. S. "Boxer". 
FREDERICK MAXWELL HERON, 
Commander, H. M. S. "Seagull". 
Source: Parliamentary Papers, Slave Trade, vol. 93,1876-88, 
"Treaty 
between Great Britain and the King of Dahomey 1878" 
(c. 1902), Vol. LXVII. 
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APPENDIX C 
Extracts from French Shippiný, 1865 
Date of Value in 
Arrival/Leaving Tonnage Destination Trade Goods Cargo Francs 
19/2/65-30/3/65 300 Whydah Ballast 866 Barrels 
oil 268,000 
13/4/65-30/4/65 174 Whydah Rum and 212,000 kilo 
Provisions nuts 700,000 
6/5/65-2/8/65 269 Whydah Ballast 770 Barrels 
oil 220,000 
19/5/65-13/9/65 224 Whydah/ Rum, 
Porto Novo/ Cloth 998,000 kilo 
Lagos +? nuts 105,000 
3/7/65-5/8/65 298 Whydah/ 396,000 kilo 
Lagos ? nuts 144,000 
14/8/65-30/8/65 269 Whydah/ Rum, Cloth Ballast 
Porto Novo +? [sic] 144,000 
20/8/65-6/10/65 201 Whydah/ Rum, Cloth, 
Porto Novo/ Liquers, 500 Barrels 
Lagos +? oil 175,000 
9/9/65-12/l/66 249 Whydah Rum 362,000 kilo 
nuts 125,000 
18/9/65-2/12/65 276 Whydah/ Rum & 839 Barrels 
Porto Novo Cloth oil 160,000 
20/9/65-16/12/65 294 Whydah/ Rum, Cloth, 806 Barrels 
Porto Novo Liquers +? oil 160,000 
23/10/65-18/l/66 212 Whydah/ 312,000 kilo 
Porto Novo ? nuts 112,000 
TOTAL 11 Vessels 2766 tons 3781 Barrells oil 
uts - value 1,539,000 franc_. 
Source: Annexed in Beraud a'M. A. E., 3/2/1866, NA 
F12: 2060. 
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